UNIVERSITY  of  CALiFORWM 

AT 
LOS  ANGELES 


TT-»T-k  A  nyv 


INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 


INSTINCT 
AND    EXPERIENCE 


BY 

G.   LLOYD  MORGAN 

D.Sc,  LL.D.,  F.R.S, 

PROFESSOR    IN    THE    UNIVERSITY    OF    BRISTOL 


NEW    YORK 

THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1912 


JLibrary 


IN  the  summer  of  1910 a  symposium  on  the  subject  of 
Instinct  and  Intelh'gence  was  held  in  London  at  a 
joint  meeting  of  the  Aristotelian  and  British  Psycho- 
logical Societies  and  of  the  Mind  Association.     Con- 

V  siderable  interest  in  the  discussion  was  shown  both  in 

V  the  room  in  which  we  met  and  beyond  its  walls.     The 
^^  papers  then  taken  as  read,  and  subsequently  published 

in  the  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  disclose  not  a 
little  divergence  in  the  sense  in  which  the  terms  instinc- 
tive and  intelligent  are  used,  an  underlying  diver- 
l,  gence  in  the  principles  on  which  the  proffered 
'^  interpretations  are  based,  and  indications,  more  or  less 
clear,  of  yet  deeper-seated  differences  of  philosophical 
foundation. 

The  questions  at  issue  seem  to  open  out  live 
^  t  problems,  and  problems  of  wide  range.  Being  under 
'^  promise  to  write  a  short  work  on  some  aspect  of 
genetic  psychology  I  thought  I  might  do  some  service 
by  expanding  my  own  contribution  to  the  sym- 
posium, by  bringing  it  into  relation  with  the  views 
expressed  by  other  contributors,  by  following  up  the 
subject  in  further  detail,  and  especially  by  giving 
something  like  definite  form  to  the  doctrine  of  ex- 
perience, which  has,  of  late  years,  been  taking  shape 
in  my  mind,  under  influences  too  numerous  to  admit 
of  detailed  citation. 


vi  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

The  burden  of  my  contention  is  that  the  history  of 
the  universe,  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  read  it,  is  one 
continuous  story,  every  episode  in  which  is,  if  one  may 
so  phrase  it,  logically  correlated  with  other  relevant 
episodes.  I  use  the  word  logically  in  a  broad  sense 
as  equivalent  to  intelligibly,  with  no  finalistic  implica- 
tion. For  reasons  which  I  hope  to  render  clear  I 
avoid  the  terms  mechanical  or  mechanistic,  since  there 
is  much  in  the  world-story  which,  though  it  should  be 
interpreted  as  logically  or  intelligibly  determinate, 
involves  natural  relationships  with  which  neither 
mechanics  nor  mechanism,  as  such,  has  any  concern. 
The  world-story,  then,  is  intelligible  and,  in  that  sense, 
has  a  logic  which  we  may  endeavour  to  understand. 
But  the  story  is  only  given  up  to  date ;  we  can  only 
found  our  interpretation  on  the  part  that  has  so  far 
been  told  ;  of  its  further  and  future  development  we 
can  only  make  forecasts  in  so  far  as  we  can,  in  some 
measure,  sympathetically  identify  our  own  finite  and 
imperfect  logic  of  interpretation  with  the  fuller  and 
more  perfect  logic  of  the  story  we  attempt  to  read,  a 
world-story  within  which  our  own  life  and  thought  is 
itself  a  correlated  episode  forming  part  of  the  story 
as  a  whole.  Often  our  powers  of  prevision  are  balked. 
It  is  true  that  where  we  are  dealing  with  repetitive 
routine,  little  more  is  required  than  a  skilled  applica- 
tion of  our  powers  of  calculation.  But  in  the  evolution 
which  supersedes  routine  we  have  again  and  again  to 
confess  that  we  cannot  foretell  how  the  world-story 
will  work  out  in  the  future.  This  however,  I  contend, 
is  not  because  the  inherent  development  of  the  story 
will  be  lacking  in  logical  coherence  ;  it  is  because  our 
imperfect    insight    and    reason    fail    to   grasp    the 


PREFACE  vii 

determining  factors  within  the  deeper  logic  of  the 
universe.  This  deeper  logic  is  what  I  have  elected 
to  term  the  ground  of  the  world,  both  as  that  which 
is  experienced  or  experienceable,  and  as  the  process 
of  experiencing.  This  is  the  basis  of  the  uniformity 
of  nature,  if  by  this  we  mean,  not  merely  repetition 
da  capo  of  the  tune  of  the  past  in  recurrent  routine, 
but  that  progressive  and  unitary  development  of  a 
harmonious  theme,  which  is  true  evolution.  In 
claiming  for  the  universe  an  inner  relevance — a  unity 
of  concatenation  of  correlated  episodes — I  am  not,  how- 
ever, concerned  to  contend  that,  for  our  finite 
understanding,  there  is  nowhere  and  at  no  time 
discoverable  irrelevance.  World-processes  in  their 
detail  seem  often  to  have  a  way  of  running  into  blind 
alleys  which  are  off  the  line  of  evolutionary  progress  ; 
but  even  along  the  main  lines  of  progress  since,  so  far 
as  we  can  judge,  the  elimination  of  irrelevance  is  a 
condition  of  advance  in  human  logic,  it  may  well  be 
that  what  we  call  evolution  Is  of  the  same  type.  At 
any  rate  the  development  of  the  world,  and  of  life  on 
its  surface,  tends  consistently  to  increasing  relevance 
and  more  closely  knit  coherence  in  logical  texture. 
As  differentiation  and  integration  proceed  the  growing 
complexity  involves  a  type  of  structure  which  answers 
more  and  more  closely  to  what  in  our  thought  is 
characteristically  logical,  apparent  irrelevance  being 
caught  up  into  a  richer  relevance  within  a  progressive 
whole. 

Within  this  developing  whole  with  which  experi- 
ence deals  that  experience  has  itself  been  developed. 
This  involves  the  presence  of  those  special  relation- 
ships which  are  characterized  by  conscious  awareness. 


viii  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

How  shall  we  deal  with  them  ?  There  they  are  as 
a  matter  of  fact ;  that  no  one  can  deny.  They 
eventually  have  all  the  richness  and  complexity  which 
are  abundantly  illustrated  in  human  life ;  that  must 
be  realized  to  the  full.  But  how  are  they  to  be 
interpreted  ?  As  part  of  the  world-story,  the  highest 
outcome  of  its  logic  developed  ab  intra?  Or  as 
alien  insertions  ab  extras  derived  from  a  logic  of 
wholly  different  source  ?  I  advocate  the  acceptance 
of  the  former  alternative. 

But  what  does  this  imply  ?  It  implies  that  the 
fully  explicit  logic  of  human  reason  is  but  a  higher 
development  of  the  scarcely  explicit  logic  of  perceptual 
intelligence  ;  and  that  this  in  turn  has  its  roots  deeply 
embedded  in  the  implicit  logic  of  instinct  which,  as  I 
define  it,  is  organic  behaviour  suffused  with  awareness. 

Now  granted  that  we  have  here  genuine  evolution 
as  contrasted  with  the  routine  repetition  which  it 
supersedes,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  key-note  of  the 
successive  steps  of  progress  is  that  (if  I  may  pursue 
the  logical  analogy)  there  is  always  more  in  the 
conclusion  than  was  contained  in  the  premises.  That 
is  what  I  understand  by  the  progressive  synthesis 
which  is  characteristic  of  an  evolving  universe  which 
we  can  interpret  in  rational  fashion.  It  emphasizes, 
for  example,  the  fact  that  in  natural  selection  we  have 
not  only  the  elimination  of  failure  ;  we  have  also  the 
synthetic  production  of  success.  But  I  contend  that 
the  grounds  of  the  conclusion  are  always  within  the 
logical  system  of  nature,  and  are  not  imposed  on  that 
system  ab  extra.  That  is  where  I  part  company  with 
Dr.  Driesch's  Entelechy,  M.  Bergson's  Vital  Impetus, 
and  the  Psychic  Entity  of  Mr.  McDougall's  Animism. 


PREFACE  ix 

And  if  (carrying  things  yet  one  stage  further  back) 
conscious  experience  in  the  individual  organism,  as  a 
concrete  universal  containing  its  share  of  the  ground 
of  the  universe,  appears  to  involve  a  conclusion 
carrying  more  than  was  present  in  the  merely  organic 
premises  of  embryological  development — that,  I  urge, 
is  just  a  fact  of  world-synthesis  to  be  accepted — that, 
I  claim,  is  of  the  same  order  as  the  facts  which  are 
characteristic  of  evolution  throughout  its  entire  range. 
If  then  we  ask  why  this  fact  should  be  what  it  is  and 
as  it  is,  we  must  surely  generalize  the  question,  and 
ask  why  evolution  should  have  those  characteristics 
which,  by  patient  research,  we  find  that  it  does 
possess  ;  to  which  question,  as  I  understand  the  matter, 
we  can  give  no  answer  unless  we  resort  to  what  I 
have  termed  the  metaphysics  of  Source. 

Such  being  in  outline  my  personal  orientation 
towards  the  intra-mundane  philosophy  of  experience,  I 
have  attempted  to  lead  up  to  a  discussion  of  some  of 
the  problems  it  opens  out  through  a  consideration 
of  the  nature  of  instinctive  behaviour  and  its  accom- 
panying instinctive  experience. 

C.    LLOYD    MORGAN 

University  of  Bristol 
May,  191 2 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

INSTINCTIVE   BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE 

The  Biological  Approach — The  Problem  of  the  Source  of  the 
Natural  Order  excluded  from  Science — The  Moorhen's  Dive 
as  an  Example  of  Instinctive  Behaviour — Biological  Defini- 
tion of  Instinctive  Behaviour — Diving  differentiated  from 
Swimming  and  affords  Specific  Experience — Dependent  on 
Racial  Preparation  under  Biological  Evolution — Conscious- 
ness at  the  outset  a  mere  Spectator — Primary  and  Secondary 
Meaning — Physiological  Sketch  of  Reflexes  concerned  in 
Instinctive  Behaviour — Those  involving  only  lower  Brain- 
cenlres,  distinguished  from  those  involving  the  Cortex — 
Further  Interpretation  of  Moorhen's  Dive — The  Earlier 
Stage  of  Instinctive  Swimming — Are  the  Movements  really 
such  as  to  afford  Nr<.v  Data  to  Experience  ? — Dr.  Myers' 
Contention  that  a  completely  New  Movement  is  impossible — 
Its  Logical  Results — The  Beginning  of  Experience  when  the 
Moorhen  is  hatched— Previous  Experience  in  the  Eggshell 
may  be  regarded  as  practically  negligible — The  Primary 
Genesis  of  Experience  in  Instinctive  Performance — Difficult 
Philosophical  Questions  with  regard  to  the  Conscious 
Accompaniments — Broadened  Connotation  of  term  Instinc- 
tive—  Dr.  Driesch's  definition  of  Instinct  —  Dr.  Myers' 
Criticism  thereof  —  Instinctive  Performance  practically 
serviceable — Serviceable  to  what  Ends  ? — The  Guidance  of 
Experience  introduces  Conditions  other  than  those  of 
Instinctive  Performance  . 


xii  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

CHAPTER  II 

THE   RELATION   OF   INSTINCT   TO    EXPERIENCE 

FACE 

Instinctive  Behaviour  an  Organic  Heritage — The  Experience 
gained  a  Condition  of  Modified  Behaviour — Dr.  Myers' 
Identification  of  Instinct-intelligence  —  Its  Consideration 
postponed  —  Some  questions  of  Terminology  —  Cortical 
Influence  on  Lower  Brain-centres  correlated  with  Intelligent 
Modification  of  Behaviour — Dr.  Stout's  Criticism — When 
does  Learning  by  Experience  occur? — What  are  its  Character- 
istics?— Divergence  of  View — The  First  and  the  Second 
Occasion — The  Potential  Experiencer — Pre-perception  in 
Instinctive  Performance — Mr.  McDougall's  and  Dr.  Stout's 
Doctrine  of  Inherited  Pre-perception  —  Philosophical 
Implications  postponed  —  The  Nature  of  Pre-perceptual 
Meaning — Is  its  presence  necessary  for  the  Interpretation 
of  Instinctive  Behaviour — If  present,  due  to  Inherited 
Dispositions  within  the  Cortex — Excluded,  therefore,  from 
Instinctive  Behaviour  as  such — If  included.  Instinctive 
Behaviour  is  incipiently  voluntary,  as  in  Mr.  McDougall's 
and  Dr.  Archdall  Reid's  Definitions  of  Instinct — As  a  form 
of  Cortical  Spread  dim  Pre-perception  may  be  accepted  as 
nowise  contradictory  to  the  Thesis  of  this  Book — But,  as 
Dr.  Stout  admits,  it  is  relatively  indeterminate— Definiteness 
the  outcome  of  instinctive  Pre-adjustment — Dr.  Stout's 
contention  that  Intelligence  must  be  present  at  the  Outset 
of  Experience — Process  and  Product  of  Experience — Intelli- 
gence as  Process  is  what  Dr.  Stout  rightly  emphasizes — Some 
measure  of  agreement  notwithstanding  some  divergence- 
Instinctive  Endowment  and  Congenital  Capacity  for  learning 
— Cortical  Processes  as  correlated  with  Experience  condition 
the  Modifications  of  the  Sub-cortical  Processes  primarily 
concerned  in  Instinctive  Behaviour    .....       28 


CHAPTER   III 

REFLEX   ACTION   AND   INSTINCT 

Recapitulation  of  Position — The   Identification   of   Instinctive 
Behaviour  with  Complex  and  Compound  Reflex  Action — 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

Instinctive  Experience  correlated  with  cortical  changes 
conditioned  by  Instinctive  Procedure — Instinctive  Experience 
an  Abstract  Conception  referring  to  certain  Factors  of 
Experience  as  contradistinguished  from  the  Intelligent 
Factors — Prof.  Sherrington's  Researches  on  Reflex  Action — 
First  and  Second  Grades  of  Co-ordination — Chief  Points  of 
Emphasis — Scratch-reflex  of  the  Dog — The  Spinal  Animal 
— Summation  of  Allied  Stimuli — Antagonistic  Reflexes — 
The  Common  Final  Path — In  Competition  for  Use  of  Final 
Common  Path  one  Reflex  generally  prevails — Bearing  of  this 
on  Instinctive  Phenomena — Alternation  of  Reflexes — Spinal 
Irradiation  and  Induction— Further  Effective  Co-ordination — 
Influence  of  Fatigue — Scale  of  Potency — Nocuous  Stimuli 
generally  pre-potent — Constellations  of  Stimuli  give  purpo- 
sive results — The  Decerebrate  Animal — Activities  of  Decere- 
brate Frog  ;  of  the  Decerebrate  Pigeon  ;  of  the  Decerebrate 
Dog — Observations  of  Goltz  and  Prof.  Sherrington — Expres- 
sions of  Emotion — Does  the  Decerebrate  Animal  behave 
instinctively  ? — Assumed  Conditions  of  Experience  excluded 
with  Removal  of  Cortex — How  is  Cortical  Control  operative? 
Principles  of  Integration  probably  the  same  throughout 
Central  Nervous  System — Dr.  Paulow  on  Transference  of 
sufficient  Stimulus — Afferent  Inlets  and  Instinctive  Behaviour      54 


CHAPTER  IV 

HEREDITARY    DISPOSITIONS    AND    INNATE   MENTAL 
TENDENCIES 

The  Biological  Origin  of  Instinctive  Behaviour  and  its  Relation 
to  Consciousness — Is  Consciousness  as  old  as  or  later  than 
Organic  Life? — Our  Provisional  Hypothesis — The  Con- 
genital and  the  Acquired ;  their  Relations  to  Heredity — 
Should  Inherited  Mental  Capacity  in  definite  direction  be 
termed  Instinctive? — Rational  and  Intellectual  Instincts  of 
some  Authors  —  Higher  Innate  Tendencies  regarded  as 
Instinctive — Instinct  of  Mozart,  Pascal,  Bidder — Suggested 
Differentiation  of  Terms  Innate  and  Instinctive — Cortical 
and  Sub-cortical  Dispositions  —  Secondary  Meaning  and 
Inherited  Re-presentations — Pre-percepti  ve  Interest  and  Corti- 
cal Spread — Mr.  McDougall's  Doctrine  of  Instinct — General 


xiv  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 


and  Specific  (Instinctive)  Tendencies  —  Animistic  View 
involving  Teleological  Interpretation  —  Mr.  McDougall's 
"  Principal  Instincts  of  Man" — The  Relation  of  Instinct  to 
Emotion — Classes  of  Instinctive  Modes  of  Behaviour  and 
Experience — Predicates  of  Inherited  Constitution  as  Logical 
Subject — Instincts  as  Unitary  Principles — Disposition  and 
Constitution — Danger  of  regarding  Instincts  as  Faculties — 
Pugnacity  as  a  Concept,  and  as  a  Principle  or  Force — The 
Nature  of  Impulse — The  role  of  the  Innate  Mental  Tendencies 
— How  they  run  parallel  with  Instinctive  Tendencies 
— Mr.  McDougall's  Treatment  of  the  Complex  Emotions — 
Compounds  of  Elements  or  Predicates  of  a  Logical  Subject  ? 
Emotion  as  a  Mode  of  Experiencing  —  The  Unity  of 
experiencing,  and  the  Multiplicity  of  Items  experienced        .       87 

CHAPTER   V 

THE   GROUND   OF   EXPERIENCE 

The  Double  Reference  of  Experience — The  Experienced  and 
Experiencing — The  Subject  as  "owning"  Experience — 
Existence  of  Nature  as  experienceable  postulated — Instinctive 
Experience  simplest  and  naivest  form  of  Experience — Involves 
Conscious  Relationships,  and  thus  distinguished  from  Organic 
Process — The  "ed"  Reference  and  the  "ing"  Reference 
scarcely  differentiated — Conscious  Relationships  constitutive 
of  World-process  and  really  count — The  Limits  of  the 
Mental — Are  Concepts  mental  or  non-mental? — Policy  of 
Interpretation  outlined — Concept  of  Source  or  Agency  ex- 
cluded from  Science  —  Natural  Processes  correlated — The 
Conditions  of  Process — Are  there  Conditions  of  World- 
process  as  a  whole  ? — The  Concept  of  Ground — Constitu- 
tion of  Nature  as  Ultimate  Ground  for  Science — Example 
from  Crystallization  —  Process  and  Product  —  Pluralistic 
Products  and  Monistic  View  of  Process — One  World-story — 
Unity  of  Concatenation — Perceptual  Facts  and  Universal 
Concepts — Ideal  Constructions  as  Maps — True  so  far  as 
useful — Limits  of  Scientific  Prediction — The  Beginnings  of 
Crystallization — Could  Nature  and  Properties  of  Protoplasm 
be  foretold  ? — Mechanism  and  Vitalism  as  Descriptive  Terms 
— Vital  Force  and  Vital  Chemistry — The  Concept  of  En- 
telechy — Entelechy  as  Ground  and  as  Source — Is  there  one 


CONTENTS  XV 


PAGE 


Science  of  Nature? — Organisms  as  Historical  Beings — 
Constitution  of  Nature  the  Ground  of  their  History — If  New 
Departures  frequent  in  Inorganic  World,  why  not,  on  the 
same  terms,  in  the  Organic  ? 126 


CHAPTER  VI 

NATURAL    HISTORY    AND   EXPERIENCE 

Is  there  a  Natural  History  of  Experience  ? — Self-consciousness  as 
terminus  ad  quern  and  as  terminus  a  quo — The  Relation 
of  History  to  Science — General  Rules  only  emerge  when 
History  repeats  itself — The  Ground  of  the  Expectations 
involved — Routine  as  the  Basis  of  Science — Within  what 
Limits  does  History  repeat  itself? — In  what  Sense  is  Evolu- 
tion the  Appearance  of  the  New  ? — The  New  as  only  a 
Re-grouping  of  the  Old — The  Characteristics  of  Routine — 
Organic  Routine  and  Organic  Evolution — Routine  and  Not- 
Routine  in  Experience — The  Concept  of  the  Individual — 
Does  Heredity  "provide"  for  both  Routine  and  Evolution? 
— M.  Bergson's  Doctrine  of  Heredity  and  the  Vital  Impetus 
—  A  Contribution  to  Metaphysics  rather  than  to  Science — 
M,  Bergson  and  Darwin — M.  Bergson's  Stress  on  the 
Continuity  of  Process — His  Doctrine  of  Intellectual  Snap- 
shots— All  Process  of  the  Vital  and  Conscious  Order — Steps 
of  the  Argument — The  Antithetical  Views  of  Philosophical 
Materialists — The  Search  for  Reality — Relationship  and  its 
Terms — The  Conscious  Relationship  really  counts — Relation- 
ships in  Transverse  Section — The  Snap-shot  "now"  of 
Experience — A  Specialized  and  Selective  Relationship — 
Analogies  throughout  the  Natural  Order  —  Instinctive 
Experience  as  a  Sequence  of  "  nows "  ;  conditioned  by 
Primary  Meaning  —  Secondary  Meaning  involves  Factors 
of  Revival  —  The  Importance  of  Context  —  Longitudinal 
Relationships — Pre-perception  and  Memory — The  Relation- 
ships extended  in  Ideal  Construction — Map  of  Space  and 
Time — M.  Bergson's  Doctrine  of  Time  and  Memory — The 
Distinction  between  the  "eds"  and  the  "  ing"  of  Experience, 
as  the  Basis  of  much  of  M.  Bergson's  Philosophy — Can  we 
make  the  "  ing  "  an  "  ed  "  ? 163 


xvi  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   INSTINCT 

PAGE 

Sydney  Smith  on  the  Contrast  between  Instinct  and  Reason — 
M,  Bergson's  Doctrine  of  Instinct  and  Intelligence  as 
Different  Forms  of  Knowledge — The  Relation  of  Instinct 
to  Consciousness — Consciousness  as  Annulled — Relation  to 
old  Physiological  Views  on  Automatism — The  Insinuation 
of  Life  as  Pure  Memory — The  Brain  as  a  Switchboard,  not 
in  any  sense  a  Storehouse  of  Memories — Pure  Memory  as 
Spirit  directs  the  Physiological  Impulses  in  the  Nervous 
System  by  the  insertion  of  Choice — What  we  enjoy  as 
Consciousness  is  the  Glow  of  Unconscious  Spirit  traversing 
Unconscious  Brain-matter — Instinct  and  Organization — Their 
Relation  to  Pure  Memory — M.  Bergson's  View  of  the 
Relation  of  Instinct  to  Intelligence— Divergent  Paths  in 
Arthropods  and  Vertebrates  as  Choice  of  Vital  Impetus — 
Must  attempt  to  deal  with  M.  Bergson's  Views  sympathetic- 
ally— Is  the  Absence  of  Learning  a  Criterion  of  Instinct  ? — 
Both  Instinct  and  Intelligence  involve  Innate  Knowledge; 
the  one  of  Things  and  Matter,  the  other  of  Relation  and 
Form — Seeking  and  finding  through  Instinct  and  Intelligence 
— The  Nature  of  Instinctive  Knowledge  in  the  Insect — 
Instinct  as  Sympathy,  but  the  Interpretation  not  Scientific — 
M.  Bergson's  Aim  avowedly  Philosophical — His  Appeal  to 
Experience  as  experiencm^ — Instinct,  Intuition,  and  Sym- 
pathy— Intuition,  Invention,  and  Application — The  Kernel 
of  M.  Bergson's  Doctrine  of  Instinct  —  Relation  of  the 
Doctrine  to  that  here  advocated  —  In  all  Experience  the 
"ing"  and  the  "eds"  correlative;  but  with  Variations  of 
Emphasis  —  The  Detachment  of  Intellectual  Interpretation 

—  M.  Bergson's  Method  of  Hypostatising  the  Results 
of  Analysis  —  The  Home  of  Motion  and  Duration  — 
How  do  we  get  at  Movement  and  Process  outside  us — 
The  r61e  of  Sympathy  and  of  Empathy  —  M.  Bergson's 
Stress  on  the  Inward  Direction  of  Instinct  and  Sym- 
pathy towards   Process — Dr.  Myers  reverses  the  Direction 

—  His  Views  on  the  Relation  of  Instinct  and  Intelli- 
gence    .,...•.•..     204 


CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTER  VIII 

FINALISM    AND   MECHANISM  :     BODY   AND  MIND 

PAGE 

Finalism  and  Correlated  Routine — Organic  Tunes  played  da  capo 
— Entelechy  and  Variations  or  Mutations  —  Finalism  in 
Human  Life  as  Purposeful — Similar  Ends  reached  through 
Different  Means — Stability  of  Constitution — The  Sense  in 
which  the  Present  is  conditioned  by  the  Future — Universal 
Finalism — Mechanism  the  Antithesis  to  Finalism — Technical 
Details  of  a  Mechanical  Ideal  Construction  —  Mechanistic 
Interpretation  in  Terms  of  Physics  and  Chemistry— Organic 
Phenomena  need  a  further  Formula — Psychological  Relation- 
ships correlated  but  not  identical  with  Physiological — Need 
we  introduce  Source  ? — Ambiguities  to  be  avoided — Mechan- 
istic Philosophy  and  Universal  Correlation  —  Conscious 
Relationships  as  Pre-perceptive  really  count — One  Natural 
Order  or  two  ? — Is  Inter-action  inconceivable  ? — Where  lies 
the  Mystery  ? — The  Doctrine  of  Parallelism — \Vhat  is  to  be 
expected  from  the  Appeal  to  Physiology  ? — The  Contention 
that  Different  Psychical  States  may  be  correlated  with  the 
same  Cerebral  States — Parallelism  in  Terms  of  the  "ing" 
and  the  "eds"  of  experience — Not  two  Processes,  but  one, 
in  merging  Unity  with  Different  Relationships — Dr.  Driesch's 
"  Intra-psychical  Series  " — Has  nothing  to  do  with  the  Brain 
— Mr.  McDougall's  Argument  from  "  Meaning "  —  No 
Unitary  Neural  Process  correlated  with  Meaning — His  Thesis 
in  Terms  of  "ing"  and  "eds" — His  Psychic  Entity  an 
Hypostatized  Abstraction — Our  Interpretation  of  the  Facts 
of  Meaning — Organic  Total  Reaction — Retinal  Rivalry — 
Divergent  Interpretations  of  Biological  Facts — Return  to 
Finalism  and  Mechanism — The  Doctrine  of  Panpsychism — 
Is  all  Process  Conscious  or  Quasi-conscious? — The  Emphasis 
on  Pre-perception — In  any  case  Nature  the  Product  of 
Unitary  Process      .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .241 

Index 293 


INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 


CHAPTER   I 

INSTINCTIVE    BEHAVIOUR    AND 
EXPERIENCE 

I  PROPOSE  to  approach  the  problems  of  experi- 
ence through  the  avenue  of  biology.  My  aim 
is  to  treat  the  phenomena  of  conscious  existence  as 
a  naturalist  treats  the  phenomena  of  organic  life.  I 
shall  therefore  begin  with  instinctive  behaviour  and 
shall  endeavour  to  give  some  account  of  the  nature 
of  the  instinctive  experience  which,  as  I  believe, 
accompanies  it.  In  this  way  we  shall  get  some  idea 
of  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  beginnings  of  experience 
in  the  individual  organism. 

A  consideration  of  the  criticisms  to  which  such  a 
method  of  treatment,  and  its  results,  have  been 
subjected  will  lead  to  some  qualification  of  the 
hypothesis  at  first  barely  outlined,  and  will  open  up 
further  problems  with  regard  to  the  nature  and 
development  of  experience.  We  shall  find  as  we 
proceed  that  the  term  instinctive  is  used  by  different 
writers  with  rather  wide  divergence  of  meaning.  It 
will  become  evident  that  men  of  weight,  like 
Dr.    Titchener    and    Dr.    Thorndike    in    America, 

B  I 


2  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

M.  Bergson  in  France,  Dr.  Driesch  and  Father 
Wasmann  in  Germany,  Dr.  Stout,  Mr.  McDougall, 
and  Dr.  C.  S.  Myers  in  England,  employ  the  term 
with  differing  connotation  and  denotation.  Minor 
differences  are  found  among  writers  whose  approach 
like  my  own  is  from  the  side  of  biology.  Under 
these  circumstances  some  attempt  to  correlate 
divergent  opinions  should  be  helpful  to  further 
progress.  Such  an  attempt  might  be  made  by  one 
who,  having  no  particular  view  of  his  own  to  support, 
could  undertake  the  task  with  wholly  unprejudiced 
judgment.  That  in  my  case  is  impossible.  I  have 
already  reached  conclusions  of  my  own.  If,  however, 
I  can  succeed  in  giving  a  fair  and  just  account  of  the 
teaching  of  those  from  whom  I  differ,  and  can  make 
clear  the  grounds  of  my  dissent,  the  fact  that  I  write 
as  an  advocate,  rather  than  one  who  is  fitted  to  be 
judge  and  arbiter,  may  perhaps  conduce  to  that 
vitality  of  treatment  which  is  one  of  the  advantages 
of  a  conflict  of  views. 

But  as  we  follow  up  the  relation  of  instinct  to 
other  modes  and  phases  of  the  life  of  experience  we 
shall  find  that  wider  and  wider  issues  are  brought 
into  the  field  of  our  consideration.  It  is  part  of  my 
aim  to  deal  with  these  in  the  spirit  of  one  who  has 
not  only  an  interpretation  of  instinct  to  formulate,  but 
also  a  more  comprehensive  scientific  doctrine  to 
advocate — a  doctrine  of  the  relation  of  experience  to 
the  world  as  experienceable.  For  the  further  we  go 
the  more  clearly  shall  we  see  that  a  thinker's  con- 
clusions with  regard  to  the  nature  of  instinct  are 
intimately  connected  with  his  philosophical  attitude 
towards  large  and  far-reaching   world-problems.      I 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE  3 

propose  to  discuss  these  problems  from  the  point  of 
view  of  one  who  comes  to  them  from  the  scientific 
side,  so  far  as  the  space  at  my  command  permits,  and 
so  far  as  such  discussion  is  calculated  to  throw  light 
on  the  nature  and  development  of  experience. 

Under  the  stimulating  influence  of  M.  Bergson 
the  more  philosophical  aspect  of  life-problems  has 
recently  come  into  special  prominence.  Through  his 
powerful  advocacy,  through  the  teaching  of  Dr. 
Driesch,  and  more  recently  through  the  skilfully 
marshalled  arguments  of  Mr.  McDougall — to  mention 
no  other  names — the  pendulum  of  opinion  has 
acquired  new  impetus  in  the  vitalistic  direction  of  its 
swing.  My  own  position  will,  I  trust,  be  made  suffi- 
ciently clear  in  the  sequel.  I  shall  urge  that  there  is  a 
tendency  to  introduce  into  a  scientific  discussion  of 
such  problems  concepts  which  I  regard  as  non- 
scientific. 

The  aim  of  science,  I  conceive,  is  to  develop  a 
generalized  interpretation  of  natural  processes  in  all 
their  relationships,  including  the  conscious  relation- 
ships which  go  to  the  synthetic  formation  of 
experience.  Science  does  not,  however,  attempt  to 
give  any  answer — not  even  the  hint  of  an  answer — to 
the  further  question : — What  is  the  Source  of  the 
natural  processes  so  interpreted  ?  That  I  conceive 
to  be  a  metaphysical  question.  It  opens  up  issues 
which  are  intimately  connected  with  Theology  and 
with  Religion.  With  such  metaphysical  problems  I 
do  not  attempt  to  deal  in  this  book.  Without  for 
one  moment  denying  their  vital  human  interest  and  / 
their  supreme  importance,  I  wish  at  the  outset  to 
exclude  them  altogether  from  any  place  in  a  scientific 


4  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

interpretation  of  natural  processes.  My  only  concern 
with  them  will  be  an  emphatic,  and  perhaps  often 
repeated,  denial  of  their  right  of  entry  into  a  scientific 
universe  of  discourse,  as  I  define  the  term  scientific. 
It  may,  of  course,  be  said  that,  by  doing  this,  one 
leaves  the  scheme  of  science  quite  unexplained.  Not 
only  the  mode  of  origin  of  the  world  in  which  we 
live,  but  its  final  end  and  purpose  are  thus  wholly  dis- 
regarded. Exactly  so!  These  are  just  the  questions 
which  should  be  left  over  for  metaphysical  treatment. 
Physics,  chemistry,  astronomy,  geology,  mineralogy — • 
all  the  sciences  which  deal  with  the  inorganic  world — 
have  long  ago  recognized  this.  Some  day  biology  and 
psychology  will  do  so  with  equal  candour  and  to  their 
lasting  profit. 

Some  years  ago  *  I  had  under  observation  two 
young  moorhens  or  waterhens  which  I  had  hatched  in 
an  incubator  and  watched  from  day  to  day,  almost 
from  hour  to  hour,  with  some  care.  One  of  these, 
about  nine  weeks  old,  was  swimming  in  a  pool  at  the 
bend  of  a  stream  in  Yorkshire.  A  vigorous  rough- 
haired  puppy,  highly  charged  with  canine  vitality,  ran 
down  from  the  neighbouring  farm,  barking  and 
gambolling  ;  and  from  the  bank  he  made  an  awkward 
feint  towards  the  young  bird.  In  a  moment  the 
moorhen  dived,  disappeared  from  view,  and  soon 
partially  reappeared,  his  head  just  peeping  above  the 
water  beneath  the  overhanging  bank.  Now  this  was 
the  first  time  the  bird  had  dived.      I  had  repeatedly 

>  Cf."  Habit  and  Instinct,"  p.  64,  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology," 
vol.  iii.,  pp.  II  and  221.  Some  passages  which  have  appeared  in  papers 
contributed  to  this  Journal  are  here  utilized. 


BEHAVIOUR  AND  EXPERIENCE  5 

endeavoured  to  elicit  this  characteristic  piece  of 
behaviour,  but  had  failed.  My  friend  Mr.  F.  A. 
Knight  tells  me  that  he  has  seen  a  moor-chick,  not 
more  than  a  day  old,  dive  under  a  log  of  wood  when 
suddenly  disturbed.  I  have  seen  them  dive  nearly  as 
early  in  life.  Under  unnatural  conditions,  however, 
in  a  large  bath,  and  under  natural  conditions  in  the 
Yorkshire  stream,  do  what  I  would  in  my  efforts  to 
coax  or  to  frighten  the  young  bird,  I  had  never  been 
able  to  make  him  dive.  But  now  at  last  that 
blundering  puppy  succeeded,  where  I  had  so  often 
failed.  And  when  this  characteristic  piece  of 
behaviour  came  upon  my  little  friend — came  upon 
him  suddenly  and  without  warning — his  dive  was 
absolutely  true  to  type. 

I  have  elsewhere  ^  advocated  the  acceptance  of  a 
definition  of  instinctive  behaviour  as  that  which  is,  on 
its  first  occurrence,  independent  of  prior  experience  ; 
which  tends  to  the  well-being  of  the  individual  and 
the  preservation  of  the  race  ;  which  is  similarly  per- 
formed by  all  the  members  of  the  same  more  or  less 
restricted  group  of  animals ;  and  which  may  be 
subject  to  subsequent  modification  under  the  guid- 
ance of  experience.  Such  behaviour  is,  I  conceive,  a 
more  or  less  complex  organic  or  biological  response  to 
a  more  or  less  complex  group  of  stimuli  of  external 
and  internal  origin,  and  it  is,  as  such,  wholly 
dependent  on  how  the  organism,  and  especially  the 
nervous  system  and  brain-centres  have  been  built 
through  heredity,  under  that  mode  of  racial  pre- 
paration which  we  call  biological  evolution. 

How   far   does   the   behaviour    of  the   moorhen* 

'   "Animal  Behaviour,"  p.  71.  ^ 


6  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

when  it  dives  for  the  first  time  in  its  life,  conform 
to  this  definition  ?  I  conceive  that  it  conforms  all 
along  the  line  so  long  as,  but  only  so  long  as,  we 
restrict  our  attention  to  its  specific  nature  as  dive. 
Qua  dive,  it  is  independent  of  prior  diving  experience, 
for  there  has  been  no  such  experience.  Of  course  it 
may  be  said  that  diving  involves  swimming  and  that 
of  swimming  the  moorhen  has  had  abundant 
experience  during  two  months  of  active  life.  That 
is  surely  true  enough.  But  to  dive  is  not  only  to 
swim,  but  to  swim  with  a  difference.  It  is  adapted 
to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  complete  immersion. 
I  do  not  think  that  any  careful  observer  will  deny 
that  diving  is  a  differentiated  form  of  swimming  and 
that  it  has  specific  characters  which  make  it  some- 
thing other  than  merely  swimming  under  water. 
The  whole  poise  and  set  of  the  body,  the  position 
of  the  head  and  outstretched  neck,  the  impelling 
strokes  of  the  legs,  are  specially  adapted  to  a 
relatively  new  mode  of  progression.  There  must  be 
a  correlated  modification  of  the  processes  of  respira- 
tion. The  question  is  whether  these  and  other 
specific  differentiations  of  behaviour  are  instinctive 
in  the  sense  that  they  are  as  such  independent  of 
prior  experience.  That  they  are  wholly  independent 
of  all  previous  experience  I  do  not  assert.  If  that 
were  the  case  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  they 
could  possibly  be  incorporated  with,  and  synthetically 
assimilated  to,  the  experience  already  gained.  But 
that  they  provide  new  factors  to  be  so  incorporated 
and  assimilated  seems  to  me  to  be  a  conclusion 
forced  upon  us  by  the  facts  of  the  case.  The 
particular   and  specific  form  of  behaviour  exhibited 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE  7 

by  the  moorhen  on  the  occasion  of  its  first  dive  is,  I 
believe,  dependent  as  such  on  how  the  nervous 
system  has  been  built  up  under  that  mode  of  racial 
preparation  which  we  call  biological  evolution.  If 
in  further  criticism  of  the  view  I  wish  to  make  clear, 
it  be  urged  that  though  perhaps  the  specific  form  of 
the  scare-begotten  dive-situation  is  due  to  the 
hereditary  make-up  of  the  nerve-centres,  it  is  also 
partly  dependent  (e.g.  in  its  relation  to  swimming) 
on  how  the  nerve-centres  have  been  moulded  and 
modified  under  previous  experience — that  is  to  say 
in  psychological  terms,  partly  dependent  on 
intelligent  guidance — I  venture  to  remind  my  critic 
that  we  are  endeavouring  to  disentangle  the  factors 
of  behaviour ;  that  all  I  urge  is  that  an  instinctive 
factor,  new  to  experience,  is  introduced.  I  am  ready 
to  admit,  nay  more  I  am  prepared  to  contend,  that, 
just  in  so  far  as  the  behaviour  is  dependent  on  previous 
experience,  we  have  also  the  presence  of  the  intelligent 
factor.  In  a  moorhen  two  months  old  instinct  and 
intelligence  co-operate.  None  the  less  the  instinctive 
and  intelligent  factors  are  distinguishable  in  analysis. 
What  are  we  to  understand  by  intelligent 
guidance  ?  At  a  later  stage  of  our  enquiry  I  shall 
endeavour  to  defend  the  hypotheses  that  intelligent 
guidance  is  the  function  of  the  cerebral  cortex  with 
its  distinguishing  property  of  consciousness  ;  that  the 
co-ordination  involved  in  instinctive  behaviour,  and 
in  the  distribution  of  physiological  impulses  to  the 
viscera  and  vascular  system,  is  the  primary  function 
of  the  lower  brain-centres ;  that,  in  instinctive 
behaviour  as  such,  consciousness  correlated  with 
processes  in  the  cerebral  cortex,  is  so  to  speak,  a 


8  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

mere  spectator  of  organic  and  biological  occurrences 
at  present  beyond  its  control ;  but  that,  as  spectator, 
it  receives  information  of  these  occurrences  through 
the  nerve-channels  of  connexion  between  the  lower 
and  the  higher  parts  of  the  brain.  This,  however,  is 
only  an  outline  sketch  of  a  programme  for  further 
discussion.  At  present  we  are  only  concerned  with 
this  question  :  What  gives  to  experience  its  guiding 
value  ?  Dr.  Stout  has  enabled  us  to  give  the  answer 
in  one  word.  Experience  has  guiding  value  in  virtue 
of  the  meaning  it  embodies.  Why  does  the  burnt 
child  shun  fire?  Because  the  sight  of  fire  has 
meaning.  Why  does  the  chick  that  has  but  once  or 
twice  taken  a  ladybird  into  its  bill  no  longer  peck  at 
these  insects  notwithstanding  its  instinctive  tendency 
to  peck  at  any  small  object  within  reach  ?  Because 
the  appearance  of  the  ladybird  carries  meaning. 
Why  does  your  dog  beg  when  you  say  **  biscuit "  ? 
Because  the  sound  has  meaning.  One  is  obliged,  in 
order  to  avoid  pedantry,  to  say  that  the  sight  or 
sound  or  other  presentation  to  sense  carries  or 
conveys  or  has  meaning.  It  would  be  more  correct 
to  say  that  the  total  experience  in  any  one  of  these 
situations  is  meaningful.  Any  given  experience  in 
any  given  moment  is  a  synthetic  product  or,  from  a 
different  point  of  view,  a  phase  in  a  continuous 
synthetic  process.  It  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind 
that,  no  matter  how  far  and  in  what  detail  we  may 
analyse  such  a  synthetic  phase  of  naively  developing 
experience  into  its  constituents,  within  the  experience 
as  given  and  felt,  or  as  Professor  Alexander  would 
say  enjoyed,  these  constituents  merge  their  individu- 
ality to  form  an  indissoluble  whole. 


BEHAVIOUR  AND   EXPERIENCE  9 

We  may  here  distinguish  between  primary  and 
secondary  meaning.^  Suppose  there  be  a  bit  of 
developing  experience  occurring  as  such  for  the  first 
time — our  moorhen's  dive  for  example — which  gives 
a  sequence  a,  b,  c,  d.  Since  the  consciousness  of  the 
first  part  of  the  sequence  has  not  faded  away  when 
the  latter  part  comes,  the  experience  at  the  phase  d 
is  not  one  of  d  only  but  of  d  as  qualified  by  the  net 
results  of  the  precedent  a,  by  c.  This  qualification  of 
d  by  what  has  gone  before  is  the  primary  meaning 
which  d  "  carries  "  ;  it  is  that  which  makes  d  mean- 
ingful through  primary  retention.  There  is  here  no 
revival  of  what  has  faded  out  of  consciousness  and 
has  to  be  reinstated.  Thus  primary  experience — 
that  of  the  dive  to  wit — swells  with  meaning  as  it 
grows,  as  it  develops,  as  it  proceeds  on  its  course. 
But  now  suppose  the  completed  series  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  /, 
has  been  previously  experienced ;  then  on  a 
subsequent  occasion  when  d  is  reached  it  is  not  only 
qualified  by  the  precedent  a,  b,  c,  of  this  occasion, 
but  also  by  a  revival  or  pre-perception  of  the  e,  /, 
which  formed  part  of  the  series  on  a  previous 
occasion.  This  pre-perception,  this  expectation  be- 
gotten of  previous  experience,  is  the  secondary 
meaning  which  d  then  carries.  Behaviour  in  part 
determined  by  secondary  meaning  I  term  intelligent. 
If  the  situation  within  which  the  sound  "biscuit," 
in  its  appropriate  setting,  occurs  had  not  developed 
on  former  occasions  in  a  certain  routine,  your  dog 
would  have  no  expectation  or  pre-perception  of  what 
would  follow  on  this  occasion — the  sound  would 
carry  no  secondary  meaning.  We  must  remember 
>  Cf.  G.  F.  Stout,  "  Manual  of  Psychology,"  Bk.  I.  Ch.  ii.  §§,  7  and  9. 


10  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

that  in  the  early  stages  of  the  genesis  of  experience, 
what  is  expected  is  in  large  measure  the  revived 
experience  of  behaving  in  certain  ways  within  the 
previous  routine.  It  must  be  remembered  too  that 
meaning — (I  shall  use  this  term  in  reference  to 
secondary  meaning) — is  limited  to  the  qualifying 
revival  of  part  of  the  previous  routine — re-presented 
in  experience  but  not  again  presented  to  experience 
through  the  channels  of  sense  as  the  situation  actually 
develops. 

Bearing  this  in  mind  let  us  return  to  our  puppy 
and  moorhen.  I  will  first  describe  in  physiological 
terms  what  I  conceive  to  take  place ;  and  I  shall, 
for  the  moment,  disregard  the  fact  that  the  bird 
has  a  cerebral  cortex.  He  fs  therefore,  I  assume, 
an  unconscious  automaton  of  the  purely  reflex 
order,  until  we  take  his  higher  brain-centres  into 
consideration.  Groups  of  effective  stimuli  fall  upon 
the  receptor  end-organs  of  eye  and  ear.  These 
initiate  physiological  impulses  which  are  transmitted 
by  the  optic  and  auditory  nerves,  and  throw  the 
lower  brain-centres  into  functional  activity.  From 
these  centres  two  sets  of  impulses  proceed  outwards 
along  efferent  nerves.  The  first  set  calls  into  play 
the  muscles  concerned  in  diving.  The  second  set 
is  distributed  to  the  viscera^the  vascular  system, 
alimentary  system,  respiratory  system.  When  I 
took  it  out  of  the  water  the  bird  was  panting  with 
open  beak,  its  heart-beat  was  strong  and  quick. 
Although  I  did  not  observe  defecation  in  this  case, 
I  have  frequently  observed  its  occurrence  in  similar 
cases.  It  is  often  noticeable  when  young  birds  are 
first  put  into  water.    Now  from  the  organs  concerned 


BEHAVIOUR   AND  EXPERIENCE         II 

in  swimming  and  diving  and  from  the  heart,  lungs, 
and  other  viscera,  afferent  impulses  proceed  inwards 
to  the  lower  brain-centres  and  either  initiate  new 
processes  therein  or  modify  those  which  are  already 
taking  place. 

Thus  there  are  three  sets  of  afferent  or  in-going 
impulses.  The  first  set  of  afferent  impulses  (a)  is 
due  to  some  specific  mode  of  sensory  contact  with 
the  environment.  This  through  its  action  on  the 
lower  brain-centres  gives  rise  to  the  two  sets  of 
afferent  impulses  (i)  ^to  the  organs  of  behaviour,  (2) 
to  the  visceral  organs.  And  then  from  these  organs 
come  the  other  two  sets  of  afferent  impulses  {&)  from 
limbs  concerned  in  behaviour  and  (c)  from  heart,  lungs, 
etc.  Is  this  scheme  already  somewhat  complex  ? 
It  is  reduced  to  a  simplicity  which  is  probably 
absurdly  inadequate  to  the  facts.  If  we  regard 
the  dive  as  a  whole  we  have  to  remember  that 
the  stimuli  to  eye  and  ear  merely  start  the  train 
of  events  which  breaks  in  upon  a  foregoing  train 
of  events.  Directly  the  bird  is  under  water  there 
are  new  stimuli  due  to  complete  immersion.  It  is 
probable  that  the  mere  fact  of  total  immersion  is 
the  condition  (or  a  condition)  of  the  differentiated 
mode  of  swimming  under  water.  There  is  a  new 
influence  of  the  environment  as  the  moorhen 
approaches  the  bank.  Is  it  going  too  far  to  say 
that,  throughout  the  continuous  dive,  the  total 
stimulation  of  the  lower  brain-centres  is  constantly 
varying?  Is  it  unreasonable  to  suggest  that  each 
phase  of  the  dive  is  definitely  correlated  with  the 
progressively  varying  group  of  processes  in  the  lower 
brain  -centres  ? 


12  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

Now  whether  a  decerebrate  bird — one  whose 
cerebral  hemispheres  had  been  removed  or  thrown 
out  of  action — would  dive  as  did  my  moorhen  in 
the  Yorkshire  stream,  I  cannot  say.  We  have  some 
data  for  the  discussion  of  such  a  question  ;  and  these 
will  be  considered  in  the  sequel.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  however,  in  my  moorhen,  the  higher  brain- 
centres  and  cortex  were  intact.  And  I  think  it  in 
the  highest  degree  unlikely  that  the  processes 
occurring  in  its  cerebral  hemispheres  were  without 
influence  on  its  behaviour.  This  indeed  is  but  to 
repeat  in  other  words  what  I  have  said  above — that 
in  such  behaviour  instinct  and  intelligence  co-operate  ; 
for  the  cortex  is  the  organ  of  intelligence  ;  meaning 
is  correlated  with  cortical  process.  Let  us  then 
restore  to  their  proper  place  the  cerebral  cortex,  the 
presence  of  which  we  have  so  far  disregarded.  The 
cortex  is  connected  with  the  lower  nerve-centres. 
From  them,  or  through  them,  it  can  receive  physio- 
logical impulses  ;  to  them  it  can  transmit  other 
controlling  impulses.  When  groups  of  visual  and 
auditory  stimuli  excite  the  receptor  end-organs  of 
eye  and  ear,  not  only  are  the  lower  brain-centres 
thrown  into  activity  but,  through  them,  certain 
regions  of  the  cortex  are  excited.  In  and  through 
this  excitement  the  moorhen  sees  and  hears  the 
puppy.  When  afTerent  impulses  reach  the  brain 
from  the  organs  concerned  in  behaviour,  not  only 
is  the  activity  of  the  lower  brain-centres  qualified 
by  their  effects,  but  through  them  the  cerebral 
cortex  is  further  excited.  In  and  through  this 
excitement  the  moorhen  feels  its  own  behaviour ; 
has  the  experience  of  swimming  and  diving.     When 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE         13 

afferent  impulses  reach  the  brain  from  the  heart, 
lungs,  and  other  viscera,  from  many  parts  of  the 
organism,  not  only  is  the  activity  of  the  lower  brain- 
centres  further  qualified  by  their  added  effects,  but 
through  them  also  the  cerebral  cortex  is  further 
excited.  In  and  through  this  excitement,  the  moor- 
hen (according  to  the  James-Lange  theory  of 
emotion)  feels  scared.  At  any  rate  they  help  to 
contribute  to  the  total  complex  experience  which 
has  emotional  colour.  Now  all  these  three  sets  of 
data  unite  and  combine  to  form  that  part  of  the 
synthetic  product  of  the  bird's  continuous 'experience 
which  is  due  to  the  performance  of  the  instinctive 
act.  But  the  situation  is  meaningful ;  and  the 
incorporated  (secondary)  meaning  is  the  outcome 
of  previous  experience  which  has  left  traces  in  the 
cortex  and  mind  of  the  moorhen.  It  is  in  the 
highest  degree  improbable  that  even  on  the  initial 
occasion  when  the  bird  dives  for  the  first  time, 
cortical  and  conscious  processes  exercise  no  control- 
ling influence  on  the  behaviour  of  the  moorhen.  And 
just  in  so  far  as  they  do  exercise  such  influence,  the 
behaviour  is  under  intelligent  guidance. 

If  then  I  interpret  the  matter  correctly  in  outline, 
there  was,  correlated  with  the  cortical  processes  of 
the  moorhen  as  he  swam  in  the  pool,  a  certain 
amount  of  experience  actually  present,  and  a  certain 
amount  of  individual  preparation  of  the  cortex  such 
as  to  afibrd  the  neural  conditions  of  revived  experi- 
ence. So  much  to  begin  with.  Here  we  have  the 
moorhen  as  actual  or  potential  experiences  Then 
comes  a  new  situation  which  the  experiencer  can 
assimilate.     In  this  case,  in  so  far  as  a  new  instinctive 


14  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

response  is  called  forth,  the  conditions  are  largely 
supplied  by  the  racial  preparation  of  the  lower  brain- 
centres  as  the  outcome  of  evolutionary  process.  The 
new  factors  comprise  (i)  a  specific  presentation 
differing  from  previous  presentations  in  what  one 
may  term  initiating  value,  (2)  a  specific  response, 
differing  in  certain  ways  from  all  previous  responses 
and  therefore  affording  new  data  to  behaviour- 
experience,  and  (3)  a  hitherto  unfelt  quality  of 
emotional  tone.  I  do  not  think  that  the  young 
bird  had  ever  been  really  scared  before.  But 
though  we  may  analyse  the  newly  experienced 
situation  in  some  such  way  as  this,  the  bird  pre- 
sumably gets  the  whole  as  a  coalescent  synthetic 
net  result  with  a  bearing  on  behaviour  and  some, 
perhaps  much,  reinstatement  of  the  meaning  which 
has  qualified  previous  situations.  He  just  lives 
through  one  palpitating  situation,  assimilates  its 
teachings,  and  emerges  from  the  ordeal  a  new  bird. 
As  experiencer  he  is  never  again  what  he  was  before. 
Let  us  now  go  back  to  an  earlier  stage  of  our  little 
moorhen's  life,  to  near  the  beginning  of  his  free 
existence,  to  a  time  when  he  was,  not  two  long 
months  old,  an  experiencer  of  some  standing  as  moor- 
hens go,  but  when  he  had  seen  but  a  few  brief  days  of 
life  beyond  the  confines  of  the  egg-shell.  We  started 
with  our  birdling  as  experiencer  swimming  about  in 
the  stream.  The  question  I  have  now  to  consider 
is  this: — How  did  he  reach  this  level  of  conscious 
organization  i  It  is  obvious  that  I  cannot  trace  in 
detail  the  genesis  of  his  experience,  though  I 
watched  him  carefully  from  day  to  day.  I  must  select 
an  episode  which  has  some  bearing  upon  his  diving 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE         15 

in  the  stream.  It  may  be  said  that  this  behaviour 
was  closely  and  intimately  related  with  the  long 
experience  of  swimming  which  he  had  already  gained. 
But  there  was  a  time  when  he  had  no  experience  of 
water  and  swimming.  I  remember  the  day  when  I 
first  placed  him  in  a  large  bath.  Even  then  he  was 
already  an  experiencer  having  gained  so  much 
experience  as  was  possible  during  the  few  hours  of 
life  he  had  enjoyed.  Still,  comparatively  few  things 
had  for  him,  so  far,  become  meaningful.  Of  swim- 
ming experience  he  had  none.  The  great  lake  of  my 
bath  had  for  him  no  meaning.  Racial  preparation 
had  however  fitted  the  tissues  contained  within  his 
black  fluffy  skin,  and  the  subtler  tissue  of  his  lower 
brain-centres,  to  respond  in  a  quite  definite  manner  to 
the  stimulation  of  water  on  the  breast  and  legs.  And 
in  the  first  act  of  swimming — true  to  type,  practically 
serviceable  to  secure  a  biological  end,  though  needing 
that  which  came  later,  the  perfecting  touch  of 
intelligent  guidance, — in  this  first  act  of  swimming 
there  were  afforded  to  his  experience  analogous 
factors  to  those  I  have  given  above  in  considering  his 
instinctive  dive — a  specific  presentation,  a  specific 
group  of  behaviour  feelings,  a  specific  emotional 
tone,  all  coalescent  into  one  felt  synthesis,  developing 
in  accordance  with  a  developing  situation. 

We  have  not  yet,  however,  got  back  to  the 
initial  genesis  of  experience  in  our  moorhen.  So 
long  as  he  brings  to  any  given  situation  experience 
already  gained,  his  very  first  behaviour  in  that 
situation  may  carry  meaning — not  very  definite 
ad  hoc  meaning,  no  doubt,  but  still  some  meaning. 
Dr.  Myers  lays  stress  on  this  already  gotten  meaning, 


16  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

but  he  goes  further  than  I  am  prepared  to  go.  He 
says  ^ : — "  To  my  mind  it  is  certain  that,  on  the 
occasion  of  the  chick's  first  peck,  or  the  duckling's 
first  swim,  the  bird  is  dimly,  of  course  very  dimly, 
conscious  of  the  way  in  which  it  is  about  to  act.  I 
believe  this  because  no  organism  can  ever  execute  a 
new  movement  which  does  not  involve  other  move- 
ments that  have  been  performed  previously.  A 
completely  new  movement  is  as  impossible  as  a 
completely  new  thought.  When  a  chick  first  attempts 
to  peck,  many  of  the  muscles  then  called  into  action 
must  have  contracted  before.  Thus  the  feeling  of 
activity  arising  on  the  occasion  of  the  chick's  first 
peck  is  not  altogether  a  new  one.  It  is  related,  as 
each  of  our  own  experiences  is  related,  to  past 
experiences.  And  the  very  vague  awareness  of  results, 
associated  with  those  previous  feelings  of  activity, 
gives  the  chick  a  vague  awareness  of  the  result  of  its 
first  peck,  before  it  has  actually  performed  the  action." 
Now  for  the  present  I  will  assume  that  "awareness 
of  results "  is  synonymous  with  secondary  meaning. 
If  the  chick's  first  peck  has  some  dim  and  vague 
meaning  due  to  foregoing  use  of  the  same  muscles, 
none  the  less  the  accomplished  peck  supplies  the  data 
for  new  meaning — not  merely  meaning  in  terms  of 
previous  other-use  of  the  same  muscles,  but  meaning 
in  terms  of  their  specific  pecking-use.  It  is  this 
specific  pecking-use  which  I  believe  to  be  biologically 
determined  through  the  natural  selection  of  variations 
(or  mutations  1 )  of  germinal  origin.  I  find  difficulty 
in  accepting  the  view,  to  be  considered  in  the  sequel, 
that  it  is  appreciably  determined  by  any   dim    and 

'  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  2 1 1. 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE         17 

vague  awareness  of  results  which,  as  pecking-results, 
have  never  yet  been  experienced.  With  regard  to  the 
moorhen's  first  swim,  then,  I  do  not  deny  that  when 
placed  in  the  bath  he  had  already  gained  the 
experience  necessarily  involved  in  using  the  same 
limbs  and  the  same  muscles  in  walking.  But  I 
conceive  that  when  he  makes  his  first  strokes  in  the 
water  the  awareness  that  he  is  going  to  swim,  even 
granting  its  existence,  is  so  very  dim  and  vague  as  to 
be  negligible  in  comparison  with  the  purely  reflex 
tendency  to  swim  grounded  in  the  moorhen's 
organic  constitution.  As  M.  Bergson  says  ^ : — 
"  Thousands  and  thousands  of  variations  on  the  theme 
of  walking  will  never  yield  a  rule  for  swimming.  .  .  . 
Swimming  is  an  extension  of  walking,  but  walking 
would  never  have  pushed  you  on  to  swimming," 
In  the  first  peck  or  the  first  swim,  therefore,  accord- 
ing to  my  interpretation,  we  have  as  peck  and  as 
swim  the  instinctive  factor  relatively,  but  still  only 
relatively,  pure — relatively  impure  in  so  far  as  it  is 
accompanied  by  such  very  dim  and  very  vague 
awareness  of  what  is  coming  as  may  be  due  to  other 
previously  gotten  experience.  Some  slight  admixture 
of  intelligent  meaning  is  still  present  because  we  have 
not  yet  got  down  to  the  very  beginning  of  our 
moorhen's  experience. 

If  one  tries  to  follow  out  to  its  logical  conclusion 
Dr.  Myers'  statement  that  "  no  organism  can  ever 
execute  a  new  movement  which  does  not  involve 
other  movements  that  have  been  performed 
previously ; "  if  one  tries  to   grasp   his   contention  ^ 

*  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  204. 
'  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  269. 
C 


18  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

that  "  there  never  can  be  a  beginning  of  experience, 
— a    beginning   which   has   no    relation   to   previous 
experience "  ;   one  seems   posed  by  the  problem  of 
infinite   regress.      One   gets    back    to    the    embryo 
within  the  egg-shell,  and  thus  to  the  fertilized  ovum, 
and   so   to   parents   and   ancestors    more   and   more 
remote  ;  and  still  we  are,  I  suppose,  told  that  there 
never  can  be  a  beginning  to  experience  ;  the   stage 
we   have   reached,  no    matter   how   remote   or   how 
primitive,  still  has  relation  to  previous   experience ! 
I   am  fully  aware  that  any  adequate  discussion  of 
the  place  of  experience  in  the  universe  must  lead  up 
to    very    difficult    philosophical    problems.       Every 
movement  regarded  as  a  part  or  phase  of  the  world- 
process  is  conditioned  by  antecedent  movement  like- 
wise   so    conditioned.       Every    organic    movement 
however  new   (really  new,  in  some  cases,  as  I  hold) 
is  of  course  related    to    foregoing   organic  changes. 
And  for  those  who  are  convinced  by  the  arguments 
of  Paulsen   and   others   in   favour  of  panpsychism, 
there  is,  of  course,  no  beginning  of  consciousness  ; 
and    if   we    equate   experience    and   consciousness, 
there  is  for  them  no  beginning  of  experience.     All 
this   is,  however,  beyond  the  scope  of  our  present 
considerations.      Our   universe  of  discourse   is  just 
now  of  a  much  more  limited  range.     I  assume  that 
the   behaviour  of  the    moorhen  has  a  beginning — a 
beginning   that   is   sufficiently  well    marked   for  the 
practical   purposes  of  our   inquiry,  however  limited 
may  be  their  philosophical  range.     I  want  to  get, 
if  possible,  at  the  very  beginning  of  such  experience 
as   correlated    with  such   initial    behaviour.     And  I 
therefore  go  yet  one  stage  further  back  in  the  history 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE         19 

of  our  little  bird.  I  suggest  that  when  the  moorhen 
chick  was  struggling  out  of  the  cramping  egg-shell 
there  came  what  we  may  fairly  regard  as  the  initial 
presentations  to  sense,  followed  by  the  initial 
responsive  behaviour  in  the  earliest  instinctive  acts, 
accompanied,  we  may  presume,  by  the  initial 
emotional  tone,  coalescent  in  primary  synthesis. 
Thus  I  conceive  that,  for  scientific  interpretation, 
experience  has  its  genesis.  A  number  of  instinctive 
responses  occur  in  virtue  of  the  organization  established 
by  centuries  of  racial  preparation  as  the  outcome  of 
natural  selection  or  of  other  factors  in  organic 
evolution.  These  unite  synthetically  to  generate 
experience.^  It  is  itself  dim  and  vague,  but  it  can 
carry  no  meaning,  however  dim  and  vague,  in  terms 
of  previous  experience,  for  of  such  previous  experience 
there  has  been  none.  The  only  meaning  in  this  sense 
which  can  possibly  be  present  is  such  as  might 
conceivably  be  derived  from  experience  previously 
gained  within  the  unbroken  egg-shell.  I  am  ready 
to  yield  this  much  for  what  it  is  worth,  merely 
remarking  that  for  practical  interpretation  it  is  not 
worth  much,  and  that  what  there  is  of  it  is  of  the  reflex 
and  instinctive  order.  If  I  may  be  allowed  to 
neglect  it  as  a  vanishing  quantity,  then  I  conceive 
we  reach  the  stage  at  which  the  experiencer  as  such 
has  its  primary  genesis.  It  is  called  into  existence  by 
the  earliest  instinctive  behaviour  (whenever  and 
however  that  earliest  behaviour  occurs),  and  here, 
for     strictly    scientific     interpretation,    I     find     the 

'  I  have  elsewhere  used  the  expression  **  primary  tissue  of 
experience."  I  shall  use  it  no  longer,  It  is  by  no  means  felicitous 
and  it  has  misleading  implications. 


20  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

very  first  beginnings  of  the  individual  experience. 
From  this  primitive  stage  to  that  later  stage  when 
the  moorhen  swam  in  the  Yorkshire  stream  is  a  far 
cry.  But  just  as  there  is  one  moorhen  with  inter- 
related parts  and  organs,  one  central  nervous  system 
correlating  the  incoming  data  of  presentation  and 
co-ordinating  the  outgoing  nerve-impulses  in  respon- 
sive behaviour,  so  there  grows  up  in  correlation  with 
the  cortical-processes,  one  experience  for  which 
the  presentative  data  acquire  meaning  and  become 
precepts  for  the  guidance  of  further  behaviour. 
Thus  is  it,  I  conceive,  in  the  case  of  the  moorhen  : 
thus  is  it  in  the  case  of  the  human  infant.  Such  in 
all  cases  is  the  starting-point  of  the  natural  history  of 
experience,  the  unification  of  which  finds  expression 
in  behaviour  and  conduct. 

Such  is  my  main  thesis.  I  shall  have  to  consider 
in  the  next  chapter  the  question  whether  my 
assumption  that  all  meaning  is  the  result  of 
individual  acquisition  needs  qualification  ;  and,  if 
so,  whether  my  thesis  is  invalidated.  I  must  ask  the 
reader  to  remember  that  I  seek  to  give  at  the  outset 
an  outline  sketch  of  my  view.  I  must  ask  him  to 
remember  that  any  hypothesis  with  regard  to  the 
genesis  of  experience  must  inevitably  remain  beyond 
the  range  of  direct  verification  from  the  aspect  of 
experiencing.  I  have  never  been  a  moorhen.  And 
though  I  was  once  a  baby,  I  have  no  memory-data 
for  compiling  my  reminiscences  during  the  first  year. 
No  one  has.  When  did  my  experience  begin  ?  At 
birth  ?  Or  was  it  some  time  later  ?  Is  what  Wm. 
James  calls  "the  big  blooming  buzzing  confusion" 
of  the  early  days  of  life  to  be  called  experience  ?    Or 


BEHAVIOUR  AND  EXPERIENCE        21 

does  experience  begin  when  this  chaos  of  stimulation 
becomes  incipiently  cosmic  ?  Or,  again,  must  we 
seek  the  beginnings  of  experience  before  birth,  when 
the  child  is  still  in  the  womb  ?  And,  if  so,  when  did 
it  begin  ?  At  what  stage  of  the  development  of  the 
nervous  system  ?  Or  was  it  even  before  the  neural 
band  was  differentiated  from  epiblastic  tissue?  Has 
all  vital  process  an  accompaniment  of  consciousness  ? 
And,  if  so,  is  all  such  consciousness  to  be  called 
experience?  Such  questions  are  easily  asked.  But 
only  speculative  imagination  can  furnish  answers.  I 
have  assumed  that  experiencing  is  correlated  with 
physiological  processes  in  the  cortex.  Trying  to  look 
at  the  genesis  of  experience  from  as  reasonable  a 
point  of  view  as  my  modest  share  of  common-sense 
permits,  I  suggest  that  instinctive  behaviour, 
biologically  determined,  affords  those  grouped 
stimulations  which  initiate  cortical  process,  and  afford 
grouped  data  in  consciousness  which  may  serve  in 
some  degree  to  explain  (so  far  as  it  can  be  explained) 
the  genesis  of  experience. 

It  appears  to  me,  then,  that  for  purposes  of 
psychological  interpretation,  in  so  far  as  this  is 
concerned  with  the  genesis  of  experience,  we  should 
so  far  broaden  the  connotation  of  the  qualifying 
adjective  instinctive  as  to  include  all  those  primary 
and  inherited  modes  of  behaviour,  including  reflex 
acts,  which  contribute  in  any  degree  to  experience. 
If  there  be  reflexes  or  modes  of  instinctive  behaviour 
which  have  no  correlated  consciousness,  with  them 
the  psychologist  has  no  concern.  He  may  cheerfully 
hand  them  over  to  the  biologist. 

Now  among  the  invertebrates,  and  especially  the 


2^  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

insects,  there  are  cases  of  instinctive  behaviour  of  a 
remarkably  stereotyped  nature.  A  complicated 
series  of  acts,  showing  wonderful  nicety  and  accuracy 
of  adaptation,  is  performed  once,  and  only  once,  in 
the  lifetime  of  the  individual  without  any  opportunity 
of  imitation  so-called.  These  cases  may  conform  to 
Dr.  Driesch's  definition  ^  of  an  instinct  as  "  a  compli- 
cated reaction  that  is  perfect  the  very  first  time." 
Dr.  Myers  has  criticized  this  definition.  "  I  question," 
he  says,^  "  whether  this  is  ever  literally  the  case,  if 
only  the  reaction  could  be  submitted  to  close  enough 
examination,  .  .  .  Instincts  are  almost  always  modifi- 
able and  perfected  by  later  experience.  .  .  .  An 
instinct  which  is  from  the  first  unalterable  is  nothing 
but  a  reflex."  I  believe  that  in  all  cases  an 
instinctive  act  is,  from  the  biological  and  physio- 
logical point  of  view,  nothing  but  a  reflex.  But  from 
the  psychological  point  of  view  it  is  always  something 
more  than  a  reflex,  in  so  far  as  it  affords  data  to 
conscious  experience.  I  am,  however,  in  full  agree- 
ment with  Dr.  Myers  when  he  says  that  instincts  are 
almost  always  modifiable  and  perfected  by  later 
experience.  Dr.  Driesch's  brief  definition  applies 
only  to  a  very  limited  number  of  instinctive 
activities.  It  scarcely  applies  at  all  to  the  instinctive 
behaviour  of  such  vertebrates  as  birds  and  mammals. 
I  have  therefore  suggested  the  following  modification 
of  the  brief  definition :  Instinctive  behaviour,  as 
congenitally  determined,  is  practically  serviceable  on 
the   occasion   of  its   first   performance.      Take    the 

•  "Science  and   Philosophy  of  the  Organism"  (1908),  vol.  ii., 
p.  no, 

*  '•  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  211, 


BEHAVIOUR   AND   EXPERIENCE         23 

flight  of  the  swallow  as  an  example  which  may 
illustrate  a  vast  number  of  instinctive  acts.  Is 
there  a  biologist  who  has  adequate  acquaintance 
with  the  facts,  who  would  dream  of  asserting  that  the 
instinctive  performance  at  the  outset  has  anything 
approaching  in  delicacy  and  effectiveness  the  perfected 
skill  of  the  mature  bird — a  skill  shot  through  and 
through  with  meaning  of  the  highest  value  for 
experience  of  life  on  the  wing  ?  ^  None  the  less,  I 
am  convinced  from  personal  observation  ^  that  the 
relatively  imperfect  instinctive  flight  of  the  young 
swallow  taken  from  the  nest  is  practically  serviceable 
and  has  survival  value.  It  is  good  enough  to  preserve 
the  little  bird  from  falling  to  the  ground  and  running 
the  risk  of  destruction,  the  very  first  time  it  leaves  the 
nest,  even  when,  as  in  my  own  experiments,  the 
normal  period  of  flight  is  somewhat  antedated.  The 
outcome  of  natural  selection  is  not  to  produce  either 
behaviour  or  organic  structure  which  is  so  perfect 
that  no  trace  of  imperfection  can  be  discovered  by 
the  closest  examination.  One  of  the  least  imperfect 
organs  is  the  normally  developed  human  eye  ;  and 
yet,  as  we  all  know,  Helmholtz  found  in  the  organ  of 
vision  many  defects.^  The  products  of  natural  selec- 
tion are  practically  serviceable,  not  theoretically 
perfect.  Only  where,  as  most  markedly  in  the  case 
of  some  of  the  instinctive  activities  of  insects,  a  close 
approach  to  perfection  is  necessary  in  order  that  the 
behaviour  shall   be   serviceable  for  survival  of  the 

1  Cf.  "  Animal  Behaviour,"  p.  88. 
«  Cf.  "  Habit  and  Instinct,"  p.  71. 

*  "Popular  Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects," — The  Eye  as  an 
Optical  Instrument,  pp.  197,  fif. 


U  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

species,  do  we   find   that   it   is   scarcely,  if    at  all, 
subject  to  further  improvement. 

But  if  we  accept  the  view  that  instinctive  actions 
are  susceptible  of  improvement  under  the  guidance 
of  intelligence,  it  is  clear  that  the  biological  value  of 
such  instinctive  actions  includes  the  fact  that  they  are 
serviceable  as  affording  a  basis  for  such  improvement. 
Improvement  implies  something  which  can  be  im- 
proved ;  instinctive  activities  supply  that  improvable 
something.  I  have  said  above  that  for  purposes  of 
psychological  interpretation,  in  so  far  as  this  is 
concerned  with  the  genesis  of  experience,  we  should 
so  far  broaden  the  connotation  of  the  qualifying 
adjective  instinctive  as  to  include  all  those  primary 
and  inherited  modes  of  behaviour,  including  reflex 
acts,  which  contribute  in  any  degree  to  experience. 
In  many  cases  the  instinctive  action,  in  this  broader 
sense,  is  serviceable  as  a  congenital  factor  which, 
under  the  guidance  of  intelligence,  is  incorporated  in 
a  larger  whole.  Mr.  McDougall,  who  is  unable  to 
accept  ^  my  modification  of  Dr.  Driesch's  brief  defini- 
tion, says  that  while  he  agrees  that  the  imperfections 
of  many  instinctive  actions  on  their  first  performance 
render  inacceptable  the  definition  proposed  by  Dr. 
Driesch,  he  thinks  that  these  imperfections  are  so 
great  in  many  cases  as  to  render  my  own  definition 
untrue  of  much  instinctive  behaviour.  "When  the 
young  kitten  attentively  watches  the  dangled  button 
or  the  rolling  ball,  and  makes  its  first  futile  effort  to 
seize  it,  its  behaviour  is  instinctive,  but  can  hardly  be 
called  practically  serviceable."  I  shall  deal  later 
with  Mr.  McDougall's  general  theory  of  instinct — a 

'  •'  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  259. 


BEHAVIOUR  AND  EXPERIENCE        25 

theory  which  is  worthy  of  careful  consideration. 
Here  and  now  I  will  only  say  that,  accepting  as  I  do 
the  cardinal  features  of  Dr.  Groos's  contention  that 
the  biological  value  of  animal  play  lies  in  the  fact 
that  it  affords  the  instinctive  basis  for  the  further 
developed  and  perfected  activities  of  later  life,  the 
behaviour  of  the  kitten  is  eminently  serviceable. 

Dr.  Stout ^  regards  my  criterion  as  "too  purely 
biological  to  meet  psychological  requirements,"  and 
supplements  it  by  adding,  as  characteristic  of 
instinctive  behaviour,  "  a  definiteness  such  as  would 
require  to  be  explained  as  the  result  of  learning  by 
experience  or  conscious  contrivance,  if  it  were  not 
directly  provided  for  by  inherited  constitution  of  the 
nervous  system,  as  determined  by  the  course  of 
biological  development."  This  emphasizes  the 
purposive  (but  not  purposeful)  character  of  instinctive 
behaviour,  and  appears  to  me  to  be  a  helpful  and 
acceptable  supplement  for  purposes  of  description. 

I  suggest  then  that,  for  the  biologist  and 
the  psychologist,  a  criterion — not  the  only  criterion, 
but  a  criterion  of  instinctive  behaviour,  is  that  it  is 
serviceable  on  the  first  occasion.  But  the  biologist, 
for  the  purposes  of  his  interpretation  of  animal  life, 
will  ask :  Serviceable  to  what  end  ?  First  of  all, 
serviceable  as  affording  the  congenital  foundations  for 
an  improved  superstructure  of  behaviour.  That  is 
one  way  in  which  instinctive  behaviour  is  serviceable 
— the  way  which  is  of  special  interest  to  the 
psychologist.  From  the  more  distinctively  biological 
point  of  view,  instinctive  behaviour  is  broadly  and 
generally  serviceable  for  survival  to  which  sundry 
'  G,  F.  Stout,  '•  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol,  iii.,  p.  245. 


26  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

bodily  activities  contribute.  In  further  detail, 
instinctive  behaviour  is  serviceable  for  avoiding 
danger,  by  shrinking,  quiescence,  or  flight ;  service- 
able for  warding  off  the  attacks  of  enemies  ;  service- 
able for  obtaining  food,  capturing  prey,  and  so  forth ; 
serviceable  for  winning  and  securing  a  mate,  for 
protecting  and  rearing  offspring  ;  in  social  animals, 
serviceable  for  co-operating  with  others,  and  so 
behaving  that  not  only  the  individual  but  the  social 
group  shall  survive.  But,  it  will  be  said,  surely  these 
are  the  very  ends  for  the  attainment  of  which 
intelligence  is  also  serviceable  !  Unquestionably  this 
is  so.  It  is  just  because  the  many  and  varied  modes 
of  instinctive  behaviour  are  serviceable  for  the  attain- 
ment of  the  same  ends  for  which  intelligence  is  also 
serviceable,  that  their  consideration  is  essential  to  the 
right  understanding  of  the  natural  history  of 
experience.  Instinctive  behaviour,  which  has  its 
roots  in  organic  evolution,  affords  the  rude  outline 
sketch  of  that  far  less  imperfect  and  far  more  fully 
serviceable  behaviour,  the  finishing  touches  of  which 
are  supplied  by  practice  under  the  guidance  of 
intelligence.  The  net  result  (what  is  for  popular 
speech  the  perfected  instinct)  is  a  joint  product  of 
instinct  and  intelligence,  in  which  the  co-operating 
factors  are  inseparable,  but  none  the  less  genetically 
distinguishable. 

I  must  here  plead  guilty  to  the  charge  of  some 
laxity  of  expression.  It  is  difificult  at  the  same  time 
to  avoid  undue  pedantry  and  to  attain  some  measure 
of  exactness.  What  do  I  mean  by  saying  that 
instinctive  behaviour  comes  "  under  the  guidance  of 
intelligence " }     I    mean    that    physiologically   the 


BEHAVIOUR  AND   EXPERIENCE         27 

functioning  of  the  sub-cortical  centres  is  conditioned 
by  the  functioning  of  the  cortical  centres.  I  mean  that, 
psychologically,  the  experience  begotten  by  behaving 
instinctively,  reacts  on  subsequent  behaviour.  In  so 
far  as  behaviour  is  modified  or  in  part  conditioned 
by  such  reaction  I  call  it  intelligent.  The  guidance 
of  intelligence  is  merely  a  convenient  form  of  words 
by  which  to  indicate  the  influence  of  the  condition- 
ing factor — acquired  meaning  ;  a  factor  which  is 
absent  in  the  automatism  of  instinctive  behaviour. 

But  the  relation  of  instinct  to  intelligence  will  be 
discussed  more  fully  in  the  next  chapter,  wherein 
some  criticisms  of  my  thesis  will  come  under 
consideration. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE     RELATION     OF    INSTINCT    TO 
INTELLIGENCE 

THE  specific  definiteness  of  behaviour  of  the  type 
to  which  I  apply  the  term  instinctive,  is  an 
organic  heritage.  It  is  dependent  upon  the  inherited 
structure  of  the  nervous  system.  According  to  the 
interpretation  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  it  is 
determined  by  the  hereditary  disposition  of  the 
neurones  in  the  lower  or  sub-cortical  brain-centres. 
But  the  accompanying  experience  is  correlated  with 
functional  activities  within  the  cortex.  And  when 
such  experience  has  been  gained  it  may  be  the 
condition  of  intelligent  modification  of  behaviour. 
This  interpretation  is,  however,  open  to  criticism." 
Dr.  Myers  regards  ^  *'  the  separation  of  instinct  and 
intelligence  as  a  purely  artificial  abstraction."  Instinct 
and  intelligence  are,  he  urges,  the  same  process 
regarded  from  different  standpoints.  "So  far  as 
instinctive  behaviour  can  be  regarded  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  individual  experience  of  the  organism 
it  appears,  however  imperfectly,  as  intelligent — 
characterized  by  finalism.  So  far  as  intelligent 
behaviour  can  be  regarded  from  the  standpoint  of 

*  '•  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  pp.  209  and  270.    Page 
references  ia  brackets  in  this  Chapter  are  to  this  volume, 

28 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE         29 

observing  the  conduct  of  other  organisms,  it  appears, 
however  imperfectly,  as  instinctive — characterized  by 
mechanism."  "  Thus  the  psychology  and  physiology  of 
instinct  are  inseparable  from  the  psychology  and  physio- 
logy of  intelligence.  There  is  not  one  nervous  apparatus 
for  instinct  and  another  for  intelligence.  . .  .  Through- 
out the  psychical  world  there  is  but  one  physiological 
mechanism  ;  there  is  but  one  psychological  function — 
instinct-intelligence."  I  suppose  the  divergence  of 
opinion  between  us  partly  rests  upon  differences  in  the 
definition  of  terms.  In  any  case  this  double-aspect 
doctrine  is  interesting  and  suggestive.  I  cannot 
discuss  it  now ;  nor  can  I  here  follow  Dr.  Myers  into 
the  difficult  regions  of  finalism  and  mechanism.  Some- 
what will  be  said  concerning  them  in  due  course.  At 
present  I  am  only  concerned  to  emphasize  the  fact 
that,  so  far  as  the  consciousness  of  instinctive  per- 
formance is  under  consideration,  I  too  believe  that 
there  is  one  and  only  one  "  physiological  mechanism," 
within  which,  as  I  have  indicated  above,  neural 
processes  have  experience-correlates.  This,  in  my 
interpretation,  is  the  cerebral  cortex.  Just  now,  how- 
ever, I  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  cortex.  I  must 
ask  to  be  allowed  to  develop  my  thesis  on  the 
assumption  that  the  specific  nature  of  the  instinctive 
performance  is  biologically  and  physiologically 
determined  by  the  inherited  disposition  of  the 
neurones  in  the  lower  sub-cortical  brain-centres. 

I  pause  here  to  consider  in  passing  a  question  of 
terminology.  In  the  current  popular  phraseology  we 
often  speak  of  the  instincts  of  animals,  using  the  word 
in  the  plural.  This  plural  implies  the  singular.  But 
what  is  an  instinct?     Mr.   W.    McDougall  protests 


30  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

against  the  usage  of  the  word  instinct  to  denote  an 
instinctive  action.  "  It  is  true,"  he  says,  "  that  this 
has  the  sanction  of  general  usage  ;  but  to  describe 
any  particular  action  as  an  instinct  is,  I  submit,  a 
loose  and  confusing  usage  against  which  we  ought  to 
set  our  faces.  We  ought,"  he  continues,  "rather  to 
use  the  term  an  instinct  to  denote  that  feature  of  the 
innate  constitution  of  any  organism,  that  inherited 
disposition,  in  virtue  of  the  possession  of  which  the 
organism  acts  instinctively ;  just  as  we  ought  to 
distinguish  between  a  habit  and  the  habitual  actions 
of  which  the  habit  is  the  enduring  condition"  (p.  253). 
I  cannot  regard  Mr.  McDougall's  suggestion  as  quite 
satisfactory.  It  savours  somewhat  of  "  faculty "  in- 
terpretation. It  naturally  arises  out  of  his  use  of  the 
word  instinct  for  an  inherited  mental  tendency 
correlated  with  an  inherited  neural  disposition.  But 
even  accepting  his  definition  of  instinct  I  question 
the  propriety  of  calling  an  inherited  disposition 
an  instinct.  Is  it  not  better  to  use  the  adjective 
instinctive  to  qualify  the  words  behaviour  or  disposi- 
tion, according  to  the  context,  and  to  use  the  term 
instinct,  as  we  use  the  term  intelligence,  to  serve  as 
the  general  heading  for  a  definite  type  of  behaviour 
or  a  definite  type  of  disposition,  as  the  case  may  be  ? 
Apart  from  this  question  whether  we  should  apply 
the  word  instinctive  to  a  kind  of  behaviour  or  to  the 
disposition  with  which  a  kind  of  behaviour  is  correlated 
or  to  both,  there  is  a  wider  divergence  in  the  use  of 
terms.  Indeed  there  is  scarcely  any  term  that  is  used 
with  greater  differences  of  connotation.  At  present 
we  need  only  consider  the  extension  of  the  term 
instinctive   so   as  to  cover   not   only  the   modes  of 


INSTINCT   AND   INTELLIGENCE         31 

behaviour  and  dispositions  which  are  congenital  but 
also  those  which  are  acquired.  The  interpretation  I 
have  put  forward  involves  the  distinction,  which  I 
believe  to  be  valid  on  biological  grounds,  between 
congenital  modes  of  behaviour  dependent  upon 
inherited  dispositions,  and  acquired  modes  of  be- 
haviour dependent  upon  the  modifications  of  these 
dispositions  superinduced  in  the  course  of  indi- 
vidual life.  The  former  fall  under  the  heading 
instinct ;  the  latter  under  the  heading  intelligence. 
Professor  Wundt  in  his  lectures  on  Human  and 
Animal  Psychology  accepted  the  distinction,  but 
applied  the  term  instinctive  to  both  kinds  of 
behaviour.  "  Movements,"  he  said,  ^  "  which  originally 
followed  upon  simple  or  compound  voluntary  acts, 
but  which  have  become  wholly  or  partly  mechanized 
in  the  course  of  the  individual  life  or  of  generic 
evolution,  we  term  instinctive  actions."  He  here, 
therefore,  divides  instinctive  actions  into  two  classes, 
(i)  those  which  are  congenital  and  (2)  those  which  are 
acquired.  Father  Wasmann,^  too,  distinguishes  in- 
stinctive actions  under  two  groups  ;  (i)  those  which 
immediately  spring  from  the  inherited  dispositions  ; 
(2)  those  which  proceed  from  the  same  inherited 
dispositions  but  through  the  medium  of  sejise  experi' 
ence.  The  first  group  he  regards  as  instinctive  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term  ;  the  latter  as  instinctive  in 
the  wider  acceptance  of  the  term.  Since  we  have  the 
word  habit  as  a  general  group  name,  and  the  phrase 

*  "  Lectures  on  Human  and  Animal  Psychology."  English 
Translation  (1894),  p.  388.  But  Cf.  "  Outlines  of  Psychology." 
English  Translation  (1907),  p.  317. 

*  "  Instinct  and  Intelligence  in  the  Animal  Kingdom."  English 
Translation  (1903),  p.  35. 


32  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

habitual  actions,  to  apply  to  those  modes  of 
behaviour  "  which  have  become  wholly  or  partly 
mechanized  in  the  course  of  individual  life  "  "  through 
the  medium  of  sense-experience,"  it  is  better,  I  submit, 
to  restrict  the  term  instinctive  to  congenital  modes  of 
behaviour  dependent  upon  inherited  dispositions. 

But  I  go  further.  I  restrict  the  term  instinctive 
in  its  biological  acceptation  lo  congenital  modes  of 
behaviour  dependent  upon  inherited  dispositions 
within  the  lower  brain-centres}  I  ask  that,  for  the 
present,  I  should  be  allowed  to  proceed  on  this 
assumption  as  a  working  hypothesis.  In  virtue  of 
these  inherited  dispositions,  the  organism  appro- 
priately stimulated  exhibits  adaptive  responses  and 
is  subject  to  visceral  disturbances.  These  adaptive 
responses  and  these  visceral  disturbances  afford  new 
stimuli  which  in  turn  affect  the  lower  brain-centres. 
But  the  initial  sensory  stimuli,  those  from  the  motor 
organs  concerned  in  behaviour,  and  those  from  the 
viscera,  not  only  stimulate  the  lower  brain-centres, 
they  also  stimulate  the  cortex  of  the  brain.  Here,  and 
here  only,  occur  those  physiological  processes  which 
are  intimately  correlated  with  the  experience  process. 
Here,  and  here  only,  therefore,  does  experience  have 
its  genesis.  If  then  I  restrict  the  term  instinctive  in 
its  biological  acceptation  to  congenital  modes  of 
behaviour  dependent  upon  inherited  dispositions 
within  the  lower  brain-centres,  I  extend  the  term 
instinctive  in  its  psychological  acceptation  to  the 
cortical  experience  which  results  from  the  pre- 
sentation of  a  situation  and  the  correlated 
performance  of  a  biologically  instinctive  action. 

'  I  have  here  in  view  the  higher  vertebrates  only. 


INSTINCT   AND   INTELLIGENCE  33 

In  the  interpretation  I  seek  to  develop,  the 
primary  role  of  the  psycho-physiological  functions  of 
the  cerebral  cortex  is  to  play  down  upon  and  control 
the  functional  activities  of  the  lower  nerve-centres 
and  thus  to  modify  the  behaviour  of  the  organism  as 
a  whole.  That  is  their  essential  function  at  any  rate 
for  genetic  treatment,  and  in  their  earlier 
manifestations  in  the  life  of  an  active  organism.  As 
soon  therefore  as  the  cortex  is  called  into  functional 
activity  it  begins  to  influence  the  sub-cortical  centres 
and  to  modify  the  physiological  processes  which  are 
going  on  therein.  Although  in  a  decerebrate 
animal  an  instinctive  train  of  activities  might,  and  I 
conceive  would,  run  its  course  wholly  in  virtue  of 
the  inherited  organization  of  the  lower  centres,  in  the 
unmaimed  cerebrate  animal  the  later  stages  of  even 
the  first  performance  of  an  instinctive  behaviour- 
sequence  would  be  liable  to  cortical  control  — 
would  be  liable  to  some  modification  due  to  the 
influence  of  the  cortex.  Hence,  if  we  regard  the 
present  as  a  short  but  appreciable  period  of  time,  we 
may  say  that  present  experience  is  constantly 
influencing  present  behaviour.^  In  the  interpretation 
which  I  suggest,  then,  experience  is  correlated  with 
the  functional  activity  of  the  cortex ;  that  functional 
activity  and  that  experience  are  initially  called  into 
being  by  a  complex  sequence  of  stimuli  due  to  the 
development  of  an  instinctivel  situation  through  the 
integrative  action  of  the  sub-cortical  brain-centres. 
But  the  moment  it  is  called  into  being  by  the  initial 
phases  of  an  instinctive  sequence  it  is,  or  may  be, 
influential  in   modifying    succeeding  phases  of  that 

'  Cf.  "  Animal  Behaviour,"  pp.  45  and  47. 
D 


^4  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

sequence.  Such  modification  by  cortical  and 
experiential  guidance  is,  as  such,  intelligent.  Thus 
the  instinctive  and  the  intelligent  factors  in 
behaviour,  closely  as  they  are  related,  are  dis- 
tinguishable in  analysis. 

But  here  Dr.  Stout,  than  whom  there  is  no  more 
acute  and  able  critic  in  matters  psychological,  raises 
the  question  whether  every  instinctive  action  as  such 
is  not  also  determined  by  intelligence.  "The 
crucial  issue,  here,"  he  says,  "  concerns  the  nature  of 
the  mental  process  in  the  first  performance  of  an 
admittedly  instinctive  action.  If  the  first  per- 
formance involves  intelligence,  it  will  not  be  disputed 
that  the  same  holds  true  of  subsequent  performances  " 

(P-  237). 

Dr.  Stout  then  turns  to  a'  criticism  of  my  thesis. 
"  Mr.  Morgan,"  he  says,  "  holds  that  instinctive 
behaviour  cannot  at  the  outset  be  determined  by 
intelligent  consciousness.  His  reason  appears  to 
be  as  follows.  .  .  .  An  animal,  in  consequence  of  a 
train  of  previous  experience,  intelligently  modifies 
its  behaviour  from  the  outset,  when  it  is  again 
confronted  with  a  similar  situation.  This  implies 
what  we  call  learning  by  experience.  But  when  does 
the  animal  learn  its  lesson  ?  Does  the  actual 
process  of  learning  take  place  on  the  second 
occasion  or  on  the  first  ?  Plainly  it  takes  place  on  the 
first  and  not  on  the  second.  On  the  second  occasion 
the  lesson  is  utilized  :  but  in  order  to  be  utilized  it 
must  already  have  been  learned.  Thus  if  the  actual 
process  of  learning  involves  intelligent  consciousness, 
intelligence  must  accompany  every  instinctive  act 
which  leads  to  intelligent  modification  of  behaviour 


INSTINCT  AND   INTELLIGENCE  35 

on  its  repetition  in  a  similar  situation.  But  Mr. 
Morgan's  position  is  that  an  instinctive  action  which 
leads  to  intelligent  modification  of  behaviour  on  its 
repetition,  may  none  the  less  be  itself  wholly 
unintelligent.  What  he  regards  as  implying 
intelligence  is  not  the  actual  process  of  learning  by 
experience,  but  only  its  product,  the  state  of  having 
already  learnt  by  experience.  Such  a  view  seems  to 
run  counter  to  all  that  we  otherwise  know  concerning 
the  development  of  knowledge.  Setting  aside  the 
special  question  concerning  instinct  there  is  nothing 
to  show  that  learning  by  experience  is  ever  an 
unintelligent  process  involving  merely  a  sequence  of 
blind  sensations  and  feelings  without  discrimination 
and  identification  and  without  any  apprehension  of 
successive  and  simultaneous  parts  as  related  to  the 
whole  and  to  each  other  within  the  whole. 

"When  it  is  thus  exactly  defined,  Mr.  Morgan's 
view  becomes,  I  think,  much  less  plausible." 

Dr.  Stout  at  the  beginning  of  this  passage  quite 
correctly  states  my  opinion  that  instinctive  behaviour 
cannot  at  the  outset  be  determined  by  intelligent 
consciousness.  It  is,  I  believe,  at  the  outset 
biologically  determined  by  the  inherited  disposition 
of  the  neurones  in  the  lower  nerve-centres.  But  it 
is,  from  the  outset,  accompanied  by  consciousness. 
And  this  accompaniment  of  consciousness  is,  I 
contend,  the  beginning  of  experience  in  the  individual 
— here  we  have  the  primary  genesis  of  experience  for 
natural  history  treatment.  Dr.  Stout  asks,  when 
does  the  animal  learn  its  lesson,  on  the  second 
occasion  or  the  first  ?  Now,  in  accordance  with  the 
common  usage  of  our  language,  I   take  it  that  to 


36  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

learn  a  lesson  implies  an  already  conscious  learner. 
The  lesson  so  learnt  is  something  added  to  previous 
experience  or  knowledge.  To  avoid  ambiguity, 
therefore,  I  prefer  to  put  the  question  in  the  follow- 
ing form  : — When  does  the  animal  acquire  experience 
— or  when  does  its  experience  begin — on  the  second 
occasion  or  the  first  ?  I  had  supposed  that  my  own 
answer  to  this  question  was  tolerably  clear.  For  my 
contention  is  that  the  animal  gets  its  initial  ex- 
perience on  this  first  occasion,  that  is  to  say  through 
the  performance  of  instinctive  actions  biologically 
determined.  In  this  sense,  then,  I  fully  agree  that 
the  animal  learns  its  lesson,  or  acquires  its  experience, 
on  the  first  occasion  and  utilizes  it  on  the  second. 
But  when  we  come  to  the  further  question : — What 
is  involved  in  such  learning  i' — in  our  answers  to 
this  question  Dr.  Stout  and  I  are  seemingly  poles 
asunder.  If  I  correctly  understand  the  concluding 
sentence  of  his  paragraph,  there  are  involved  in  the 
very  first  learning  by  experience  during  the  per- 
formance of  an  instinctive  action  "  discrimination 
and  identification  ...  an  apprehension  of  simul- 
taneous and  successive  parts  as  related  to  the  whole 
and  to  each  other  within  the  whole."  Can  I  be 
mistaken  ?  I  think  not.  Dr.  Stout  says : — There 
is  nothing  to  show  that  learning  by  experience  is 
ever  "  without  these  characteristics."  I  had  thought 
that,  for  genetic  interpretation,  within  psychology  as 
a  science,  the  apprehension  of  simultaneous  and 
successive  parts  as  related  to  the  whole  and  to  each 
other  within  the  whole  was  a  very  late  product  of  the 
conceptual  development  of  human  thought.  I  had 
even   fancied    that    Dr.   Stout    himself    had,    more 


INSTINCT   AND   INTELLIGENCE         37 

effectively  than  most  men,  helped  me  to  realize  this 
fact.  But  apparently  Dr.  Stout  believes  that  all  this 
is  present,  implicitly  I  suppose,  at  what  I  regard  as 
the  very  outset  of  experience.     There  we  differ. 

My  own  interpretationof  the  genesis  of  experience 
involves  no  such  implicit  knowledge.  At  the  risk  of 
wearisome  repetition  I  will  restate  my  position.  Let 
me  use  the  phrase  synthetic  impression  for  the  direct 
and  immediate  experience  which  is  the  result  of  the 
felt  development  of  an  instinctive  situation — say  the 
pecking  of  a  newly-hatched  chick  at  a  small  object 
and  all  that  immediately  follows  thereon.  In  the 
performance  of  this  act  a  specific  form  of  experience 
has  its  genesis.  Now  consider  a  second  occasion  on 
.which  the  chick  pecks  at  a  similar  object.  Its  action 
is  initiated,  let  us  say,  by  a  group  of  visual  stimuli. 
These  visual  stimuli,  in  so  far  as  they  affect  the 
cortex  of  the  brain,  give  rise  to  a  visual  presentation. 
But  this  presentation  is  only  part  of — only  the  initial 
phase  of — the  total  synthetic  impression  which  was 
the  net  result  of  the  felt  development  of  the  whole 
instinctive  situation.  The  rest  of  the  original  total 
impression  is,  on  the  later  occasion,  re-presentatively 
revived  or  reinstated  in  the  cortex  before  it  is 
presentatively  supplemented  by  afferent  nerve- 
impulses  from  the  organs  concerned  in  behaviour  and 
by  the  results  of  that  behaviour.  There  is  a  pre- 
perception  of  what  is  or  may  be  just  coming.  The 
visual  presentation  has  meaning  and  is  raised  to  the 
level  of  a  percept.  It  calls  up  or  reinstates  the  past 
experience.  Whereas  on  the  first  occasion  the 
cortex  responded  in  virtue  of  its  congenital  psycho- 
physiological dispositions ;    on   the  second  occasion 

-f  <n  -^  C-  o  -< 


38  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

the  cortex  responds  in  virtue  of  these  dispositions  as 
modified  by  the  total  impression  received  on  the 
previous  occasion.  Since  the  cortex  plays  down  on 
the  lower  centres  and  modifies  their  dispositions  the 
behaviour  on  the  second  occasion  is  different  from 
that  on  the  first. 

In  the  foregoing  statement  of  my  interpretation  I 
used  the  phrase  synthetic  impression  for  the  net 
result  in  conscious  experience  of  the  development  of 
an  instinctive  sequence  as  a  whole  on  the  first 
occasion  of  its  performance.  And  I  said  that  when, 
on  the  second  occasion,  a  presentation  is  given  the 
rest  of  the  original  total  impression  is  re-presentatively 
revived  or  reinstated  before  it  is  presentatively 
supplemented  by  afferent  nerve-impulses  from  the 
organs  concerned  in  behaviour  and  by  the  results  of 
that  behaviour.  There  is,  I  said,  a  pre-perception  of 
what  is  or  may  be  just  coming  ;  the  visual  presenta- 
tion has  meaning  and  is  raised  to  the  level  of  a 
percept.  I  think  that  this,  in  principle,  accords  with 
the  view  hitherto  generally  accepted  by  psychologists. 
Both  pre-perception  and  secondary  meaning  are 
commonly  regarded  as  dependent  on  revival  and 
give  to  a  presentation  its  perceptual  value.  Mr. 
McDougall  has,  however,  suggested  a  different  view. 
He  regards  what  I  have  called  the  instinctive 
impression  as  already  perceptual,  and  defines  instincts 
as  congenital  perceptual  systems.^ — "  The  impression," 
he  says,^  "  must  be  supposed  to  excite  not  merely 
detailed  changes  in  the  animal's  field  of  consciousness, 
but  a  sensation  of  complex   of  sensations   that   has 

*  "  Physiological  Psychology,''  p.   io6. 

*  "An  Introduction  to  Social  Psychology,"  p.  28. 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE         39 

significance  or  meaning  for  the  animal ;  hence  we 
must  regard  the  instinctive  process  in  its  cognitive 
aspect  as  distinctly  of  the  nature  of  perception,  how- 
ever rudimentary."  Dr.  Stout  in  further  criticism  of 
my  interpretation  has  developed  the  position  at 
greater  length.  The  importance  of  the  point  at  issue 
is  such  as  to  justify  a  somewhat  lengthy  citation  of 
his  criticism.  The  plausibility  of  my  view,  he  says, 
(p.  238),  "  does  not  wholly  depend  on  the  failure  to 
distinguish  between  the  actual  process  of  learning, 
and  its  result  as  expressed  in  subsequent  behaviour. 
It  rests  also  on  the  supposed  impossibility  of  mentally 
referring  to  the  future  except  in  the  way  of  looking 
forward  to  an  experience  which  has  already  occurred 
on  a  past  similar  occasion,  and  is  now  recalled  by 
association.  .  .  .  ThisView  is  plausible  and  may  even 
appear  self-evident.  But  it  will  not,  I  think,  bear 
rigorous  scrutiny.  In  the  first  place,  I  would  point 
out  that  if  the  mind  of  the  animal  is  initially  aware 
only  of  the  actual  sensations  and  feelings  belonging 
to  the  present  moment  of  experience,  mere  revival 
by  association  cannot,  of  itself,  make  any  difference  in 
this  respect."  .  .  .  Such  revival  "  would  not,  of  itself, 
suffice  to  explain  the  birth  of  the  new  power  of 
transcending  its  blind  and  ignorant  present  so  as  to 
anticipate  a  future  event  which,  as  such,  cannot 
actually  be  experienced  when  it  is  only  anticipated. 
Such  a  power  can  in  the  last  resource  only  be 
accounted  for  as  involved  in  the  fundamental  nature 
of  that  relation  between  mind  and  reality,  or  between 
reality  and  mind  which  we  call  knowledge. 

"  It  will  of  course  be  said  that  though  the  faculty 
of  mentally  anticipating  the   future  does   not    itself 


40  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

depend  on  the  revival  ofthe  content  of  past  experience 
through  association,  yet  such  revival  may  be  a  neces- 
sary condition  of  its  being  called  into  actual  exercise, 
and  this  position,  it  may  be  conceded,  has  a  certain 
prima  facie  show  of  self-evidence.  For  how,  it  may 
be  asked,  can  the  mind  anticipate  when  there  is  nothing 
to  determine  what  it  is  that  is  to  be  expected  by  it. 
How  can  it  look  forward  to  a  future  which  is  utterly 
indefinite  ?  And  how  can  the  direction  of  expectant 
thought  be  defined  except  by  previous  experience 
on  similar  occasions  ?  Such  questions  seem  to  me 
to  admit  of  a  simple  answer.  It  is  conceded  by 
everybody,  and  by  Mr.  Morgan  in  particular,  that  in 
the  first  performance  of  an  instinctive  act,  an  animal 
is  cognizant  of  a  perfectly  specific  object,  which  is  a 
complex  whole  of  distinguishable  constituents  'all 
coalescent  into  one  felt  situation.'  Further,  as  Mr. 
Morgan  himself  admits  and  maintains, '  all  experience 
involves  a  consciousness  of  process  as  transitional 
and  in  no  wise  static'  These  points  being  presup- 
posed, I  see  no  intrinsic  absurdity  in  the  assumption 
that  even  in  the  commencement  of  the  first  perform- 
ance of  an  instinctive  action,  the  given  situation  may 
be  apprehended  as  about  to  have  a  further  develop- 
ment. Such  anticipation,  if  it  exists,  is  not  wholly 
indefinite  ;  for  the  mental  reference  is  to  a  coming 
change  and  development  in  a  certain  specific 
situation,  and  is  therefore,  to  that  extent,  itself  a 
specific  anticipation  of  the  future.  Of  course  it  is 
relatively  indeterminate;  for  the  animal  has  no 
clue  to  the  particular  character  of  the  changes 
which  are  to  take  place.  The  particular  character 
of    the    changes    only    becomes    specified    as    they 


INSTINCT  AND   INTELLIGENCE         41 

actually  occur  in  consequence  of  the  instinctive 
movements  which  are  specially  provided  for  in  the 
inherited  constitution  of  the  animal.  The  really 
vital  point  is,  that  when  they  do  occur,  they  occur 
as  the  further  specification  of  something  already 
vaguely  anticipated,  so  that  each  successive  stage 
of  the  advancing  experience  involves  not  only  the 
apprehension  of  an  actual  present,  but  of  a  future 
which  has  become  present. 

"  The  significance  of  this  can  only  be  appreciated 
when  we  consider  the  process  in  its  conative  as  well 
as  its  cognitive  aspect.  Given  that  a  certain  actual 
situation  is  apprehended  as  alterable,  it  becomes 
possible  to  want  it  altered.  This  accounts  not  only 
for  the  mental  reference  to  a  further  development 
of  the  initial  situation,  but  also  for  the  thought  of 
a  development  required  for  satisfying  a  felt  want. 
Thus,  under  the  conditions  I  am  assuming,  there 
will  not  be  merely  blind  restlessness,  but  conation 
in  the  proper  sense  as  active  tendency  directed  to 
an  end,  which  is  not  merely  an  end  for  an  external 
observer,  but  for  the  animal  itself." 

There  is  much  in  these  paragraphs  which  seems 
to  me  well  put  with  all  Dr.  Stout's  characteristic 
subtlety,  and  worthy  of  very  careful  consideration. 
It  is  true  that  he  reads  into  the  consciousness  of 
the  animal  in  the  naive  instinctive  situation  a  good 
deal  more  than  I  am  prepared  to  regard  as  necessary 
to  its  adequate  interpretation.  Let  me  take  one 
point  in  illustration.  He  says  that  it  is  conceded 
by  everybody,  and  by  me  in  particular,  that  in  the 
first  performance  of  an  instinctive  act,  an  animal  is 
cognizant   of  a   perfectly   specific   object.     But    the 


42  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

question  arises  in  what  sense  we  are  to  understand 
the  word  object.  If  a  specific  group  of  (let  us  say) 
visual  data  constitutes  an  object,  then  the  very  first 
time  a  chick  is  in  this  kind  of  conscious  relationship 
with  a  cinnabar  caterpillar  there  is  an  object  of  vision. 
If  on  the  other  hand  we  define  the  term  object  as 
denoting  a  group  of  sensory  data  which  carries 
meaning,  then  the  cinnabar  caterpillar  as,  for  experi- 
ence, a  mere  group  of  visual  data,  is  not  yet  an  object 
in  this  sense.  It  is  not  an  object  until  further 
experience  has  supplied  other  data,  let  us  say  those 
of  taste  or  of  touch,  which,  in  subsequent  revival, 
may  qualify  the  visual  presentation.  Then  the  sight 
impression  carries  meaning  and  the  caterpillar  is 
so  far  an  object  of  perception.  Let  us  provisionally 
grant  that,  prior  to  such  further  individual  experience, 
there  may  be  very  dim  and  vague  pre-perception 
of  what  is  just  going  to  be  experienced.  In  that 
case  the  visual  impression  at  once  carries  so  much 
meaning  as  is  supplied  through  this  dim  and  vague 
pre-perception.  Apart  from  this  possibility,  meaning 
is  acquired  through  individual  experience  and  raises 
the  bare  sensory  impression  to  the  percept  of  an 
object.  I  see  no  reason,  however,  why  one  should  not 
speak  of  the  caterpillar  as  an  object  for  the  chick,  in 
the  figure  of  prolepsis.  Not  yet  an  object  strictly 
speaking,  since  it  lacks  all  meaning,  it  is  none 
the  less  the  object  that  will  be  for  perceptual 
experience.  That  is  the  sense  in  which  I  use  the 
word  object  in  discussing  instinct. 

There  is  another,  and  perhaps  closely  allied, 
way  in  which  Dr.  Stout  reads  into  the  consciousness 
of  the  animal  in  the  instinctive  situation  more  than 


INSTINCT  AND   INTELLIGENCE  43 

I  am  disposed  to  regard  as  necessary  to  its  interpreta- 
tion. The  behaviour  is  unquestionably  purposive 
and  directed  to  an  end  which  the  observer  can  fore- 
see ;  but  Dr.  Stout  regards  it  as  in  some  measure 
purposeful,  that  is  directed  to  an  end  which  the 
animal  itself  more  or  less  dimly  foresees.  In  the 
one  interpretation  it  is  only  quasi-conative ;  in  the 
other  it  is  at  least  incipiently  conative — conditioned 
by  prospective  psychological  value.  I  question 
the  presence  of  any  true  conation  in  instinctive 
behaviour.  Therein  lies  the  hopeless  inadequacy 
of  my  interpretation  from  the  point  of  view  taken 
by  Dr.  Stout  and  Mr.  McDougall.  But  I  cannot 
here  follow  up  this  part  of  the  subject.  Dr.  Stout's 
argument  clearly  shows,  also,  the  way  in  which  an 
exhaustive  discussion  of  the  problem  of  the  genesis  of 
experience  leads  up  to  large  philosophical  questions, 
such  as  "the  fundamental  nature  of  the  relation 
between  mind  and  reality."  Into  the  broader  dis- 
cussion of  these  questions  I  cannot  now  enter ;  but 
so  much  of  what  Dr.  Stout  says  above  involves 
"the  faculty  of  mentally  anticipating  the  future," 
that  I  must  try  and  state  briefly  my  reading  of  the 
psychology  of  prospective  reference. 

Innumerable  incidental  presentations  of  daily 
life  have  meaning  for  our  behaviour  in  terms  of  its 
results.  I  see  two  water-taps  over  a  basin  which  has 
a  hole  in  the  bottom.  A  plug  attached  to  a  chain 
hangs  on  one  side.  If  I  am  in  a  mood  to  wash  my 
hands,  I  either  put  in  the  plug  and  then  turn  the  hot- 
water  tap,  or  if  I  expect  the  water  which  first  runs 
from  the  tap  to  have  been  chilled  by  standing  in  the 
pipe,  I  let  the  water  run  for  a  little  while,  and  then 


44  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

put  in  the  plug.  I  probably  insert  the  plug  as  soon 
as  the  water  runs  warm  because  I  expect  that  hotter 
water  will  soon  follow.  Such  a  trivial  incident 
exemplifies  expectation  in  varying  phases  and 
behaviour  nicely  adapted  thereto.  The  whole 
business  is  largely  dependent  on  the  interest  of  the 
moment — for  if  I  don't  want  to  wash  my  hands  I 
shall  take  no  notice  of  the  presentation  to  sight  of 
basin  and  tap.  Now  whether,  when  I  begin  to 
turn  the  tap  and  before  the  water  actually  flows,  I 
have  a  definite  anticipatory  image  of  the  water  that 
is  just  going  to  flow  ;  or  whether  I  have  that  much 
vaguer  form  of  prospective  meaning  which  may  be 
termed  pre-perception  ;  this  is  a  question  which  we 
need  not  discuss.  I  certainly  cmi  form  a  definite 
anticipatory  image ;  I  can  picture  the  water  which 
might  be  flowing  from  a  dry  tap.  But  whether  I 
do  quite  normally  and  naturally  frame  such  a 
definite  image  under  the  unsophisticated  circum- 
stances of  washing  my  hands  at  the  club,  I  am  by 
no  means  sure.  I  rather  think  not.  To  take  a 
different  example — so  far  as  I  can  ascertain,  I 
frame  no  definite  taste-images,  properly  so  called. 
But  I  most  certainly  have  a  pre-perception  of 
what  is  just  coming  when  I  lift  a  cup  of  coffee  to 
my  lips.  I  take  it  that  in  any  case,  the  pre-per- 
ception is  the  first  genetic  stage  of  prospective 
reference.  And  I  take  it  there  can  be  no  question 
that  the  sight  of  basin  and  tap  carries  this  form 
of  anticipatory  meaning,  and  has  interest,  as  the 
outcome  of  previous  experience.  Now  although 
we  may  say  in  popular  speech  that  one  of  the 
characteristics  of  intelligent  behaviour  is  that  it  is 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE  45 

in  large  measure  determined  by  the  future,  this  is, 
of  course,  merely  an  elliptic  statement  of  the  actual 
fact  that  it  is,  qua  intelligent,  conditioned  by 
anticipatory  meaning.  The  future,  as  not  yet  in 
being,  at  any  rate  for  scientific  interpretation,  cannot 
determine  anything.  All  determination  is  present 
determination. 

The  question  is : — How  does  this  anticipatory 
meaning  originate .?  Dr.  Stout  urges  that  if  it  is 
not  present  on  the  first  occasion  of  the  performance 
of  an  instinctive  action,  neither  can  it  be  present 
on  the  second  occasion  which  is  only  "enriched  by 
elements  of  the  same  kind  reproduced  by 
association."  He  does  not  make  quite  definite  what 
he  means  by  elements  of  the  same  kind.  No  doubt 
all  cognitive  elements,  qua  cognitive,  are  of  the  same 
kind ;  still  re-presentative  elements,  as  such,  are 
surely  distinguishable  from  presentative  elements. 
But  the  anticipatory  meaning  of  which  Dr.  Stout 
speaks  can  hardly  be  termed  re-presentative  in  the 
usual  since  of  the  word,  since  it  does  not  follow  but 
precedes  presentation.  I  am  not  just  now  concerned, 
however,  with  the  question  whether  for  satisfactory 
interpretation  we  should  assume  that  such 
anticipatory  meaning  is  present  on  the  first  occasion. 
The  first  point  for  consideration  is  whether  it  must 
be  then  present,  if  ever  present.  Dr.  Stout  asserts 
that  it  must.  As  at  present  advised,  I  do  not  feel 
convinced  that  his  assertion  is  justified.  It  appears 
to  me  that  the  very  fact  of  the  occurrence  of  re- 
presentation on  the  second  occasion  of  the 
performance  of  what  was,  in  the  first  instance, 
purely  instinctive  behaviour,  suffices  to  explain  quite 


46  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

naturally  the  new  power  of  transcending  the  "  blind 
and  ignorant  present."  For  these  re-presentative 
factors — these  "  elements  reproduced  by  association  " 
— are  on  the  second  occasion  present  in  experience 
just  before  they  are,  or  may  be,  presentatively 
supplemented  through  actual  behaviour.  This  affords, 
for  psychological  treatment,  the  initial  stage  of  that 
prospective  reference  which  becomes  so  character- 
istic a  feature  of  more  highly  developed  intelligence. 
A  re-presentative  factor,  present  in  consciousness, 
anticipates,  in  temporal  sequence,  the  occurrence  of  a 
like  presentative  factor.  And  there  appears  to  me 
to  be  nothing  illogical  in  urging  that  such  re- 
presentative revival  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
pre-perception. 

At  the  same  time,  hke  Dr.  Stout,  "I  see  no 
intrinsic  absurdity  in  the  assumption  that,  even  in 
the  commencement  of  the  first  performance  of  an 
instinctive  action,"  there  is  present  some  dim  and 
vague  pre-perception  of  the  coming  development  of 
the  instinctive  situation.  There  is  certainly  no 
absurdity  in  assuming  that  the  inherited  dispositions 
of  the  cortex  are  such  as  to  furnish  the  neural 
basis  of  such  vague  and  indefinite  pre-perception  as 
Dr.  Stout  assumes  to  be  present  ab  initio.  I  must, 
however,  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  this  pre-perception 
would  be,  for  my  interpretation,  due  to  an  inherited 
disposition  within  the  cortex,  whereas  instinctive 
behaviour,  as  such,  is  entirely  determined  by 
hereditary  dispositions  within  the  sub-cortical  centres. 
If  this  be  so,  even  granting  that  Mr.  McDougall's 
and  Dr.  Stout's  assumption  is  correct,  it  nowise 
invalidates    my    own    doctrine    of    instinct.      The 


INSTINCT   AND   INTELLIGENCE  47 

supposed  pre-perception  is  something  added  to,  and 
not  part  of,  the  instinctive  consciousness. 

The  question  therefore  turns  upon  the  definition 
of  terms.  Dr.  Stout  and  Mr.  McDougall  include 
under  instinct  the  factor  of  pre-perception  which, 
granting  its  presence  within  experience,  I  should 
exclude  from  instinct,  I  exclude  it  because  I 
believe  it  to  be  correlated  with  hereditary  dis- 
positions of  the  cortex.  If  it  be  included,  how- 
ever, instinctive  behaviour  is  conative  and  of  the 
voluntary  order.  This  is  the  view  of  Dr.  Archdall 
Reid.  Not  realizing  that  this  is  implied  in  what 
Mr.  McDougall  had  written.  Dr.  Reid  says : — ^  "  As 
far  as  I  am  aware,  no  one  but  myself  regards 
instinctive  actions  as  voluntary.  Usually  they  are 
classed  as  a  kind  of  reflex.  However,  I  feel  con- 
fident I  am  right."  His  confidence  is,  of  course, 
justified  if  he  so  defines  instinct  as  to  make  it 
voluntary !  His  definition  is  closely  accordant  with 
that  of  Mr.  McDougall.  Mr.  McDougall  ^  defines 
an  instinct  as  a  specific  and  innate  mental  tendency, 
and  holds  that  it  carries  meaning  from  the  first. 
Dr.  Reid  defines  an  instinct  as  an  innate  and 
inherited  mental  impulse  or  inclination  to  do  a 
certain  act,  and  holds  that  it,  from  the  first,  implies 
the  prompting  of  a  desire  to  do  the  action.  Dr. 
Archdall  Reid  does  not  define  desire ;  but  I  take 
it,  that  what  he  means  by  desire  is  much  the  same 
as  what  Mr.  McDougall  has  in  mind  when  he  insists  on 
the  presence  of  meaning  with  prospective  reference. 

'  G.  Archdall  Reid,  "  The  Laws  of  Heredity  "  {1910),  p.  373. 
'  Wm.  McDougall,  "  An  Introduction  to  Social  Psychology  "  (1908), 
pp.  20 and  28. 


48  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

Let  us  then  grant  that  re-presentative  revival  is 
not  a  necessary  condition  of  pre-perception,  and  that 
anticipatory  consciousness  may  be  determined  by  con- 
genital dispositions  within  the  cortex.  The  position, 
then,  within  the  scheme  of  my  interpretation,  is  this  : 
Within  both  the  lower  brain-centres  and  the  cortex 
there  are  inherited  structural  dispositions  which  on 
stimulation  function  in  a  congenital  manner.  The 
processes  in  the  lower  centres  determine  what  is  from 
a  biological  point  of  view  instinctive  performance  ; 
the  cortex  is  also  affected  and  there  is  correlated 
instinctive  experience.  But  since  the  cortex  itself 
has  its  inherited  dispositions,  there  occurs  a  cortical 
spread  of  disturbance  which  is  correlated  with  pre- 
perceptive  or  anticipatory  consciousness.  Just  in  so 
far  as,  through  natural  selection,  the  hereditary  lines 
of  cortical  spread  are  consonant  with  the  lines  of 
sub-cortical  and  instinctive  spread,  will  the  antici- 
patory consciousness  be  consonant  with  that  evoked 
by  instinctive  performance.  I  shall  deal  in  the  fourth 
chapter  with  hereditary  cortical  dispositions  and 
innate  mental  tendencies. 

No  doubt,  as  Dr.  Stout  says,  the  initial  pre-per- 
ception of  end  to  be  attained  is  "  relatively  indeter- 
minate ;  for  the  animal  has  no  clue  to  the  particular 
character  of  the  changes  which  are  to  take  place. 
The  particular  character  of  the  changes  only  becomes 
specified  as  they  actually  occur  in  consequence  of  the 
instinctive  movements  which  are  specially  provided 
for  in  the  inherited  constitution  of  the  animal.  .  .  . 
The  animal  will  initially  have  no  anticipation  of  the 
special  means  by  which  the  end  is  attainable,  or  the 
special  form  which  it  will  assume.     It  is  precisely 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE         49 

this  deficiency  which  is  supplied  by  the  inherited 
constitution  of  its  nervous  system  as  pre-adjusted  for 
a  certain  mode  of  behaviour  in  certain  circumstances." 
But,  in  the  form  in  which  I  can  provisionally  accept 
Professor  Stout's  doctrine  of  vague  initial  pre-per- 
ception,  this  too  is  provided  for  in  the  inherited 
constitution  of  the  nervous  system.  In  my  view  this 
is  provided  for  in  the  inherited  constitution  of  the 
cortex  ;  while  the  pre-adjustment  for  a  certain  mode 
of  behaviour  in  certain  circumstances  is  provided  for 
in  the  inherited  constitution  of  the  lower  nerve-centres. 
The  former  provides  the  psycho-physiological  basis 
of  that  indeterminate  interest  in  the  situation  on 
which  Dr.  Stout  lays  stress  ;  the  latter  provides  for  a 
further  development  of  the  situation  on  specific  lines 
through  which  the  interest  is  defined,  kept  up,  and 
increased.  There  is  close  inter-relation  and  co- 
operation between  instinct  and  intelligence. 

This  brings  us  back  to  Dr.  Stout's  original  question 
to  which  he  reverts  in  the  following  passage  :  "  How 
can  the  actual  process  of  learning  by  experience,  which 
is  supposed  to  generate  intelligence,  be  itself  entirely 
unintelligent  ?  How  can  a  series  of  experiences  in 
the  way  of  blind  sensation  and  feeling  result,  on  a 
subsequent  occasion,  in  the  open-eyed  pursuit  of  an 
end  ?  So  far  as  I  can  discover,  this  is  supposed  to 
take  place  merely  through  the  revival  of  past 
experiences  by  association.  But  the  bare  revival  of 
an  experience  cannot  be  or  contain  more  than  the 
original  experience  itself.  If  this  consist  of  blind 
sensation  and  feeling,  so  will  its  reproduction.  No 
intelligent  alteration  of  behaviour  such  as  animals 
actually  display  could  be  accounted  for  in  this  way. 


50  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

The  intelligence  is  shown  in  a  more  or  less  systematic 
modification  of  the  whole  conduct  of  the  animal  when 
a  new  situation  arises  resembling  the  old  one." 
(p.  242.) 

Now  I  have  already  stated  my  opinion  that 
conscious  experience  accompanies  instinctive  be- 
haviour from  its  very  outset  and  that  the  moment 
the  cortical  processes  which  have  experience-correlates 
are  initiated,  they  begin  to  play  down  upon  and 
modify  the  processes  within  the  lower  nerve-centres. 
Thus  I  account  for  the  beginning  of  experience  in  the 
individual,  and  for  the  beginning  of  its  control  over 
behaviour.  The  question  therefore  really  turns  upon 
the  definition  of  intelligence.  As  Mr.  McDougall 
says  (p.  252)  : — "  Stout  will  not  agree  to  restrict  the 
designation  intelligent  to  processes  that  involve 
modification  of  innately  determined  modes  of 
behaviour ;  he  maintains  that  the  process  that  is 
capable  of  resulting  in  such  modification  is  ipso  facto 
intelligent,  whether  or  no  such  modification  of  innate 
dispositions  be  affected  by  it.  It  seems  to  me  that 
Stout  is  here  rejecting  a  very  useful  definition  of 
intelligence  which,  thanks  largely  to  the  work  of 
Lloyd  Morgan,  has  become  widely  accepted.  Will  it 
not  suffice  to  say  that  the  activities  of  a  nature  modi- 
fiable by  experience  are  ipso  facto  m^ni2\  or  psychical ; 
but  that  intelligence  is  not  operative,  is  not  manifested, 
if  no  modification  of  innate  tendencies  is  affected  ?  " 
Dr.  Stout  himself  clearly  indicates  the  point  at  issue. 
He  says,  in  a  passage  already  quoted,  that  what  I  re- 
gard as  intelligent  is  not  the  actual  process  of  learn- 
ing by  experience,  but  only  its  product.  That  is  so. 
Using    the    terms     instinctive     and    intelligent    as 


INSTINCT  AND  INTELLIGENCE         51 

adjectives  to  qualify  the  word  behaviour,  I  have  sought 
analytically  to  distinguish  two  types  of  behaviour,  a 
congenital  type  to  which  the  term  instinctive  should 
be  applied  and  an  acquired  type  to  which  the  term 
intelligent  should  be  applied.  All  goes  smoothly 
enough  so  long  as  we  are  dealing  with  behaviour. 
But  Dr.  Stout,  rightly  I  think,  insists  that  intelligent 
behaviour  is  the  product  of  intelligent  process.  The 
point  is  one  of  great  importance  and  he  does  well  to 
press  it  home.  I  believe  that  I  am  in  substantial 
agreement  with  him  though  we  may  seem  to  differ. 
But  I  cannot  discuss  the  matter  fully  here.  It  belongs 
to  a  later  stage  of  my  thesis.  I  shall  there 
emphasize  the  distinction,  which  I  regard  as  cardinal, 
between  experience  as  experienr^^  and  experience  as 
experien«>z^.  Now  whenever,  so  far,  I  have  spoken 
of  instinctive  experience  my  statements  have 
reference  to  what  is  experienced.  And  when  I  have 
spoken  of  intelligent  behaviour  as  characterized  by 
some  element  of  meaning,  the  reference  is  to  meaning 
as  intelHgen^^<^ — as  something  meant.  I  have  tacitly 
taken  for  granted  that  what  is  experienced  implies  a 
process  of  experiencing.  Even  when  I  have  spoken 
of  the  moorhen  as  "experiencer "  I  have  looked 
upon  it  as  a  mental  organism  with  a  quasi-objective 
structure  built  up  of  what  it  has  hitherto  experienced. 
Dealing  throughout  with  the  so-called  objective 
aspect  of  experience,  I  have  employed  phraseology 
which  some  of  my  critics  have  no  doubt  regarded  as 
tainted  with  the  vice  of  associationism.  I  have 
described  instinctive  experience  as  compounded  of 
factors  all  coalescent  into  one  felt  situation.  I  have 
said  that  when  the  behaviour  is  intelligent  there  are 


52  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

present  items  which  are  re-presented  or  revived.  As 
long  as  we  are  dealing  with  the  "  eds  "  of  experience 
I  see  no  objection  to  regarding  the  more  complex 
products  as  built  up  by  the  compounding  of  a 
number  of  more  elementary  factors  in  a  higher 
synthesis.  But  when  we  come  to  consider  the  more 
vital "  ing  "  of  experience,  and  try  in  some  measure 
to  think  mental  process  instead  of  thinking  of  mental 
products,  then,  I  conceive,  the  terminology  of 
association  is  wholly  inapplicable.  Our  own  mental 
life  is  not  one  in  which  perceiving,  conceiving, 
remembering,  imagining,  and  so  forth,  are  con- 
tiguously associated.  It  is  all  of  these,  with  differing 
emphasis  ;  and  all  of  these  at  once,  interpenetrating 
and  merging,  as  M.  Bergson  would  say.  It  gives  rise  no 
doubt  to  associated  products  ;  but  that  is  just  because 
it  is  an  associating  process.  If  then  Dr.  Stout  claims 
that  an  associating  process  must  be  present  on  the 
first  occasion  in  order  that  associated  products  shall  be 
subsequently  revived,  I  most  fully  agree  with  him. 
And  if  he  claims  that  the  associating  process  is  one 
and  continuous  throughout  conscious  life,  from  start  to 
finish,  there  is  really  no  essential  difference  between 
us  on  that  matter.  I  can  therefore,  in  large  measure, 
if  not  wholly,  agree  with  him  when  he  says  that 
"  there  is  no  special  form  of  psychical  activity  which 
requires  to  be  distinguished  by  the  technical  term 
instinct.  If  the  term  is  to  have  a  distinctive  and 
useful  meaning  it  must  refer  directly,  not  to  a  form 
of  psychical  process,  but  to  purely  biological  adapt- 
ation comparable  to  the  prearrangements  of  structure 
and  function  which  in  human  beings  subserve  the 
digestion    of    food "    (p.    243).     This    in    the    main 


INSTINCT  AND   INTELLIGENCE         53 

expresses  my  own  view.  The  sequence  of  instinctive 
experience,  correlated  with  a  physiological  sequence 
in  the  cortex,  though  it  is  a  conscious  sequence, 
and  though  it  affords  data  for  an  associating  process, 
is  not  in  itself  a  psychical  process  proper,  because  its 
course  is  not  determined  by  conscious  relationships, 
but  is  determined  by  purely  organic  and  physiological 
relationships,  comparable  to  those  which  subserve  the 
digestion  of  food.  It  is  just  for  this  reason  that  I  do 
not  regard  it  as  conative,  since  I  conceive  that  it  is  of 
the  essence  of  conative  process  that  it  is  determined 
by  conscious  relationships  with  their  attendant 
psychical  values.  All  intelligent  process  is  truly 
conative  since  it  is  determined  by  conscious  relation- 
ship to  an  end  more  or  less  clearly  anticipated.  It  is 
just  because  Dr.  Stout  regards  pre-perception  as 
always  present  as  a  condition  of  the  course  of  mental 
process,  that  he  is  fully  justified  in  urging  that 
intelligence  and  conation  are,  so  far,  in  being  ab 
initio. 


CHAPTEK    III 

REFLEX   ACTION    AND   INSTINCT 

I  HAVE  approached  the  consideration  of  behaviour 
from  the  biological  side,  though  I  seek  also  to 
correlate  it  with  its  accompanying  experience. 
Taking,  for  example,  the  graceful  and  effective  flight 
of  the  swallow  on  the  wing  which  would  popularly 
be  regarded  as  an  instinctive  performance,  I  regard 
much  of  its  delicate  accuracy,  and  the  nicety  of  its 
accommodation  to  varying  circumstances,  as  due  to 
intelligent  guidance,  the  outcome  of  much  experience 
gained  on  previous  occasions  and  now  utilized  on 
this  occasion.  Some  slight  improvement  may  be 
due  to  the  repeated  functioning  of  the  lower  nerve- 
centres  as  such :  some  further  improvement  is  no 
doubt  due  to  the  continued  development  and  matur- 
ing of  these  centres.  But  more  improvement  is,  I 
conceive,  due  to  cortical  influence.  I  do  not  suggest, 
and  have  never  dreamt  of  suggesting,  that  the  flight 
of  an  adult  swallow  would  be  what  it  is,  and  as  it  is, 
in  the  absence  of  such  interaction  between  the  higher 
and  the  lower  nerve-centres.  But  tracing  backwards 
the  story  of  flight-development  in  the  individual  bird 
— piecing  together  such  a  story  from  what  appear  to  be 
trustworthy  observations — I   reach  the   stage   when 

54 


REFLEX    ACTION   AND    INSTINCT        55 

the  swallow  first  dives  from  the  nest.*  I  am  satisfied 
that  on  this  first  occasion  we  have  true  flight,  in  the 
absence  of  any  previous  experience  of  flight  as  such. 
If  it  be  said  that  the  young  bird  has  had  ample 
opportunities  of  seeing  its  parents  fly,  and  has 
already  learnt  to  fly  by  watching  them,  I  venture  to 
assert  that  in  no  such  manner  can  a  skilled  act 
be  learnt.  If  even  a  man  cannot  learn  to  fence  or  to 
play  billiards  by  watching  others  who  are  skilled 
exponents,  and  this  notwithstanding  the  fact  of  the 
large  amount  of  control  over  his  bodily  activities 
already  acquired  by  long  experience  and  practice  in 
other  fields  of  skill,  how  can  we  expect  a  fledgling 
swallow  to  learn  to  fly  by  watching  his  parents,  see- 
ing that  he  has  never  yet  put  his  wings  to  their  true 
functional  use  ?  I  do  not  deny  that  he  has  already 
some  experience  of  fluttering  his  wings  within  and  on 
the  edge  of  the  nest.  I  am  ready  to  grant  him  so 
much  experience  before  he  dives  from  the  nest ;  but 
I  contend  that  the  actual  flight,  when  he  commits 
himself  to  the  wing,  is  a  substantially  new  experience. 
Again  I  do  not  deny  that  during  his  very  first  flight 
he  is,  all  the  time  of  its  continuance,  gaining  ex- 
perience ;  nor  do  I  deny  that  the  experience  thus 
being  gained  from  moment  to  moment  is  from 
moment  to  moment  influential  on  his  efl'ective  flight. 
Provisionally  I  am  prepared  to  admit  the  possible 
presence  of  exceedingly  dim,  vague,  and  ill-defined 
pre-perception  of  the  behaviour  that  is  coming,  just 
before  it  actually  comes ;  but  I  assume  that  all 
experience  is  the  conscious  accompaniment  of  the 
functional  activity  of  the  cortical  centres,  and  that 

'  For  details,  see  "Habit  and  Instinct,"  p.  71. 


66  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

this  should  analytically  be  distinguished  from  the 
subtly  compounded  reflex  actions  of  the  lower  centres 
by  which  instinctive  behaviour  as  such  is  determined. 

Dr.  Myers  has  said^: — "The  old  view  that 
instincts  are  merely  'complex  reflexes'  dies  hard. 
Even  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan,  if  I  understand  him 
correctly,  hesitates  to  relinquish  it."  Dr.  Myers 
might  have  gone  further ;  for,  from  the  physiological 
and  biological  point  of  view  I  have  not  the  smallest 
hesitation  in  retaining  it.  That,  in  my  opinion,  is 
just  exactly  what  primarily,  and  in  their  first  intent, 
they  are — complex  reflexes,  constituting  adaptive 
behaviour  of  the  organism,  the  nature  of  which  is 
determined  by  the  inherited  structure  and  the 
physiological  dispositions  of  the  sub-cortical  nerve- 
centres.  It  is  these  complexly  co-ordinated  reflexes 
which  determine  instinctive  behaviour  as  I  define  it  ; 
and  if  the  organism  were  possessed  only  of  sub- 
cortical centres  there  would  be  the  end  of  the  matter. 
But  it  so  happens  that  the  organism  is  possessed  also 
of  cortical  centres.  Afferent  impulses  from  the  whole 
behaving  animal — impulses  arising  out  of  all  that 
occurs  from  the  initial  stimulation  to  the  final 
response — reach  the  cortex,  stimulate  it  [to  functional 
activity,  and  thus  aflbrd  data  of  conscious  experience. 
If  then  we  regard  instinctive  behaviour  as,  primarily 
and  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  the  outcome  of 
complex  reflexes,  we  must  also  regard  instinctive 
experience  as,  secondarily  and  from  the  psychological 
point  of  view,  the  synthetic  product  of  the  data  afforded 
by  instinctive  behaviour. 

Regarding  the  interpretation   of  behaviour  from 
'  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  210. 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND  INSTINCT       57 

the  physiological  point  of  view,  we  have  now  to  direct 
our  attention  to  the  relation  of  instinctive  performance 
to  reflex-action  on  the  one  hand  and  to  cortical 
control  on  the  other  hand.  My  summary  account  of 
reflex  phenomena  is  based  on  Dr.  C.  S.  Sherrington's 
admirable  work.^  I  shall  adopt  his  terminology 
and  in  stating  some  of  his  conclusions  shall  often  use 
his  own  words.  The  simplest  reflex  involves  three 
distinguishable  but  related  processes  ;  initiation  by  a 
stimulus,  conduction,  and  end-effect ;  and  for  these 
three  processes  there  are  three  separable  structures, 
the  receptor  for  the  initiation,  the  effector  for  the  end- 
effect,  and,  between  these  two,  the  conductor.  Now 
such  processes  occur  in  the  unicellular  organisms  ; 
but,  in  them,  separable  structures  are  not  clearly 
differentiated.  Whether  it  is  desirable  to  apply  the 
term  "  reflex  "  to  the  behaviour  of  protozoa  we  need 
not  here  discuss.  Dr.  Sherrington  thinks  it  better  to 
reserve  the  term  for  reactions  involving  specifically 
recognizable  nerve-processes,  and  morphologically 
differentiated  nerve-cells — involving,  that  is  to  say,  a 
reflex-arc,  with  receptor,  conductor,  and  effector. 
The  reflex  therefore  implies  the  existence  of  organic 
processes  within  the  constituent  structural  cells  ;  and 
it  suggests,  if  it  does  not  necessarily  imply,  the 
existence  of  physiological  processes  in  the  organic 
substance  which  intervenes  between  the  cells.  Such 
a  simple  reflex  is  then,  for  physiological  interpretation 
the  unit  reaction  in  nervous  integration.  The  idea 
we  form  of  a  simple  reflex  is,  however,  an  abstract 
and  analytic  conception  ;   because   all   parts   of  the 

'  C.  S.  Sherrington,   •'  The  Integrative  Action  of  the   Nervous 
System  "  (1906). 


58  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

nervous  system  are  connected  together  and  probably 
no  part  of  it  is  ever  capable  of  reaction  without  affect- 
ing and  being  affected  by  various  other  parts.  In 
any  case  it  only  exhibits  in  ideal  simplicity  the  first 
grade  of  co-ordination.  It  is  obvious  that  if  the 
integration  of  the  animal  mechanism  is  due  to 
co-ordination  by  reflex  action,  reflexes  must  them- 
selves be  co-ordinated  with  one  another ;  for  the 
co-ordination  by  reflex  action  there  must  be  co- 
ordination of  reflex  actions.  This  is  the  second 
grade  of  co-ordination.  By  further  compounding  of 
reflexes  the  net  result  is  an  orderly  co-adjustment 
and  sequence  of  reactions  in  the  organism  as  a  whole. 

Now  if  I  have  so  far  rightly  expressed  Dr. 
Sherrington's  conclusions,  these  questions  arise: — 
How  far  does  this  process  of  the  compounding  of 
reflexes  extend  .-'  In  the  progressive  development  of 
nervous  function  is  there  some  stage  at  which 
another  and  a  different  process  supervenes?  If  so 
what  is  the  physiological  nature  of  this  different 
process  }  Granted  that  there  are  two  processes,  does 
the  difference  between  them  coincide  with  the  alleged 
difference  between  compound  reflex  action  and 
instinctive  behaviour?  Leaving  these  questions  for 
the  present  unanswered  we  may  consider  first  the 
integration  that  is  effected  by  the  spinal  cord ; 
secondly  the  integration  which  takes  place  when  not 
only  the  spinal  cord  but  the  sub- cortical  brain-centres 
are  effective  ;  and  thirdly  the  nature  of  the  further 
integration  which  is  brought  about  by  the  functional 
activity  of  the  cerebral  cortex. 

We  have  seen  that  our  conception  of  a  simple 
reflex  is  the  product  of  abstract  thought.     It  is  the 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND   INSTINCT        59 

unit  reaction  which  is  reached  by  the  physiological 
analysis  of  the  functional  process  of  a  highly  complex 
nervous  system.  It  seems  to  involve  at  least  three 
structural  units  or  neurones — very  often  more  than 
three,  but  at  least  three.  There  is  on  the  one  hand 
the  receptive  neurone  proceeding  from  the  receptor  to 
the  grey  matter  of  a  segment  of  the  spinal  cord  ; 
there  is  on  the  other  hand  the  effective  neurone 
connecting  the  grey  matter  of  that  or  another  segment 
of  the  spinal  cord  with  the  effector  in  gland  or 
muscle  ;  and  between  these  lies  the  third  neurone, 
within  the  spinal  cord,  connecting  the  other  two. 
Into  the  details  of  minute  structure  we  need  not 
enter.  The  matters  of  emphasis  are ;  first  that  the 
several  neurones  are  separable  but  related  cells ; 
secondly  that  the  cells  are  functionally  coupled  at 
the  synapses,  where  delicately  branching  tufts  of  the 
one  cell  come  into  relation  with  those  of  the  other 
cell ;  thirdly  that  the  conduction  across  the  synapse 
is  always,  under  normal  conditions,  forward  towards 
the  effector ;  fourthly  that  crossing  the  synapse 
involves  some  resistance  and  delay  in  the  passage 
of  the  nervous  impulse  through  the  arc,  and  that 
this  resistance  is  variable ;  and  lastly  that,  if  we 
regard  the  connexions  within  the  simple  reflex  arc 
as  primary  connexions,  we  must  remember  that  there 
are  indefinitely  numerous  secondary  synaptic  con- 
nexions, with  other  neurones.  Obviously  this  last 
feature  is  of  great  importance.  Isolated  though  it 
may  be  for  abstract  thought,  the  simple  reflex  is  never 
isolated  in  functional  activity ;  if  it  were  so  isolated 
the  integration  of  reflexes  would  be  a  physiological 
impossibility. 


60  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

What  we  commonly  term  a  reflex  act  is  generally  a 
pretty  complex  matter  and,  in  its  normal  occurrence, 
involves  other  reflexes.  Take,  for  example,  the 
well-known  scratching  reflex  of  the  dog.  If  some  part 
of  a  large  saddle-shaped  area  around  and  behind  the 
shoulder  be  irritated,  vigorous  scratching  of  the 
hind-foot  of  that  side  follows.  But  how  far  this 
is  from  the  simple  reflex  reached  by  abstraction ! 
It  involves  rapidly  alternating  flexion  and  extension  ; 
and  it  further  involves  such  modification  of  other 
reflexes  as  is  implied  by  the  fact  that  the  dog  has  to 
stand  on  three  legs  while  he  scratches  with  the 
fourth.  He  may  at  the  same  time  turn  his  head, 
open  his  mouth,  prick  his  ear,  bend  his  tail  and  so 
forth.  Moreover  the  dog  seems  to  "  know "  just 
where  to  scratch  ;  further  forward  or  further  back  in 
accordance  with  the  position  of  the  pulex  irritans, 
which  affords  the  initiating  stimulus.  Now  does 
the  dog  thus  act  by  the  compounding  of  reflexes,  or 
does  he  act  instinctively  or  again  does  he  act 
intelligently  ?  I  take  it  that  the  normal  dog  "  knows  " 
that  he  is  scratching  in  the  sense  of  just  having  a  bit 
of  scratching  experience  ;  and  I  see  no  reason  why 
we  should  deny  that  he  to  some  extent  guides  his 
scratching  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the 
experience  he  is  getting.  Translating  this  into 
physiological  terms  the  cortex  is  called  into  activity 
and  exercises  some  influence  over  the  scratching 
process.  But  how  shall  we  translate  into 
physiological  terms  the  relation  between  the 
instinctive  response  and  compound  reflex  action  ? 
Shall  we  say,  quite  provisionally,  that  if  it  involves 
sub-cortical  brain-centres  we  may  term  it  instinctive ; 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND  INSTINCT       61 

while  if  it  involves  no  centres  higher  than  those 
in  the  spinal  cord  we  may  regard  it  as  a  compound 
reflex  ?  If  so  we  must  remember  that  the  distinction 
is  quite  provisional. 

Now  much  of  Dr.  Sherrington's  illuminating 
work  on  reflex  action  has  been  carried  out  on  the 
"spinal  animal."  It  is  found  that  an  animal  will 
recover  from  the  effects  of  the  operation  of  transect- 
ing the  spinal  cord  in  the  region  of  the  neck.  By 
this  operation  the  normal  connexion  between  the 
brain  and  the  parts  of  the  spinal  cord  below  the 
level  of  transection  is  severed,  and  it  is  possible 
to  study  the  integrative  action  of  the  disconnected 
spinal  cord.  If  we  assume  that  conscious  experience 
is  correlated  with  the  functioning  of  cortical 
neurones,  the  spinal  animal  as  such  is  an  un- 
conscious automaton.  On  this  view,  which  for  the 
present  we  may  provisionally  accept,  the  reflex 
phenomena  are  the  outcome  of  physiological 
mechanism,  or,  to  use  a  preferable  phrase,  of 
physiological  integration.  We  shall  have  to  consider 
at  a  later  stage  of  our  inquiry  the  relations  of 
mechanism  to  vitalism  and  finalism.  Here  and  now 
it  suffices  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  natural 
processes  of  the  organic  world,  of  which  the  integra- 
tive action  of  the  nervous  system  is  a  conspicuous 
example,  differ  in  many  important  and  essential 
respects  from  the  natural  processes  of  the  lifeless 
inorganic  world.  If  therefore  one  speaks  of  the 
mechanism  of  the  nervous  system,  it  must  be  under- 
stood that  one  does  so  without  philosophical  implica- 
tions, using  the  term  descriptively  ;  and  that  one  is 
dealing   with  living    mechanism    subject    to    those 


62  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

specialized    conditions    which    it     is    the    aim    of 
physiology  to  elucidate. 

The  scratching  reflex  is  readily  elicited  in  a 
spinal  dog,  either  by  gently  plucking  some  of  the 
hairs  on  the  receptive  saddle-shaped  area,  or  by 
electric  stimulation  with  a  fine  needle,  very  lightly 
inserted  in  the  skin  near  the  hair-roots.  There  is 
some  differentiation  of  the  response  in  accordance 
with  the  locality  of  the  stimulus.  Thus,  when  the 
irritation  is  far  forward  the  foot  is  carried  farther 
forward  ;  when  the  irritation  is  far  back  the  foot  is 
carried  farther  back.  To  bring  about  the  response 
the  stimulus  must  be  of  sufficient  intensity.  There 
is  a  threshold  of  excitability  which  varies  according 
to  the  circumstances.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the 
receptor  has  its  own  threshold,  the  reflex  arc  as  a 
whole  offers  some  resistance  to  the  passage  of  the 
nervous  impulse  ;  for  the  synapses  interpose  barriers 
to  the  passage,  and  if  the  whole  arc  is  to  be  called 
into  activity  both  receptor  and  synaptic  thresholds 
must  be  surpassed.  But  by  summation  of  subhminal 
stimuli  the  reflex  may  be  elicited.  If  a  spot  on  the 
receptive  area  be  stimulated  so  slightly  that  no 
response  follows,  and  if  the  exciting  electric  needle 
be  applied  at  successive  not  too  short  intervals  to 
other  neighbouring  spots  with  like  absence  of  result, 
it  is  none  the  less  found  that  when  two  or  three  of 
these  spots  are  simultaneously  stimulated  the  scratch- 
ing reflex  is  elicited.  Two  stimuli  of  the  receptive 
neurones  of  allied  spots,  each  of  which  is  by  itself 
ineffective,  combine  to  constitute  a  sufficient  stimulus 
calling  the  effector  neurones  into  play.  So,  too,  a 
succession  of  subliminal  stimuli  on  the  same  spot, 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND   INSTINCT       63 

and  perhaps  still   more  a  succession  of  subliminal 
stimuli  on  closely  allied  spots,  serve  to  evoke  the 
response.     Under   normal   circumstances   scratching 
results   from    an   allied    series   of    slight   irritations. 
That's  where  the  flea  comes  in.     In  the  case  of  some 
reflexes   there   is  an  added   allied   reflex  from   the 
receptors  in  muscles,  sheaths  and  tendons  which  are 
stimulated  by  the  muscular  activity.     Although  the 
receptor  portion  of  this  reflex  arc  is  obviously  quite 
diff"erent  from  that  which  proceeds  from    the  skin, 
it  seems  to  make  use  of  the  same  effector  neurone, 
and  thus  supplements  the  initiating  reflex.     This  is 
the  case  in  the  flexion-reflex  of  the  leg.     This  reflex 
is  elicited  by  a  sharp  pin-prick  on  the  sole  of  the 
foot ;  but  added  strength  is  given  to  this  reflex  when 
the  leg  is  flexed.     The  reflex  excited  by  the  muscles 
in  action  allies  itself  with  the  reflex  excited  by  the 
pin-prick  on  the  footpad  or  between  the  toes.     A 
subliminal  stimulation  of  the  afferent  nerve  of  the 
hamstring  muscle,  if  it   be   applied   simultaneously 
with  a  subliminal  stimulation  of  the  foot,  results  in 
a  marked  flexion  reflex,  though  neither  stimulus  by 
itself  suffices  to  do  so.     In  both  these  reflexes,  there- 
fore, we  have  an  effector  path  common  to  more  than 
one   receptor   path,  the   stimuli    from  which  act   in 
alliance  upon  the  efi'ector  organ. 

The  pin-prick  on  the  foot  gives  rise  to  a  flexion 
reflex  drawing  up  the  leg,  and  thus  removing  the  foot 
from  the  source  of  injury.  The  same  stimulus  which 
excites  the  muscles  which  bend  the  leg  at  the  same 
time  inhibits  those  which  extend  it.  But  if,  instead  of 
applying  a  prick  or  electric  stimulus,  smooth  and 
gentle  pressure  be  applied  to  the  foot  between  the 


64  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

pads,  the  result  is  different.  A  strong,  brief  exten- 
sion follows  called  the  extensor  thrust.  It  is 
generally  accompanied  by  a  similar  brief  extension 
of  the  three  other  limbs.  The  flexion  reflex  and  the 
extensor  thrust  are  antagonistic.  They  cannot  both 
occur  at  once  in  the  same  limb.  Similarly  with  the 
scratching  reflex.  A  dog,  whether  it  be  normal  or 
spinal,  cannot  scratch  both  sides  at  once  with  both 
hind  feet.  Now  suppose  the  left  leg  is  scratching  in 
response  to  a  stimulus  from  the  left  shoulder ;  a 
stimulus  on  the  right  shoulder  w^ill  inhibit  the 
response  of  the  left  leg,  though  the  stimulus  on  the 
left  shoulder  is  still  continued.  It  is  clear,  therefore, 
that  both  stimuli,  that  which  provokes  and  that,  from 
the  other  side,  which  inhibits,  take  effect  through  the 
same  effector  neurones. 

We  are  thus  led  up  to  the  principle  of  the 
common  path.  I  am  throughout  giving  expression, 
partly  in  his  own  words,  to  Dr.  Sherrington's  results. 
Here  I  condense  his  description  (p.  115).  "At  the 
commencement  of  every  reflex  arc  is  a  receptive 
neurone  extending  from  the  receptive  surface  to  the 
central  nervous  organ.  This  neurone  forms  the  sole 
avenue  which  impulses,  generated  at  its  receptive 
point  (or  small  group  of  points)  can  use,  whither- 
soever their  destination.  This  neurone  is  therefore 
a  path  exclusive  to  the  impulses  generated  at  its  own 
receptive  point,  and  other  receptive  points  than  its 
own  cannot  employ  it.  .  .  .  But  at  the  termination 
of  every  reflex  arc  we  find  a  final  neurone,  the 
ultimate  conductive  link  to  an  effector  organ.  This 
last  link  of  the  chain  differs  obviously  in  one 
important  respect  from  the  first  link  of  the  chain.     It 


REFLEX    ACTION   AND   INSTINCT       65 

does  not  subserve  exclusively  impulses  generated  at 
one  single  receptive  source,  but  receives  impulses 
from  many  receptive  sources  situate  in  many  and 
various  regions  of  the  body.  It  is  the  sole  path 
which  all  impulses,  no  matter  whence  they  come, 
must  travel  if  they  are  to  act  on  the  muscle-fibres  to 
which  it  leads.  Therefore,  while  the  receptive 
neurone  forms  a  private  path  exclusively  serving 
impulses  of  one  source  only,  the  final  or  efferent 
neurone  is,  so  to  say,  a  public  path,  common  to 
impulses  arising  at  any  of  many  sources  of  reception. 
.  .  .  Before  finally  converging  upon  the  motor  neurone, 
the  arcs  converge  to  some  degree.  Their  private 
paths  embouch  upon  internuncial  paths  common  in 
various  degree  to  groups  of  private  paths.  The 
terminal  path  may,  to  distinguish  it  from  internuncial 
common  paths,  be  called  the  final  common  path. 
The  motor  nerve  to  a  muscle  is  a  collection  of  final 
common  paths." 

But  though  the  impulses  from  a  number  of  private 
paths  thus  converge  upon  the  common  final  path 
they  may  also  so  affect  other  neurones  in  the  spinal 
cord  as  to  give  rise  to  a  distribution  to  other  final 
paths.  Thus  the  effector  discharge  elicited  from  a 
single  point  of  prick  stimulation  in  the  hind  limb 
may  be  distributed  to  the  muscles  at  hip,  knee,  and 
ankle.  The  reflex  throws  into  contraction  the  flexor 
muscles  of  each  of  these  joints ;  it  also  throws  into 
contraction  the  extensor  muscles  of  the  opposite 
limb ;  and  it  at  the  same  time  causes  a  relaxation  of 
the  extensor  muscles  in  the  flexed  leg.  If  the  spinal 
cord,  as  the  result  of  other  reflexes,  happens  to  be 
sending   impulses    to    these   extensor   muscles,   the 

F 


66  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

flexion  reflex  has  the  effect  of  inhibiting  the 
discharge.  The  result  is  that,  when  reflex  action 
occurs,  not  only  are  the  flexor  muscles  made  to 
contract,  but  their  antagonists,  the  extensors,  are  at 
the  same  time  relaxed.  This  automatic  throwing  of 
antagonists  out  of  action  is  of  much  service  in  further- 
ing co-ordination.  If  there  be  two  coincident  reflexes 
in  extensors  and  flexors,  respectively,  the  result  is 
either  this  reflex  or  that  reflex,  but  not  the  two 
together.  "  The  flexor  reflex,  when  it  occurs,  seems 
to  exclude  the  extensor  reflex,  and  vice  versa.  If 
there  resulted  a  compromise  between  the  two  reflexes, 
so  that  each  reflex  had  a  share  in  the  resultant,  the 
compound  would  be  an  action  which  was  neither  the 
appropriate  flexion  nor  the  appropriate  extension. 
Were  there  to  occur  at  the  final  common  path 
algebraical  summation  of  the  influence  exerted  on  it 
by  two  opposed  receptive  arcs,  there  would  result  in 
the  effector  organ  an  action  adapted  to  neither,  and 
useless  for  the  purposes  of  either." 

These  purely  physiological  results  have  an 
important  bearing  on  the  interpretation  of  instinctive 
behaviour  and  its  early  modification  through  the 
meaning  it  acquires.  The  chick  which  has  had 
experience  of  a  nauseous  insect,  acts  differently 
when  it  comes  upon  a  similar  insect  on  a  subsequent 
occasion.  But  his  different  behaviour  is  not  a  mere 
compromise  between  originally  successive  reflexes, 
though  some  signs  of  compromise,  accompanied  by 
apparent  hesitation,  may  sometimes  be  observed.* 
More    commonly    the    pecking    reflex    is    entirely 

'  Cf.  G.  F.  Stout,  *'  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii,,  pp. 
242,  243. 


REFLEX  ACTION   AND   INSTINCT       67 

inhibited  by  the  cortical  process  which  carries 
meaning.  We  do  not  find  at  the  same  time  or  in 
rapid  succession  a  combination  of  pecking  at  the 
insect  and  ejection  from  the  bill.  We  find  one 
reflex  or  the  other  reflex  or  neither  ;  or  perhaps  the 
one  with  diminished  efficacy.  We  seldom  get  any 
muddling  up  of  the  one  with  the  other.  That  is  not 
the  way  in  which  behaviour  normally  develops.  The 
very  familiar  fact  of  the  swiftly-established  avoidance 
of  the  unpleasant  or  the  painful, — a  fact  which  is  of 
the  utmost  importance  for  the  theory  of  the  guidance 
of  behaviour  in  a  world  where  pain  is  a  warning  of 
danger  to  the  organism — this  fact  maybe  correlated 
with  that  prepotency  of  noxious  stimuli,  when  there 
is  any  competition  for  the  use  of  a  common  path,  to 
which  attention  will  presently  be  drawn. 

To  revert  now  to  the  physiological  teachings  of 
the  spinal  animal  the  "dilemma  between  reflexes 
would  seem,"  says  Dr.  Sherrington,  "  to  be  a  problem 
of  frequent  occurrence  in  reflex  co-ordination.  We 
note  an  orderly  sequence  of  actions  in  the  movements 
of  animals,  even  in  cases  where  every  observer  admits 
that  the  co-ordination  is  merely  reflex.  We  see  one 
act  succeed  another  without  confusion.  Yet, 
tracing  this  sequence  to  its  external  causes,  we 
recognize  that  the  usual  thing  in  nature  is  not  for 
one  exciting  stimulus  to  begin  immediately  after 
another  ceases,  but  for  an  array  of  environmental 
agents  acting  concurrently  on  the  animal  at  any 
moment  to  exhibit  correlative  change  in  regard  to  it, 
so  that  one  or  other  group  of  them  becomes — 
generally  by  increase  in  intensity — temporarily 
prepotent.     Thus  there  dominates  now  this  group, 


68  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

now  that  group  in  turn.  It  may  happen  that  one 
stimulus  ceases  coincidently  as  another  begins,  but 
as  a  rule  one  stimulus  overlaps  another  in  regard 
to  time.  Thus  each  reflex  breaks  in  upon  a  condition 
of  relative  equilibrium,  which  latter  is  itself  reflex.  In 
the  simultaneous  correlation  of  reflexes,  some  reflexes 
combine  harmoniously,  being  reactions  that  mutually 
reinforce.  These  may  be  termed  allied  reflexes,  and 
the  neural  arcs  which  they  employ,  allied  arcs.  On 
the  other  hand,  some  reflexes,  as  mentioned  above, 
are  antagonistic  one  to  another  and  incompatible. 
These  do  not  mutually  reinforce,  but  stand  to  each 
other  in  inhibitory  relation.  One  of  them  inhibits 
the  other,  or  a  whole  group  of  others.  These  reflexes 
may  in  regard  to  one  another  be  termed  antagonistic  ; 
and  the  reflex  or  group  of  reflexes  which  succeeds 
in  inhibiting  its  opponents  may  be  termed  prepotent 
for  the  time  being"  (p.  119). 

It  is  characteristic  of  such  reflexes  as  scratching 
that  there  is  alternation  of  flexion  and  extension — 
an  alternation  which  gives  rise  to  a  rhythm  of  about 
four  strokes  per  second.  This  seems  to  be  mainly 
due  to  the  fact  that  following  the  excitation  of  the 
flexors  there  is  a  refractory  state  during  which  the 
mechanism  shows  diminished  excitability.  Such 
a  refractory  state  allows  for  phases  during  which 
stimuli  fail  to  excite,  alternating  with  phases  in  which 
the  stimuli  easily  excite.  In  the  scratch-reflex  the 
refractory  period  is  short — less  than  one-fifth  of  a 
second.  But  in  the  extensor  thrust  it  is  relatively 
long,  lasting  for  nearly  one  second.  For  this  period 
of  time  the  stimulation  of  the  foot  fails  to  elicit 
another  extensor  response.     As  the  extensor  thrust 


REFLEX  ACTION  AND  INSTINCT       69 

is  probably  an  important  elen:ient  in  the  mechanism 
of  the  dog's  locomotion,  the  biological  utility  of  the 
prolonged  refractory  state  is  suggested.  "  After  the 
extensor-thrust,  the  limb  has  to  be  given  over  to  the 
flexor  muscles  in  order,  without  touching  the  ground 
to  swing  forward  in  preparation  for  the  next  step  by 
the  limb.  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  part  of 
the  means  by  which  selective  adaptation  has  secured 
this  result  is  the  evolution  of  the  long  refractory 
phase  following  the  activity  in  the  reflex  arc  of  the 
extensor-thrust "  (p  69). 

The  phenomena  of  spinal  irradiation  and  induc- 
tion, together  with  fatigue  effect,  serve  to  render  the 
combination  and  co-ordination  of  reflexes  more 
effective.  A  strong  stimulation  gives  rise  to  spinal 
disturbance  which  spreads  from  that  focal  response 
which  is  normal  for  a  normal  stimulus,  to  other 
allied  responses.  But  the  spread  is  an  orderly 
spread.  Thus,  as  stimulation  of  the  foot  for  the 
flexion-reflex  is  increased,  the  extension  of  the 
opposite  hind  limb  becomes  more  marked,  then 
follow  in  the  fore  limb  of  the  same  side  extension 
at  elbow  and  retraction  at  shoulder,  then  in  the 
opposite  fore-limb  flexion  at  elbow,  extension  at 
wrist  and  some  protraction  at  shoulder  ;  also  turning 
of  the  head  towards  the  stimulated  side,  and  often 
opening  of  the  mouth  and  lateral  deviation  of  the 
tail  (p.  1 51)'  "The  stimulus  which  excites  a  reflex 
tends  by  central  spread  to  facilitate  and  lower  the 
threshold  for  reflexes  allied  to  that  which  it  par- 
ticularly excites.  A  constellation  of  reflexes  thus 
tends  to  be  formed  which  reinforce  each  other,  so 
that   the   reflex    is   supported    by    allied    accessory 


TO  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

reflexes,  or  if  the  prepotent  stimulus  shifts,  allied  arcs 
are  by  the  induction  particularly  prepared  to  be 
responsive  to  it  or  to  a  similar  stimulus"  (p.  206). 
This  is  termed  by  Dr.  Sherrington  immediate  spinal 
induction.  In  successive  induction  it  would  seem 
that,  in  the  case  of  a  reflex  which  is  accompanied 
by  the  inhibition  of  an  antagonistic  reflex,  this 
inhibition  is  followed  by  a  phase  of  exalted  activity. 
During  the  flexor-reflex,  for  example,  the  extensor 
arcs  are  inhibited  ;  but  after  the  flexor-reflex  these 
opposing  arcs  are  in  a  state  of  exalted  excitability. 
Hence  the  flexor-reflex,  if  intense  and  prolonged, 
may,  directly  its  own  exciting  stimulus  is  discontinued, 
be  succeeded  by  a  "  spontaneous  "  reflex  of  extension. 
By  virtue  of  this  spinal  contrast,  therefore,  the  flexion- 
reflex  predisposes  to  and  may  actually  induce  an 
extension-reflex,  and  conversely  an  extension-reflex 
predisposes  to  and  may  actually  induce  a  flexion- 
reflex.  This  process  is  qualified  to  play  a  part  in 
linking  reflexes  together  in  a  co-ordinate  sequence 
of  successive  combination  (pp.  208,  212). 

Another  condition  influencing  the  issue  of  com- 
petition between  reflexes  of  different  source  for 
possession  of  one  and  the  same  common  path  is 
fatigue.  "  It  prevents  the  too  prolonged  continuous 
use  of  the  common  path  by  any  one  receptor.  It 
precludes  one  receptor  from  occupying  for  long 
periods  an  efl"ector  organ  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  receptors.  It  favours  the  receptors  taking 
turn  and  turn  about.  It  helps  to  ensure  serial  variety 
of  reaction"  (pp.  214,  222).  Since  the  efferent 
neurone  forms  a  final  common  path  for  an  indefinite 
number  of  receptors,  one  would  expect  that  it  would 


REFLEX  ACTION  AND  INSTINCT       71 

not,  like  them,  be  readily  susceptible  to  fatigue,  and 
this  expectation  is  justified  by  experimental  evidence. 
There  are,  too,  certain  reflexes  which  persist  for  long 
periods.  These  are  the  reflex  postures.  The  hind 
limbs  of  the  spinal  frog  assume  a  squatting  attitude 
which  is  reflex.  Similarly  in  the  spinal  dog  or  cat, 
certain  muscles  exhibit  a  slight  but  persistent  con- 
traction. This  is  observable  in  those  muscles 
whose  action  antagonizes  gravity.  The  reflex- 
arcs  concerned  in  the  maintenance  of  this  tonic 
contraction  of  muscles  have  been  shown  in  several 
cases  to  arise  within  those  muscles  which  exhibit 
the  reflex  tone.^  Of  all  reflexes  these  tonic  re- 
flexes of  ordinary  posture  are,  in  Dr.  Sherrington's 
experience,  the  most  easily  interrupted  by  other 
reflexes.  "If  various  species  of  reflex  are  arranged 
in  the  order  of  their  potency  in  regard  to  power  to 
interrupt  one  another,  the  reflexes  initiated  in  recep- 
tors which,  considered  as  sense  organs,  excite  sensa- 
tions of  strong  affective  quality,  lie  at  the  upper 
end  of  the  scale,  and  the  reflexes  that  are  answerable 
for  the  postural  tonus  of  skeletal  muscles  lie  at  the 
lower  end  of  the  scale.  One  great  function  of  the 
tonic  reflexes  is  to  maintain  habitual  attitudes  and 
postures.  They  form,  therefore,  a  nervous  back- 
ground of  active  equilibrium.  It  is  of  obvious 
advantage  that  this  equilibrium  should  be  easily 
upset,  so  that  the  animal  may  respond  agilely  to 
the  passing  events  that  break  upon  it  as  intercurrent 
stimuli"  (p.  231). 

In  this  passage  Dr.   Sherrington  places   at   the 

*  C.  S.  Sherrington,  "Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  nth  Ed.,  vol. 
XXV.,  p.  675. 


72  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

top  of  the  scale  of  potency  the  reflexes  which,  in 
the  intact  animal,  have  conscious  concomitants  of 
strong  affective  quality.  It  is  noteworthy  that  even 
in  the  decerebrate  animal,  in  which,  by  transection, 
the  cortical  connexions  have  been  severed,  these 
reflexes  are  prepotent  over  others.  "  It  is  those 
areas,  stimulation  of  which,  as  judged  by  analogy, 
can  excite  pain  most  intensely,  and  it  is  those  stimuli 
which,  as  judged  by  analogy,  are  most  fitted  to 
excite  pain  which,  as  a  general  rule,  excite  in  the 
spinal  animal — where  pain  is  of  course  non-existent — 
the  prepotent  reflexes.  If  there  are  reactions  to 
specific  pain-nerves,  this  may  be  expressed  by  saying 
that  the  nervous  arcs  of  pain-nerves,  broadly  speaking, 
dominate  the  spinal  centres  in  peculiar  degree. 
Physical  pain  is  thus  the  psychical  adjunct  of  an 
imperative  protective  reflex.  It  is  preferable, 
however,  since  into  the  merely  spinal  and  reflex 
aspect  of  the  reaction  of  these  nerves  no  sensation 
of  any  kind  can  be  shown  to  enter,  to  avoid  the 
term  pain-nerves.  Remembering  that  the  feature 
common  to  all  this  group  of  stimuli  is  that  they 
threaten  or  actually  commit  damage  to  the  tissue 
to  which  they  are  applied,  a  convenient  term  for 
application  to  them  is  nocuous.  In  that  case  what, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  sense,  are  cutaneous  pain- 
nerves  are  from  the  point  of  view  of  reflex  reaction 
conveniently  termed  noci-ceptlve  nerves.  In  the  com- 
petition between  reflexes  the  noci-ceptlve  as  a  rule 
dominate  with  peculiar  certainty  and  facility "  (p. 
228). 

I  have  culled  from  Dr.  Sherrington's  illuminating 
work    examples   of   the    integrative    action  of  the 


REFLEX    ACTION   AND  INSTINCT       73 

nervous  system  in  the  spinal  animal.  From  the 
cases  cited  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  even  in  the 
spinal  animal  a  reflex  act  is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
an  isolated  response,  save  for  the  purposes  of 
physiological  analysis.  Any  given  reflex  tends  to 
facilitate  other  allied  reflexes  and  to  inhibit  other 
antagonistic  reflexes.  How  this  inhibition  is  effected 
we  do  not  fully  understand.  It  unquestionably 
plays  an  important  part  in  spinal  integration.  In  the 
spinal  animal  what  takes  place  at  any  given  moment, 
or  in  a  brief  period  of  time  during  which  reflexes  are 
enchained  in  orderly  sequence,  depends  on  the 
spinal  pattern,  set  or  disposition.  "  It  is  not  usual," 
as  Dr.  Sherrington  tells  us,  "  for  the  organism  to  be 
exposed  to  the  action  of  only  one  stimulus  at  a  time. 
It  is  more  usual  for  the  organism  to  be  acted  on  by 
many  stimuli  concurrently,  and  to  be  driven  reflexly 
by  some  group  of  stimuli  which  is  at  any  particular 
moment  prepotent  in  action  on  it.  Such  group  often 
consists  of  some  one  pre-eminent  stimulus,  with 
others  of  harmonious  relation  reinforcing  it,  forming 
with  it  a  constellation  of  stimuli,  that,  in  succession  of 
time,  will  give  way  to  another  constellation  which 
will  in  its  turn  become  prepotent"  (p.  178).  If  then 
there  is,  in'the  spinal  animal,  a  constellation  of  stimuli, 
breaking  in  upon  the  existing  physiological  process 
in  the  cord,  and  resulting  in  behaviour  which  is 
purposive,  adaptive,  and  enchained  in  definite 
sequence,  are  we  to  term  the  net  result  in  response 
compound  reflex  action  or  instinctive  behaviour  ? 
Looking  at  the  matter  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
observation  of  behaviour — disregarding  the  conscious- 
ness which  would  normally  accompany  the  behaviour 


74  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

in  the  unmaimed  animal — this  question  is  not  easily 
answered.  Dr.  Sherrington  sees  (p.  266)  "no  wide 
interval  between  the  reflex  movements  of  the  spinal 
dog  whose  foot  attempts  to  scratch  away  an  irritant 
applied  to  its  back  .  .  .  and  the  reaction  of  the 
decerebrate  dog  that  turns  and  growls  and  bites  at 
the  fingers  holding  its  hind  foot  too  roughly  .  .  . 
which  is  probably  the  reaction  of  an  organic  machine." 
Granted,  then,  that  the  spinal  animal  gives  evidence 
only  of  compound  reflex  action,  the  decerebrate 
animal  seems  to  be  capable  of  behaviour  which,  as 
such,  would  assuredly  be  termed  instinctive  by  the 
biological  observer. 

To  the  decerebrate  animal  therefore  we  now  turn — 
that  is  to  say  the  animal  in  which  the  cerebral  hemis- 
pheres and  their  cortex  have  been  destroyed,  leaving 
however,  the  sub-cortical  centres  and  the  spinal  cord 
intact  and  functionally  effective.  We  need  not  delay 
over  the  familiar  and  oft-quoted  case  of  the  frog  of 
which  Michael  Foster  ^  said  that  in  the  absence  of 
the  cerebral  hemispheres  it  **  can  by  the  application 
of  appropriate  stimuli  be  induced  to  perform  all  or 
nearly  all  the  movements  which  an  entire  frog  is 
capable  of  executing.  .  .  .  The  nervous  machinery 
required  for  the  execution,  as  distinguished  from  the 
origination,  of  bodily  movements  even  of  the  most 
complicated  kind,  is  present  after  complete  removal 
of  the  cerebral  hemispheres,  though  the  movements 
are  such  as  to  require  the  co-operation  of  highly 
diff'erentiated  aff"erent  impulses."  If  then  we  may 
trust   such  observations  as   those  on    which   these 

'  "  A  Text  Book  of  Physiology,"  7th   Ed.  Part  iii.  (1897),  pp. 
1073-6. 


REFLEX   ACTION  AND  INSTINCT       75 

conclusions  are  based,  they  seem  to  support  the  view 
that  the  decerebrate  frog  performs,  if  not  all,  at  any 
rate  a  great  number  of  activities  which  are  of  the 
instinctive  order.  Such  a  frog  according  to  Dr.  Max 
Schrader  ^  catches  flies,  buries  itself  in  the  mud  in 
the  cold  season,  and  takes  to  the  water  when  the 
warmer  weather  comes. 

In  the  decerebrate  pigeon  ^  "  the  appearance  and 
behaviour  of  the  bird  are  strikingly  similar  to  those 
of  a  bird  exceedingly  sleepy  and  stupid.  It  is  able 
to  maintain  what  appears  to  be  a  completely  normal 
posture  and  can  balance  itself  on  one  leg  after  the 
fashion  of  a  bird  which  has  in  a  natural  way  gone  to 
sleep.  .  .  .  Placed  on  its  side  or  its  back  it  will 
regain  its  feet ;  thrown  into  the  air  it  flies  with 
considerable  precision  for  some  distance  before  it 
returns  to  rest.  It  frequently  tucks  its  head  under 
its  wings,  and  at  times  may  be  seen  to  clean  its 
feathers ;  when  its  beak  is  plunged  into  corn  it  eats. 
It  may  be  induced  to  move  not  only  by  ordinary 
stimuli  applied  to  the  skin,  but  also  by  sudden  loud 
sounds,  or  by  flashes  of  light ;  in  its  flight  it  will, 
though  imperfectly,  avoid  obstacles,  and  its  various 
movements  appear  to  be  to  a  certain  extent  guided  not 
only  by  touch  but  by  visual  impressions."  In  the 
bird  as  in  the  frog  it  would  seem  that  "  the  parts  of 
the  brain  below  or  behind  the  cerebral  hemispheres 
constitute  a  nervous  machinery  by  which  all  the 
ordinary  bodily  movements  may  be  carried  out." 

'  Max  Schrader,  "  Zur  Physiologic  des  Froschgehirns,"  Pfliiger's 
Archiv.  Bd.  xli.  (1887).  Schrader's  results  are  summarized  by  Loeb, 
"  Comparative  Physiology  of  the  Brain,"  chapter  ix, 

•  M,  Foster,  op,  cit.  p.  1078. 


76  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

According  to  Dr.  Schrader  the  sleepy  and  stupid 
condition  of  the  decerebrate  pigeon  passes  by  after  a 
few  days  when  the  shock-effect  of  the  operation  has 
diminished.  Such  a  bird  flies  from  one  place  to 
another  with  perfectly  co-ordinated  movements  and 
alights,  for  example  on  a  bar,  like  a  normal  bird.  It 
sleeps  at  night ;  but  during  most  of  the  day  wanders 
about  restlessly  and  untiringly.  It  avoids  obstacles, 
but  "  to  these  animals  all  objects  are  alike.  They 
have  no  enemies  and  no  friends.  They  live  like 
hermits,  no  matter  in  how  large  a  company  they  find 
themselves.  The  languishing  coo  of  the  male  makes 
as  little  impression  on  the  female  deprived  of  its 
cerebrum  as  the  rattling  of  peas  or  the  whistle  which 
formerly  made  it  hasten  to  its  feeding-place.  Neither 
does  the  female  show  interest  in  its  young.  The 
young  ones  that  have  just  learned  to  fly  pursue  the 
mother,  crying  unceasingly  for  food,  but  they  might 
as  well  beg  food  of  a  stone."  ^  If  these  observations 
are  correct  it  looks  as  if  much  behaviour  of  the 
instinctive  order  is  relatively  unaffected  ;  and  the 
salient  fact  seems  to  be  that,  with  the  destruction  of 
the  cerebral  cortex,  many  objects  and  many  stimu- 
lations appear  to  have  lost  all  meaning. 

Turning  now  to  observations  on  mammals,  accord- 
ing to  Dr.  Goltz^  the  decerebrate  dog  "would  He 
curled  up  like  a  normal  dog  ;  it  could  be  aroused  by 
the  loud  blowing  of  a  horn,  and  by  blowing  through  a 

*  Max  Schrader,  "  Zur  Physiologic  des  Vogelgehirns,"  Pfliiger's 
Archiv.  Bd.  xliv.  (1889)  quoted  by  Loeb.,  op.  cit.  p.  244. 

2  F.  Goltz,  "Der  Hund  ohne  Grosshirn,"  Pfluger's  Archiv.  Bd.  li. 
(1892).  See  F.  W.  Mott  in  "A  System  of  Medicine,"  edited  by 
AUbutt  and  RoUeston,  vol.  vii.  (191 1),  p.  257. 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND   INSTINCT       77 

tube  a  current  of  air  on  to  its  skin,  when  it  would 
raise  itself  on  its  four  legs  and  shake  itself.  If  the 
animal  had  been  roused  by  the  blast  of  a  horn,  it  would 
put  its  paw  up  to  its  ear  as  if  something  unpleasant 
had  happened.  When  the  animal  was  removed  from 
the  pen,' as  it  was  every  day,  to  be  fed,  it  growled, 
snapped,  and  snarled  like  an  angry  brute,  and  resisted 
and  struggled  to  be  free  and  return  to  its  cage ;  it 
showed,  in  fact,  exactly  the  same  signs  of  anger  as  the 
decerebrate  dog,  whose  sciatic  nerve  was  stimulated 
in  Sherrington's  experiment — lowering  of  the  head, 
bristling  of  the  hair,  retraction  of  the  ears,  and  growl- 
ing, biting  and  snapping.  Although  removal  from  the 
cage  every  day  would  have  meant  to  the  normal 
animal  appeasement  of  hunger,  yet  this  animal  every 
day  for  eighteen  months,  until  the  day  of  its  death 
under  chloroform,  gave  the  same  instinctive  signs  of 
anger,  and  never  joy,  fear,  or  affection."  Similarly  in 
the  decerebrate  cat,  Dr.  Sherrington  (p.  255)  could 
never  evoke  such  expression  as  might,  had  the  cerebral 
hemispheres  been  present,  have  been  indication  of 
pleasurable  sensation.  Never,  for  instance,  could 
purring  be  elicited,  although  its  opposite,  snarling 
was  obtained  so  easily.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
pleasure  is  probably  always  an  affective  accompani- 
ment of  meaning  ;  whereas  what  we  interpret  as  pain 
may  be  a  physiological  reaction  to  noci-ceptive  stimuli. 
The  one  is  correlated  with  cortical  process  ;  the  other 
need  not  be  so  correlated.  Dr.  Goltz's  decerebrate 
bitch  "  made  no  distinction  between  a  stranger  and  the 
man  who  had  fed  her  every  day.  She  had  no  memory, 
but  still  possessed  desires  as  physiological  tendencies 
and  instinctive   reactions.      When   hungry  .  .  .   she 


78  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

performed  continuous  pacing  movements  ;  moreover, 
she  would  place  her  two  forepaws  on  the  front  of  the 
cage,  standing  on  her  hind  legs.  She  would  maintain 
her  position  on  four  limbs  on  a  smooth  and  sloping 
surface  and  defecated  normally."  Dr.  Sherrington 
found  (p.  306)  that  even  in  the  spinal  dog  defecation 
was  invariably  followed  by  a  number  of  vigorous 
kicks  with  the  hind  limbs.  Dr.  Goltz's  dog  refused 
to  eat  meat  which  had  been  soaked  in  a  solution  of 
quinine.  He  adds  that  he  threw  to  his  own  house 
dog  a  piece  of  the  same  doctored  meat.  The  animal 
took  it  eagerly,  pulled  a  wry  face  and  hesitated.  But 
on  a  look  of  encouragement  from  his  master  the  dog 
swallowed  it.  He  overcame  his  instinctive  rejection 
of  it  and  thus,  as  Dr.  Goltz  remarks,  by  his  self- 
control  gave  proof  of  the  intact  cerebrum  he 
possessed. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  the  decerebrate  animal 
there  are  sundry  expressions  of  the  emotions.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  if  we  assume  that  correlated 
consciousness  is  restricted  to  the  cortex  these  are  purely 
physiological  responses.  From  certain  experiments 
on  newly-born  puppies  Dr.  Pagano^  concludes  that  in 
the  basal  ganglia  of  the  brain — that  is  in  sub-cortical 
centres — there  are  found  at  birth  physiological 
preorganized  mechanisms  of  emotional  reactions. 
The  cerebral  cortex  not  being  functional  at  birth  is, 
therefore,  not  indispensable  for  expressive  reactions 
of  the  same  kind  as  those  which  accompany  emotional 
states.  Dr.  Pagano  concludes  also  that  the  superior 
psychical    centres   which  are   superimposed  on    the 

'  Pagano,  •'  Archives  Italiennes  de  Biologic  "  (1906).    See  Mott,  op. 
cit.  258. 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND   INSTINCT       79 

lower  centres  are  only  a  new  source  of  stimulus  for 
primordial  expression,  but  at  the  same  time  the 
origin  of  secondary  modifications  of  emotional 
expressions.  Dr.  Sherrington  (p.  254),  however, 
draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  hemicephalic  children 
in  total  absence  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres  and  of 
the  midbrain  with  its  basal  ganglia,  seem  to  react  as 
do  normal  infants  of  the  same  age  to  stimuli  that, 
judging  from  adult  experience,  are  unpleasant. 
They  cry  or  whimper,  pucker  the  mouth,  and  retract 
the  head.  The  drawing  down  of  the  angles  of  the 
mouth  and  the  drawing  down  of  the  lower  lip  seem 
indicative  of  pain :  pouting  of  the  lips  seems  to 
indicate  pleasure.  Of  course  these  facts  are  not 
adduced  to  show  that  in  the  expression  of  normal 
children  the  thalamus  is  not  implicated  ;  they  are 
adduced  further  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  for  certain 
forms  of  expression  the  cerebral  cortex  is  not 
necessarily  implicated. 

I  have  now  cited  from  the  works  of  accredited 
representatives  of  physiological  investigation  and 
interpretation — and  cited  as  far  as  possible  in  their 
own  words  lest  I  should  misrepresent  their  statements 
— some  evidence  which  seems  to  show  that  behaviour 
of  the  instinctive  order,  as  regarded  from  the  bio- 
logical standpoint,  is  due  to  the  integrative  action  of 
sub-cortical  centres.  Such  evidence  appears  to  me 
to  justify  the  provisional  hypothesis  that  what  the 
biologist  terms  instinctive  performance  is  the  outcome 
of  inherited  sub-cortical  dispositions.  These  dis- 
positions are,  on  this  view,  the  structural  correlate  of 
the  functioning  of  a  completely  organized  system  of 
neural  arcs.     How  they  function  at  any  given  moment 


80  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

depends  upon  the  inherited  organization,  upon  the 
constellation  of  stimuli  to  which  they  are  subjected  at 
that  moment,  and  upon  the  way  in  which  they  are 
already  functioning.  Whether  we  draw  the  line 
between  compound  reflex  action  and  instinctive 
behaviour  at  some  ideal  transection  at  the  base  of  the 
bulb,  appears  to  be  a  matter  of  little  importance. 
More  important  is  the  question  whether  there  is  any 
essential  difference  between  spinal  integration  and 
sub-cortical  brain  integration.  I  conceive  that  there 
is  no  essential  difference.  There  is  fuller  and  richer 
alliance  between  groups  of  reflexes  ;  there  is  more 
subtle  inhibition  of  other  groups ;  there  is  a  more 
complex  and  more  widely  effective  phase  of  adapt- 
ation. But  if  sub-cortical  behaviour  is  rightly  termed 
instinctive,  then  I  see  no  reason  for  hesitating  to 
regard  it  as  compound  reflex  action,  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  the  outcome  of  progressive  complication  in  the 
effective  co-ordination  of  reflexes. 

The  psychologist  will,  however,  object  that  from 
his  point  of  view,  and  within  his  universe  of  discourse, 
instinct  is  a  mode  of  conscious  experience  and  that  it 
is  misleading,  if  not  absurd,  to  apply  this  term  to 
phenomena  which  ex  hypothesi  are  unconscious — un- 
conscious, that  is  to  say,  on  the  assumption  that 
consciousness  is  correlated  with  cortical  process.  So 
be  it.  Let  it  be  freely  granted  that  the  spinal  or 
the  decerebrate  animal  is  unconscious  and  is  therefore 
incapable  of  instmctive  experience.  That  surely  does 
not  show  that  the  entire  and  intact  animal  is  destitute 
of  such  experience.  It  does  not  show  that  the  cortex, 
when  normally  present,  does  not  receive  impulses 
from  the  organism  that  is  behaving  under  sub-cortical 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND  INSTINCT       81 

integration.  It  must  be  remembered  that  these 
cervical  transections,  this  ablation  of  the  cerebral 
hemispheres,  are  means  to  physiological  analysis. 
The  value  of  observations  in  the  physiological 
laboratory  lies  not  so  much  in  the  information  they 
afford  with  respect  to  the  maimed  animal,  as  in  the 
insight  they  give  for  the  much  more  important  task 
of  the  interpretation  of  the  normal  animal's  behaviour. 
Only  thus  can  we  attain,  through  the  privileged  and 
responsible  work  of  trained  investigators,  sure  data 
for  assigning  to  special  parts  of  the  nervous  system 
their  special  functions  and  thus  inferring  their  normal 
relationships.  The  outcome  of  physiological  analysis 
of  the  kind  we  have  been  considering  is  that  complex 
behaviour  of  the  instinctive  type  is  determined  by  the 
hereditary  dispositions  of  the  sub-cortical  centres. 
But  the  lesion  which  cuts  off  impulses  from  the  cortex, 
cuts  off  also  impulses  to  the  cortex.  I  submit  as  a 
not  unreasonable  doctrine  in  the  present  state  of  our 
knowledge,  that  in  the  entire  animal  orderly  impulses 
due  to  the  performance  of  determinate  behaviour 
reach  the  cortex  and  there  generate  the  instinctive 
experience — or  let  us  rather  say  the  instinctive  factor 
in  experience.  In  the  normal  life  the  impulses 
arising  out  of  the  behaviour  (including  of  course  its 
receptive  initiation)  break  in  upon  a  cortex  which  is 
already  functioning.  This  functioning  as  a  whole  has, 
as  its  conscious  correlate,  the  changing  continuum 
of  experience.  To  this  continuum  the  instinctive 
experience  is  assimilated.  The  existing  pattern  of 
experience  is  modified  and  rearranged.  Just  as  the 
simple  reflex  is  an  abstract  concept  which  refers  to 
that  which  probably  never  occurs  in  isolation,  so  is 

G 


82  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

the  instinctive  experience  an  abstract  concept — 
having  reference  no  doubt  to  an  indefinitely  more 
complex  object  of  thought,  but  none  the  less  abstract. 
In  its  isolation,  save  for  analytical  thought  and  the 
interpretation  of  a  larger  whole  within  which  it  is 
component — in  its  isolation,  I  say,  it  perhaps  cannot 
exist  as  constituting  experience,  it  can  only  co-exist 
with  factors  of  like  order.  The  utmost  we  can  say  is 
that,  in  the  genesis  of  experience,  the  instinctive 
responses  afford  the  nearest  approach  we  can  conceive 
to  the  primary  pattern  which  ruffles  the  surface  of  the 
relatively  uniform  continuum  of  hitherto  indefinite 
consciousness. 

I  have  said  above  that  we  must  bear  in  mind 
that  the  lesion  which  cuts  off  physiological  impulses 
from  the  cortex,  cuts  off  also  afferent  impulses  to  the 
cortex.  The  latter  give  rise  to  those  cortical  changes 
which  are  the  neural  correlates  of  instinctive  experi- 
ence ;  the  former  in  some  way  effect  the  control  of 
instinctive  behaviour  by  the  cerebral  cortex — control 
by  that  part  of  the  nervous  system  which,  as  we  have 
provisionally  assumed,  alone  possesses  the  adjunct 
of  consciousness — hence,  in  our  elliptic  phraseology 
conscious  control.  There  can  be  no  question  about 
the  fact  of  this  control.  But,  as  Dr.  Sherrington  says 
(pp.  388-390),  "  it  is  urgently  necessary  for  physiology 
to  know  /i02v  this  control  is  operative  upon  reflexes, 
that  is  how  it  intrudes  and  makes  its  influence  felt 
upon  the  running  of  the  reflex  machinery.  ...  Its 
analysis  has  not  proceeded  far.  We  may  premise," 
he  adds,  "  that  some  extension  of  the  same  processes 
as  are  operative  in  simultaneous  and  in  successive 
combination   of  reflexes,  must  be  operative  in  this 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND  INSTINCT       83 

control.  There  we  saw  reflexes  modifying  each 
other,  and  the  more  complex  reactions  being  built 
up  from  simpler  and  more  restricted  ones.  Some 
extension  of  the  same  process  should,  in  view  of  our 
inferences  concerning  the  nature  and  dominance  of 
the  brain,  apply  here  also."  "Looking  at  the  matter 
from  a  purely  physiological  point  of  view,"  said 
Michael  Foster  (p.  1078),  "the  real  difference  between 
an  automatic  act  and  a  voluntary  act  is  that  the 
chain  of  physiological  events  between  the  act  and 
its  physiological  cause  is  in  the  one  case  short  and 
simple,  and  in  the  other  case  long  and  complex." 

I  take  it  that  in  the  ideal  construction  which  it  is 
the  aim  of  the  physiologist  to  frame,  the  principles  of 
integration  are  fundamentally  the  same  throughout 
the  central  nervous  system.  No  essentially  new 
process  different  in  principle  from  other  integrative 
processes  occurs  in  the  cortex.  What  does  occur  is, 
it  would  seem,  the  intercalation  of  new  groups  of 
arcs  which  permit  of  the  associative  connexions 
which  are  acquired  in  the  course  of  individual  life. 
We  cannot  assert  as  a  proven  fact,  but  we  may  infer 
from  such  facts  as  we  do  possess,  that  the  cortex  is 
the  pre-eminent,  if  not  the  only,  part  of  the  nervous 
system  in  which  such  acquired  association  takes 
place.  It  is  pre-eminently,  or  perhaps  exclusively, 
the  organ  of  educability,  and  hence  the  organ  of 
intelligent  control.  We  have  seen  that  inhibition  is 
by  no  means  the  prerogative  of  the  cortex  only. 
Inhibition  and  facilitation  are  seen  in  the  integrative 
processes  of  the  spinal  cord.  It  is  not  improbable, 
however,  that  acquired  inhibition,  like  acquired 
association,  is  characteristically  a  cortical   function. 


84  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

But  the  purely  physiological  conditions  are  not 
known.  Psychical  factors  are  at  once  suggested, 
and  we  pass  to  a  quasi-psychological  explanation  ; 
in  so  doing  we  confess  our  physiological  ignorance. 
By  whatever  method  of  cortical  linkage  of  neural  arcs 
it  is  effected,  acquired  control  often  carries  with  it 
inhibitions  which  are  hereditarily  bound  up  with  the 
controlled  act.  We  can  control  our  swallowing ; 
but  the  act  of  swallowing  automatically  inhibits 
respiration ;  it  seems  also  to  have  an  automatic 
inhibitory  effect  on  the  heart-beat. 

Simple  forms  of  acquired  association  have  been 
brought  into  the  field  of  laboratory  practice  by  Dr. 
Pawlow.^  If  acid  fluid  be  placed  in  a  dog's  mouth 
there  is  a  reflex  which  affords  an  increased  flow  of 
saliva.  By  placing  a  cannula  in  the  duct  of  the 
submaxillary  gland  the  rate  of  flow  can  be  deter- 
mined. Let  some  other  sensory  organ  be  stimulated 
at  the  same  time  as  the  mouth  is  moistened  with  the 
acid  solution.  For  example  let  a  horn  be  blown  in 
an  adjoining  room  every  time  the  acid  fluid  is  placed 
in  the  dog's  mouth.  After  a  while  the  blast  of  the 
horn  affords  an  auditory  stimulus  which  in  and  by 
itself  gives  an  increased  flow  from  the  salivary  gland. 
Indeed  Dr.  Pawlow  found  that  any  stimulus  which 
was  made  coincident  with  the  acid-in-the-mouth 
response  may  be,  by  the  establishment  of  associative 
connexions,  rendered  a  sufficient  stimulus  for  increased 
flow  of  saliva.  A  new  set  of  receptive  neurones  are 
connected  up  with  the  common  path  to  the  effector 

'  Pawlow,  "Scientific  Investigation  of  the  Psychical  Faculties 
or  Processes  in  Higher  Animals,",  Huxley  Lecture,  1906.  ••  Lancet," 
1906,  ii,,  p.  911.     Cf.  Mott,  op.  cit.,  p.  251. 


REFLEX   ACTION   AND   INSTINCT        85 

gland.  I  am  not  aware  whether  such  experiments 
have  been  made  with  decerebrate  dogs.  We  do  not 
know  whether  such  new  connexions  can  be  established 
in  the  sub-cortical  centres  without  the  intervention  of 
the  cerebral  cortex.  If  by  further  physiological 
research  it  should  be  shown  that  this  is  the  case,  it 
would  but  serve  to  indicate,  what  is  not  inherently 
improbable,  that  new  receptor  inlets  for  the  evoking 
of  instinctive  response  may  be  established  without 
necessarily  calling  into  play  the  intelligent  or 
cortical  arcs  of  the  central  nervous  system.  New 
connexions  may  be  acquired  within  the  lower  centres 
without  the  intervention  of  the  integrating  influence 
of  the  cortex. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  Dr.  Pawlow's  experimental 
results  confirm  the  general  conclusions  which  may 
be  drawn  from  observations  dealing  with  acquired 
modifications  of  behaviour.  Those  who  lay  'stress 
on  the  motor  aspect  of  instinctive  behaviour,  and 
consider  it  in  the  light  of  physiological  research, 
regard  it  as  the  functional  outcome  of  a  complexly 
organized  system  of  final  common  paths.  That  is 
the  essential  feature  of  the  hereditary  disposition  of 
the  lower  nerve  centres.  The  receptor  side  is  less 
rigidly  stereotyped.  That  is  to  say,  a  closely  similar 
response  may  be,  and  often  is,  the  outcome  of  the 
play  of  environmental  situations  which  have  only 
a  general  likeness — which  vary  to  some  extent, 
sometimes  to  a  considerable  extent,  in  detail.  The 
situation  which  evoked  the  moorhen's  dive  need  not 
have  been  just  that  which  I  have  briefly  described. 
As  Mr.  McDougall  has  well  said,^  such  "  an  instinct 
'  •'  Introductioa  to  Social  Psychology,"  p,  37. 


86  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

has  several  innately  organized  afferent  inlets,  through 
each  of  which  its  central  and  afferent  parts  may 
be  excited  without  the  other  afferent  inlets  being 
involved  in  the  excitement."  As  life  proceeds  the 
inlet  side  of  the  behaviour  business  becomes  further 
organized  through  experience.  The  birds  which 
remain  unmoved  while  the  express  train  thunders 
by,  may  precipitately  scatter  at  the  yapping  of  a 
little  dog.  The  organization  of  experience  in  its 
early  stages  is,  in  large  measure,  the  organization 
of  perception,  the  acquisition  of  meaning,  and  the 
correlation  of  the  data  afforded  by  the  special  senses 
with  the  data  afforded  by  the  responsive  behaviour 
itself.  This  is  in  large  measure  the  result  of  acquisi- 
tion in  the  course  of  individual  life.  None  the  less 
this  acquisition  is  itself  dependent  on  hereditary 
dispositions  and  innate  tendencies  to  the  considera- 
tion of  which  we  must  now  proceed. 


CHAPTER   IV 

HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  AND  INNATE 
MENTAL  TENDENCIES 

IN  an  oft-quoted  passage,  too  frequently  torn  from 
its  context,  Dr.  Groos  contends  ^  that  "  the  idea 
of  consciousness  must  be  rigidly  excluded  from  any 
definition  of  instinct  which  is  to  be  of  practical 
utility,"  since  "it  is  always  hazardous  in  scientific 
investigation  to  allow  an  hypothesis  which  cannot 
be  tested  empirically."  I  take  it,  however,  that  the 
question  before  Dr.  Groos,  when  he  wrote  these 
words,  was  that  of  origin.  The  question  was  not : 
Does  consciousness  accompany  instinctive  perform- 
ance ?  The  question  was :  Does  instinctive  per- 
formance owe  its  genesis  to  the  guidance  of  conscious- 
ness ?  or,  as  Dr.  Groos  himself  puts  it,  in  words 
immediately  preceding  those  which  I  have  quoted  : 
"  Is  this  useful  adjustment  attributable  to  conscious 
will  ?  "  It  is  to  this  question  that  he  gives  a  negative 
answer.  His  whole  thesis  implies  an  accompaniment 
of  consciousness ;  "  the  feeling  of  pleasure,"  he  says, 
"  that  results  from  the  satisfaction  of  instinct  is  the 
primary  psychic  accompaniment  of  play  "  (p.  288). 
It  is  abundantly  clear  from  a  perusal  of  Dr.  Groos* 

'  Karl  Groos,  "The   Play  of  Animals  ".( 1898).    Translated  by 
Elizabeth  L.  Baldwin  (1 901),  p,  62. 

87 


88  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

work,  that  his  contention  is  that  the  origin  of  instinct 
is  to  be  sought  in  the  field  of  biological  inquiry ;  that 
within  this  field  the  idea  of  consciousness  as  exercis- 
ing guidance  in  origin  is  to  be  excluded ;  but  that 
the  consciousness  which  accompanies  instinctive 
performance  affords  data  for  intelligent  modification 
of  behaviour  through  practice  and  exercise. 

In  dealing  with  instinctive  performance  from  the 
strictly  biological  point  of  view  the  question  of  the 
existence  or  non-existence  of  the  psychological 
accompaniments  may  be,  and  often  is,  ignored. 
Thus  Dr.  and  Mrs.  Peckham  ^  place  under  the  term 
instinct  "  all  complex  acts  which  are  performed 
previous  to  experience,  and  in  a  similar  manner 
by  all  members  of  the  same  sex  and  race,  leaving 
out  as  non-essential,  at  this  time,  the  question  of 
whether  they  are  or  are  not  accompanied  by  con- 
sciousness." The  exclusion  of  the  psychology  of 
instinct  is  here  purely  methodological.  The  question 
for  general  biology  is  whether  the  behaviour  is,  as 
a  matter  of  observation,  adapted  to  the  environing 
circumstances  on  the  occasion  of  its  first  occurrence, 
or  is  brought  into  closer  relation  to  these  circum- 
stances by  acquired  accommodation.  The  question 
for  physiology  is  whether  the  behaviour  is  due  to 
certain  inherited  connexions  among  the  neurones 
of  the  central  nervous  system,  or  is  due  to  con- 
nexions which  have  been  established  in  the  course  of 
individual  life.  Both  general  biologist  and  physiolo- 
gist may  ignore  the  question  whether  certain  psycho- 
logical   relationships    are    also    present ;    but    only 

*  George  W.  and  Elizabeth  G.  Peckham,  "On  the  Instincts  and 
Habits  of  the  Solitary  Wasps  "  (1898),  p.  231. 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  89 

because   they  do  not  fall  within  their  special   field 
of  study. 

If,  however,  we  see  reason  to  believe  that  some 
animals  learn  by  experience,  we  have  to  admit 
the  existence  of  psychological  relationships.  And 
if  we  assume  that  some  of  the  vital  processes  of 
the  animal  organism  are  correlated  with  conscious 
experience,  we  have  to  face  the  question :  If  some, 
why  not  all  ?  We  have  to  consider  the  problem  of 
the  relation  of  life  to  consciousness  throughout  the 
whole  range  of  organic  evolution  and  development. 
It  may  be  that,  as  Dr.  Titchener  ^  believes,  "  con- 
sciousness is  as  old  as  animal  life,  and  that  the  first 
movements  of  the  first  organisms  were  conscious 
movements."  Or  it  may  be  that  consciousness 
appeared  later  than  life,  and  if  so  we  have  to  face 
the  questions :  When,  from  what  source,  and  under 
what  conditions  ?  If  we  accept  the  former  alterna- 
tive and  hold  with  Dr.  Titchener  "  that  the  earliest 
movements  were  conscious  movements,  and  that  all 
the  unconscious  movements  of  the  human  organism, 
even  the  automatic  movements  of  heart  and  intes- 
tines, are  the  descendants  of  past  conscious  move- 
ments," we  have  the  speculative  difficulty  of  explain- 
ing the  lapse  of  consciousness  in  certain  admittedly 
unconscious  movements.  If  on  the  other  hand  we 
accept  the  second  alternative  we  have  the  speculative 
difficulty  of  explaining  the  rise  of  consciousness 
from  the  lap  of  the  unconscious.  In  the  one  case 
something  vanishes  ;  in  the  other  case  something  new 
appears.  What  course  shall  we  take  >  We  shall 
ignore    these    speculative    difficulties.      There    are 

'  E.  B.  Titchener,  *'  A  Text-book  of  Psychology  "  (191 1),  p.  451. 


90  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

certain  phenomena  of  organic  behaviour  which 
seemingly  cannot  be  explained  unless  we  take  into 
consideration  experiential  relationships  like  those 
which  are  conditions  of  our  own  conduct — relation- 
ships which  really  count,  in  that  their  presence  or 
absence  makes  a  real  difference.  We  accept  them  as 
existent,  just  in  so  far  as  they  appear  to  be  necessary 
for  scientific  interpretation,  and  no  further.  As  effective 
relationships  they  seem  to  be  correlated,  in  the  higher 
vertebrates,  with  functional  processes  in  the  cortex. 

What,  then,  do  I  mean  by  effective  consciousness  ? 
I  mean  consciousness  which  involves  so  much  pre- 
perception  as  to  condition  the  course  of  behaviour. 
On  this  depends  all  profiting  by  experience.  Now 
whether  there  be  some  dim  and  vague  pre-perception 
in  the  first  instinctive  performance  ;  or  whether  this 
only  comes  as  the  result  of  previous  individual 
performance  ;  in  either  case  something  of  the  nature 
of  conscious  perception  is  a  prior  condition  to  pre- 
perception.  In  any  interpretation  on  the  lines  of 
natural  history,  if  the  perceptual  preparation  be  not 
provided  in  the  life-history  of  the  individual,  it  must 
be  provided  in  the  life-history  of  the  race.  But  if 
effective  consciousness,  as  pre-perceptual,  is  con- 
ditioned by  previous  perception,  it  is  clear  that  such 
previous  perception  itself  involves  the  conscious 
relationship.  Hence  there  can,  I  think,  be  little 
question  that  consciousness  must  be  present  in 
correlation  with  certain  dominant  vital  processes 
before  behaviour  guided  by  pre-perception  affords  to 
us  sufBcient  evidence  that  it  is  a  condition  that  counts 
in  evolutionary  progress  and  in  the  development  of 
any  given  organism. 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  91 

Apart  from  speculation,  therefore,  it  is  a  question 
of  evidence — evidence  peculiarly  difficult  to  obtain 
and  to  assess  at  its  true  value.  Still  the  question  is  : 
Is  there,  in  this  or  that  organism,  evidence  that  the 
behaviour  is  guided  by  pre-perception  ?  If  there  is, 
then  we  are,  I  take  it,  bound  to  infer  the  prior 
presence  of  perceptive  consciousness  in  order  to 
interpret  its  origin.  As  the  result  of  very  careful  and 
valuable  observations  on  the  infusoria.  Dr.  Jennings 
has  brought  forward  the  evidence  which  satisfies  him 
that  in  them  some  behaviour  is  guided  by  pre- 
perception.  I  am  not  quite  satisfied  by  the  evidence. 
But  though  I  have  elsewhere  taken  up  a  sceptical 
attitude,  I  am  fully  prepared  to  admit  that  there  is  a 
reasonable  probability  that  the  behaviour  of  some  of 
these  lowly  organisms  may  be  conditioned  by  pre- 
perceptual  consciousness.  We  ought  not  to  deny 
the  presence  of  consciousness  in  any  animal ;  but  we 
ought  ^to  require  good  evidence  of  pre-perceptual 
guidance.     That  seems  to  be  essential. 

How  then,  it  may  be  asked,  do  I  propose  to 
square  such  a  view  with  the  reiterated  assumption 
that  in  the  higher  vertebrates — those  in  which  a 
cortex  is  well  differentiated — conscious  guidance  is 
specially  correlated  with  cortical  conditions?  Here 
again  it  is  entirely  a  matter  of  evidence.  As  at 
present  advised — taking  into  consideration  Dr. 
Sherrington's  work  on  the  spinal  animal,  and  the 
observations  recorded  by  skilful  observers  on  the 
animal  deprived  of  its  cortex — I  do  not  find  satis- 
factory evidence  that  the  reflex  behaviour  is 
conditioned  by  pre-perception.  The  outcome  of 
further  research  may  very  possibly  lead  me  to  alter 


92  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

my  opinion.  If  so,  I  shall,  I  hope,  be  ready  to  admit 
that  I  was  mistaken.  Till  then  I  must  continue  to 
hold  the  views  that  I  have  indicated,  and  draw  the 
line  between  the  cortex  and  the  sub-cortex.  I  see 
no  evolutionary  reason  why  we  should  not  accept  the 
conclusion,  to  which  the  facts  seem  to  point,  that  as 
perception  and  pre-perception  rise  to  higher  grades 
of  development,  they  are  concentrated  in,  and  perhaps 
limited  to,  just  the  very  highest  modes  of  process  in 
the  most  delicately  organized  part  of  the  central 
nervous  system.  I  am  therefore  inclined  to  surmise 
that  the  line  should  not  be  drawn  in  the  lower 
vertebrates  where  I  am  assuming  that  it  should  be 
drawn  in  birds  and  mammals.  It  is  quite  possible, 
nay,  more,  I  incline  to  regard  it  as  probable,  that  the 
line  shifts  upwards  as  the  nervous  system  is  evolved 
in  the  race  and  developed  in  the  individual. 

There  is  one  more  point  on  which  I  would  fain,  if 
it  be  possible,  make  clear  my  position.  It  may  be 
said  that  to  limit  the  conscious  relationship  to  cortical 
process  is  absurd,  since  experience,  as  such,  refers 
not  to  events  in  a  particular  part  of  the  brain,  but 
to  events  in  the  external  world — the  shining  of  a 
distant  planet  for  example.  But  I  take  it  that  in 
such  a  case  it  is  ideally  possible  to  trace  a  complete 
series  of  correlations  from  certain  events  in  the  planet 
to  certain  events  in  the  cortex  and  thence  onwards, 
let  us  say,  to  certain  events  in  the  instrument  by 
which  a  record  of  the  moment  of  the  planet's  transit  is 
made.  The  conscious  relationship  is  a  link  in  the 
correlated  chain  between  the  star  and  the  instrument ; 
for  I  assume  that  in  its  absence  the  observer  would 
not  record  the  transit.     Now  I  do  not  think  we  are 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  93 

able  to  explain  how  this  conscious  relationship  in  a 
long  chain  comes  to  refer  to  distant  terms  at  either 
end  of  the  correlation  series.  I  do  not,  of  course, 
mean  that  psychology  has  nothing  to  say  on  the 
subject ;  it  has  much  to  tell.  I  mean  that,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  the  story  psychology  tells  is  that  of  a 
correlation  of  such  references,  so  that  this  comes  to 
mean  that ;  but,  for  the  present  at  any  rate,  we  have 
to  accept  that  reference,  in  some  initial  form,  as  part 
of  the  constitution  of  experience.  No  doubt  from  the 
evolutionary  point  of  view  the  reference  is  initially  in 
the  direction  from  which  the  stimulus  comes  along 
the  afferent  nerve.  But  some  such  reference  seems 
to  be  just  a  given  fact  which  we  must  accept.  If  this  be 
so,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  specific  physiological 
alliance  is  within  the  cortex,  or  extends  from  the 
receptor  through  the  cortex  to  the  effector,  as  indeed 
it  may  do  for  all  we  know.  The  essential  point  is 
that  the  cortex  is  functionally  implicated  ;  and  that 
if  it  be  not  so  implicated  there  is,  it  would  seem,  no 
satisfactory  and  trustworthy  evidence  that  the 
conscious  relationship  is  present  with  guiding  value. 

Quite  provisionally,  then,  I  assume  that  effective 
consciousness — that  which  is  connected  with  the 
profiting  by  experience,  is  correlated  with  cortical 
process.  Now  both  cortical  processes  and  sub- 
cortical processes  are  dependent  on  connexions 
among  the  neurones  of  the  central  nervous  system  ; 
some  of  these  connexions  seem  to  be  congenital ; 
others  appear  to  be  acquired  in  the  course  of 
individual  life.  Instinctive  behaviour,  as  I  have 
described  it,  seems  to  be  dependent  on  congenital 
connexions  in  the  sub-cortical  centres.    But  there 


94  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

are  also  congenital  connexions  in  the  cortical  centres. 
To  these  are  due  the  innate  tendencies  or  inherited 
dispositions  to  be  considered  in  this  chapter. 

There  is  perhaps  some  ambiguity  in  the  contrast 
between  the  congenital  and  the  acquired.  Especially 
is  this  the  case  when  we  use  hereditary  and  congenital 
as  equivalent  terms.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  it 
may  be  said  that  every  organic  or  mental  process  or 
product  is,  broadly  considered,  based  on  hereditary 
transmission — or,  in  stricter  phrase,  historically 
correlated  with  preceding  phases  of  process  along  the 
line  of  parents  and  ancestry.  No  doubt  we  cannot 
act  or  think  in  any  way,  unless  we  inherit  the  ability 
or  capacity  thus  to  act  or  think.  In  this  sense  all 
acquisition  depends  on  an  innate  power  of  acquiring. 
If,  with  Sir  E.  Ray  Lankester,  we  contrast  congenital 
instinct  with  educability,  we  must  remember,  as  he  is 
careful  to  show,  that  educability  is,  in  this  broad 
sense,  an  inherited  character.  Similarly,  in  an 
equally  broad  sense,  everything  is  acquired.  The 
adult  possesses  a  number  of  characters  which,  since 
they  were  not  present,  as  such,  in  the  fertilized  ovum, 
are,  in  this  broad  sense,  acquired  in  the  course  of 
development.  This  is  not,  indeed,  the  technical  sense 
in  which  biologists  are,  for  the  most  part,  agreed  to 
use  the  term.  And  it  sounds  a  little  extravagant, 
to  those  who  employ  the  term  in  its  technical  sense, 
when  Dr.  Archdall  Reid  ^  claims  that  normal  racial 
characters  are  "  acquired "  under  "  the  stimulus  of 
nutriment " ;  for,  in  these  racial  characters  the 
hereditary  factors   of  correlation  far   outweigh  any 

'  G.  Archdall  Reid,  <' The  Laws  of  Heredity"  (1910),  pp.  208, 
431,  432. 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  95 

specific  correlation  there  may  be  with  the  nature  of 
the  so-called  stimulus— that  is  with  the  necessary 
conditions  of  nutriment,  appropriate  temperature,  and 
so  forth.  What  are  generally  regarded  as  acquired 
characters  are  those  which  are  definitely  correlated 
with  the  conditions  under  which  the  bodily  tissues 
undergo  modification. 

But  we  cannot  here  discuss  a  somewhat  subtle  and 
technical  problem.  It  must  suffice  to  put  the  matter 
thus  : — Every  organism  has  an  inherited  constitution  ; 
and  every  organism  develops  amid  an  assemblage  of 
surrounding  conditions.  Now  in  the  case  of  some 
organic  and  mental  products  the  emphasis  seems  to 
lie  in  the  inherited  constitution  ;  in  the  case  of  others 
the  emphasis  seems  to  lie  in  the  response  to  incident 
conditions.  In  the  former  the  hereditary  correlation, 
in  the  latter  a  definite  correlation  with  the  circum- 
stances, is  predominant.  Some  modes  of  bodily  and 
mental  behaviour  come  with  a  minimum  of  learning, 
the  emphasis  being  on  the  coming  rather  than  on 
the  learning ;  others  come  by  much  learning,  the 
emphasis  here  being  on  the  learning  rather  than  on 
the  coming.  Innate  tendencies  and  inherited  dis- 
positions come  with  the  constitution  ;  of  course  the 
appropriate  conditions  must  be  there,  but  the  stress 
is  on  the  constitution. 

That  capacity  is  a  constitutional  trait — is  what 
every  one  who  deals  with  the  problem  of  heredity 
admits,  nay,  contends.  We  scarcely  need  to  be  told 
by  Dr.  Archdall  Reid  with  all  the  emphasis  of  italics 
that  "if  we  wish  to  avoid  hopeless  confusion  it 
is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  two  entirely 
different   things  ;  between,  on  the  one  hand,  capacity 


96  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

y 
to  make  mental  acquirements,  and,  on  the  other  the 
mental  acquirements  themselves.  .  .  .  The  ability  is 
inborn  and  tends  to  be  inherited  by  offspring  ;  the 
acquirements  are  not "  (p.  42 1).  And  it  is  questionable 
whether  there  is  any  one,  who  has  considered  the 
problems  of  heredity,  in  even  the  most  superficial 
manner,  who  fails  to  realize  that  innate  capacity  has  a 
constitutional  tendency  to  be  developed  in  more  or 
less  definite  lines.  "  While  it  is  possible,"  says  Dr. 
Archdall  Raid,  "  that  some  geniuses  may  be  men 
endowed  with  exceptional  all-round  capacity,  they 
are  usually  distinguished  from  the  average  type  by 
exceptional  capacity  in  some  particular  department 
of  mental  activity.  It  is  probable,  for  example,  that 
Shakespeare  had  more  poetic  capacity  (i.e.  power  of 
responding  to  poetic  experiences,  of  recording  and 
learning  to  utilize  such  experiences),  and  less  artistic 
capacity  than  Michael  Angelo,  who  presumably  had 
less  mathematical  capacity  than  Newton,  who  in  turn 
had  less  military  capacity  than  Napoleon,  who  again 
was   inferior   in   philosophic    capacity   to    Darwin " 

(p.  436). 

I  quote  this  passage,  not  because  I  think  its 
author  would  claim  for  it  any  striking  originality,  but 
to  raise  the  question  whether  such  innate  differentia- 
tions of  inherited  capacity  should  be  termed  instinctive. 
We  are  here  within  the  sphere  of  intelligence,  and 
indeed  within  the  narrower  sphere  of  that  higher 
order  of  conceptual  intelligence  which  approaches  or 
reaches  the  level  of  genius.  Are  we  still  also  within 
the  sphere  of  instinct  ?  It  may  be  said  that  human 
genius  is  a  kind  of  instinct,  and  that  Mozart  took  to 
music  as  instinctively  as  a  duckling  takes  to  water. 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  97 

For  both,  of  course,  the  necessary  medium  must  be 
presented ;  but  both  deal  with  this  medium  with  a 
facility  due  to  hereditary  dispositions.  If,  then,  all 
specialized  hereditary  dispositions  are  to  be  termed 
instinctive,  and  if  all  performance  conditioned  by 
such  dispositions  is  likewise  to  be  termed  instinctive, 
we  must  admit  the  presence  of  an  instinctive  factor 
which  permeates  the  whole  of  our  intellectual  life. 

We  here  open  up  a  question  of  considerable 
importance.  In  an  endeavour  to  reach  some  definite 
conclusion  in  the  matter  we  must  first  ask  whether 
accredited  writers  apply  the  term  instinctive  to 
hereditary  tendencies  in  the  sphere  of  the  intellect. 

Thomas  Reid  considered  instinctive  belief  as  one 
of  the  best  gifts  of  nature.^  "  Children,"  he  says,^ 
"  have  everything  to  learn  ;  and,  in  order  to  learn, 
they  must  believe  their  instructors.  .  .  .  They 
believe  a  thousand  things  before  they  ever  spend  a 
thought  on  evidence.  Nature  supplies  the  want  of 
evidence,  and  gives  them  an  instinctive  kind  of  faith 
without  evidence."  An  example  of  "  belief  which 
seems  to  be  instinctive,  is  that  which  children  show 
even  in  infancy,  that  an  event  which  they  have 
observed  in  certain  circumstances,  will  happen  again 
in  like  circumstances."  Similarly  Adam  Smith 
says  ^ : — "  There  seems  to  be  in  young  children  an 
instinctive  disposition  to  believe  whatever  they  are 
told."  Hamilton,  commenting  on  Reid,  urges  that 
"  the  terms  instinctive  belief,  judgment,  cognition,  are 

>  Thomas  Reid,  •'  Works,"  edited  by  Sir  \Vm.  Hamilton  (6th  Ed. 
1863),  p.  184. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  549. 

'  Adam  Smith,  •*  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,"  pt.  vii.,  §4. 
H 


98  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

expressions  not  ill  adapted  to  characterize  a  belief, 
judgment,  cognition,  which,  as  the  result  of  no 
anterior  consciousness,  is,  like  the  products  of  animal 
instinct,  the  intelligent  effect  of  (as  far  as  we  are 
concerned)  an  unknowing  cause.  In  like  manner 
we  can  hardly  find  more  suitable  expressions  to 
indicate  those  incomprehensible  spontaneities  them- 
selves, of  which  the  primary  facts  of  consciousness 
are  the  manifestations,  than  rational  or  intellectual 
instincts." 

But  all  this,  it  may  be  said,  is  a  matter  of  past 
history.  Hamilton/  with  his  marvellous  erudition, 
may  cite  a  cloud  of  witnesses  in  favour  of  the  usage  of 
the  term  instinctive  in  this  manner ;  but  have  we  not 
re-defined  the  term  since  those  days  ?  Let  us  turn 
then  to  a  philosopher  of  our  own  times.  M.  Bergson 
has  elaborated  a  doctrine  of  instinct  which  we  shall 
have  to  consider  at  some  length.  But  in  the  follow- 
ing passages  the  word  is  used  in  a  general  sense. 
"The  impulsive  zeal,"  he  says,^  "with  which  we 
take  sides  on  certain  questions  shows  how  our 
intellect  has  its  instincts."  He  speaks  of  the 
tendency  to  accept  a  mechanical  interpretation  of 
things  as  "the  mechanistic  instinct  of  the  mind"; 
he  tells  us  that  "  intellect  instinctively  selects  in  a 
given  situation  whatever  is  like  something  already 
known  "  ;  he  affirms  that  "common-sense  instinctively 
distinguishes  between  the  two  kinds  of  order  " — that 
is,  the  vital  order  and  the  inert  order,  which  for 
M.  Bergson  are  strongly  contrasted  in  nature  and  in 

'  Hamilton's  "  Reid,"  p.  761. 

^  «'  Time  and   Free  Will,"    Eng.  Translation  by  F.  L.   Pogson 
(1910)1  pp.  134-135- 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  99 

origin ;  he  speaks  of  "  a  strong  instinct  which  assures 
the  probability  of  personal  survival  "  ;  he  lays  stress 
on  "  the  cinematographical  instinct  of  our  thought," 
that  is,  our  tendency  to  deal  with  events  in  continuous 
progress,  not  in  their  steady  flow  of  insensible  change 
and  becoming,  but  as  a  series  of  isolated  snap-shots 
taken  like  instantaneous  photographs  in  the  camera 
of  thought.^  Now  these  and  other  such  expressions 
have  reference  to  innate  intellectual  capacity  ;  but 
they  have  reference  to  something  more  than  a 
general  store  of  capacity  or  fund  of  educability. 
There  is  reference  in  each  case  to  a  process  having  a 
definite  direction.  And  the  term  instinctive  is  used 
to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  specific  direction  is 
not,  or  not  only,  the  result  of  intelligent  acquisition, 
but  is  the  outcome  of  hereditary  dispositions.  For 
though,  in  M.  Bergson's  philosophy,  the  hereditary 
dispositions  are  made  by  Life  or  Consciousness  for 
its  own  free  use ;  yet,  as  thus  made  and  thus  used, 
they  are  embodied  in  the  "  canalized "  nervous 
system,  so  that,  at  any  rate,  "  everything  is  bound  to 
happen  as  if  perception  were  a  consequence  of  the 
state  of  the  brain.^ 

It  may  perhaps  be  said  that  the  passages  I  have 
culled  from  M.  Bergson's  writings  serve  only  to 
illustrate  certain  idiosyncrasies  of  his  own  special 
doctrine  of  instinct.  Let  us  then  turn  to  the  pages 
of  two  text-books  of  psychology,  written  quite 
recently.  Defining  instincts  as  "all  connexions  or 
tendencies  to  connexion  which  are  unlearned — are  in 
us  apart  from  training  or  experience,"  Dr.  Thorndike 

'  "Creative  Evolution,"  pp.  i8,  31,  236,283,  333. 
*  *'  Matter  and  Memory,"  p.  314. 


100         INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

says  * : — "  The  inborn  constitution  of  a  human  being 
provides  connexions  between  certain  situations  and 
the  responses  made  to  them."  And  after  enumerating 
the  attributes  of  instincts,  he  says  : — "  All  the  charac- 
teristics of  instincts  thus  summarized  belong  to  the 
subtler  possibilities  of  mental  life  which  are  called 
capacities  "  ;  and  he  proceeds  to  instance  the  capacity 
for  managing  men,  and  that  for  acting,  or  for  literary 
production.  Both  instincts  and  capacities,  then,  are 
as  such,  dependent  upon  inborn  constitution,  and  the 
distinction  between  them,  if  there  be  any  valid 
distinction,  would  seem  to  lie  in  the  fact  that 
capacities  are  "  the  subtler  possibilities  of  mental  life  " 

(p.  191). 

"If  we  try  to  work  out  a  rough  classification  of 

instincts,"  says  Dr.  Titchener,^  "  we  find  at  the  lower 
end  of  the  scale  a  number  of  movements  that  grade 
off  into  the  reflex — such  things  as  coughing,  smiling, 
sneezing,  swallowing,  threading  our  way  on  the 
street,  beating  time  to  music.  .  .  .  These  are  definite 
responses  to  particular  stimuli.  At  the  upper  end  of 
the  scale,  we  find  large  general  tendencies :  the 
tendency  that  makes  us  take  the  world  of  percep- 
tion as  a  world  of  real  things  ;  the  empathic  tendency, 
that  makes  us  humanize  our  surroundings,  animate 
and  inanimate  alike ;  the  social  tendency,  that  makes 
us  imitative  and  credulous  ("  suggestible "  in  a 
narrower  sense) ;  the  tendency  to  dual  division, 
closely  connected  with  the  polar  opposition  of 
pleasantness-unpleasantness,  which  makes  us  classify 

»  Edward  L.  Thorndike,  '« The  Elements  of  Psychology  "  (2nd  Ed. 
1907),  p.  187. 

'  '•  Text  Book  of  Psychology  "  (191 1),  pp.  463-464. 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  101 

the  world  by  pairs,  good-bad,  active-passive,  etc.  .  .  . 
Between  these  extremes  lie  what  we  may  term  the 
instincts  proper  :  fear,  love,  jealousy,  rivalry,  curiosity, 
pugnacity,  repulsion,  self-abasement,  self-assertion, 
and  so  on,"  We  have  thus  a  pretty  wide  range  of 
instinctive  tendencies  (in  the  broader  sense)  from 
sneezing  or  coughing  to  classification  in  opposing  or 
contrasted  pairs;  and  even  in  the  narrower  sense, 
from  fear  and  pugnacity,  through  jealousy  and 
rivalry,  to  self-abasement  and  self-assertion.  Dr. 
Titchener's  classification  comes  to  some  extent 
into  line  with  Dr.  Thorndike's,  if  we  correlate  the 
"  large  general  tendencies  "  of  the  former  psychologist 
with  the  "  inborn  capacities  "  of  the  latter.  In  both 
there  is  a  distinction  between  sundry  "instincts 
proper"  and  sundry  subtler  hereditary  possibilities  of 
the  mental  life. 

Let  us  now  revert  to  Mozart  and  the  duckling. 
The  one,  in  virtue  of  innate  proclivities,  responds  in  a 
special  way  to  the  stimulating  touch  of  musical 
phrase  and  cadence,  falling  on  a  peculiarly  sensitive 
ear  and  brain.  The  other,  in  virtue  of  innate 
tendencies,  responds  in  a  special  way  to  the  touch  of 
water  on  limbs  and  breast.  It  Is  true  that  Mozart 
has  to  learn  to  give  expression  to  the  music  that  is 
in  him,  whereas  the  duckling  has  not  to  learn  to  give 
expression  to  the  swimming  that  is  latent  in  his 
nature  as  a  water-bird  to  the  manner  bom.  Still, 
Mozart's  learning  is  so  remarkably  rapid  that  it  may 
fairly  be  urged  that  there  is  an  innate  facility.  If, 
then,  we  are  to  apply  the  term  instinctive  to  all  that 
is  unlearned — to  all  the  factors  of  the  mental  life 
which  are  the  outcome  of  congenital  dispositions,  as 


102         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

distinguished  from  the  factors  which  are  the  outcome 
of  acquired  dispositions — there  can  be  no  question 
that  Mozart  took  to  music  as  instinctively  as  the 
duckling  takes  to  water.  That  seems  to  have  been 
Huxley's  view.  "  The  child,"  he  says/  "  who  is 
impelled  to  draw  as  soon  as  it  can  hold  a  pencil ;  the 
Mozart  who  breaks  out  into  music  as  early  ;  the  boy 
Bidder  who  worked  out  the  most  complicated  sums 
without  learning  arithmetic ;  the  boy  Pascal  who 
evolved  Euclid  out  of  his  own  consciousness  ;  all 
these  may  be  said  to  have  been  impelled  by  instinct 
as  much  as  the  beaver  and  the  bee.  And  the  man  of 
genius  is  distinct  in  kind  from  the  man  of  cleverness, 
by  reason  of  the  working  within  him  of  strong  innate 
tendencies — which  cultivation  may  improve,  but 
which  it  can  no  more  create  than  horticulture  can 
make  thistles  bear  figs." 

If,  as  Huxley  says,  in  the  paragraph  preceding 
this  passage,  "hereditary  mental  tendencies  may 
justly  be  called  instincts," — and  this  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  accordance  with  the  usage  of  many  writers — 
then,  to  define  instinctive  behaviour,  as  I  have  done, 
as  the  grouping  term  under  which  is  comprised 
complex  groups  of  co-ordinated  responses  which  tend 
to  the  preservation  of  the  race,  and  which  charac- 
terize all  the  members  of  the  same  more  or  less 
restricted  group  of  animals — such  as  chicks,  neuter 
insects,  and  female  finches — is,  to  say  the  least  of  it, 
hopelessly  inadequate. 

I  suppose  it  is  pretty  obvious  that  my  definition 
is  not  meant  to  cover  the  facts  presented  by  the  early 

•  T.  H.  Huxley,  "Hume"  (1879),  p.  113.     "Collected  Essays," 
vol.  vi.,  p.  132. 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  103 

life  of  Mozart,  Bidder,  or  Pascal.  I  suppose  it  is 
pretty  obvious  that  I  do  not  use  the  terms  instinctive 
and  innate  as  equivalent  and  interchangeable.  In 
the  use  of  terms,  I  advocate,  while  all  that  is 
instinctive  is  innate,  there  is  much  that  is  innate 
which  is  not  instinctive.  Instinctive  behaviour  is  the 
outcome  of  the  possession  of  congenital  dispositions  ; 
but  there  are  congenital  dispositions  which  determine 
other  features  of  the  mental  life  than  the  sequence  of 
instinctive  experience.  Since  we  have  two  adjectives, 
instinctive  and  innate,  I  see  no  reason  whatever  for 
continuing  to  use  them  as  synonymous.  Why  not 
reserve  the  narrower  term  instinctive  for  behaviour  of 
a  specific  congenital  type,  dependent  on  purely  bio- 
logical conditions,  nowise  guided  by  conscious 
experience,  though  affording  data  for  the  life  of 
consciousness .-'  Why  not  use  the  broader  term 
innate  to  include  also  those  differentiations  of  con- 
genital capacity  which,  in  man,  show  hereditary 
tendencies  to  artistic  appreciation  and  expression,  to 
mechanical  invention,  to  scientific  investigation  and 
interpretation,  to  philosophic  thought ;  always 
granting  (as  I  am  prepared  to  grant)  that  these 
inherited  tendencies  exist  ?  Such  an  initial  set  of  the 
mental  life  in  a  specific  direction  is  of  course  just  as 
characteristic  of  animal  life  as  of  human  life.  Closely 
connected  with  instinctive  behaviour  are  what  we 
may  term  the  innate  interests ;  for  example,  the 
racial  interest  of  the  cat  in  mousing,  of  the  bird  in 
nest-building,  of  the  beaver  in  damming  up  streams,  of 
nearly  all  female  animals  in  the  care  of  the  young 
they  have  produced,  and  so  forth.  I  am  well  aware 
that    these    are    commonly    regarded    as    typically 


104         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

instinctive.  Tiiat  they  are  intimately  correlated  with 
instinctive  behaviour  I  freely  acknowledge.  That 
they  are  the  outcome  of  congenital  dispositions  I  do 
not  for  a  moment  deny.  But  they  are  not  instinctive 
as  I  define  the  term.  They  are  innate  tendencies  of 
the  mental  life  in  the  development  of  which  the 
instinctive  consciousness,  properly  so  called  (in  my 
terminology),  is  implicated. 

But  why  do  I  thus  distinguish  so  sharply  innate 
tendency  from  instinct  ?  Because  I  regard  it  as  due 
to  the  congenital  dispositions  of  the  cortex.  And 
this  brings  me  back  to  the  physiological  side  of  my 
doctrine  of  instinct.  My  thesis  is  that,  in  its  strictly 
biological  aspect,  instinctive  behaviour  is,  as  such, 
wholly  due  to  congenital  dispositions  in  the  sub- 
cortical centres.  I  have  given  at  length  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  the  kind  of  physiological  evidence  on 
which  I  rely.  But  this  instinctive  behaviour  of  the 
ideally  decerebrate  animal — which  is,  I  admit  (out- 
side the  physiological  laboratory),  a  product  of 
abstraction — in  the  intact  animal  also  stirs  the  cortex. 
Here  arises  conscious  experience  of  the  presented 
situation  and  of  the  behaviour  as  taking  place.  But 
here  also  are  at  the  same  time  initiated  the  cortical 
processes  which  accompany  mental  process.  Now  the 
cortex  itself,  like  the  sub -cortical  brain,  has  its  con- 
genital dispositions ;  and  these  are  the  physiological 
basis  of  the  innate  mental  tendencies,  proclivities, 
faculties,  and  interests.  These  cortical  processes  are 
the  correlates  of  hereditary  modes  of  conative  process. 
I  do  not  myself  apply  the  term  conation  to  mental 
process  which  merely  follows  in  the  wake  of  instinctive 
procedure  determined  by  purely  biological  hereditary 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  105 

dispositions  of  the  sub-cortical  centres.  Perhaps  we 
might  here  apply  the  term,  quasi-conative,  suggested 
by  Dr.  Stout  ^  in  a  slightly  different  connexion.  The 
point  on  which  I  wish  to  lay  stress  is  that  true  cona- 
tion is  always  conditioned  by  anticipatory  meaning 
— by  a  conscious  relationship,  and  hence  in  my 
interpretation  is  always  correlated  with  cortical 
dispositions. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  second  chapter 
I  said  that  while  I  am  ready  to  admit  some  vague 
pre-perception  as  associated  with,  or  supplementary  to, 
the  instinctive  consciousness,  I  am  not  prepared  to 
admit  that  it  forms  part  of  the  consciousness  correlated 
with  the  instinctive  situation  as  such.  For  granting 
the  existence  of  such  more  or  less  vague  and  as  yet 
undefined  pre-perception,  this  is  due,  I  believe,  to 
hereditary  dispositions  within  the  cortex,  and  not  to 
inherited  connexions  among  the  sub-cortical  neurones 
which  are  the  conditions  of  instinctive  behaviour. 

I  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  all  secondary 
meaning,  in  the  psychological  sense,  as  dependent 
on  prior  individually  gained  experience.  The  sight 
of  a  lady-bird  acquires  meaning  for  the  chick  through 
taking  the  insect  into  the  bill.  I  have  therefore 
spoken  of  meaning  as  of  guiding  value  through  the 
revival  of  past  experience.  But  one  should  be  ready 
to  assimilate  new  ideas.  Now  Mr.  McDougall,  Dr. 
Stout  and  Dr.  Myers  suggest  or  accept  the  view  that 
some  measure  of  re-presentation  precedes  presenta- 
tion. Mr.  McDougall  gives  expression  to  this  view  in 
a  form  which  attributes  no  little  definiteness  to  the 
anticipatory    consciousness.      The    weaver-bird     is 

'  "Manual  of  Psychology,"  Bk.  II.,  ch.  ii.,  §  3,  p.  I43« 


106         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

credited  with  an  innate  representation  of  the  form  of 
the  nest  it  is  going  to  build.  Mr.  McDougall  holds 
that  "  there  is  no  such  fundamental  difference  between 
the  dispositions  that  condition  perception  and  re- 
presentation respectively,  as  to  warrant  us  in  drawing 
a  rigid  line  between  them,  and  in  saying  that,  while 
dispositions  subserving  perception  may  be  inherited, 
those  subserving  representation  are  not,  or  cannot 
be  inherited."  1  But,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  inherited 
re-presentation  is  here  regarded  as  something  far 
more  than  the  vague  pre-perception  in  favour  of 
which  Dr.  Stout  argues.  It  approaches,  if  it  does  not 
reach  the  full  stature  of,  a  definite  anticipatory  image. 
I  find  insuperable  difficulties  in  accepting  the  doctrine 
of  innate  ideas  in  this  new  form. 

But  though  I  cannot  come  into  line  with  Mr.  Mc- 
Dougall's  thought,  I  can  go  some  way  with  Dr.  Stout, 
especially  if  I  am  allowed  to  regard  the  pre-perceptive 
consciousness  as  assuming  an  affective  rather  than  a 
cognitional  form  and  as  taking  the  guise  of  an  undefined 
interest  in  what  may  come.  In  human  life  interest 
often  diffuses  itself  forward  in  a  form  so  indefinite 
that  it  is  difficult  to  give  expression  to  it  in  cognitive 
terms.  We  may  not  be  aware  in  any  clear  fashion, 
in  a  sense  scarcely  aware  at  all,  of  what  is  coming  ; 
and  yet  we  may  be  keenly  interested,  partly  because 
we  don't  yet  know.  Of  course  in  human  life  this  is 
a  somewhat  complex  mental  attitude.  It  implies  a 
recognized  gap  in  our  knowledge,  a  gap  that  we  want 
to  be  filled  in,  and  to  be  filled  in  adequately.  Still 
most  of  us,  I  suppose,  are  familiar  with  a  less  com- 
plex attitude,  where  we  just   expect   some  kind  of 

■  "Brit,  Journ.  of  Psych.,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  251. 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  107 

satisfaction,  though  what  form  this  satisfaction  will  take 
remains  altogether  indefinite.  Still  it  has  real  value  ; 
it  leads  us  on  and  makes  us  persist  in  the  behaviour 
through  which  the  situation  is  further  developed. 
May  I  accept  Dr.  Stout's  teaching  (I  am  always  proud 
to  learn  from  him)  in  some  such  form  as  this  ?  Putting 
the  matter  in  my  own  way  I  ask  :  May  we  not  assume 
that  the  very  first  time  the  moorhen  is  in  the  water, 
there  is  some  form  of  cortical  spread  of  physiological 
disturbance,  determined  by  hereditary  dispositions, 
which  takes  the  conscious  form  of  undefined  pleasur- 
able interest  conducing  to  persistence  in  the  instinctive 
behaviour  of  swimming  ?  Since  this  would  be  a 
prospective  conscious  relationship,  of  real  value  as  a 
condition  furthering  the  instinctive  act,  it  would  be  so 
far  truly  conative.  May  there  not  be  an  innate 
psycho-physiological  tendency  of  cortical  process  to 
spread  along  hereditary  lines  parallel  to  the  lines  of 
spread  in  the  biologically  instinctive  sub-cortical 
process?  If  we  speak  of  this  as  an  incipient  psycho- 
logical end,  since  the  diffused  pleasure  is  a  conscious 
relationship  of  real  conditioning  value ;  and  if  we  look 
forward  towards  its  further  development ;  may  we  not 
say  that,  broadly  speaking,  the  conative  or  psycho- 
logical end,  correlated  with  cortical  process,  is  pleasure 
and  satisfaction  in  living  'the  racial  life ;  and  that, 
broadly  speaking,  the  biological  end  of  the  sub-cortical 
process  is  survival  ?  Thus  should  I  explain  the  fact 
that  there  is  a  correlation  between  pleasure  or  satis- 
faction and  those  modes  of  instinctive  behaviour 
which  conduce  to  the  preservation  of  the  species.  I 
should  extend  this  even  to  details — of  nest-building 
for  example.     To  carry  out  this   or  that  detail  in 


108  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

racial  fashion  is  supported  by  pleasure ;  each  de- 
parture from  the  routine  of  racial  procedure  is  checked 
by  the  diffused  pain  which  is  closely  correlated  with 
cortical  inhibition.  Thus,  through  natural  selection, 
there  is  established  a  consonance  between  innate 
mental  tendencies  and  the  congenital  automatism  of 
instinctive  behaviour.  In  this  connexion  Mr.  Mc- 
Dougall  ^  is  right  in  contending  that  the  establishment 
of  this  consonance  must  be  accepted  as  evidence  that 
"  pleasure  and  pain  are  efficient  causes  of  appetition 
and  aversion  " ;  or,  as  I  should  prefer  to  phrase  it, 
that  the  conscious  relationship  is  a  condition  which 
really  counts  in  the  determination  of  behaviour  and 
conduct.  Whether  this  lends  any  support  to  a 
doctrine  of  animism,  such  as  Mr.  McDougall  advocates, 
is  a  wholly  different  question. 

From  what  has  already  been  said  in  this  chapter 
it  is  sufficiently  obvious  that  what  I  have  spoken  of 
as  innate  tendencies  are  just  what  some  authors  term 
instincts.  Among  these  authors  is  Mr.  McDougall, 
though  he  does  not  include  under  the  term  the 
more  general  innate  tendencies  included  by  Dr. 
Thorndike  and  Dr.  Titchener. 

A  salient  feature  of  Mr.  McDougall's  treatment 
is  the  emphasis  he  lays  on  the  very  intimate  and 
close  connexion  between  instinct  and  emotion. 
"  Each  of  the  principal  instincts,"  he  says,^  "  con- 
ditions some  one  kind  of  emotional  excitement 
whose  quality  is  specific  or  peculiar  to  it  ;  and  the 
emotional  excitement  of  specific  quality  that  is  the 
affective  aspect    of   the   operation    of  any   one    of 

'  "  Physiological  Psychology,"  p.  l6o;  "Body  and  Mind,"  p.  324. 
-  "An  Introduction  to  Social  Psychology"  (1908),  p.  47. 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  109 

the  principal  instincts  may  be  called  a  primary 
emotion."  I  fully  agree  with  Mr.  McDougall  that 
emotional  tone  accompanies  the  mental  processes 
which  are  due  to  hereditary  cortical  dispositions,  I 
think  it  probable  however  that  emotional  expression, 
and  the  visceral  reflexes  which  have  played  so 
conspicuous  a  part  in  recent  discussion,  form  part  of 
the  instinctive  automatism,  and  are  the  outcome  of 
hereditary  dispositions  in  the  basal  ganglia  of  the 
brain.  As  Mr.  McDougall  notes  (p.  33),  "the 
evidence  of  this  view  has  been  greatly  strengthened 
by  the  recent  work  of  Pagano."  I  am,  however, 
disposed  to  question  whether  the  emotional  experi- 
ence arises  here.  Its  brain-correlates  are  probably 
cortical.  This,  I  take  it,  is  Dr.  Pagano's  opinion. 
But  Mr.  McDougall,  as  I  understand  him,  regards 
the  nervous  activities  in  these  sub-cortical  ganglia  as 
the  correlates  of  the  affective  or  emotional  aspect  or 
feature  of  the  total  psychical  process. 

In  any  case  "the  human  mind,"  says  Mr. 
McDougall  (pp.  19,  20),  "has  certain  innate  or 
inherited  tendencies  which  are  the  essential  springs 
or  motive  powers  of  all  thought  and  action.  .  .  , 
These  all-important  and  relatively  unchanging 
tendencies,  which  form  the  basis  of  human  character 
and  will,  are  of  two  classes :  (i)  The  specific 
tendencies  or  instincts ;  (2)  The  general  or  non- 
specific tendencies  arising  out  of  the  constitution  of 
the  mind  and  the  nature  of  mental  process  in  general, 
when  mind  and  mental  process  attain  a  certain 
degree  of  complexity  in  the  course  of  evolution." 
"  Instincts,"  he  contends  (p.  26),  "  are  more  than 
innate  tendencies  or  dispositions  to  particular  kinds 


110         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

of  movement.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
even  the  most  purely  instinctive  action  is  the  outcome 
of  a  distinctively  mental  process,  one  which  is 
incapable  of  being  described  in  purely  mechanical 
terms,  because  it  is  a  psycho-physical  process, 
involving  psychical  as  well  as  physical  changes,  and 
one  which  like  every  other  mental  process,  has,  and 
can  only  be  fully  described  in  terms  of,  the  three 
aspects  of  all  mental  process — the  cognitive,  the 
afifective,  and  the  conative  aspects  ;  that  is  to  say 
every  instance  of  instinctive  behaviour  involves  a 
knowing  of  some  thing  or  object,  a  feeling  in 
regard  to  it,  and  a  striving  towards  or  away  from  that 
object." 

This  passage  serves  well  to  bring  out  the  wide 
divergence  of  our  different  interpretations  of 
instinctive  behaviour  and  instinctive  experience. 
Not  only  does  Mr.  McDougall  include  (whereas  I 
exclude)  inherited  mental  tendencies,  correlated 
with  psycho-physiological  dispositions  and  processes 
within  the  cortex  ;  he  believes  that  the  most  purely 
instinctive  action  (including,  I  presume,  such  cases  as 
that  of  my  moorhen's  dive)  is  the  outcome  of 
distinctively  mental  processes,  involving  cognition, 
affective  tone,  and  conation ;  whereas  I  believe  that 
they  are  the  outcome  of  distinctively  biological 
processes,  though  they  also  afford  primary  data  in 
experience.  But  the  divergence  really  lies  deeper. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  Mr.  McDougall  says  that  the 
instinctive  action  cannot  be  described  "  in  purely 
mechanical  terms."  What  are  we  to  understand  by 
purely  mechanical  terras  }  That  we  shall  have  to 
consider  later.     If  we  substitute  the  phrase  "purely 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  111 

physiological  terms,"  I  believe  that  it  is  in  these 
terms  that  instinctive  behaviour,  as  such,  is  to  be 
explained.      But    Mr.    McDougall    holds*   that   all 
bodily  processes,   especially   those   of   growth    and 
repair,  and  a  fortiori,  I  presume,  instinctive  response, 
are  not  susceptible  of  what  I  should  term   purely 
physiological  explanation.     How  then  are  they  to  be 
explained  ?      By  the   guiding  agency  of    the    soul. 
The  explanation  offered  is  animistic.      For  if  "  we 
deny  to  the  soul  or  thinking  principle    all   part   in 
these  bodily  processes,  we   shall    have  to  postulate 
some  second  and  distinct   teleological  factor  opera- 
tive  in    organisms.     The  principle  of   economy   of 
hypothesis,  therefore,"  in  Mr.   McDougall's  opinion, 
"directs  us   to   attempt   to   conceive   that   the   soul 
may  be  operative  in  the  guidance  of  bodily  growth, 
either   directly   or   by   means  of  a   general    control 
exercised   by  it  over  some   system   of  subordinate 
psychic  agents."     Of  course  if  this  is  so,  if  even  the 
growth     of    the    embryo    is    subject    to    psychical 
control  (p.  375),  the  observed  behaviour  of  the  spinal 
animal   or  of  the   decerebrate  bird   or  mammal,   is 
something  more  than  co-ordinated  reflex  action  ;  it 
is  a  manifestation  of  "  the  soul  or  thinking  principle." 
To  this  aspect  of  Mr.  McDougall's  thought  we  shall 
have  to  return  in  the  sequel.      For  the   present   it 
suffices    to   draw  attention    to   the   relation   of  his 
doctrine  of  instinct  to  his  doctrine  of  animism. 

The  principal  instincts  of  man,  each  of  which  is  also 
a  primary  emotion,  are,  according  to  Mr.  McDougall,^ 
seven  in  number:  (i)  the  instinct  of  flight  and  the 
emotion  of  fear ;  (2)  the  instinct  of  repulsion  and  the 

>  "  Body  and  Mind,"  p.  373.  *  "  Social  Psychology." 


112         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

emotion  of  disgust ;  (3)  the  instinct  of  curiosity  and 
the  emotion  of  wonder  ;  (4)  the  instinct  of  pugnacity 
and  the  emotion  of  anger  ;  (5)  and  (6)  the  instincts  of 
self-abasement  (or  subjection)  and  of  self-assertion 
(or  self-display),  and  the  emotions  of  subjection  or 
elation  (negative  or  positive  self-feeling) ;  (7)  the 
parental  instinct  and  tender  emotion.  These  seven 
instincts  "  are  those  whose  excitement  yields  the  most 
definite  of  the  primary  emotions,  and  from  these 
seven  primary  emotions  together  with  the  feelings  of 
pleasure  and  pain  (and  perhaps  also  feelings  of 
excitement  and  of  depression)  are  compounded  all, 
or  almost  all,  the  affective  states  that  are  popularly 
recognized  as  emotions,  and  for  which  common 
speech  has  definite  names"  (p.  81).  To  these  may 
be  added  as  of  less  importance  the  instinct  of 
reproduction,  the  gregarious  instinct,  the  instinct  of 
acquisition,  and  that  of  construction.  In  the  chapter 
on  the  general  innate  tendencies  (p.  90),  sympathy, 
suggestibility,  imitation,  play,  habit,  and  the 
temperamental  factors  are  discussed. 

I  need  not  again  emphasize  the  fact  that  Mr. 
McDougall  and  I  use  the  terms  instinct  and  instinc- 
tive with  a  difference  of  connotation.  It  will  be 
more  profitable  to  try  and  show  how  our  differences 
of  outlook  are  related.  First  with  regard  to  the 
connexion  between  instinctive  and  emotional  ex- 
perience. On  the  fact  that  there  is  an  intimate 
connexion  we  both  lay  stress.  I  may  be  allowed 
here  to  recapitulate  my  own  view  of  the  matter. 
When  a  specific  situation  affords  an  appropriate 
constellation  of  stimuli,  there  issue  reflexly  from  the 
sub-cortical  centres  two  sets  of  efferent  impulses,  (i) 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  113 

those  which  evoke  a  specific  mode  of  instinctive 
behaviour,  including  those  motor  responses  which 
constitute  much  of  the  so-called  emotional  expression  ; 
(2)  those  which  evoke  visceral  disturbance — changes 
of  heart-beat,  and  of  the  respiratory  rhythm, 
modifications  of  the  digestive  and  glandular  functions,^ 
alterations  in  the  peripheral  vascular  flow,  a  diffused 
influence  on  the  general  coenaesthesis  and  so  forth. 
From  all  this  complex  of  bodily  changes  under  (i) 
and  (2),  afferent  impulses  come  into  the  central 
nervous  system,  and,  when  they  reach  the  cortex, 
qualify  the  experience  of  the  presented  situation  and 
thus  complete  the  instinctive  experience  with  its 
accompanying  emotional  tone.  I  regard  it  as 
probable  that,  in  its  primary  genesis,  the  emotional 
tone  is  in  large  measure  correlated  with  cortical 
disturbance  due  to  stimulation  which  is  visceral  and 
coenaesthetic  in  origin.  If  we  look  upon  the  James- 
Lange  theory  as  one  which  is  solely  concerned  with 
such  primary  genesis,  there  is  much  to  be  said  in  its 
favour.  This  may  well  be  the  way  in  which  affective 
meaning  is,  in  the  first  instance,  acquired.  But  when 
once  it  has  been  thus  acquired,  when  once  associative 
connexions  have  been  established,  the  emotional  mean- 
ing, like  the  cognitive  meaning  which  it  qualifies,  may 
be  called  up  or  revived,  within  a  cortical  disposition, 
before  visceral  impulses  again  come  in  to  supplement 
and  reinforce  the  emotional  experiences  in  primary 
fashion.  I  take  it,  however,  that  in  the  absence  of 
such  reinforcement  an  emotion  is  so  cold-blooded  as 

*  The  influence  of  those  physiological  products  which  are  termed 
hormones  on  emotional  tone  is  probably  of  very  great  importance. 
Cf,  McDougall,  pp.  117,  118. 
I 


114         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

to  be  scarcely  worthy  of  the  name.     Such  in  outline 
is  my  account  of  the  matter. 

In  Mr.  McDougall's  interpretation   "the  innate 
psycho-physical  disposition,  which  is  an  instinct,  may 
be   regarded   as  consisting    of  three   corresponding 
parts,  an  afferent,  a  central,  and  a  motor  or  efferent 
part,  whose  activities  are  the  cognitive,  the  affective, 
and   the  conative   features  respectively  of  the   total 
instinctive    process."       The     afferent    part    is    the 
presentation  of  the  situation,  the  efferent  part  is  the 
behaviour  response,  and  such  visceral  innervation  as 
may  modify  the  working  of  the  internal  organs  "  in 
the  manner  required  for  the  most  effective  execution 
of  the  instinctive  action."     Between   these  two  lies 
the  central  part,  the  nervous  activities  of  which  "  are 
the  correlates  of  the  affective  or  emotional  aspect  or 
feature  of  the  total  psychical  process "  (pp.  32-33). 
The  emotional  part  is  thus  intercalated  between  the 
presentation  and  the  behaviour  and  visceral  response. 
"  All  the   principal    instincts   of  man  are   liable   to 
modifications  of  their  afferent  and  motor  parts,  while 
their  central  parts  remain  unchanged  and  determine 
the  emotional  tone  of  consciousness  and  the  visceral 
changes  characteristic  of  the  excitement  of  the  instinct" 
(p.  42).     These  quotations  suffice,  I  think,  to  indicate 
that   there  is    a   wide    divergence    in   our    several 
interpretations.     But  I  cannot  dwell  further  on  this 
aspect  of  the  problem  of  instinct. 

When  we  come  to  the  consideration  of  the 
primary  innate  tendencies — whether  we  take  the  major 
seven  or  add  to  these  the  minor  four  (one  of  which  at 
least,  the  reproductive  instinct,  seems  worthy  of  major 
rank)— I  find  it  less  easy  to  correlate  our  different 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  115 

views.    No  doubt  the  distinction  which  Mr.  McDougall 
draws  between  the  specific   and  the  general  innate 
tendencies  may  fairly  be  taken  as  that  between  the 
relatively  specific  and  the  relatively  general ;  though 
I  am  not  sure  that  he  would  agree  to  this  qualifica- 
tion,  for  his  primary  instincts  seem  to   function  as 
independent  elements  or  agents.     So  far  from  regard- 
ing any  one  of  them  as  a  primary  element,  I  regard 
each  item  on  his  list  as  denoting  a  class  to  which  a 
group-name   is  attached — a  class  comprising  varied 
modes   of   behaviour   and   modes   of  experience — a 
class  within  which  these  varied  modes  are  grouped 
because  they  have  certain  features  in  common,  and 
tend  towards  what  we  may  term,  in  a  very  general 
way,  the  same  end.     Thus  any  one  of  his  instinctive 
tendencies   appears   to   me  to    emphasize    what    is 
similar   in   a  number  of  rather  varied   experiences 
which  are  also  characterized  by  much  difference.     I 
cannot  say  how  many  particular  modes  of  instinctive 
behaviour  and  instinctive  experience  in  my  sense  of 
the  words  would  be   comprised   under   the   general 
heading   of  parental   instinct — quite   a   considerable 
number.     Though  I  should  not  for  one  moment  think 
of  denying   that  "  self-assertion  "  and  "  subjection  " 
involve,  in  each  case,  exceedingly  complex  congenital 
dispositions,  sub-cortical  and  cortical ;  and  though  I 
do  not  here  feel  disposed  to  question  the  convenience 
of  these   particular   terms,   under  which   to    group 
antithetical     bodily    and     mental     tendencies    that 
accompany  the  performance  of  many  rather  varied 
modes  of  behaviour  ;   none  the  less  they  appear  to 
me  rather  to  denote  certain  characteristics  common 
to  the  experience  that  accompanies  these  or  those 


116         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

modes  of  behaving,  in  this  or  that  set  of  presented 
circumstances,  than  unitary  principles  that  determine 
these  experiences  or  these  modes  of  behaviour. 

To  put  the  matter  in  a  different  way  I  should 
regard  the  "  seven "  primary  instincts  as  so  many 
leading  predicates  we  may  make  of  the  innate  con- 
stitution of  the  organism  regarded  as  the  logical 
subject.  Each  predicate  will  of  course  be  contingent 
upon  the  conditions.  Thus  we  may  say  that  the 
innate  constitution  of  the  organism  is  such  that  under 
these  or  those  conditions  he  is  pugnacious,  curious, 
self-assertive,  touched  by  tender  emotion,  and  so 
forth.  I  find  this  point  of  view  more  helpful  than 
the  assignment  of  what  may  in  each  case  be  predi- 
cated to  unitary  principles  or  mental  forces. 

But  here  we  open  up  a  fresh  aspect  of  the  whole 
matter.  Instinct  is  for  Mr.  McDougall  a  determinant 
of  activity.  The  instinctive  mental  process  "  results 
from  "  the  excitement  of  an  instinct  (p.  46).  "  We 
may  say,  then,  that  directly  or  indirectly  the  instincts 
are  the  prime  movers  of  all  human  activity ;  by  the 
conative  or  impulsive  force  of  some  instinct  (or  of 
some  habit  derived  from  an  instinct)  every  train  of 
thought  ...  is  borne  along  towards  its  end,  and 
every  bodily  activity  is  initiated  and  sustained. 
The  instinctive  impulses  determine  the  ends  of  all 
activities  and  supply  the  driving  power  by  which  all 
mental  activities  are  sustained.  .  .  .  These  impulses 
are  the  mental  forces  that  maintain  and  shape  all  the 
life  of  individuals  and  societies,  and  in  them  we  are 
confronted  with  the  central  mystery  of  life  and  mind 
and  will "  (p.  44). 

Now   we   may,    from    my   point   of  view,  quite 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  117 

legitimately  speak  of  behaviour  or  of  mental  process 
as  "  determined "  by  psycho-physiological  disposi- 
tions, if  by  this  we  mean  that,  among  the  con- 
ditions under  which  bodily  or  mental  process  runs  a 
particular  course  such  dispositions  must  be  taken 
into  account.  But  what  is  a  disposition  ?  Mr. 
McDougall  says  ^  that  we  ought  to  use  the  term 
an  instinct  to  denote  that  feature  of  the  innate  consti- 
tution of  any  organism,  that  inherited  disposition, 
in  virtue  of  which  the  organism  acts  instinctively. 
Here  innate  constitution  and  inherited  disposition 
are  apparently  regarded  as  equivalent.  Are  they 
quite  equivalent  "i  Is  there  not  some  ambiguity  in 
the  use  of  the  word  disposition  ?  I  take  it  that,  from 
the  physiological  point  of  view,  a  disposition  is  a 
configuration  or  a  constellation  of  complexly-grouped 
neurones  which,  in  virtue  of  its  physiological  rela- 
tionships and  connexions,  is  the  structural  and 
functional  condition  of  the  flow  of  nervous  process 
along  certain  channels.  But  should  we  not  distin- 
guish between  the  disposition,  as  a  configuration 
of  neurones,  and  the  constitution  of,  let  us  say, 
the  cerebral  cortex  ?  The  constitutive  elements  of 
the  nervous  system  are  the  neurones  themselves, 
with  their  store  of  so-called  potential  energy  ;  the 
disposition  is  the  manner  in  which  these  neurones 
are  grouped  and  connected.  Now  this  grouping 
and  connexion  as  such,  this  configuration  or  constel- 
lation of  neurones,  this  disposition  of  elements,  has, 
I  conceive,  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  genera- 
tion of  "impulsive  force."  The  impulsive  force,  if 
we  elect  to  use  this  phrase,  is  the  energy  implicate 

*  "British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol  iii.,  p.  253. 


118  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

in  the  constitution  of  the  neurones,  of  the  nervous 
system,  of  the  organism.  All  such  "  impulsive  force  " 
is,  for  the  interpretation  I  accept,  just  part  of  the 
constitution  of  nature  as  a  going  concern.  And 
since  psychological  relationships  are  themselves  also 
part  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  therein  lies  the 
ground  of  mental  process  (as  of  all  other  process) 
as  it  runs  its  course,  psycho-physiological  dispositions 
being  the  conditions  of  certain  modes  of  describable 
relationship. 

But  on  this  view  what  becomes  of  impulse  ?  Let 
me  lead  up  to  an  answer  to  this  question  by  the 
prior  consideration  of  another  question. 

If  we  say  that  pugnacity  makes  the  robin  pug- 
nacious, or  self-assertion  makes  the  child  self-assertive, 
or  curiosity  impels  the  monkey  to  pry  into  this  and 
that,  are  we  not  in  some  danger  of  regarding  each 
instinct  as  a  faculty  in  terms  of  which  the  instinctive 
process  may  be  explained  ?  We  have  such  a  way  of 
making  our  general  and  abstract  terms  pose  as  so- 
called  forces.  Thus  by  many  people  gravitation 
is  supposed  to  make  bodies  attract  each  other  ;  and 
crystallization  to  make  sugar  run  into  crystalline 
form.  I  am  one  of  those  who  regard  gravitation 
as  a  concept  under  which  attractions  of  a  certain 
order  are  formulated ;  crystallization  as  that  which 
denotes  certain  modes  of  crystalline  synthesis.  So 
too  I  should  regard  pugnacity  as  the  concept  under 
which  fall  specific  modes  of  behaviour  and  experience  ; 
self-assertion  as  that  under  which  may  be  grouped 
certain  other  modes  of  behaviour  and  experience, 
and  so  forth.  All  such  concepts  are  merged  within, 
and  form  related  factors  of,  the  more  general  concept 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  119 

of  the  constitution  of  nature.  If  then  we  are  asked 
why,  say,  crystallization  occurs  under  such  and  such 
conditions,  all  that  we  can  reply  is  that  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature  is  such  that  under  these  conditions 
it  does  occur.  There's  an  end  of  the  matter  so  fat 
as  science  is  concerned.  The  constitution  of  nature 
as  the  ground  of  crystallization  (and  of  other  processes) 
is  just  a  concept  we  reach  by  a  patient  study  of  all 
the  facts  which  are  presented  to  observation.  Of 
course  such  concepts  refer  to  reality,  real  facts  in  real 
relationship.  But  crystallization  does  not  make  the 
facts  to  be  what  they  are  ;  but  the  related  facts  being 
what  they  are  (so  far  as  we  have  learnt  them)  makes 
our  concept  of  crystallization  what  it  is.  The  con- 
stitution of  nature,  as  a  concept  having  reference  to 
reality,  summarises  within  our  ideal  construction  a 
whole  with  closely  interrelated  parts.  It  does  not 
make  the  facts :  it  is  the  facts  as  universal  and  not 
merely  particular.  So,  too,  pugnacity  does  not 
make  the  facts  of  behaviour  and  experience  what 
they  are ;  but  these  given  facts  related  in  certain 
ways  are  comprised  under  the  concept  of  pugnacity. 
The  constitution  of  the  conscious  organism  does  not 
make  the  facts  of  the  conscious  life  ;  but  the  totality 
of  correlated  facts  is  l^what  forms  the  basis  of  our 
concept  of  that  constitution.  Instinct  (or  a  com- 
mittee of  instincts)  is  not  something  that,  through 
impulsive  force  and  motive  power,  drives  bodily  or 
mental  processes  towards  their  end  ;  it  is  a  concept 
in  terms  of  which  we  can,  in  some  measure,  interpret 
these  processes  as  facts  presented  in  nature. 

And  so  we  get  back  to  impulse.     Impulse  is  not, 
I    conceive,    something  which   makes   any  process, 


120         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

strong  or  weak,  to  run  its  course,  any  more  than 
crystallization  impels  the  molecules  of  a  crystal  to 
enter  into  synthetic  form — any  more  than  force 
(for  those  whose  usage  I  follow)  makes  physical 
motion  to  occur.  Impulse  is  the  name  we  give  to  a 
specific  mode  of  experience  which  arises  when  bodily 
and  mental  processes  are  running  their  course.  I  do 
not  question  the  reality  of  such  a  specific  mode 
of  experience.  I  provisionally  accept  feelings  of 
"activity"  in  the  sense  of  awareness  of  process  in 
progress.  The  term  impulse,  like  the  physical  term 
force,  may  conveniently  be  used  to  express,  though 
with  far  less  of  mathematical  precision,  a  measure  of 
the  mental  process  within  a  conscious  configuration. 
On  this  understanding,  since  impulse  denotes  a  felt 
measure  of  intensity,  there  can  be  no  objection  to 
speaking  of  the  strength  of  an  impulse,  or,  in  the 
higher  conceptual  life,  the  strength  of  a  motive. 
Indeed,  on  this  understanding,  I  see  no  objection 
to  speaking  of  impulsive  power,  or  of  motive  force, 
so  long  as  it  is  clearly  realized  that  these  expressions 
denote  a  measure  of  the  intensity  of  processes  which 
they  take  no  share  in  producing.  Of  course,  as  I  am 
well  aware,  it  will  be  said  that  all  this,  with  its 
analogies  drawn  from  the  inorganic  sphere,  implies 
a  hopelessly  mechanistic  interpretation.  So  be  it, 
if  so  it  be.  We  shall  discuss  the  concept  of  mechanism 
later  on.  For  the  present,  I  would  only  beg  my 
critic  to  realize  that  such  a  mechanistic  interpre- 
tation, if  such  it  is,  nowise  disregards,  nay  insists 
on,  the  distinguishing  importance  of  those  con- 
scious relationships  which  count  in  any  experiential 
situation    every    whit   as    much    as    the   crystalline 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  121 

relationships   count   in   an   evaporating   solution  of 
alum. 

I  take  it  that  in  what  I  have  said  I  have  altogether 
parted  company  from  Mr.  McDougall,  whose  doctrine 
of  instinct  and  impulse  has  quite  other  implications. 
So  that,  after  all,  these  comments,  while  they  indicate, 
I  trust,  with  sufficient  clearness  the  nature  of  my 
own  outlook,  only  serve  to  show  the  wide  divergence 
in  basal  scientific  conceptions  between  Mr.  McDougall 
and  me ;  just  as  the  earlier  comments  served  to 
illustrate  the  distinction  I  should  draw  between  the 
innate  mental  tendencies  which  he  terms  instincts, 
and  the  compound  reflexes  in  automatic  response  to 
which,  and  to  the  accompanying  experience,  I  restrict 
the  term.  Let  us  then  without  further  quarrel  over 
philosophical  implications,  or  over  technical  designa- 
tion, take  the  innate  tendencies.  I  should  put  the 
matter  thus.  There  is,  correlated  with  hereditary 
cortical  dispositions,  innate  mental  tendency  to  carry 
up  into  the  sphere  of  educability  all  the  essential  life- 
processes  which  find  their  earliest  expression  in  the 
automatism  provided  for  by  the  sub-cortical  disposi- 
tions. Among  these  are  tendencies  to  exercise  the 
locomotor  apparatus  and  to  go  abroad  in  the  world 
within  a  varying  range  ;  to  get  the  food  in  special 
relation  to  which  the  species  has  been  evolved ;  to 
mate  and  procreate  its  kind  ;  to  foster  and  protect 
the  young ;  to  associate  with  others  in  flocks  or 
herds ;  to  imitate  others  ;  to  be  self-assertive  in  one 
social  situation,  or  submissive  in  another ;  pug- 
naciously to  hold  his  own,  or  timidly  to  escape  from 
the  dangerous  by  flight ;  to  pry  into  the  strange  and 
unusual ;  to  overcome  obstacles  and  difiiculties  by 


122         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

persistent  effort.  The  list  might  be  almost  indefinitely 
extended  ;  and  within  the  list  the  inter-relationships 
are  of  the  most  varied  kind,  rendering  the  task  of 
analysis  very  difficult.  Just  because  we  have  passed 
from  the  relatively  stereotyped  responses  of  the 
automatic  order,  to  the  more  plastic  moulding  of 
behaviour  which  educability  implies,  we  find  the 
closest  integration  within  the  sphere  of  innate  mental 
tendency — an  integration  which  justifies  the  use  of 
the  singular  rather  than  the  plural  number.  In  his 
treatment  of  innate  tendency  Mr.  McDougall  has 
written  much  that  is  thoughtful,  valuable,  and  stimu- 
lating. Where  I  find  it  most  difficult  to  accept  his 
doctrine  is  when  he  divides  up  the  dififerentiated  and 
integrated  tendency  into  specific  elementary  con- 
stituents. I  fully  realize  the  extreme  difficulty  of 
the  discussion  of  the  emotions — I  think  I  should 
prefer  to  say,  emotion.  Where  so  many  have 
failed  Mr.  McDougall  could  hardly  expect  to  be 
wholly  successful.  For  the  light  he  has  shed  on  the 
subject  we  should  be  grateful.  I  for  one  tender  him 
sincere  thanks.  But  I  believe  that  in  attempting  to 
build  up  what  we  call  the  more  complex  and  richer 
human  modes  of  emotion  as  compounds  of  this  and 
that  and  the  other  primary  emotion,  he  is  on  a  false 
track.  Instead  of  saying  that  reverence,  for  example, 
is  a  combination  of  so  much  wonder,  plus  so  much 
fear, ////i'  so  much  submission,  plus  so  much  tender 
feeling,  I  should  prefer  to  deal  with  such  an  emotion 
in  another  fashion.  I  should  prefer  to  make  reverence 
the  logical  subject  of  which  wonder  and  the  rest  may 
be  predicated.  That,  I  conceive,  leaves  to  Mr. 
McDougall's  treatment  all  the  real  value  which  it 


HEREDITARY  DISPOSITIONS  123 

possesses.  But  I  should  regard  these  four  predicates 
as  very  far  from  being  exhaustive.  With  reverence 
or  any  other  complex  emotion  I  should  feel  that  so 
much,  so  very  much,  depends  on  the  context.  I  do 
not  deny  that  in  the  case  of  emotional  attitudes, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  cognitional  attitudes  we  call 
concepts,  we  may  in  some  measure  treat  them  "in 
general,"  that  is  to  say,  use  predicates  which  will 
be  appropriate  in  any  context.  But  I  urge  that  of 
any  emotion,  as  it  has  its  being  in  life,  or  in  the 
literature  that  deals  with  life,  the  particular  context 
is  all-important.  To  any  student  of  the  emotional 
life  I  should  say  : — Read  Mr.  McDougall's  interesting 
discussion  by  all  means ;  and  then  take  a  chapter 
in  some  first-rate  novel,  where  life  at  high  tide  is 
described,  underline  every  emotional  word,  and  pre- 
dicate of  each  all  that  you  can,  with  all  the  contingent 
conditions  in  full  view. 

The  difficulty  with  the  emotions  is  that  they  are 
modes  of  the  inner  life  of  experiencing.  Directly 
we  pass  from  the  interpretation  of  experience  in  terms 
of  what  is  presented  or  represented  in  or  to  that 
experience,  and  seek  to  elucidate  the  correlative 
aspect  of  experiencz«^,  we  are  in  a  different  region  of 
psychological  genesis — a  region  all  its  own,  since  here 
alone  is  there  direct  awareness  of  process  as  such. 
Here,  as  M.  Bergson  would  say,  we  are  in  touch  with 
life.  Here  the  methods  of  intelligence  and  the 
intellect  only  help  us  in  so  far  as  they  deal  with 
symbolic  substitutes  for  a  reality  which  can  only  be 
felt  or,  as  Dr.  Alexander  says,  enjoyed.  Here 
intuition  (in  M.  Bergson's  sense  of  the  word)  sheds  a 
suffused  light  over  parts  of  a  continuum  wherein 


124         INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

there  are  no  distinguishable  boundary  surfaces.  Or 
rather,  perhaps,  the  glow  of  mental  life  within  a 
continuous  process  is  the  suffused  light  of  intuition, 
is  enjoyment.  Here  the  methods  dear  to  the  associ- 
ationist  cease  to  be  applicable.  Whatever  may  be 
said  for  the  associationist  doctrine  from  the  point  of 
view  of  what  is  experienc^^ — presented  to  experience 
in  the  form  of  impressions,  percepts,  concepts,  and  so 
forth — (and  much  may  be  said  for  it  from  this  point 
of  view) ;  when  we  consider  the  process  of 
experienc/;/^,  we  have  in  place  of  juxtaposition  what 
M.  Bergson  calls  interpenetration.  In  the  field  of 
emotion,  on  its  living  side  as  a  qualification  of  mental 
and  vital  process,  we  must,  I  conceive,  put  away  from 
us  all  ideas  of  juxtaposition,  compounding  and 
algebraical  summation,  helpful,  nay,  essential,  as  these 
may  be  in  the  field  of  cognition,  as  dealing  with  the 
cognized.  Here  and  throughout  the  so-called  inner 
aspect  of  the  mental  life — the  aspect  of  enjoyment — 
we  have  subtle  differentiation  of  the  process  of 
experiencing  which  is  only  a  phase  of  the  ineradicably 
one  and  continuous  process  of  living.  Even  the  term 
differentiation  savours  of  cognition  and  the  intellect. 
Each  succeeding  phase  of  the  mental  life,  as  mental 
living,  melts  into  and  serves  but  to  qualify  the  net 
synthetic  result  of  all  previous  phases.  Now,  Mr. 
McDougall  is  a  strenuous  upholder  of  the  unity  and 
continuity  of  mental  process.  In  his  treatment  of 
the  emotions,  however,  he  seems  to  follow  too  closely 
the  methods  of  the  associationists — where  he  speaks,^ 
for  example,  of  admiration  as  a  binary  compound,  of 
awe  as  a  tertiary  compound,  and  of  reverence  as  a 

'  "  Social  Psychology,"  pp.  131,  132. 


HEREDITARY   DISPOSITIONS  125 

blend  of  wonder,  fear,  gratitude,  and  negative  self- 
feeling.  The  word  blend  may  indeed  indicate 
merging  and  interpenetration.  But  does  not  Mr. 
McDougall  himself  tell  us  ^  that  "  the  consciousness 
of  any  individual  is,  or  has,  a  unity  of  a  unique  kind 
.  .  .  and  that  it  cannot  properly  be  regarded  as 
consisting  of  elements,  units,  or  atoms  of  conscious- 
ness put  together  or  compounded  in  any  way "  ? 
What  Mr.  McDougall  here  says  of  the  soul,  I  hold  to 
be  true  of  the  unitary  process  of  living,  part  of  which 
involves  the  conscious  relationships  of  experience. 
On  these  grounds  I  find  some  difficulty  In  accepting 
the  doctrine  that  the  complex  life  of  emotion  is  com- 
pounded of  any  given  number  of  so-called  primary 
emotions  as  elements. 

But  all  this  turns  on  the  nature  of  one's  concep- 
tion of  experience.  It  has  surely  become  evident 
that  our  interpretation  of  the"  moorhen's  instinctive 
dive  depends  on  our  outlook  towards  the  universe  at 
large  ! 

»  "  Body  and  Mind,"  p.  283. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE 

THE  term  experience  is  one  of  those  which 
Wm.  James,  in  his  picturesque  phraseology, 
called  double-barrelled.  It  has,  as  Professor  James 
Ward  contends,  a  duality  of  reference.  In  one  context 
it  refers  to  that  which  is  or  may  be  experienc^^.  In 
another  context  it  refers  to  some  phase  in  the  process 
of  experienc/«^.  When  Mr.  Bradley  says*  that 
"  sentient  experience  is  reality,  and  what  is  not  this 
is  not  real,"  the  reference  is  in  part  to  experience  as 
that  which  is  experienced.  And  when  Professor  Ward 
says  2  that  "  there  is,  for  each,  but  one  experience, 
his  own  ;  and  an  experience  that  is  not  owned  is  a 
contradiction,"  the  emphasis  of  his  reference  is  to 
experience  within  the  process  of  experiencing. 

Now,  if  all  experience  has  this  double  reference 
(l)  to  that  which  is  or  may  be  experienced  (say 
the  world  in  which  we  live),  and  (2)  to  a  process 
of  experiencing  ('*  owned  "  by  "  somebody  "),  the 
question  arises  whether  we  are  to  equate  experience 
and  existence.     That  in  the  absence  of  "  somebody  " 

»  F.  H.  Bradley,   "Appearance  and  Reality,"  2nd  Ed.  (1908), 

p.  144. 

*  James  Ward,  "Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,"  2nd  Ed.  (1903), 

vol.  ii.,  p.  III. 

126 


THE   GROUND   OF  EXFERIENCE      127 

"having"  experience  of  the  objects  around  him,  they 
would  not  then  and  there  be  experienced  is  obvious 
enough.  But  that  when  they  are  not  being  experi- 
enced by  him  or  by  any  mundane  sentient  being  they 
are  non-existent, — that  their  very  existence  depends 
upon  their  being  experienced, — upon  their  entering 
into  a  conscious  relationship — this  is  sheer  assump- 
tion based  on  negative  premisses.  It  may,  no  doubt, 
be  said  that  it  is  also  sheer  assumption  that  they  do 
exist  when  they  are  not  being  experienced.  How 
are  we  to  establish  its  validity  save  by  that  direct 
experience  which  is,  by  the  conditions  laid  down, 
excluded  ?  Well,  let  us  grant  that  we  must  e'en 
accept  the  one  assumption  or  the  other.  I  do  not 
propose  to  discuss  a  very  old  problem.  I  merely 
wish  to  state  that  I  proceed  on  the  assumption  that 
the  existence  of  the  world  does  not  depend  upon 
its  being  experienced.  But  granted  that,  on  this 
assumption,  objects  exist  and  processes  run  their 
course  in  the  world  as  actually  or  possibly  experi- 
enced, the  question  may  still  be  asked  whether 
they  are  in  themselves,  in  their  essential  being, 
independently  of  sensory  perception,  just  exactly 
what  they  appear  to  be  to  us  or  to  other  sentient 
beings.  That  question  does  not  concern  us  here. 
What  does  concern  us  is  how  they  exist  for  actual  or 
possible  experience,  and  how  this  kind  of  existence 
may  be  interpreted.  That  is  what  science  endea- 
vours to  elucidate. 

I  must  not  linger  over  the  question  at  issue 
between  realist  and  idealist.  I  may,  however,  devote 
a  few  more  lines  to  an  attempt  to  make  my  position 
quite  clear — so  far   as  that  is  possible  within   so 


128         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

brief  a  space.  Take  an  ordinary  bit  of  perceptual 
experience.  I  see  and  feel  my  pen.  This  involves 
experiencing  and  something  experienced.  Now  of 
course  it  is  open  to  us  to  call  both  mental.  Then  the 
properties  of  the  pen  in  the  experienced  context  are 
mental ;  and  the  phases  of  experiencing  it  are  mental. 
Both  are  of  the  conscious  order.  Thus  Miss  Calkins,^ 
speaking  of  the  qualities  and  relations  of  things, 
says: — "You  can  give  no  unchallenged  account  of 
them  except  as  distinctive  ways  of  experiencing,  that 
is,  of  being  conscious."  This  may  be  true  enough  m 
d  sense  ;  but  it  is  somewhat  confusing.  Why  not  say 
that  these  are  distinctive  traits  of  the  experienced, 
that  is,  of  what  we  are  conscious  of  in  the  experience 
we  share  with  others }  Now  the  world  that  I  am 
conscious  of  in  common  with  others,  I  term  physical ; 
and  the  process  of  being  conscious  of  it  I  term  mental. 
I  find  this  terminology  more  convenient  than  the 
application  of  the  term  mental  to  both.  I  seek  then 
to  elucidate  the  nature  of  relationships  in  the  context 
of  the  physical  or  experienceable,  and  the  relations 
which  occurrences  in  that  context  bear  to  the  process 
of  experiencing.  I  do  not  dream  of  denying  that  the 
experienced  and  the  experienceable  imply  actual  or 
possible  processes  of  experiencing.  But  I  see  no 
reason  to  accept  the  assertion  that  experienceable 
processes  in  the  physical  world  cannot  get  along 
quite  well,  when  there  is  no  actual  experiencing  of 
them  on  the  tapis.  But,  of  course,  however  indepen- 
dent they  may  be  in  this  sense,  they  are  always 
dealt  with  in  terms  of  the  experienceable.     These 

'  Mary  Whiton  Calkins,  "Journal  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology," 
vol.viii.,  p.  458  (191 1). 


THE   GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE       15^9 

are    the   only  terms    in    which  we    can    deal   with 
them. 

In  the  interpretation  I  have  striven  to  set  forth  in 
earlier  chapters — and  we  must  note  that  it  is  an 
interpretation  in  conceptual  terms — in  this  interpret- 
ation, instinctive  experience  is  the  concrete  synthesis 
which  is  primarily  given  in  the  higher  vertebrate.  For 
though  we  can,  in  the  analysis  of  thought,  resolve  it 
into  yet  simpler  factors,  yet  this  is  an  analysis  of  what 
is  given  as  a  synthetic  whole — a  synthetic  whole  that 
is  from  the  outset  (if  an  outset  be  ideally  conceivable) 
changing,  growing,  developing.  We  must  think  it  in 
cinematographical  snap-shots,  as  M.  Bergson  would 
say — for  concepts  tend  to  assume  a  static  form,  and  it 
is  only  by  thinking  along  them  and  through  them 
that  we  restore  to  them  the  moving  progress  of  reality. 
But  in  the  experience  as  lived  by  the  organism  it  is 
nowise  static,  it  is  pulsing  onwards.  It  has  duration, 
in  M.  Bergson's  sense  of  the  term,  within  which  there 
is  correlated  change  and  progress.  In  other  words  it 
is  process.  And  as  process  it  is  synthetic.  All  process 
at  any  rate  all  vital  process,  is  synthetic  ;  that  is  pait 
of  the  connotation  oi  the  term.  An  essential  feature 
of  the  view  I  have  tried  to  develop  is  that  the 
synthetic  process  of  experiencing  is  correlated  with 
the  synthetic  process  of  living  which  is  its  natural 
precursor  and  which  is  here  raised  to  a  higher  status. 
Its  essential  characteristic — that  which  differentiates 
it  from  the  lower  level  of  living — is  that  new  relation- 
ships supervene — those  relationships  which  we 
describe  as  conscious  and  especially  pre-perceptive. 
Until  the  cortex  is  called  into  functional  activity  in 
any  organism,  these   relationships,   so    far   as    that 

K 


130         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

organism  is  concerned,  are  not  yet  in  being.  If  then 
we  analyse  any  ideally  static  phase  of  the  instinctive 
experience,  snap-shotted  in  conception,  and  if  we 
reach  certain  factors  therein,  as  factors  in  a  moving 
whole  which  is  then  and  there  the  experience,  we  shall 
utterly  fail  to  understand  the  whole  business  so  long 
as  we  persist  in  thinking  only  of  the  factors  as  asso- 
c'lated,  and  wilfully  lose  sight  of  the  synthetic  nature 
of  the  process  itself  as  associat;^^. 

We  saw,  however,  that  Prof.  Ward  contends  that 
an  experience  that  is  not "  owned  "  is  a  contradiction  ; 
and  I  said  above  that  in  the  absence  of  somebody 
having  experience  of  the  objects  around  him  they 
would  not  then  and  there  be  experienced.  What  do 
we  mean  by  somebody  ?  What  do  we  mean  by  that 
somebody  owning  experience  ?  Of  course,  it  will  be 
said,  we  mean  the  subject !  Well,  then,  what  do  we 
mean  by  the  subject .?  Let  us  go  back  to  our  moor- 
hen swimming  in  the  Yorkshire  stream.  I  spoke 
of  him  as  an  experiencer  having  already  a  body  of 
synthetic  experience  to  which  the  new  experience  of 
diving  was  added  in  further  synthesis.  I  endeavoured 
to  trace  the  moorhen's  experience  backwards  until 
he  was  hatched.  I  suggested  that  (apart  from  such 
experience  as  might  have  been  gained  within  the  egg- 
shell previous  to  hatching)  the  experiencing  of  the 
moorhen  then  and  there  had  its  beginning.  Dr. 
Myers  in  criticism,^  urged  that  my  endeavour  to  get 
at  the  beginning  of  instinctive  experience  is  vain 
because,  according  to  his  contention,  there  never  can 
be  a  beginning  of  experience — a  beginning  which  has 
no  relation  to  previous  experience.  Does  he  mean 
'  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  269. 


THE   GROUND   OF    EXPERIENCE       131 

that  there  is  no  beginning  of  the  process  of  experience, 
or  no  beginning  of  the  products  of  experience  ?  We 
shall  have  a  few  words  to  say  presently  as  to  the 
relation  of  process  to  product.  At  present  we  may 
ask  what  evidence  we  have  of  process  apart  from  its 
products,  save  in  so  far  as  we  are  directly  aware  of  the 
process  of  experiencing  which  we  ourselves  enjoy — 
the  one  and  only  process  of  which  we  can  be  aware  in 
this  way.  Let  us,  however,  fix  our  attention  on  process. 
Does  any  process  have  a  beginning  .?  I  take  it  that 
for  evolutionary  treatment  the  answer  must  depend  on 
the  sense  in  which  the  question  is  asked.  All  natural 
processes  are  historically  correlated.  If  then  by 
having  a  beginning  it  is  meant  that  there  is  no  correla- 
tion whatever  between  the  process  in  question  and 
previous  world-process,  the  answer  must  be : — No. 
In  this  sense  no  process  has  a  beginning.  But  if  the 
question  is  whether  a  series  of  phases  of  process  and 
its  products  may,  for  scientific  treatment,  be  isolated 
(of  course  relatively)  and  regarded  as  a  whole,  then 
the  answer  is  surely  : — Yes.  In  this  sense  any  span 
of  process  which  may  be  thus  rounded  off  as  a  subject 
of  inquiry  (the  life  of  my  cat,  for  example,  or  the 
writing  of  this  book)  has  a  beginning — to  be  correlated 
with  process  outside  the  limits  thus  assigned.  In  this 
sense  the  experience  of  what  we  call  the  individual 
has  a  beginning  and  an  end.  As  a  subject  of  inquiry 
it  is  a  logical  subject — that  subject  being  the  process 
under  consideration  as  a  whole  ;  and  as  a  subject  a 
number  of  things  may  be  predicted  of  it.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  individual  is  a  span  of  synthetic 
process  which,  as  synthetic,  hangs  together  so  as  to 
form,  for  our  interpretation,  one  logical  subject,  and 


132         INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

any  one  of  its  predicates  may  be  said  to  be  owned  by 
it  or  by  that  to  which  its  concept  has  reference — by 
John  Smith  or  by  "somebody."  That  is  what  I 
understand  by  the  subject — always  a  logical  subject 
referring  to  a  specific  span  of  world  process — nothing 
less  and  nothing  more.  Of  course  there  is  for  each  of 
us  one  specific  bit  of  world-process  of  which  we  are 
aware  and  which  we  enjoy  in  a  peculiar  and  unique 
manner,  and  to  which  we  apply  the  term  subject  in  a 
specially  restricted  sense.  It  is  the  logical  ground  of 
our  own  experience — our  process  of  experiencing  with 
all  its  experienced  items. 

Now  in  instinctive  experience,  and  even  in  the 
early  and  closely  succeeding  phases  of  perceptual 
experience,  enriched  by  secondary  meaning,  the 
references  to  "  eds  "  and  "  ing  "  (if  I  may  be  allowed 
this  shorthand)  are  scarcely,  if  at  all,  differentiated 
from  the  common  ground  of  experience  in  which 
both  are  implicit.  The  experience  is  just  naive 
living  as  a  process  involving  conscious  relationships 
which  are  acted  on  but  not  yet  thought — the  terms 
of  which  have  not  yet  even  incipiently  been  snap- 
shotted as  concepts.  That  comes  much  later.  And 
the  difficulty  of  interpretation  is  that  we  must 
describe  in  conceptual  terms  that  which  is  still  in  the 
pre-conceptual  stage  of  natural  development.  We 
are  forced  to  distinguish  the  situation  with  its 
stimulating  objects  in  definite  relation  to  the 
organism  with  its  conscious  relationships  to  the 
situation,  the  whole  arbitrarily  cut  out  from  the 
total  world-process  in  an  insignificant  corner  of  which 
they  are  a  passing  phase.  How  else  can  we  proceed  ? 
And  yet  the  experience  itself  is  just  this  little  scrap 


THE   GROUND   OF   EXPERIENCE       133 

of  world-process  suffused  with  awareness  and  not 
yet  analyzed  into  those  concepts  we  frame  to  aid  us 
in  our  interpretation. 

And  we  too,  as  interpreters  in  relation  to  the 
problems  to  be  elucidated,  are  also,  each  one  of  us, 
just  an  individualized  and  differentiated  centre  with- 
in the  world  process  ;  each  one  of  us  suffused  with 
the  higher  awareness  of  systematic  knowledge,  in 
conscious  relationship,  not  only  to  a  set  of  facts  as 
presented,  but  to  the  concepts  man  has  framed  and 
named  for  their  completer  mastery — capable  in  some 
measure  of  grasping  the  relationship  of  instinctive 
experience  to  the  natural  order  within  which  it  bears 
the  relation  of  part  to  whole. 

What  do  I  mean  by  speaking  in  such  a  connexion 
of  a  relation  of  part  to  whole  ?  Surely,  it  will  be 
said,  if  by  "whole"  reference  is  intended  to  the 
order  of  nature  and  if  by  "  part "  reference  is 
intended  to  conscious  experience  and  knowledge,  the 
two  references  are  to  radically  different  orders  of 
existence — to  the  world  we  are  conscious  of,  and  to 
consciousness  itself.  This  disparity  is,  it  will  be 
urged,  fundamental.  The  problem  of  philosophy  is 
to  explain  how  these  two  utterly  diverse  existences 
come  into  relationship — not  the  relationship  of  part 
to  whole  within  one  order  of  existence ;  nay,  rather 
of  this  mind-order  with  that  world-order.  But  the 
assumption  on  which  I  proceed  is  that  there  is,  for 
scientific  treatment,  one  order  and  only  one.  Within 
that  order  there  are  many  and  varied  relationships — 
and  among  these  relationships  are  those  which  we 
call  experiential  or  conscious.  One  thing  is  certain 
and    involves    no    assumption ;  that  the    conscious 


134         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

processes  of  which  we  are  aware  in  ourselves  and 
which  we  enjoy,  are  in  relation  to  processes  outside 
us  which  we  cannot  enjoy  in  the  same  sense,  since 
they  are  not  constituent  parts  of  our  own  life- 
process.  They  may  or  may  not  have  their  own 
enjoyment  ;  but  that  we  cannot  directly  share. 
Herein  lies  the  cardinal  distinction  which  has  been 
misinterpreted  as  implying  two  different  orders  of 
being  ;  the  distinction  between  a  privileged  world- 
process  which  is  suffused  with  awareness  and  enjoy- 
ment, the  flow  and  change  of  which  is  felt  from 
within,  and  other  world-processes  or  their  products 
which  can  only  be  known  and  contemplated  as  they 
affect  this  privileged  process  from  without.  Why 
there  should  be,  within  the  constitution  of  nature, 
privileged  processes  having  this  character  of  enjoy- 
ment is  not  a  question  to  which  science  can  give  any 
reply.  Science  cannot  tell  us  why  there  are  chemical, 
or  physical,  gravitative  or  crystalline  processes. 
Science  just  accepts  the  world  as  it  finds  it ;  and 
unquestionably  among  its  findings  are  those  relation- 
ships which  we  term  conscious.  The  fact  of 
experience  testifies  to  their  existence — whether  we 
regard  them  as  part  of  the  constitution  of  one  order 
of  nature,  or  assume  the  existence  of  two  orders  of 
being.  The  former  is  the  interpretation  I  seek  to 
develop.  Fully  admitting  that  in  experience  we  live 
and  have  our  mental  being  ;  fully  realizing  that  on 
experience  all  our  knowledge  is  founded  :  I  urge 
that  the  ground  of  experience  is  the  constitution  of 
nature,  within  privileged  centres  of  which  a  privileged 
process  is  polarized  into  experiencz>^  and  the 
experienc^^. 


THE  GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE       135 

If  then  we  can  accept  this  distinction  between 
the  **  eds  "  and  "  ing  "  of  experience  as  cardinal  with- 
in the  conscious  relationship  as  such ;  if  we  can 
accept  the  implication  that  there  can  be  no  "  ed  "  in 
individual  experience  without  its  correlative  "  ing " 
(though  there  may  be  "  ing  "  without  clearly 
differentiated  "  eds  "  )  ;  and  if  we  allow  the  assump- 
tion that  within  the  world  to  which  the  "  eds " 
refer  there  are  other  relationships  independent  of 
individual  experience ;  we  are  in  a  position  to  follow 
up  this  method  of  interpretation.  But  a  subtle 
question  here  arises.  What  are  the  limits  of  the 
mental  ?  Are  the  "  eds  "  as  such  within  the  mind  ? 
It  is  a  matter  of  definition.  If  the  mind  is  essentially 
experiencing  process,  then  what  is  experienced  is,  m 
a  sense,  always  outside  the  mind — is  it  that  with 
which  experiencing  is  in  relation !  Within  the  field 
of  sensory  perception  the  sens^c/,  as  I  urged  above, 
is  non-mental  ;  it  is  what  we  call  physical  in 
its  reference.  In  a  series  of  masterly  addresses 
to  the  Aristotelian  Society  (1908-11)  Professor 
Alexander  has  contended  that  we  ought  to  regard 
as  non-mental  not  only  the  sensa  but  the  cognita, — 
not  only  the  objects  of  perception,  but  the  objects  of 
thought  and  imagination.  The  trouble  is  that  we 
thus  apply  the  term  non-mental  to  the  characteristic 
products  of  mental  process !  None  the  less  the 
distinction  Professor  Alexander  has  in  view  is  a 
really  valid  one,  and  is  in  line  with  that  which  M. 
Bergson  is  never  tired  of  drawing.  That  distinction 
is  the  one  I  have  drawn  above,  between  what  is 
experienced  or  thought,  and  the  process  of  experienc- 
ing or  thinking  ;  it  is  the  distinction  between  what  is 


136         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

minded,  and  minding.  Now  minding  is,  for  Professor 
Alexander,  the  essential  feature  of  that  conation 
which  2>,  for  him,  mental  process,  and  which  affords 
the  true  subject-matter  of  psychology.  Hence,  for 
him  the  minded,  as  such,  is  non-mental.  Will  it  not, 
however,  suffice  for  our  purposes  to  hold  fast  to  the 
cardinal  distinction  ;  to  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  the 
order  of  nature,  as  conceived  and  thought,  is  dealt 
with  in  a  context  distinguishable  from  that  of  the 
process  of  conceiving  and  thinking  it ;  and  to  leave 
in  abeyance  the  rather  technical  question  whether 
concepta  should  be  termed  mental  or  non-mental. 

Sir  J.  J.  Thomson  has  said  that  the  man  of  science 
deals  with  policies  rather  than  with  creeds.  No 
doubt  one  must  so  far  believe  in  one's  policy  as  to 
proceed  with  some  confidence  along  the  course  which 
it  indicates.  Still  it  lacks  that  element  of  finality 
which  the  word  creed  implies.  As  a  policy,  then,  I 
accept  one  order  of  nature  and  one  science  of 
phenomena  ;  as  a  policy  I  accept  as  independent  of 
individual  experience  the  natural  processes  to  which 
our  perceptual  experience  and  our  systematic  know- 
ledge refers  ;  as  a  policy  I  regard  the  conscious 
relationship  as  a  natural  relationship  to  be  correlated 
with  others  within  the  constitution  of  nature ;  as  a 
policy  I  accept  the  cardinal  distinction  between  the 
*'  eds  "  and  the  "  ing  "  within  the  privileged  process 
which  is,  for  scientific  treatment,  my  mental  life  ; 
and  as  a  policy  I  exclude  from  science,  as  I  define 
it,  the  metaphysics  of  Source. 

By  Source  (which  I  shall  write  with  a  capital  letter 
merely  to  distinguish  it  as  a  metaphysical  conception), 
by  Source,  often  spoken  of  as  Cause,  I  mean  some 


THE  GROUND  OF  EXrERIENCE       137 

Agency  outside  or  underlying  process  which  calls 
process  into  being  or  directs  its  course.  The  Platonic 
Ideas,  in  the  commonly  current  acceptation,  Berkeley's 
Eternal  Spirit,  Kant's  Transcendental  Ego,  Schopen- 
hauer's Will,  Dr.  Driesch's  Entelechy,  M.  Bergson's 
Life,  the  animist's  Soul,  the  Subject  of  many 
psychologists  and  the  Force  of  many  physicists,  all 
involve  the  metaphysical  concept  of  Source,  which 
refers  to  some  (often  extra-mundane)  Power,  of  the 
Activity  of  which  process  is  a  manifestation — some 
Reality  of  which  the  world  of  science  is  the 
phenomenal  expression.  Thus  for  T.  H.  Green  an 
Eternal  Consciousness  is  necessary  for  the  very 
existence  of  an  order  of  phenomena.  "  He  tells  us," 
as  Henry  Sidgwick  puts  it,^  "  that  it  is  a  '  source ' 
of  the  relations  which  constitute  nature  ;  that  they 
'  result  from '  its  combining  and  unifying  action  ; 
that  it  '  makes  the  animal  organism  its  vehicle '  ; 
that  it  is  'operative'  throughout  the  succession  of 
events  which  constitute  the  growth  of  the  individual 
mind  ;  that  it  '  acts  on  the  sentient  life  of  the  soul,' 
and  *  uses  it '  as  its  organ."  Now  all  such  reference 
to  Source  or  Agency  does  not  here  concern  us. 
We  may  ask,  with  Sidgwick,^  what,  for  scientific 
ijiterpretation,  "is  the  further  gain  to  knowledge  in 
referring  the  unity  and  system  to  a  unifying 
principle  as  its  source,  if  that  principle  is  to  have 
no  other  character  except  what  it  gives  itself  in  its 
unifying  action  "  ;  or  again  more  briefly  :— "  Why  do 
the   relations    want    a    Source }     Why  cannot   they 

*  Henry  Sidgwick,  "  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Kant  "  (1905), 
p.  261.    Cf.  T.  H.  Green,  "  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,"  §§  67-73. 

*  Op.  cit,,  pp.  263  and  226. 


138         INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

get  on  without  one  ? "  Although  myself  a  believer 
in  Source,  I  hold  that  this  concept  should  be 
rigidly  excluded  from  the  scientific  universe  of 
discourse.  I  too  ask : — Why  should  we  not 
endeavour  to  interpret  the  constitution  of  nature  just 
as  we  find  it  somehow  presented  to  our  experience  ? 
That  I  conceive  is  the  task  of  science,  which  should 
leave  severely  alone,  as  beyond  its  province,  all  forms 
of  the  metaphysics  of  Source,  all  reference  to  extra- 
mundane  Agency.  To  modify  Hume's  oft-quoted 
words,  "  the  scenes  of  the  universe  are  constantly 
shifting,  and  one  object  follows  another  in  an 
uninterrupted  succession  ;  but  the  Power  or  Force 
which  actuates  the  whole  machine  is  entirely" — 
outside  the  field  of  scientific  inquiry.  No  doubt  any 
limitation  of  this  field  of  inquiry  is  a  matter  of 
arbitrary  definition.  That  is  just  why  I  wish  to  make 
perfectly  clear  where  I,  for  one,  in  discussing  this 
subject,  decide  to  draw  the  line. 

A  few  more  words  may  serve  to  render  less 
obscure  my  reasons  for  excluding  the  concept  of 
Source  from  what  I  regard  as  the  province  of  science. 
Let  us  suppose  that  Life  is  the  Source  or  Cause  of 
organic  processes  and  products.  Now  according  to 
the  old  scholastic  adage,  Causa  aequat  ejfectum.  If 
Cause  is  the  Giver  and  process  the  given  then,  as 
James  put  it,  Nemo  dat  quod  non  habet.  But  the 
Cause  may  have,  and  traditionally  has,  more  than 
it  actually  gives — eminente?-  as  Descartes  would  say. 
Life  when  it  organized  the  carboniferous  flora  and 
fauna  possessed  "  eminently "  the  further  power  of 
organizing  the  plant  and  animal  world  of  to-day.  Now 
if  the  given  in  any  process  at  any  time  contains  just 


THE   GROUND   OF  EXPERIENCE       139 

what  the  Giver  then  gives,  have  we  not  in  this  given 
all  that  science  has  any  concern  with  ?  What  need 
have  we,  in  science,  of  Source  or  Cause  or  Giver,  if 
life-processes  and  life-products  are  all  that  we  are 
acquainted  with  as  given  ? 

But  it  is  not  only  that  we  are  calling  in  a  concept 
which  is  unnecessary  for  science.  We  are  so  apt  to 
make  the  Source  to  which  that  concept  refers  do  duty 
which  poses  as  scientific  business.  When  we  get  to 
a  difficulty,  instead  of  confessing  ignorance  and 
striving  to  remove  it  by  scientific  method,  we  say  : — 
"  Oh  !  that  can  only  be  explained  by  reference  to 
Source" — which,  to  put  it  bluntly,  is  a  roundabout 
way  of  expressing,  without  confessing,  scientific 
ignorance.  Furthermore,  there  is  an  almost 
ineradicable  tendency  to  endow  Source  with  a  false 
and  meretricious  simplicity.  The  Life  that  organizes 
is  supposed  to  have  a  simplicity  analogous  to  that 
which  is  attributed  to  the  mind  of  the  captain  of  an 
ironclad,  who  deals  in  his  conning-tower  with  all  the 
multiplicity  of  the  ship's  intricate  mechanism.  But 
to  every  mechanical  detail,  just  in  so  far  as  it  is 
known  to  the  captain,  there  is  what  Professor 
Alexander  would  term  the  "  non-mental "  which  is  in 
the  field  of  his  contemplation — that  which  is 
cognized,  imagined,  and  so  forth.  And  though  the 
unity  of  process  should  never  be  lost  sight  of,  yet 
within  that  unity,  merging  and  interpenetrating, 
there  is  a  complexity  strictly  correlative  to  the 
complexity  of  the  "  eds  "  with  which  it  deals.  It  is 
just  because  this  complexity  in  large  measure  defies 
analysis  (for  process  itself  can  only  be  analysed  in 
reference  to  its    products)  that  we  are  bidden    to 


140         INSTINCT  AND   EXrERIENCE 

attribute  it  to  a  Source  which  out  of  its  utter 
simplicity,  falsely  conceived,  can  produce  any 
required  amount  of  complexity — that  is,  in  effect, 
just  that  amount  which  is  actually  found.  What  is 
thus  given  is  process  and  products,  or  process/w^  and 
the  process^<^;  it  is  the  business  of  science  to  deal 
with  them  in  terms  of  correlation.  But  the 
metaphysics  of  Source  has  a  perfect  right  to  say  : 
Just  as  in  the  given  there  is  the  processed  and  the 
correlative  processing  ;  so  to  the  giv^«  there  is  the 
correlative  ^wing  by  Source. 

The  Source  of  phenomena  being  thus  excluded 
from  our  limited  field  of  inquiry,  what  shall  be  our 
definition  of  cause?  I  give  none,  because,  though 
I  have  used  the  word  above  in  one  of  its  senses,  I 
propose,  so  far  as  is  possible,  to  avoid  the  use  of  this 
very  ambiguous  term,  endeavouring  to  make  clear 
the  sense  in  which  I  do  use  it,  should  occasion  arise. 
Instead  of  employing  this  term  here  I  shall  speak  of 
any  given  process  on  which  our  attention  is  fixed,  as 
correlated  with  other  processes  ;  or  of  an  earlier 
phase  of  any  given  process  as  correlated  with  the 
later  phases,  I  shall  assume  that  ubiquitous  corre- 
lations hold  good  within  the  constitution  of  nature, 
and  that  patient  scientific  research  may  lead  to  their 
discovery.  I  shall,  however,  also  use  the  word  con- 
ditions for  the  relevant  circumstances  under  which  a 
process  runs  its  course — it  being  understood  that 
these  conditions  afford  data  for  correlation.  We  may 
thus  speak  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  synthesis 
of  a  chemical  compound,  say  carbon  disulphide, 
occurs ;  or  the  conditions  under  which  the  develop- 
ment of  a  hen's  egg  takes  place ;  or  the  conditions 


THE    GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE      141 

under  which  I  write  this  paragraph.  In  each  case 
we  fix  our  attention  on  a  current  process  reached 
through  its  products,  and  describe  other  processes 
related  to  it  as  conditions.  But  with  the  shifting  of 
our  attention  the  same  process  may  be  regarded  now 
as  conditioning  and  now  as  conditioned.  Thus,  to 
take  an  example  from  daily  life,  the  state  of  the  fire 
in  my  grate  may  be  the  condition  of  a  certain  mode 
of  my  experience ;  this  may  be  the  condition  of  my 
poking  the  fire  ;  this  again  the  condition  of  a  freer 
and  fuller  process  of  combustion  ;  and  this  of  a 
satisfactory  modification  of  my  experience.  I  give 
this  illustration  to  show  first  how  the  focus  of  our 
attention  shifts  from  one  to  the  other  of  correlated 
processes,  each  of  which  in  turn  is  made  the  subject 
of  certain  predicates ;  and  secondly,  to  emphasize 
the  fact  that  conscious  processes  really  count  as  con- 
ditions of  change  in  other  world-processes  with  which 
they  are  themselves  in  relation. 

But  how  about  the  conditions  within  the  process 
itself?  Of  course  an  earlier  phase  of  process  may 
be  regarded  as  the  condition  of  a  later  phase  of  the 
same  process.  But  if  we  have  in  mind  the  process 
itself  as  a  whole !  Then  it  seems  to  me  that  we 
ought  not,  in  that  context,  to  use  the  word  conditions. 
Of  process  itself  as  existent  it  is  futile  (in  science) 
to  seek  for  the  conditions  of  its  very  existence.  We 
can  only  find  such  conditions  in  the  realm  of  Source, 
and  that  realm  is  closed  to  us  here  by  a  self-denying 
ordinance.  Take  the  world-process  as  a  whole.  If 
we  are  asked  what  are  the  conditions  of  its  existence, 
we  must  reply :  There  are  none  ;  for  conditions  imply 
that  there  are  other  processes  with  which  this  process 


142         INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

may  be  correlated  !  Of  course  if,  with  M.  Bergson, 
we  accept  the  conception  of  two  orders  of  being — the 
one  comprising  all  processes  of  the  inert  or  the  auto- 
matic type,  the  other  all  processes  of  the  vital  or 
conscious  type — then,  clearly,  those  of  the  one  may 
be  regarded  as  affording  conditions  to  be  correlated 
with  those  of  the  other.  But  we  have  at  present  no 
concern  with  this  conception.  Accepting  provisionally 
one  order — the  world  process  with  all  its  relationships 
— we  cannot  speak  of  the  conditions  of  its  existence 
within  our  universe  of  discourse. 

But  we  do  seem  to  need — if  only  for  convenience 
of  description — a  term  which  shall  enable  us  to  refer 
the  correlated  phases  within  a  given  process  to  the 
process  as  a  whole.  To  this  end  I  shall  use  the  term 
groimd.  The  ultimate  ground  of  all  natural  occur- 
rences is,  for  science,  the  constitution  of  nature.  In 
any  changing  configuration  the  ground  of  the  change 
is  the  nature  of  the  constitution  of  that  configuration 
— gravitational  in  the  solar  system,  chemical  when 
carbon  disulphide  is  formed,  and  so  forth.  On  the 
constitutive  nature,  as  ground,  will  depend,  in  any 
given  natural  system,  the  character  and  value  of  the 
changes  which  are  observable  therein.  On  the  consti- 
tutive nature  of  the  hen's  egg  will  depend  the  character 
and  course  of  its  development.  The  living  organism 
is  thus  the  ground  of  the  organic  processes  which 
run  their  course  under  normal  conditions  in  correla- 
tion with  other  processes.  We  shall,  I  think,  find  this 
term  useful  when  we  have  to  ask  with  regard  to  some 
suggested  "  principle  " — with  regard  to  entelechy  for 
example : — Is  it  suggested  with  reference  to  Source, 
or  is  it  suggested  with  reference  to  ground  ? 


THE  GROUND   OF  EXPERIENCE       143 

Let  us  take  as  a  concrete  case  the  formation  of  a 
crystal  in  an  appropriate  solution.  I  select  the 
crystal  as  an  example  of  what  I  understand  by  a 
synthetic  product  in  the  realm  of  the  inorganic. 
Now  the  man  of  science  explains  the  formation  of 
the  crystal  by  describing  all  the  relevant  antecedent 
and  accompanying  conditions  which  may  be  observed 
or  inferred  from  the  fullest  and  most  minute  study 
of  all  the  phenomena  concerned  and  nothing  but  the 
relevant  phenomena  ;  and  by  referring  the  particular 
case  to  the  type  of  synthesis — crystallization  to  wit — 
under  which  it  is  entered  in  the  day-book  of  science. 
The  explanation  here  given  is  expressed  first  in  terms 
of  correlated  conditions,  and  secondly  in  terms  of 
ground.  On  this  understanding  there  can  be  no 
reasonable  objection  to  speaking  of  crystallization 
as  the  ground  of  the  formation  of  crystallized 
products.  It  just  refers  particular  occurrences  to 
that  phase  of  the  world-process  which  they  exemplify. 
But  what  do  we  mean  by  products,  and  what  is  their 
relation  to  process }  Rather  a  difficult  question. 
Only  a  suggestion  of  the  direction  in  which  an 
answer  may  be  sought,  and  perhaps  found,  can  be 
given.  Are  not  products  just  bits  of  frozen  world-pro- 
cess which  are  rendered  stable  and  static  for  perception 
and  conception  ?  Why  such  congealing  of  fragments 
of  process,  the  parts  of  which  hang  together  as  a 
relatively  independent  whole,  should  take  place,  we 
do  not  know.  It  may  be  that  the  seeming  stability 
is  only  a  phase  of  process  itself:  that  the  rigidity 
of  products  is  like  that  of  the  gyroscope.  Is  it  not 
to  such  a  doctrine  that  modern  theories  of  the  atom, 
purely  schematic  and  conceptual  as  they  are,  lead 


144         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

up  ?  "  Call  it  process,  or  call  it  product,  all  is 
process."  This  seems  to  express  the  tendency  of 
contemporary  scientific  thought.  Still  for  practical 
purposes  of  interpretation  we  must  distinguish 
between  product  and  process.  May  we  not  say  that 
the  product  is  that  which  is  process^<^;  and  that,  as 
M.  Bergson  urges,  such  products  lie  strewn  along  the 
course  of  the  ever-fluent  stream  of  process/^^  f  Why 
this  should  be  we  know  not ;  that  is  nature's  way. 

Incidental  reference  may  here  be  made  to  the  old 
problem  of  "  the  one  and  the  many " — a  problem 
which  Wm.  James  revived  in  his  brilliant  and 
picturesque  advocacy  of  a  pluralistic  universe.  I 
cannot,  of  course,  discuss  so  large  a  question 
parenthetically.  But  may  it  not  be  suggested  that 
the  world  of  products  strewn  along  the  course  of 
process,  frozen  into  seeming  rigidity,  inevitably  tends 
to  assume  a  radically  pluralistic  guise  ;  and  yet  that, 
none  the  less,  the  world  process  of  which  these  widely 
scattered  products  are  the  outcome,  is  one  and  con- 
tinuous ;  and  that  our  conceptual  scheme  (which  we 
believe  refers  to  an  existent  constitution  of  nature) 
reaches  its  ideal  limit  in  a  completely  monistic  inter- 
pretation ?  James  advocated  a  doctrine  of  discon- 
tinuity. Perception  (the  perceived)  itself  comes  in 
pulses,  as  the  threshold  is  surpassed.  "On  the 
discontinuity  theory,"  said  James,^  "time  change, 
etc.,  would  grow  by  finite  buds  or  drops,  either 
nothing  coming  at  all,  or  certain  units  of  amount 
bursting  into  being  'at  a  stroke.'  "  But  had  he  not 
in  view  the  discontinuity  of  products  }  That  discon- 
tinuity cannot  be  denied,  and  should  not  be  neglected. 
•  "  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,"  p,  154. 


THE   GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE       145 

But  does  this  show  that  process  is  discontinuous  ? 
May  we  not  say  that  just  as  the  sensibly  continuous 
flow  of  water  through  a  narrow  pipe  breaks  into 
separate  drops  beyond  the  orifice,  so  does  continuous 
world-process  break  up  into  the  relatively  discon- 
tinuous process-systems  which  we  call  products  ? 
Why  this  should  be  we  know  not.  But  thus  we  may 
have  a  pluralism  of  products  and  yet  a  monistic 
interpretation  of  process.  But  what  do  I  mean  by 
a  monistic  interpretation  ?  Do  I  mean  an  interpreta- 
tion which  leads  to  an  absolute  unity  of  pure  being 
in  which  all  shades  of  difference  are  annulled  ?  That 
is  certainly  not  what  I  have  in  mind.  That  seems 
to  me  a  philosophical  conception  with  which  we  have 
here  no  concern.  What  then  do  I  mean  by  a  monistic 
interpretation  ?  I  mean  one  in  terms  of  correlations 
so  complete  that  all  the  multifarious  happenings  in 
the  universe,  in  all  their  rich  and  varied  multiplicity, 
are  conceived  as  integral  parts  of  one  developing 
world-story ;  so  that  one  could  pass  in  thought  from 
any  given  phase  of  process  to  any  other  phase  of 
process  along  definitely  describable  correlation-routes. 
This  is  the  monistic  "  unity  of  concatenation  "  which, 
as  I  understand  him,  even  the  pluralistic  James  was 
prepared  to  accept  (p.  129)  at  any  rate  in  retrospective 
reference. 

But  is  the  unity  in  the  interpretation  or  in  that 
which  is  interpreted  ?  Another  ancient  problem ! 
The  old  writers  sought  to  find  and  to  express  the 
relation  of  the  realm  of  perceptual  fact  to  the  sphere 
of  conceptual  thought.  Where,  they  asked,  is  the 
home  of  universals  ;  in  the  one  or  in  the  other  .-'  In 
their  scholastic  phraseology  there    were,  they   said, 

L 


146         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

three    alternatives:   (i)    Universalia  ante  rem;   (2) 
Utiiversalia  post  rem  /  (3)   Utiiversalia  in  re.     Now 
the  first  formula  involves  the  conception  of  Source, 
and  leads  to  the  Platonic  Ideas  (as  currently  inter- 
preted) to  the  world-plan  of  the  Eternal  Spirit,  and 
the  like.     That  conception  lies  beyond  our  province 
here.     The  second  position  is  that  of  radical  empiri- 
cism.    The    conceptual   scheme    is   the  outcome   of 
man's  thought  concerning  the  phenomena  presented 
in    perceptual  detail.     So   long   as   we   are   dealing 
with  the  development  of  human  knowledge,  I  accept 
this  without  reservation.     First  the  facts,  then   the 
interpretation.     None  the  less  do  I  accept  also  the 
third  of  the  three  scholastic  formulas,  in  the  sense 
that   the  order  which  we  express  in  general  terms 
is  in  the  constitution  of  nature.     It  is  there  for  us 
to  discover  if  we  can,  though  our  discovery  of  it  may 
need    the   patient  observation   of    many    facts.     Of 
course  it  is  not  there  as  a  number  of  propositions  ; 
it  is,  however,  there  as  that  to  which  these  propositions 
have  reference.     A   given  synthetic  process   is    not 
there  in  the  form,  of  a  concept ;  but  it  is  there  ready 
to  be  named  and  formulated.     It  is  there  in  a  form 
that  is  universal  just  in  so  far  as  we  rightly  predicate 
universality  of  it. 

The  res  is  the  perceptual  country  in  which  we 
live :  the  universalia  of  thought  are  the  maps  which 
we  make  of  that  country.  Obviously  the  maps 
cannot  possibly  reproduce  all  the  details  of  the 
country.  If  they  could  it  would  utterly  spoil  their 
utility  as  maps.  They  signify  some  of  the  deeper 
meaning  of  the  country.  The  use  of  a  map  is  to 
enable  us  to  find  our  way  in  the  country,  to  emphasize 


THE   GROUND   OF  EXPERIENCE       147 

essential  relationships,  to  reduce  the  scale  of  the 
real  to  compassable  limits,  and  to  help  us  better 
to  understand  the  country  as  we  learn  to  read  the 
maps.  The  omission  of  detail  is  absolutely  essential 
to  the  value  of  a  map  for  these  purposes.  But  though 
tens  of  thousands  of  details  are,  and  must  be, 
excluded,  none  of  these  details  must  be  such  as  to 
invalidate  any  of  the  teachings  of  the  map.  That  is 
fatal.  The  map  is  no  good  if  it  is  inconsistent  with 
the  country's  facts.  Leave  out  as  much  as  may 
conduce  to  the  end  in  view  ;  but  insert  nothing 
which  conflicts  with  detailed  observation.  But  maps 
may  be  made  and  used  for  different  purposes,  so  as 
to  aid  us  to  interpret  the  country  in  different  ways — a 
political  map,  a  road  map,  a  railway  map,  a  geological 
map,  and  so  forth.  Each  must  significantly  represent 
the  facts  it  is  meant  to  summarize  ;  each  must  be 
consistent  within  itself;  each  must  be  consistent 
with  the  other  maps  so  far  as  their  data  coin- 
cide. Each  is  of  use  to  enable  us  to  find  our 
way  in  the  map,  and  to  find  our  way  in  the  country 
mapped.  More  detailed  acquaintance  with  the 
country  helps  us  to  make  a  better  map  ;  a  better 
map  helps  us  to  become  more  closely  acquainted 
with  the  country  ;  and  so  on,  to  and  fro,  up  to  the 
ideal  limits  of  acquaintance  with  and  knowledge 
of  reality.  Such  maps  are  our  ideal  constructions 
in  science.  Physics  makes  its  map  ;  physiology  its 
map ;  psychology  its  map,  and  so  on.  Each  map 
leaves  out  certain  features  of  perceptual  reality  ;  none 
can  put  in  more  than  a  certain  amount  of  detail ;  there 
must  be  no  contradiction  between  the  several  maps 
so  far  as  the  facts  to  which  they  refer  are  the  same. 


148  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

Every  mapped  out  ideal  construction  is  useful  so  far  as 
it  enables  thought  to  move  securely  within  its  scheme, 
and  affords  a  reliable  guide  in  that  which  the  scheme 
significantly  interprets — the  perceptual  world  with 
its  bewildering  multiplicity  of  particular  and  concrete 
detail.  And  just  in  so  far  as  they  are  useful  for  these 
purposes,  we  may  say  that  the  maps  are  true — true 
in  their  self-consistency,  true  in  their  consistency 
with  other  maps,  true  to  the  perceptual  experience 
from  which  they  are  derived,  true  to  the  constitution 
of  nature  in  which  that  experience  is  grounded. 

The  ideal  monistic  interpretation  of  nature  is, 
then,  a  highly  generalized  map  of  the  moving  and 
developing  world-process  wherein  all  the  correlation 
routes  are  serviceable  for  conceptual  thought,  and 
serviceable  for  the  interpretation  of  observable 
processes  and  products.  Now  suppose,  if  the  supposi- 
tion be  not  too  extravagant,  that  we  had  reached  this 
ideal.  Suppose  that  we  were  in  possession  of  an 
adequately  complete  knowledge-map  of  world-process 
and  world-products  up  to  date.  Could  we  with  like 
adequate  completeness  foretell  the  future  ?  Let  us 
narrow  down  the  question.  Let  us  suppose  ourselves 
to  be  sentient  beings  living  in  the  fire-mist  at  an 
evolutionary  period  before  crystallization  occurred 
in  what  is  now  our  solar  system.  Could  we  then, 
on  the  basis  of  the  fullest  possible  experience  of  our 
fire-mist  world,  foretell  the  forms  that  crystalline 
synthesis  would  assume  in  the  not-yet  of  the  future  ? 
I  think  not.  How  could  we  describe  and  formulate 
facts  the  like  of  which  were  not  yet  in  being  for  our 
experience  ?  It  may  be  said  that  science  is  day  by 
day   foretelling   facts   which   are   not   yet  in  being. 


THE  GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE       149 

Yes  !  But  does  science  ever  foretell  facts  the  like  of 
which  have  not  yet  swum  into  the  ken  of  experience  ? 
I  speak  under  correction  ;  but  I  believe  not.  I  hold 
that  all  scientific  explanation  is  after  the  event, 
and  that  all  scientific  prediction  is  of  like  events 
under  like  conditions.  But  surely,  it  may  be  urged, 
an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  constitution  of  nature 
would  enable  us  to  predict  any  event  no  matter  how 
novel  or  how  far  removed  from  us  in  future  time. 
In  a  sense  this  is  true  enough — but  only  in  the  sense 
that  the  supposed  adequate  knowledge  embraces  the 
constitution  of  nature  ivhen  it  is  finished — if  it  ever 
gets  finished  for  human  understanding  to  grasp.  In 
the  case  I  have  supposed,  the  order  of  nature  as  an 
evolutionary  product  was  still  in  the  making  and  had 
not  reached  the  critical  moment  of  crystallization. 
In  our  interpretation  of  the  evolutionary  process, 
if  we  place  ourselves  at  any  moment  in  the  midst  of 
its  flow,  we  anticipate  the  future  on  the  basis  of  the 
experience  gained  up  to  date.  But  even  if  that 
experience  were  exhaustive,  our  anticipations  must 
often  be  at  fault  if  the  world  is  still  in  the  making 
for  our  experience,  if  new  modes  of  synthesis 
hitherto  unexperienced,  and,  therefore,  as  I  con- 
ceive unpredictable,^  come  into  being.  I  am,  how- 
ever, fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  many  men  of 
science  would  contend  that  the  evolution  of  all 
the  varieties  of  crystal-form,  and  all  the  corre- 
lated physical  properties,  could  have  been  fore- 
told, before  their  actual  existence,  on  the  basis  of 

•  M.  Bergson,  as  I  think  unwarrantably,  restricts  the  range  of  the 
unpredictable  to  the  vital  order  ;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  for 
him  all  process  is,  in  a  wide  sense,  vital. 


150  INSTINCT    AND   EXPERIENCE 

an  adequate  knowledge  of  molecular  polarities.  But 
as  a  matter  of  historical  fact,  is  not  our  knowledge  of 
these  molecular  polarities  derived  from  the  study  of 
crystals  and  their  properties  ?  Given  specific  modes 
of  synthesis,  we  set  to  work  to  explain  them  in  terms 
of  what  we  find  therein.  But  that  is  a  different 
matter  from  predicting  the  modes  of  synthesis  before 
they  are  given  ! 

Is  such  a  view  proved  to   be  incorrect  by  the 
prediction  of  the  discovery  of  Neptune  based  on  the 
skilled   and    laborious   calculations   of   Adams   and 
Leverrier — a  prediction,  the  accuracy  of  which  was 
established  when  the  new  planet  swam  into  the  field 
of  M.  Galle's  telescope  ;  or  by  the  prediction  of  the 
physical  properties  of  certain  chemical  elements,  the 
discovery  of  which  might  be  anticipated  on  the  basis 
of  Mendeleef  s  law  ?     Surely  not.      Reduced  to  its 
simplest  expression,  what  we  have  in  such  cases  is 
a  curve  of  ideal  construction  within  which  certain 
points  may  be  ideally  interpolated  before  those  points 
have  been  shown  by  observation  to  exist  on  nature's 
curve  of  fact.     But  the  curve  of  ideal  construction  is 
based  on  experiments  and  observations  up  to  date  ; 
and  these  deal  with  occurrences  up  to  date.     But  if 
the  phenomena  of  crystallization  had  not  occurred  up 
to  date,  on  what  basis  could  a  curve  of  ideal  con- 
struction, dealing  with  the  not-yets  of  the  natural 
order,   be   founded  ?     How  could    points    be   inter- 
polated or  extrapolated  in  a  curve  for  the  drawing 
of  which  nature  had  not  yet  supplied  the  data  ? 

But  enough  of  the  inorganic  order.  Crystalliza- 
tion has  been  taken  merely  as  an  example.  Chemical 
synthesis  might  have  been  treated  on  similar  lines. 


THE   GROUND   OF   EXPERIENCE       l51 

It  might  have  been  asked  whether  the  constitution 
and  properties  of  carbon  disulphide  could  have  been 
predicted  before  the  event  of  its  coming  into  being, 
and  before  like  events  had  afforded  analogical  data. 
The  point  of  my  contention  is  that  the  progress  of 
inorganic  evolution  is  replete  with  events  which  are 
unforseeable  on  the  basis  of  the  fullest  possible 
experience  prior  to  the  actual  occurrence  of  such 
events.  All  that  we  can  do,  in  science,  is  to  correlate 
the  new  with  the  old. 

Carrying  with  us  the  lesson  we  have  learnt  from 
the  inorganic  world,  let  us  pass  onwards  to  the 
sphere  of  the  organic.  Let  us  again  ask  a  question  ; — 
Could  our  supposed  sentient  being  (Irish,  I  admit,  in 
the  figure  of  prolepsis),  existent  before  life  (as  the 
man  of  science  regards  life)  appeared  on  the  surface 
of  this  planet — could  this  impossible  being  have 
possibly  foretold  the  nature  of  organic  processes  } 
His  descendant,  speaking  in  Belfast,^  no  doubt 
discerned  "  in  that  matter  which  we,  in  our  ignorance 
of  its  latent  powers  .  .  .  have  hitherto  covered  with 
opprobrium,  the  promise  and  potency  of  all  terrestrial 
life."  But  Tyndall  was  speaking  after  the  event; 
and  I  doubt  whether  even  the  champion  of  biogenesis 
could  have  foretold  the  properties  of  protoplasm 
before  that  elusive  substance  had  come  into  exist- 
ence. Now  it  is  in  being,  we  can  gain  experience  of 
these  properties,  though  we  cannot  as  yet  correlate 
the  genetic  stages  of  its  natural  evolution.  That 
is  just  part  of  our  scientific  ignorance.  Some  of 
the   properties    of    living    organisms    are,  however, 

*  John  Tyndall,   "Address  to  the  British  Association"  (1874). 
"  Fragments  of  Science,"  6th  Ed.  {1879),  vol.  ij,,  p.  193. 


152  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

unquestionably,  as  I  believe,  different  from  the 
properties  of  inorganic  substances.  New  relationships 
as  a  matter  of  observation  obtain.  I  do  not  care,  at 
this  stage  of  our  inquiry,  to  have  much  traffic  with 
"  isms  ".  But  if  the  term  mechanism  be  employed  as 
a  group-name  by  which  to  label  certain  salient 
characteristics  of  physical  and  chemical  processes  in 
the  inorganic  world,  and  the  same  processes  in  so  far  as 
they  occur  in  organisms,  there  would  seem  to  be  no 
objection  to  the  application  of  the  term  vitalism  to 
the  salient  characteristics  of  the  specifically  physio- 
logical processes  which  differentiate  the  organism 
from  inorganic  matter.  But  obviously  the  two  terms 
should  be  used  on  a  similar  footing,  that  is  to  say,  to 
label  the  observed  characteristics  and  to  aid  us  in  our 
classification  and  our  scientific  interpretation.  Un- 
fortunately, however,  the  word  vitalism  generally 
carries  with  it  another  and  a  different  connotation. 
Inasmuch  as  any  suggested  interpretation  of  instinct 
is  sure  to  be  termed  mechanistic  or  vitalistic,  and 
inasmuch  as  one's  attitude  towards  the  instinctive 
problem  is  closely  related  to  one's  attitude  towards 
vital  problems  generally,  I  must  endeavour  to  make 
clear  my  own  point  of  view. 

First  as  to  vital  force.  This  opens  up  the  ques- 
tion. What  are  we  to  understand  by  force  ?  Given 
certain  observable  changes  of  position  in  the  solar 
system  ;  is  force  the  Source  of  these  motions  }  That 
question  is  beyond  our  province.  We  have  excluded 
Source  from  our  universe  of  discourse ;  and  we  must 
therefore  have  nothing  to  do  with  either  gravitative 
or  vital  Force  in  that  sense  of  the  word.  Then  we 
may  speak  of  force  cis  a  measure  of  the  accelerations 


THE   GROUND   OF  EXPERIENCE       153 

which  occur  in  a  mechanical  system.  But  we 
know  little  or  nothing  about  the  accelerations  of 
particles  in  an  organic  system  ;  so  that  can  scarcely 
be  the  meaning  we  are  to  attach  to  vital  force.  We 
may,  however,  speak  of  the  solar  system,  for  example, 
as  one  in  which  the  changes  which  occur  are  to  be 
interpreted  in  terms  of  gravitative  force,  meaning 
thereby  that  the  system  is  a  gravitative  system.  The 
term  gravitative  force  here  has  reference  to  the 
constitution  of  the  system  as  the  ground  of  certain 
observed  occurrences.  It  names  the  order  of  relation- 
ships with  which  we  have  to  deal.  If  the  term  vital 
force  is  used  in  an  analogous  manner,  and  if  we  are 
careful  to  make  this  quite  clear  in  our  definition,  I 
see  no  reason  why  we  should  reject  this  usage.  The 
only  serious  objection  is  that  it  is  apt  to  suggest 
Source,  and  not  what  I  have  called  ground.  I 
should,  myself,  therefore,  much  prefer  to  speak  of 
organic  constitution  or  organic  relationships.  But 
still,  since  we  speak  of  crystalline,  magnetic,  and 
chemical  forces  as  characterizing  certain  natural 
processes,  using  this  form  of  speech  to  describe  the 
constitution  of  the  system  in  each  case,  I  see  no 
objection  to  speaking  in  like  manner  of  vital  force,  as 
characterizing  organic  processes  as  such,  so  long  as  it 
is  distinctly  understood  that  this  is  just  what  is 
meant,  and  that  there  is  no  implication  of  Life  as 
Source.  If  this  implication  be  intended,  let  it  be 
clearly  stated,  then  we  shall  know  exactly  where  we 
are. 

What  then  about  vital  chemistry  ?  Vital  or 
physiological  chemistry  is  either  a  branch  of  chemistry 
or  it  is  not.     If  it  be  not,  then  the  sooner  some  other 


154  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

name  is  found  for  it  the  better.  If  it  is,  then,  surely, 
as  a  branch,  it  is  still  intimately  correlated  with  other 
branches  of  the  parent  stem  from  which  it  is 
differentiated,  and  as  such  must  be  dealt  with  in 
terms  of  chemical  processes  and  chemical  products. 
But,  it  will  be  said,  this  way  of  putting  the  matter 
studiously  avoids  the  very  point  at  issue.  As  Dr. 
Driesch  ^  has  well  phrased  it : — "  What  physiological 
chemistry  studies  is  only  results  that  are  chemically 
characterized — not  results  of  processes  that  are 
chemical  processes.  It  is  very  important,"  he  adds, 
"  to  understand  well  what  this  means.  Of  course 
chemical  potentials  have  formed  the  general  basis  of 
all  physiological  chemical  results,  but  these  results  as 
we  know,  are  not  due  to  the  mere  play  of  these 
potentials  as  such,  but  to  the  intervention  of  entelechy ; 
therefore  something  purely  chemical  is  found  in  the 
results  only,  not  in  the  processes.  Without  entelechy 
there  would  be  other  chemical  results." 

No  one  has  stated  the  case  for  vitalism  more 
clearly,  ably,  and  cogently  than  Dr.  Driesch.  His 
doctrine  of  entelechy  goes  to  the  very  root  of  the 
matter.  We  must  try  to  reach  an  understanding  of 
what  he  means  by  entelechy.  Is  it  an  assemblage  of 
natural  conditions  ;  or  is  it  a  name  for  the  constitution 
of  the  organism,  that  is  the  ground  of  organic 
phenomena ;  or  is  it  an  extra-mundane  Source  of 
these  phenomena  ? 

There  are  certain  processes  which  are  characteristic 
of  the  living  organism.  It  is  the  business  of  the 
biologist  to  deal  with  these  phenomena  in  the  terms 

'  Hans  Driesch,  "The  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism," 
vol.  ii.  (1908),  p.  254. 


THE   GROUND   OF  EXPERIENCE       155 

of  his  scientific  methods — to  explain,  for  example, 
the  development  of  the  chick  from  the  fertilized  egg, 
or  the  restitution  of  a  limb  in  a  maimed  newt.  Now 
unquestionably  all  the  processes  of  growth  and 
restitution  involve  chemical  or  metabolic  changes  with 
which  the  chemist  may  deal  according  to  his  methods, 
and  involve  molecular  changes  with  which  the 
physicist,  no  less  than  the  biologist,  is  concerned. 
Let  us  assume  that  all  the  metabolic  processes,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  susceptible  of  treatment  by  the 
chemist,  are  interpretable  in  terms  of  chemistry,  and 
that  all  the  physical  changes,  as  such,  are  found  to 
be  in  accordance  with  recognized  physical  generaliza- 
tions. This  may  be  more  than  the  vitalist  will  grant. 
Let  it  pass,  however,  as  an  assumption  which  is  the 
basis  of  scientific  research.  The  question  is  whether, 
when  the  chemist  and  the  physicist  have  done  their 
work,  there  is  anything  left  for  the  biologist  to 
explain — whether  correlated  with  these  chemical 
processes  and  these  molecular  changes,  there  are  also 
further  processes  which  assume  a  specific  form  in  the 
phenomena  of  organic  growth  that  is  nowhere  to  be 
found  in  the  inorganic  world.  Dr.  Driesch  contends 
that  they  do — that  the  biologist  may  claim  an 
autonomous  field  of  research.  Let  us  grant  that  he 
is  right.  As  at  present  advised  I  should  myself 
grant  it  freely  and  unreservedly.  Let  us,  then,  not 
only  admit,  but  contend,  that  in  the  living  organism 
there  are  specifically  organic  modes  of  synthesis. 
And  let  us  provisionally  agree  to  substitute  for  the 
familiar  word  organic,  as  qualifying,  for  example, 
growth  and  development,  the  relatively  unfamiliar 
term  entelechian.     Then  entelechy  is  the  noun  from 


156  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

which  this   adjective   is   derived ;    it   expresses   the 
distinctively  biological  concept. 

In  this  sense  I  can  accept  entelechy  as  the 
specific  ground  of  organic  processes  within  a  relatively 
autonomous  province  of  the  constitution  of  nature. 
And  in  this  sense  the  term  is  sometimes  used  by  Dr. 
Driesch.  "  Entelechy,"  he  says,  "  is  order  of  relation 
and  absolutely  nothing  else"  (p.  169).  But  the 
ground  of  all  order  in  nature  is  for  him,  following 
Kant,  to  be  sought  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind. 
Its  home  is  among  the  categories.  Unless  I  wholly 
misunderstand  him,  Dr.  Driesch  is  so  far  Kantian  as 
to  hold  that  the  given  manifold  of  sensory  experience 
is  made  into  a  cosmos  by  us  human  knowers.  I 
accept,  as  I  have  said  above,  the  other  alternative, 
and  believe  that  it  is  the  constitution  of  nature  that 
makes  us  human  knowers  what  we  are  in  the  sense 
that  we  are  just  parts  within  the  whole,  and  parts  in 
which  conscious  relationships,  strictly  correlated  with 
other  relationships,  have  been  evolved.  But  if  the 
knower  is  himself  thus  part  of  the  order  of  nature, 
may  it  not  be  reasonably  claimed  that,  whichever 
alternative  be  accepted,  the  sole  and  sufficient  ground 
of  all  experience  and  all  scientific  knowledge  is  the 
order  of  nature  ?  So  far,  as  part  of  that  order, 
entelechy  may  be  accepted  as  a  concept  of  value  in 
biological  interpretation. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  on  these  terms 
entelechy  is  accepted  as  part  of  the  constitutive 
nature  of  the  organism.  It  is  not  accepted  as  a 
natural  agent  existent  outside  the  organism  and 
somehow  acting  not  in  but  into  the  organism.  When 
we  are  told  by  Dr.  Driesch  that  entelechy  is  a  natural 


THE  GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE      157 

agent  which  rules,  determines,  and  controls  organic 
processes  (i.  p.  227-8) ;  when  we  are  told  that 
entelechy  uses  the  brain  as  a  piano-player  uses  the 
piano  (ii.  p.  97)  ;  when  we  are  told  that  it  is  the  task 
of  entelechy  to  build  up  the  organism  (ii.  p.  149)  ; 
I  seek  to  know  whether  crystallization  is  also  a 
natural  agent  which  rules,  determines,  and  controls 
crystalline  processes  ;  whether  gravitation  uses  the 
solar  system  as  a  piano-player  uses  a  piano  ;  whether 
it  is  "the  task"  of  a  committee  of  such  agents  to 
build  up  the  universe.  I  seek  to  know  what 
crystallization,  gravitation,  organization,  and  the 
rest  are  doing  when  they  are  not  playing  their 
pianos ;  and  what  evidence  there  is  of  their  exist- 
ence independently  of  their  business  avocation  as 
instrumentalists.  And  this  I  seek  to  know  within 
the  universe  of  discourse  of  science  which  just  accepts 
process  as  given,  to  be  correlated  with  other  process, 
and  has  no  concern  with  the  question  why  process  is 
what  it  is.  If  we  say  that  entelechy  uses  matter  and 
material  causality  for  its  purposes  ;  if  we  emphasize 
by  italics  that  entelechy  is  alien  not  only  to  matter 
but  also  to  its  own  material  purposes  (ii.  p.  336),  are 
we  not  passing  beyond  the  order  of  nature  as  given, 
in  our  search  for  an  entity  or  entities  through  the 
Agency  of  which  a  part  of  that  order  has  its  Source 
and  Origin?  Entelechy  we  are  told  (ii.  p.  235)  is 
affected  by  and  acts  upon  spatial  causality  as  if  it 
came  out  of  an  ultraspatial  dimension  ;  it  does  not 
act  in  space,  it  acts  into  space  ;  it  is  not  in  space,  it 
only  has  points  of  manifestation  in  space.  So,  too,  it 
is  not  in  the  material  organism  but  only  "  manifests  " 
itself  in  this  material  (p.  336).     There  is  no  living 


158  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

substance ;  there  is  only  substance  which  is  used  by 
life  (ii.  p.  246  and  248  and  i.  p.  93).  Have  we  not 
here  the  manifestation  of  Agency  as  the  Source  of 
the  order  which  is  observed.  It  certainly  appears  to 
be  so.  For  we  are  led  up  to  the  question  whether 
the  harmony  in  certain  domains  of  nature  does  not 
point  back  to  "  an  original  primary  entelechy  that 
made  it  just  as  the  artist  makes  an  object  of  art;" 
to  which  the  reply  is  that  "  the  mind  is  forced  to 
assume  this  primary  entelechy  in  the  universe,"  an 
entelechy  which  has  not  indeed  created  absolute 
reality  but  which  has  ordered  certain  parts  of  it 
(ii.  p.  370).  This  may  be  a  perfectly  valid  conception 
for  the  metaphysics  of  Source  ;  but  it  is  not  what  I 
understand  by  natural  science  of  which  biology  is  a 
branch. 

I  proceed  throughout  on  the  assumption  that, 
whatever  may  be  their  source — whether  it  be  Life, 
or  Entelechy  or  God — all  natural  processes,  including 
both  organic  and  mental  processes,  are  related  within 
the  constitution  of  nature,  and  must  be  correlated 
within  our  ideal  construction  of  the  natural  order. 
That  is  what  I  understand  by  a  universe.  If  we  could 
tell  the  story  of  evolution  up  to  date,  it  would  be  one 
story,  all  its  episodes  of  process  being  in  some 
measure  related.  But  if  it  be  one  story,  is  there  not 
one  science  of  nature  in  terms  of  which  this  story  may 
be  told  ?  Professor  J.  Arthur  Thomson  asks  ^  this 
question  and  gives  a  negative  answer.  But  what  are 
we  to  understand  by  one  science  of  nature.  Professor 
Thomson  tells  us  that  "it  must  consist  of  precise 
physico-chemical  descriptions  which  have  been,  or 
*  "  Hibbeit  Journal,"  vol.  x,,  p.  no  (Oct.  191 1). 


THE   GROUND  OF  EXPERIENCE       159 

are  in  process  of  being,  summed  up  in  mathematical 
terms."     I  take  this  to  mean  that  the  one  science  of 
nature   must   take   into  consideration  chemical  and 
physical  relationships  only,  and  must  either  (i)  deny 
the  existence  of,  or  (2)  exclude  from  its  treatment,  all 
other  relationships,  such  as  those  which  are  specifically 
organic,  still  more  those  that  are  of  the  conscious  or 
experiential  order.    Now  of  course  Professor  Thomson 
as   a   distinguished  biologist  is  not  prepared  to  do 
either  the  one  or  the  other,  and  since  he  is  precluded 
by  his  definition  of  the  one  science  from  including 
specifically  biological  relationships  therein,  he  seems 
to  urge  that  there  are  two  sciences  of  nature — in- 
organic science  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other 
hand   the  science  of  biology.     But  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  only  possible  justification  of  such  treatment 
is  the  Bergsonian  conception  of  two  separate  orders 
— the  order  of  the  inert  and  the  order  of  the  vital  and 
the  conscious.     In  other  words  the  doctrine  of  two 
sciences  is  founded  in  a  doctrine  of  radical  dualism. 
The   thesis   I   seek   to  develop  is  that  there  is  one 
science  of  nature — that  which  includes  all  kinds  of 
relationships.     But  of  course  this  one  science  of  nature 
must  not  be  so  defined  at  the  outset  as  to  limit  it  to 
physico-chemical  relationships  and  to  exclude  all  that 
is  distinctively  organic.     Professor  Thomson  includes 
under  biology  certain  phenomena  in  connection  with 
animal  behaviour  which  involve  experiential  relation- 
ships.    That  these  phenomena  cannot  adequately  be 
interpreted   in   terms   of  "precise    physico-chemical 
descriptions,"  and  in  these  terms  only,  is  for  me,  so 
true  as  to  be  a  truism.      But  I  doubt  whether  there 
are    many  of  even   the  staunchest   upholders  of    a 


160         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

so-called  mechanical  interpretation,  who  would  deny 
the  presence  of  other  relationships  than  those  which  we 
term  physical  and  chemical,  or  would  deny  that  these 
other  phenomena  are  susceptible  of  scientific  treat- 
ment. 

There  is  one  further  characteristic — a  distinctive 
characteristic — of  the  phenomena  with  which  biology 
deals  to  which  allusion  must  be  made.  Professor 
Thomson  rightly  lays  stress  on  the  fact  that  organisms 
are  historic  beings.  As  W.  K.  Clifford  said  ^  in  a 
passage  which  Professor  Thomson  quotes  : —  "  A 
living  being  must  always  contain  within  itself  the 
history,  not  merely  of  its  own  existence,  but  of  all 
its  ancestors."  Every  organism  runs  through  a  life- 
history  which  is  substantially  a  cyclic  repetition  of 
that  of  its  parents.  What,  then,  is  the  relation  of  this 
distinctively  organic  sequence  to  inorganic  processes  ? 
We  know  indeed  that  as  the  life  histories  run  their 
course  they  are  in  close  relation  to  physical  processes 
in  the  environment.  But  what  about  the  beginnings 
of  life  on  the  face  of  this  earth  ?  We  must  frankly 
confess  that  the  mists  of  our  ignorance  hide  the 
stages  of  correlation  from  our  view.  Must  we  then,  to 
account  for  the  origin  of  protoplasm,  postulate  the 
incursion  of  a  foreign  order,  hitherto  unrelated  to 
the  old  inorganic  order,  and  coming  from  an  alien 
sphere .?  If  we  do  so  we  leave  science  and  resort 
to  the  metaphysics  of  Source.  What  know  we  in 
science  concerning  this  foreign  order  save  in  and 
through  its  relationships  with  the  native  order  at 
the   points   of  postulated   incursion  ?    Let   us  once 

*  "Lectmes  and   Essays,"  vol.  i.,  p.  83,     Discourse  delivered  in 
1868. 


THE   GROUND   OF   EXPERIENCE       161 

more  suppose  that  at  some  stage  of  world-develop- 
ment a  sentient  being  might  have  observed  the 
seemingly  sudden  (if  it  was  sudden)  appearance  of 
lowly  forms  of  organization.  In  what  essential  respects 
would  such  an  occurrence  differ  from  the  seemingly 
sudden  appearance  of  crystallization  in  the  pre- 
crystalline  magma  of  an  earlier  phase  of  develop- 
ment ?  Let  us  at  least  be  consistent  in  our  thought. 
If  we  regard  organization  as  an  incursion  from  an 
alien  sphere,  let  us  also  so  regard  crystallization.  Let 
us  apply  to  the  inorganic  world  the  same  canons  of 
interpretation  which  we  apply  to  the  organic  world. 
But  if  we  do  so,  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other, 
are  we  not  postulating  a  Source  of  the  occurrences 
which  ex  hypothesi,  might  have  been  observed  as 
matters  of  experiential  fact  ? 

What  then  is  the  other  course  open  to  us  ? — What 
is  the  course  which  is  here  advocated  ?  The  naive 
acceptance  of  any  such  facts  as  can  be  established  by 
observation  and  scientific  inference.  Among  these 
facts  is,  I  conceive,  the  frequent  appearance  of  what 
must  seem  to  contemporary  experience  to  be  new  pro- 
ducts of  synthesis  at  critical  periods  of  the  develop- 
ment of  world  process.  I  suppose  few  will  deny  that 
the  genesis  of  crystals  is  correlated  with  certain 
assignable  conditions  under  which  that  genesis  occurs. 
Why  should  we  deny,  on  the  basis  of  our  present  ignor- 
ance, that  the  genesis  of  organisms  is  or  was  likewise 
correlated  with  certain  other  conditions  as  yet 
unknown  ?  Why  should  we  deny  that  the  constitution 
of  nature,  which  is  the  sufficient  ground  of  the 
genesis  of  the  one,  affords  no  ground  for  the  genesis 
of  the  other  ? 

M 


162         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

But  if  we  are  prepared  to  see  in  the  constitution 
of  nature  the  ground  of  all  those  processes  with  which 
science  attempts  to  deal,  and  of  all  those  products 
which  are  strewn  along  the  banks  of  the  flowing 
stream  of  process — in  short  of  all  perceptual  ex- 
perience and  all  scientific  knowledge — we  must  also 
be  prepared  to  regard  the  constitution  of  nature  as  the 
ground  of  new  and  unforeseeable  modes  of  synthesis. 
We  must  be  prepared  to  regard  the  world  at  any 
stage  of  progress  as  one  which  is  really  evolving. 
And  if  it  is  evolving  in  this  sense  of  exhibiting 
genuinely  new  modes  of  synthesis,  the  past  can  never 
be  a  wholly  sufficient  basis  for  anticipations  with 
regard  to  the  future.  On  this  view  of  evolutionary 
progress  there  are,  as  M.  Bergson  and  William  James 
have  claimed,  unforeseen  and  unforeseeable  possi- 
bilities in  store  for  the  universe.  The  tune  of  the 
future  will  not  be  merely  a  repetition  of  the  theme 
of  the  past,  with  only  such  insignificant  variations  as 
may  be  due  to  minor  rearrangements  of  already 
existent  chords  in  nature's  melody  and  harmony. 

Once  more  a  note  of  warning  must  be  uttered. 
The  constitution  of  nature  as  ground  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  independent  of  natural  process ;  nor 
as  imposing  on  natural  process  the  characters  it 
'possesses.  Directly  we  so  regard  it  we  pass  to  the 
conception  of  Source.  It  is  just  the  logical  form,  or, 
if  it  be  preferred,  the  intelligibility  of  the  world.  It 
neither  produces  nor  is  produced  by  process  ;  it  is 
the  essential  feature  of  the  existing  and  evolving 
universe  as  rationally  interpretable. 


CHAPTER   VI 

NATURAL  HISTORY  AND   EXPERIENCE 

IN  earlier  chapters  I  have  attempted  to  interpret 
instinctive  experience  in  terms  of  natural  history. 
But  can  there  be  a  natural  history  of  experience  ? 
Or  is  the  attempt  to  give  a  genetic  account  of 
experience  in  terms  of  natural  history,  and  science 
founded  thereon,  futile  and  foredoomed  to  failure  ? 
I  regard  instinctive  experience  as  the  earliest  phase 
of  a  continuous  development  in  the  individual, 
which  may  lead  up  to  the  enriched  thought- 
experience  of  man.  But  am  I  not,  it  will  be  asked, 
beginning  at  the  wrong  end  ?  Can  one  explain  the 
higher  in  terms  of  the  lower  ?  Must  one  not  reverse 
the  procedure  and  explain  the  lower  in  terms  of  the 
higher  ?  Those  who  approach  this  question  along 
such  a  path  as  ours  regard  human  self-consciousness 
as  a  result  of  evolution  ;  it  is,  for  them,  the  ter?ninus 
ad  quern  to  which  or  towards  which  development 
leads  up.  But  those  who  approach  the  question 
through  a  different  avenue,  urge  that  self-conscious- 
ness is  the  terminus  a  quo  from  which  we  must  start 
forth  on  our  quest  for  explanation.  Thus  T.  H, 
Green  says  ^  that  self-consciousness  is  "  at  its  begin- 

*  "Introduction    to    Hume,"     "Treatise    of    Human    Nature," 
Green  &  Grose,  vol.  i.,  p.  i66.    (Impression  of  1909.) 

163 


164         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

ning  formally  or  potentially  or  implicitly  all  that  it 
becomes  actually  or  explicitly  in  developed  know- 
ledge." There  is  of  course  a  sense  in  which  the 
naturalist  can  understand  and  accept  this  statement 
— the  sense  in  which  an  acorn  is  potentially  or 
implicitly  all  that  it  becomes  actually  or  explicitly 
in  the  developed  oak-tree.  But  here  we  have  only 
an  expectation  founded  on  knowledge  of  routine,  and 
one  which  implies  the  prior  existence  of  such  know- 
ledge, as  this  in  turn  implies  the  prior  existence  of 
a  knower.  In  any  case  this  is  certainly  not  the 
sense  in  which  Green's  statement  is  to  be  understood. 
"  A  natural  history  of  self-consciousness  is,"  he  says, 
*'  impossible  since  such  a  history  must  be  of  events 
and  self-consciousness  is  not  reducible  to  a  series  of 
events."  This  might  perhaps  be  interpreted  as 
indicating  an  insight  into  the  distinction  between  the 
events  experienced  and  the  process  of  experiencing, 
or,  as  Green  would  have  phrased  it,  between  content 
and  act.  But  for  him  the  act  implies  an  Agent,  and 
the  Agent  is  not  of  this  world.  Mind,  though  it 
may  act  into  nature  is  not  of,  or  belonging  to,  the 
order  of  nature.  "  A  form  of  consciousness  which  we 
cannot  explain  as  of  naUiral  origin  "  is,  Green  says,^ 
"necessary  for  our  conceiving  an  order  of  nature." 
Here  we  have  Consciousness  as  Source.  For  Green, 
as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter.  Source  is  all-important ; 
and  his  real  point  is  that  a  natural  explanation  of 
Source  is  impossible.  This  may  be  freely  granted 
both  by  those  who  believe  in  a  Source  of  phenomena 
and   by    those   who   disbelieve.      Now,  in  so  far  as 

*  •'  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,"  §  19,  p.  23  {5th  Ed.  1906).  Italics 
mine. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     165 

epistemology  discusses  the  origin  of  knowledge,  as 
distinct  from  its  genetic  development,  it  belongs  to 
the  metaphysics  of  Source.  Its  method  of  interpre- 
tation is  to  explain  the  lower  in  terms  of  the  higher  ; 
the  end  determines  the  course  of  events  by  which  it 
is  reached.  Hence  my  reiterated  contention  that 
any  commingling  of  the  antithetical  methods  of 
metaphysics  and  of  science  is  to  be  deprecated. 
Why  should  we  not  try  to  write  a  natural  history  of 
experience,  as  it  somehow  actually  runs  its  course, 
leaving  the  problem  of  its  Source  to  be  discussed  on 
a  different  platform  ? 

But,  granted  that  a  natural  history  of  experience 
might  be  written,  were  our  knowledge  far  more 
adequate  than  it  is  at  present ;  it  would,  I  take  it, 
in  strictness,  be  a  natural  history  of  an  individual 
experience,  just  as  the  natural  history  of  an 
organism  is,  in  strictness,  that  of  an  individual. 
Granted,  then,  that  on  these  terms,  a  natural  history 
of  experience  might  be  told,  the  question  arises 
whether  this  alone  would  suffice  for  scientific  interpre- 
tation. The  question  is  perhaps  a  little  subtle  ;  but 
it  opens  up  the  wider  question  : — What  is  the  relation 
of  history  to  science  }  If  history,  as  such,  always 
deals  descriptively  with  a  particular  series  of  events 
forming  a  sequence  which  occurred  within  an 
assignable  period  of  time  ;  and  if  it  be  the  task  of 
science  to  furnish  an  explanation  and  interpretation 
of  these  events  in  terms  of  general  rules  ;  it  does  not 
seem  possible  to  identify  the  one  with  the  other.  It 
would  appear,  rather,  that  it  is  the  function  of  history 
to  supply,  on  its  own  terms,  the  data  for  scientific 
discussion.     Granted   that   history   repeats   itself— a 


166         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

statement  which,  as  we  shall  see,  may  require  some 
qualification — only  in  so  far  as  it  does  so  may  we 
hope  to  ascertain  the  general  rules  which  obtain  in 
such  repetition.  Science  can  only  deal  effectively 
with  the  data  which  are  afforded  by  routine.  Only 
on  the  basis  of  routine  can  expectations  and  anticipa- 
tions arise.  For  Hume,  custom  afforded  a  sufficient 
ground  for  such  routine.  For  a  modern  disciple 
of  Hume,  Professor  Karl  Pearson,^  routine  is 
grounded  in  the  nature  of  the  perceptive  faculty 
itself.  For  us  the  ultimate  ground  of  perception  and 
custom  and  routine  is  the  constitution  of  nature.  But 
what  is  the  constitution  of  nature  but  that  to  which 
our  concept  of  the  natural  order  refers  ?  And  in  the 
absence  of  recurrent  phenomena  could  we  ever  have 
framed  this  conception  of  a  natural  order  ?  If 
phys  ics,  chemistry,  and  astronomy  dealt  with 
always  fresh  occurrences,  without  any  repeated  series, 
we  might  indeed  have  history  ;  but  could  we  have 
science  ?  If  the  development  of  this  oak-tree  from 
that  acorn  were  not  substantially  the  same  as  that  of 
other  oak-trees  from  other  acorns,  and  in  like  manner 
with  a  vast  number  of  organic  life-histories,  could  we, 
it  may  be  asked,  frame  any  generalizations  that 
could  properly  be  termed  biological  ?  If  again  there 
were  no  recurrent  phases  of  what  is  consciously 
experienced,  could  even  that  custom,  on  which  Hume 
relied,  have  arisen  ?  Is  not  all  co-operative  work  in 
the  interpretation  of  nature  dependent  on  the  fact 
that  sequences  of  events  are  repeated  in  and  for  the 
individual  experience  of  different  men  ?  Is  it,  then, 
too  much  to  say  that,  apart  from  the  repeated 
"  "The  Grammar  of  Science,"  i>l.  i.,  p.  115  (191 1). 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     167 

recurrence  of  sequences  which,  for  the  purposes  of 
interpretation,  may  be  regarded  as  the  same,  no 
such  conception  of  the  natural  order  as  has  been 
framed  by  men  of  science  could  have  come  into 
being  ? 

There  is  unquestionably  a  central  core  of  truth  in 
the  views  implied  in  such  questions.  But  is  it  the 
whole  truth  ?  Is  there  not  somewhat  to  be  urged  on 
the  other  side  ?  Suppose  that  we  could  know  the 
complete  history  of  the  natural  order  up  to  date. 
We  think  of  it  nowadays  in  terms  of  evolution. 
Regard  then  the  evolution  as  a  whole  and  consider 
the  thought-model  men  of  science  have  framed  of  its 
progress.  Does  this  history  repeat  itself  ?  Can  we 
conceive  that  it  has  ever  repeated  itself  in  literal 
exactness,  as  a  great  progressive  whole?  Does  the 
astronomer,  touched  with  the  spirit  of  evolution, 
believe  that  any  period  in  the  history  of  the  solar 
system  exactly  reproduced  the  events  of  any  preceding 
period  ?  Does  the  geologist,  or  the  palaeontologist, 
believe  that  the  physical  features  of  the  whole  earth 
and  the  total  flora  and  fauna  all  over  the  globe,  were 
ever  twice  the  same,  so  far  as  his  researches  enable 
him  to  form  an  opinion  ?  Has  not  every  period,  long 
or  short,  its  distinguishing  individuality  ?  If  so,  there 
is  surely  a  valid  sense  in  which  it  may  be  urged  that 
our  concept  of  evolution  is  antithetical  to  a  concept 
involving  the  complete  and  through- and-through  re- 
currence of  any  phase  of  the  evolutionary  process 
regarded  as  a  whole.  And  when  we  narrow  our  field 
of  view  and  consider  the  history  of  any  given 
organism,  still  more  that  of  the  individual  experience 
of  any  conscious  being,  is  not  the  salient  fact  that 


168  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

history  does  not  repeat  itself — that  history  always 
comprises  within  its  record  some  measure  of  genuine 
becoming,  always  presents  something  new,  something 
unique  ? 

It  may,  however,  be  urged  that  this  so-called 
genuine  becoming,  this  something  new  and  unique, 
is  only  a  re-grouping  of  world-old  elements.  But 
why  only  a  re-grouping'?  Is  not  every  synthesis 
within  the  natural  order,  on  this  view,  only  a 
re-grouping  ?  What  is  thus  stigmatized  by  the  dis- 
paraging word  only  is,  it  may  be  urged,  the  essential 
and  distinguishing  feature  of  evolution,  and  should  be 
recognized  as  such,  not  only  by  the  psychologist  and 
the  biologist,  but  by  the  interpreter  of  inorganic 
phases  of  the  evolutionary  process.  When  crystal- 
lization first  occurred  in  that  part  of  the  universe 
which  is  now  our  earth,  there  was  in  a  sense  only  a 
re-grouping  of  molecules  never  before  so  grouped. 
In  a  sense,  too,  every  time  a  crystal  forms  to-day 
there  is  only  a  synthetic  re-grouping  of  molecules 
otherwise  grouped  just  previous  to  its  formation. 
But  in  the  latter  case,  and  in  thousands  of  such  cases, 
experience  has  afforded  a  basis,  absent  in  the  first 
instance,  for  the  interpretation  of  crystal-formation 
in  terms  of  routine.  Let  us  admit  then  that, 
within  the  natural  order  as  a  whole,  there  are  many 
details  of  the  history  which  occur  over  and  over 
again,  and  differ  only  in  the  time  and  place  of  their 
occurrence  ;  for  we  may  here  neglect  the  fact  (if  such 
it  be)  that  no  two  crystals,  for  example,  are  ever 
absolutely  alike,  and  that  the  balance  of  unlikeness, 
perhaps  infinitesimal,  gives  at  any  rate  just  a  little 
uniqueness  and   individuality.     Though  the  history 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    169 

of  the  natural  order  as  a  whole  (so  far  as  we  can  form 
an  ideal  construction  of  the  whole)  does  not  in  any 
two  periods  of  time  repeat  itself,  yet  within  that 
whole  there  are  numberless  repetitions  sufficiently  alike 
to  be  comprised  under  the  generalizations  of  science. 

What,  then,  are  the  characteristics  of  such  repeti- 
tions of  process  ?  We  may  express  the  essential  feature 
diagrammatically  thus  ^ : — Take  the  recorded  curve 
of  this  bit  of  natural  process,  with  its  products, 
occurring  here  and  now ;  superpose  it  in  thought  on 
the  curve-record  of  another  bit  of  natural  process 
which  occurred  at  another  time  and  in  another  place  ; 
then  if  these  records  are  substantially  the  same, 
so  that  the  one  curve  approximately  fits  the  other — 
history  so  far  repeats  itself. 

How  stands  the  matter  then  with  regard  to  the 
organism  ?  Does  history  repeat  itself  in  a  similar 
sense  here  ?  Take  the  relatively  simple  life-history  of 
the  frog  or  newt  from  the  egg  through  the  tadpole 
phases.  Or  take  the  much  more  complex  case  of 
the  liver-fluke,  the  life-history  of  which  is  a  series 
of  quite  romantic  episodes.  I  conceive  that  in  all 
such  cases,  simple  or  complex,  the  practical  working 
zoologist  who  has  no  philosophical  theory  to 
advocate,  will  say  that,  in  biology,  history  does 
repeat  itself ;  that  when  the  record  of  any  one 
individual  organism  is  compared  with  that  of 
another  of  the  same  species  there  will  be  substantial 
agreement,  and  that  to  contend  that  there  is  not 
absolute  identity  is  a  bit  of  quibbling.  But  such  an  one 
cannot  have  learnt  to  the  full  the  lesson  of  evolution. 
For,  if  in  a  long  series,  over  a  considerable  period  of 

'  Cf,  Bcrgson,  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  227, 


170         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

time,  each  successive  individual  is  quite  like  its 
predecessors,  where  is  the  possibility  of  progress  in 
the  evolution  of  species  ?  On  such  a  view  where 
does  variation  come  in  ?  Does  not  the  history  of 
biology  teach  us  that  whereas  the  older  zoologists 
were  content  to  believe  that  history  does  repeat  itself, 
post-Darwinian  biologists  have  learnt  to  accept  the 
view  that  in  strictness  this  is  not  the  case  ?  Hence 
it  can  scarcely  be  termed  quibbling  to  contend 
that  in  no  two  cases  is  there  absolute  identity. 
Will  it  not  be  wiser  to  say : — (i)  that  for  the  purposes 
of  the  systematic  zoologist  who  is  conducting  a 
research  on  life-history  there  is  substantial  agreement 
in  the  case  of  the  different  individuals  of  any  living 
species  ;  (2)  that  for  the  purposes  of  the  evolutionist 
those  minor  differences  which  are  termed  variations 
must  be  taken  into  consideration  ;  and  (3)  that  for 
the  purposes  of  philosophic  thought  absolute  identity 
between  any  two  life-histories  is,  to  say  the  least 
of  it,  highly  improbable  ? 

Combining  these  three,  we  may  say  that  in  any 
individual  life-history  there  is  a  largely  preponderant 
portion  which  is  a  repetition  of  what  has  occurred 
before  in  other  individual  phases  of  the  history  of  the 
species  ;  that  there  is  a  much  smaller  proportion  which 
is  a  variation  from  previous  life-histories  in  the  same 
line  of  heredity  ;  and  that,  though,  among  some 
organisms,  this  latter  proportion  is  so  small  as  to 
elude  the  closest  observation,  it  is  never  a  vanishing 
quantity.  So  too,  in  the  natural  history  of  experience, 
as  one  among  the  many  concatenated  processes  of 
the  natural  order,  we  find,  as  in  the  organic  characters 
which  mark  the  course  of  the  individual  life-history 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     171 

of  an  organism,  (i)  some  measure  of  substantial  but 
never  complete  repetition,  and  (2)  some  measure  of 
the  new  and  unique.  Here  again,  however,  we  are 
faced  with  the  same  difficulty  of  interpretation.  Is 
the  apparently  new  and  unique  a  veritable  "  creative  " 
departure  from  routine  ?  Or  is  it  the  algebraical  sum 
of  characters  given  in  previous  routines  and  therefore 
predictable  if  we  knew  the  amounts  of  these 
characters  and  the  mode  of  their  summation  ?  I  see, 
at  present,  no  ground  for  denying,  though  I  am  not 
prepared  to  assert,  that  really  new  synthetic  combina- 
tions, as  contrasted  with  quasi-mechanical  mixtures 
of  old  characters,  do  occur  in  the  natural  history  of 
experience.  But  since,  as  matters  now  are,  we  have 
not  the  data  for  proof  of  either  their  presence  or 
absence,  let  us  be  content  to  grant  that  they  may 
occur.  In  any  case  a  large  measure  of  individuality 
seems  to  be  emphasized  in  the  concatenated  experi- 
ential processes  and  products  of  the  higher  organisms. 
In  a  sense  that  is  quite  valid  and  true  the  mental 
life-history  of  the  individual  never  in  any  of  its 
phases  repeats  itself,  nor  is  any  phase  an  exact 
repetition  of  previous  parental  or  ancestral  life-history. 
Hence  in  the  natural  history  of  experience  the  same 
antecedent  conditions  never  again  recur  ;  hence  I  do 
not  act  to-day  quite  as  I  acted  yesterday  ;  and  hence 
it  may  be  said  that  the  concept  of  stereotyped 
routine — of  ubiquitous  uniformity  of  sequence — is 
here  inapplicable.  The  assertion  that  like  ante- 
cedents will  always  be  followed  by  like  consequents, 
the  constitution  of  nature  being  assumed  to  be 
constant,  may  be  true  enough  ;  but  what  can  be  its 
value  here,  if,  in  the  ever-changing  flow  of  experience 


172         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

the  same  conditions  never  do  recur  ?  All  this  has  an 
element  of  truth  ;  and  M.  Bergson  and  his  followers 
do  well  to  insist  on  this  feature  of  the  conscious  life- 
history.  But  surely  it  is  not  the  whole  truth ;  for  it 
ignores  the  fact  that  though,  in  strictness,  the  life- 
history  does  not  repeat  itself  any  more  than  does 
the  history  of  the  universe,  yet  there  is  in  it  enough 
of  routine  on  which  to  found  generalizations.  M. 
Bergson  seems  rather  extravagantly  to  over- 
emphasize the  difference  and  to  minimize  the 
similarity  in  successive  phases  of  the  mental  life  ; 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  for  him  routine  and 
habit,  though  they  are  due  to  the  Agency  of  Life,  are 
part  of  the  automatism  Life  has  created,  and  are 
being,  or  have  been,  translated  into  the  stereotyped 
order  of  the  inert.  Then  and  then  only  do  they 
come  within  the  purview  of  science  so  as  to  be 
susceptible  of  treatment  in  the  static  terms  which 
science  as  he  admits  rightly  employs  in  its  interpre- 
tation. Still,  granted  that  the  quality  of  our 
experience  changes  from  day  to  day,  it  is  only  within 
the  narrow  margin  of  this  "  creative  "  difference  that 
the  resulting  actions  are,  in  M.  Bergson's  sense  of  the 
term,  "free."  And  this  limited  freedom  is,  for  us,  but 
not  for  him,  grounded  in  the  constitution  of  experi- 
ence which  is  part  of  the  constitution  of  nature. 

We  must  turn  aside  here  to  consider  briefly  what 
we  mean  when  we  speak  of  the  individual  and 
individuality.  It  is  convenient,  in  biology,  to  apply 
the  term  individual  to  the  organism  which  embodies 
that  portion  of  the  continuous  life-history  which  is 
relatively  (but  only  relatively)  isolated  and  runs  from 
the  cleavage  of  the  fertilized  ovum  to  the  death  of 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     173 

the  adult,  and  begins  again  with  the  egg  laid  by  the 
adult.  Biologists  will  remind  us  that  in  some  cases, 
as  in  that  of  the  liver-fluke,  there  are,  within  the 
individual  history,  relatively  isolable  stages  to  which 
the  term  quasi-individual  may  be  applied.  They 
will  remind  us,  too,  that,  where  the  egg  is  fertilized, 
any  individual  life-history  is  continuous  with  two  life- 
histories.  But  these  are  only  supplementary  con- 
ceptions. The  essential  conception  is  that  the 
individual  is  relatively  isolated,  and  that  it  has  certain 
characteristics  which  distinguish  it  as  an  individual 
from  otherwise  similar  individuals. 

Now  it  is  often  asserted  that  outside  the  sphere  of 
life  no  such  concept  as  that  of  individuality  is  applic- 
able. We  cannot  affirm,  it  is  urged,  that  each  molecule 
of  water  has  its  own  peculiar  distinguishing  characters 
which  mark  its  true  individuality.  Perhaps  not.  But 
can  we  deny  that  it  has  ?  No  doubt  in  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  chemist  any  such  individuality  as  atoms 
and  molecules  may  possess,  nowise  matters  for  his 
purposes.  For  these  purposes  they  are  regarded  as  all 
just  alike.  But  to  assert  that  the  real  molecules  to  which 
that  thought  has  reference — the  molecules  as  they  exist 
(if  they  do  exist)  independently  of  that  thought,  have 
no  distinguishing  characters  of  individuality — that,  I 
conceive,  is  to  go  further  than  known  facts  justify  us 
in  going.  We  cannot  get  at  them  to  compare  in 
minute  detail  each  with  others.  We  have  no  grounds 
for  any  dogmatic  assertion  on  the  matter  one  way  or 
the  other.  There  may  be,  therefore  individuality,  in 
molecules  and  crystals,  in  mountains,  in  rivers — in 
the  inorganic  world.  None  the  less  we  may  quite 
justifiably  say  that  outside  the  organic  sphere  the 


174         INSTLNCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

concept  of  individuality  is  not  applicable  in  the  same 
sense  as  within  that  sphere.  Nowhere  in  the  in- 
organic world  do  we  find  such  repetitive  cycles  ; 
nowhere  else  the  cumulative  effects  for  which  heredity 
somehow  *'  provides " ;  nowhere  else  the  subtly 
interrelated  processes  of  differentiation  from  what  is, 
or  seems,  comparatively  homogeneous  at  the  outset, 
combined  with  the  integration  of  the  differentiated 
products  into  an  organic  whole  with  characteristic 
unity.  There  is  nothing  quite  like  this  in  the  in- 
organic world.  And  hence  there  is  no  stick  individu- 
ality outside  the  sphere  of  the  organic  and  the 
conscious.  Let  us,  however,  again  fix  our  attention 
on  the  essential  feature  of  individuality.  It  is  what 
distinguishes  this  from  that.  It  is  the  balance  of 
unHkeness  which  distinguishes  this  individual 
assemblage  of  processes  and  products,  from  that 
other  assemblage  otherwise  so  closely  alike.  It  is 
a  kink  in  the  recorded-curve  which  prevents  it  from 
quite  accurately  fitting  the  generalized  statistical 
curve.  But  though  the  balance  of  unlikeness  is  the 
distinguishing  mark  of  individuality  it  is  not  that 
which  constit2ites  the  individual.  The  individual  is 
the  developing  microcosm  in  its  entirety.  It  is  a 
differentiated  centre  within  the  macrocosm.  It  par- 
takes of  the  universality  which  characterizes  the  con- 
stitution of  nature  within  which  it  is  differentiated. 

Now  does  hereditary  transmission  "  provide  "  only 
for  that  full  measure  of  repetition  which  the  study  of 
organic  and  conscious  life-histories  discloses  ;  or  does 
it  also  "  provide  "  in  some  way  for  that  far  smaller 
measure  of  variation  which  gives  to  the  individual  its 
distinguishing  characters  ? 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     175 

We  must  remember  that  the  organism  which 
expresses,  or  is  the  expression  of,  the  life-history  is 
only  relatively  isolated.  It  is  in  relation  to  the 
environment.  By  environing  conditions  it  is  more  or 
less  modified  in  running  its  course.  Some  biologists 
believe  that  the  modifications  impressed  on  the  bodily 
tissues  of  the  parent  beget  correlated  variations  in 
the  offspring.  But  since  it  is  at  present,  to  say  the 
least  of  it,  doubtful  whether  such  modifications,  due 
to  environing  conditions  aft"ecting  the  bodily  tissues, 
are  inherited,  we  may  provisionally  assume  that 
variations  do  not  arise  in  this  way.  Or,  if  it  be  so 
preferred,  we  will  assume  that  the  environment  is  so 
far  constant  that  these  conditions  of  modification 
may  be  eliminated  from  our  present  consideration. 
But  if  under  these  circumstances  variation  does  still 
occur,  would  a  complete  knowledge  of  life-histories  up 
to  date  enable  us  to  predict  its  nature  ?  Is  it  strictly 
correlated  with  some  parental  or  germinal  conditions 
of  its  occurrence  ?  I  take  it  that  the  orthodox 
biological  reply  to  these  questions  would  be  in  the 
affirmative.  But  some  biologists  would  differentiate 
between  the  two  questions.  To  the  latter  they 
would  reply  in  the  affirmative  ;  they  would  say  that 
unquestionably  there  is  hereditary  correlation.  But 
they  might  hesitate  to  affirm  with  equal  confidence 
that  even  complete  knowledge  up  to  date  would 
afford  the  basis  of  prediction — of  foretelling  the  exact 
nature  of  a  variation  which  ex  hypothesi  occurs  for  the 
first  time  and  is  therefore  really  new.  If  it  be  an 
algebraical  sum  of  parental  or  ancestral  characters 
here  juxtaposed  or  mixed  in  a  new  pattern,  it  would 
be  predictable  on  the  basis  of  routine,  since  it  would 


176         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

be  only  a  new  combination  of  old  routines.  But  if 
the  constitution  of  the  organism  should  have  reached 
a  critical  stage,  analogous  to  that  in  which  new 
crystals  or  new  chemical  compounds  are  formed — a 
critical  stage  at  which  new  variations  crystallize  out, 
or  organize  out,  if  the  expression  be  allowed  ;  then 
they  would  not  be  foreseeable,  since  previous  routine 
would  afford  no  clue  to  their  nature.  I  do  not 
contend  that  this  is  the  case.  I  question  whether 
there  are  biological  data  for  deciding  the  question. 
All  that  I  urge  is  that  if  such  unforeseeable  variations 
occur  in  the  natural  history  of  organisms,  or  in  the 
natural  history  of  experience,  then  the  business  of 
science  is  to  seek  the  correlated  conditions  of  their 
appearance,  and  to  accept  them  as  grounded  in  the 
constitution  of  nature,  remembering  that  the  world 
in  which  we  live  is  still  in  the  making,  and  may 
have  much  in  store  which  even  the  most  complete 
knowledge  up  to  date  would  not  enable  us  to 
predict. 

Now  as  we  have  already  seen,  new  and  unpredict- 
able events  in  the  history  of  experience,  and  new  and 
unpredictable  variations  in  the  course  of  evolution, 
are  what  M.  Bergson  terms  "  creative  "  and  charac- 
terizes as  "  free."  But  for  him  they  are  not  grounded 
in  the  constitution  of  the  organism,  as  part  of  the 
constitution  of  nature  one  and  indivisible,  they  are 
grounded  in  the  constitution  of  life  which  is  the 
Source  of  the  creative  and  the  free.  "  The  spontan- 
eity of  life,"  he  tells  us,  "  is  manifested  in  a  continual 
creation  of  new  forms  succeeding  others  "  ("  Great. 
Ev."  p.  91).  "  Heredity,"  he  says,  "  not  only  transmits 
characters,  it  transmits  also  the  impetus  in  virtue  of 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     177 

which  the  characters  are  modified  and  this  impetus  is 
vitality  itself"  (p.  144).  **  It  is  the  current  of  life, 
traversing  the  bodies  it  has  organized  one  after 
another  "  (p.  27).  And  this  life  is  identified  with  will 
"  which  is  employed  in  some  cases  in  setting  up  the 
mechanism  itself,  and  in  others  in  choosing  the 
mechanisms  to  be  released.  The  will  of  an  animal," 
we  are  told,  "  is  the  more  effective  and  the  more 
intense,  the  greater  the  number  of  mechanisms  it 
can  choose  from,  the  more  complicated  the  switch- 
board on  which  all  the  motor  paths  cross,  or  in  other 
words  the  more  complicated  its  brain  (p.  265).  No 
doubt  in  some  of  these  and  other  such  passages,  it 
is  a  little  difficult  to  be  quite  sure  when  M.  Bergson  is 
referring  to  natural  process  as  distinguished  from  its 
products,  and  when  he  is  referring  to  an  extra-mundane 
Source  which  acts  into  (rather  than  in)  the  organism. 
In  a  sense  we  may  say  that  heredity  "  transmits  " 
the  process  of  organizing  ;  that  I  suppose  is  what  we 
mean  when  we  say  that  characters,  as  the  products  of 
organization,  are  "  transmitted."  It  would,  however, 
conduce  to  scientific  precision  if  the  word  "  transmis- 
sion "  could  be  superseded  and  heredity  were  treated 
in  terms  of  correlation.  On  these  terms  M.  Bergson's 
extra-mundane  Life  or  Will  would  be  the  Source  of 
existing  correlations  in  the  routine  it  has  established, 
and  the  Source  of  new  correlations  in  its  creative 
capacity.  When  M.  Bergson  draws  a  distinction 
between  "  the  evolved  which  is  a  result "  and 
"  evolution  itself  which  is  the  act  by  which  the  result 
is  obtained"  (p.  53),  does  he  mean  by  "act"  a 
continuous  natural  process  of  which  the  organisms 
we  can  study  are  the  products,  or  does  he  mean  the 

N 


178  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

manifestation  of  extra-mundane  Will  ?     I  think  he 
means  the  latter. 

It  must,  of  course,  be  remembered  that  M. 
Bergson's  aim  is  to  combine  science  and  metaphysics 
in  one  comprehensive  synthesis.  He  is,  therefore, 
perfectly  justified  in  introducing  the  concept  of  the 
Source  of  organic  phenomena  into  his  universe  of 
discourse.  Whether  he  does  so  to  the  benefit  or  to 
the  detriment  of  biological  science  must  remain  a 
matter  of  opinion.  My  own  opinion  is  that  any 
introduction  of  the  metaphysics  of  Source  into 
scientific  discussion  is  always  detrimental  to  science. 
It  always  raises  false  issues.  The  current  discussion 
of  vitalism  and  animism  is  riddled  through  and 
through  with  such  false  issues — false,  that  is,  within 
the  field  of  science.  Not  content  with  accepting 
processes  and  products  and  their  relationships, 
vitalists  and  animists  persistently  ask  questions  as  to 
their  source  and  origin,  and  straightway  Entelechy, 
Life,  Psychic  Entity,  descend  from  the  blue  of 
metaphysics  to  trouble  the  waters  of  science.  The 
scientific  task  of  correlating  phenomena,  especially 
the  complex  phenomena  of  living  organisms,  is 
difiicult  enough  and  is  still  in  its  early  and  tentative 
stages.  There  are  a  great  number  of  correlation- 
questions  (in  the  broader  sense  of  the  term,  and 
not  in  the  restricted  Darwinian  sense) — questions  with 
regard  to  evolutionary  and  developmental  conditions 
— which  are  easily  asked,  but  which  at  present  cannot 
be  satisfactorily  answered.  To  say  that  organic  pheno- 
menon are  due  to  Life  which,  to  paraphrase  Green's 
words,  contains  within  itself  potentially  or  implicitly, 
all   that   it   manifests   actually   or    explicitly,  is   no 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    179 

solution,  not  even  the  hint  of  a  solution,  of  the 
scientific  problem.  M.  Bergson  in  his  criticism  of 
Darwin  and  of  later  biologists  asks  a  number  of 
questions  which  have  often  been  put  before.  If  the 
variations  which  resulted  in  the  vertebrate  eye,  he 
asks,  were  infinitesimal  and  insensible,  how  could 
natural  selection  preserve  or  accumulate  them  ?  A 
sensible  value  is  essential  to  make  the  difference 
between  elimination  or  survival.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  were  appreciable  in  amount,  and  sudden 
or  discontinuous  in  occurrence,  how  could  so  many 
complementary  and  independent  variational  jumps 
conspire  to  give  the  perfection  of  the  organ  ?  Unless 
all  jumped  together  in  working  harmony  each  several 
jump  would  be  harmful  rather  than  helpful.  And 
how  comes  it  that  the  pallial  eye  of  the  pecten,  a 
mollusk,  has  a  structure  in  some  general  features 
resembling  the  eye  of  man,  a  vertebrate?  How 
comes  it,  for  example,  that  in  both  there  is  a  peculiar 
inversion  of  the  retinal  elements,  so  that  their  recep- 
tive ends  are  directed  away  from  and  not  towards 
the  object  of  vision  ?  There  is  no  attempt  to  corre- 
late this  arrangement  with  the  presence  of  a  pig- 
mented layer;  no  consideration  of  whether  the  presence 
of  such  a  pigment  layer  is  advantageous  or  not ; 
or  of  whether,  if  advantageous,  it  would  be  of  any 
use  in  front  of  the  retina  instead  of  behind  it ;  or  of 
whether,  if  advantageous  behind  the  retina,  inversion 
of  the  direction  of  the  receptor  cells  is  not  a  struc- 
tural necessity.  Such  questions,  or  their  like,  suggest 
lines  of  investigation.  That  is  not  M.  Bergson's  aim. 
His  questions  are  put  as  posers  to  science.  And 
because  science  can  only  feel  its  way  towards  definite 


180         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

answers  to  difficult  questions — difficult  to  answer  but 
easy  enough  to  ask — we  are  straightway  bidden  to 
believe  that  all  is  due  to  Life  ;  we  are  invited  to  credit 
the  potentialities  of  Life  with  all  the  actualities  we  find 
in  the  organism.  As  if  that  helped  us  in  the  smallest 
degree  towards  an  explanation  of  the  facts  !  With 
all  due  respect  for  M.  Bergson's  poetic  genius — for 
his  doctrine  of  Life  is  more  akin  to  poetry  than  to 
science — his  facile  criticisms  of  Darwin's  magnificent 
and  truly  scientific  generalizations  only  serve  to  show 
to  how  large  a  degree  the  intermingling  of  problems 
involving  the  metaphysics  of  Source  with  those  of 
scientific  interpretation,  may  darken  counsel  and 
serve  seriously  to  hinder  the  progress  of  biology. 
*'  The  Origin  of  Species  "  formulated  a  policy  which 
has  guided  the  scientific  work  of  three  generations  of 
biologists.  I  search  in  vain  in  the  pages  of 
"  Creative  Evolution  "  for  a  hint  of  a  working  policy ; 
or  if  a  policy  is  suggested,  it  is  that  of  explaining 
biological  phenomena  by  going  outside  or  behind  the 
biological  field.  M.  Bergson  would  have  us  rise  from 
mere  science  to  the  metaphysics  of  Source. 

Now,  rightly  or  wrongly,  we  have  elected  to 
exclude  the  problem  of  Source  from  our  universe  of 
discourse.  Even  for  us,  however,  M.  Bergson's 
insistence  on  the  cardinal  importance  of  process^  is 
none  the  less  timely  and  helpful.  "  There  is,"  he 
well  says,  "  more  in  the  transition  than  the  series  of 
states — more  in  the  movement  than  the  series  of 
positions"  (p.  331).  If,  as  he  believes,  men  of  science 
and  intellectualist  philosophers,  are  apt  to  lose  sight 
of  the  thread  of  process  in  contemplating  the  concept- 
beads  they  string  upon  it,  M.  Bergson  does  well  in 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     181 

drawing  attention  to  what  they  have,  perhaps  too 
readily,  taken  for  granted  and  failed  to  render  explicit. 
But  when  he  urges  that  all  process  is,  or  is  of  the 
nature  of,  vital  process ;  when  he  arbitrarily  sunders 
process,  as  belonging  to  a  separate  order  of  the  vital 
and  the  conscious,  from  the  static  products  of  the 
order  of  the  inert ;  and  when  he  presents  his  thesis  in 
a  style  so  full  of  charm  and  with  a  wealth  of  illustra- 
tion and  of  metaphor  so  rich  and  varied  ;  the  need 
of  protest,  on  the  part  of  those  who  have  been 
led  to  very  different  conclusions,  is  imperative.  The 
difficulty  is  that  there  is  so  much  in  his  suggestive 
thought  that  can  be  gladly  accepted  by  the  most 
resolute  opponents  of  his  central  doctrine.  There  is 
a  sound  core  of  truth  in  his  criticism  of  thorough- 
going intellectualism,  based  wholly  upon  what  he 
calls  its  cinematographical  method  ;  there  is  a  sound 
core  of  truth  in  his  contention  that  the  one  and  only 
process  of  which  we  have  direct  intuitive  awareness  is 
that  which,  as  living  and  conscious  beings,  we  are. 
But  he  works  these  up  into  an  argument  of  doubtful 
validity  and  cogency.  The  steps  of  the  argument,  if 
I  have  rightly  grasped  its  purport,  are  these: — (i) 
The  method  of  the  intellect  is  to  make  a  series  of 
snap-shots  by  means  of  the  instantaneous  photography 
of  thought ;  (2)  Such  a  series,  so  made,  must  for  ever 
remain  a  series  of  separate  thought-pictures,  each  one 
of  which  is  inert  and  static ;  (3)  Hence  process  itself 
refuses  to  be  photographed,  and  therefore  cannot  be 
intellectually  conceived  since  the  concept  is  an 
intellectual  snap-shot ;  (4)  But  the  word  process  has 
a  meaning  and  refers  to  something  that  really  exists  ; 
(5)  This  reference  is  always,  in  its  first  intent,  to  the 


182  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

life  and  consciousness  which  we  feel  coursing  within 
us — that  is  to  the  vital  order  of  which  we  are  part ; 
(6)  Thus  only  by  intuition  (as  he  terms  it)  and 
never  by  conceptual  thought,  with  its  inevitably 
static  products,  are  we  aware  of  process  itself;  (7)  If 
then  there  be  process,  other  than  that  of  which  we  are 
immediately  aware  as  we  live  it,  we  must  somehow 
put  ourselves  in  its  place  by  an  act  of  "  sympathy  "  ; 

(8)  But  since  we  are  ourselves  vital  and  conscious 
agents  we  can  only  sympathize  with  other  like  agents  ; 

(9)  Hence  all  process  is  of  the  vital  and  conscious 
order,  and  even  the  order  of  the  inert  is  only  a  static 
product  precipitated  from  the  dynamic  stream  of  life. 
So  runs  the  argument.  If  I  have  here  misrepresented 
M.  Bergson's  thesis,  I  must  plead  in  excuse  the 
difficulty  of  the  subject,  the  subtlety  of  his  treatment, 
and  the  need  for  brevity. 

For  M.  Bergson,  with  his  basal  assumption  of  two 
orders  of  being,  to  one  of  which,  from  the  outset  and 
throughout,  is  assigned  all  process,  all  duration,  all 
time — for  time  is  very  stuff  of  which  life  is  made  (p.  4) 
— while  to  the  other  is  left  only  static  and  spatial 
juxtaposition  in  a  world  that  is  dead  and  inert,  there 
is  no  other  course  than  that  which  he  follows.  He 
assumes  in  his  premises  all  that  emerges  in  his 
conclusion.  No  doubt  that  is  what  we  all  do  more 
or  less !  He,  at  any  rate,  is  bound  by  his  basal 
assumption  to  interpret  all  process,  whenever  and 
wherever  it  occurs,  in  terms  of  conscious  Agency, 
and  to  regard  all  order,  all  form,  all  movement  in  the 
world  as  due  to  this  Source.  He  claims  to  be  directly 
aware  of  Will  as  a  Source  of  activity  within  him  ;  and 
since  this  is  the  only  form  of  Source  of  which  we  have, 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     185 

or  can  have,  immediate  intuition,  all  modes  of  activity 
must  for  him  be  due  to  Will.  The  strict  antithesis  of 
his  interpretation  is  that  of  those  who  explain  all 
process  in  terms  of  physical  Forces.  For  them  Force 
is  the  Agency  by  which  all  process  is  called  into  being  ; 
and  conscious  will  itself  is  only  the  phosphorescent 
glow  which  accompanies  certain  physiological  processes 
due  to  a  subtle  interplay  of  physical  Forces.  For 
M.  Bergson  process  is  reality  and  the  Reality  which 
underlies  process  is  the  Agency  of  Will.  For 
philosophical  materialists,  or  energists,  process  is 
reality  and  the  Reality  that  underlies  process  is  the 
Agency  of  Force  or  perhaps  hypostatized  Energy.^ 
For  M.  Bergson  there  are  two  orders,  one  of  which,  that 
of  the  vital  and  conscious,  is  the  home  of  Reality,  the 
other,  that  of  the  inert,  being  merely  its  sloughed  off 
skin.  For  the  materialists  there  are  two  orders,  one  of 
which,  that  of  Energy,  as  the  expression  of  Force, 
being  the  home  of  Reality,  while  the  other  is  only  its 
epiphenomenal  phosphorescence.  Both  schools  are 
in  search  of  Reality  as  the  Source  of  the  phenomen- 
ally real.  Both  are,  in  our  view,  schools  of  the 
metaphysics  of  Source  ;  neither  of  them  is  content 
to  be  a  school  of  science.  Here  we  eschew  all  capital 
letters,  and  accept  the  real  as  given.  We  make  no 
attempt  to  seek  Reality  as  its  Source — whether  that 
Reality  be  Life,  or  Force,  or  God. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  define  reality.  I  take  the 
process  and  products  of  experience  as  a  sample  of 
reality.     If   anything   in  this   universe   is  real,   the 

'  On  the  tendency  to  hypostatize  Energy  see  T.  Percy  Nunn, 
"  Animism  and  the  Doctrine  of  Energy,"  in  "  Proc.  Aristotelian  Soc." 
1911-12. 


184  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

conscious  relationships  within  a  changing  context  of 
reality,  are  real ;  and  in  following  up  the  contention 
of  this  chapter  that  the  scientific  treatment  of 
experience  is  a  branch  of  natural  history,  I  propose 
to  deal  in  some  further  detail  with  these  relation- 
ships. 

But  what  are  we  to  understand  by  the  conscious 
relationship?  If  it  be  a  relationship,  then,  it  will  be 
said,  it  involves  at  least  two  related  terms.  Of  course 
in  a  complex  context  there  may  be  an  indefinite 
number  of  terms  in  subtly  varying  relations.  But  the 
analytic  tendency  of  our  thought  leads  us  to  try  to 
deal  with  only  two  at  a  time;  and  so  the  natural 
question  seems  to  be  what  are  the  two  terms.  The 
traditional  answer  to  this  question,  where  the 
experimental  relationship  is  concerned,  is  that  these 
two  terms  are  object  and  subject.  In  perception,  for 
example,  there  is  the  relation  between  the  object 
perceived  and  the  subject  perceiving,  and  this  may  be 
followed  by  new  relationships  to  the  object  through 
the  activity  of  the  subject  which  is  expressed  in 
behaviour.  The  subject  is  thus  commonly  regarded 
as  an  Agent,  as  a  Source  of  behaviour.  Those  who 
are  resolute  in  excluding  all  forms  of  Agency  from 
any  place  in  scientific  interpretation,  cannot  accept 
this  view  of  Subject  as  Agent.  They  just  accept  the 
reality  of  process  and  products.  The  natural  order, 
as  a  going  concern,  is  a  vast  system  of  interrelated 
processes  ;  and  the  relationships  for  scientific  treat- 
ment are  the  contextual  conditions  under  which  this 
or  that  change  in  the  moving  order  of  nature  occurs. 
Now  few,  if  any,  are  likely  to  deny  that  the  conscious 
relationship  is  present  in  intelligent  behaviour ;  but 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     185 

some  do  deny  that  this  specific  relationship  makes 
any  difference  in  the  behaviour  as  such.  Surely  this 
is  httle  short  of  preposterous.  Surely  it  is  tantamount 
to  a  denial  that  the  conscious  relationship  has  any 
reality  in  correlation  with  the  context  of  the  so-called 
objective  world  as  real.  In  any  case  I  must  proceed 
on  the  assumption  (if  such  it  be)  that  the  evidence  at 
our  command  unequivocally  shows  that  the  ex- 
periential relationship  does  really  count.  But  all 
that  this  implies  is  that  given  the  presence  of  this 
relationship  the  observed  facts  of  process  are  so  and 
so :  in  the  absence  of  this  relationship  the  facts  are 
otherwise  :  the  course  of  process  is  different.  There 
is  no  concept  of  Agency  here ;  merely  a  description 
of  the  relationships  under  which  process  runs  this 
course  or  that  course. 

What,  then,  are  the  terms  of  a  relationship  ?  In 
general  it  may  be  said  that  any  process  which  is  in 
some  degree  independent  may  be  in  relation  to  any 
other  process  or  its  products.  And  what  processes 
are  selected  as  terms  (or  termini)  is  entirely  a  matter 
of  fruitfulness  for  the  immediate  purpose  in  hand, 
within  the  sphere  of  interpretation  of  multiform 
correlations.  For  it  is  only  by  a  useful  but  arbitrary 
act  of  abstraction  that  we  isolate  some  part  or  phase 
of  the  total  relational  process  and  regard  it  as  a  term. 
We  may  thus  isolate  the  organism  and  consider  its 
relationships  to  the  environment ;  or  we  may  isolate 
the  process  of  experience  and  consider  its  relationship 
to  other  life  processes  within  the  organism  ;  or  we 
may  isolate  some  phase  of  the  process  of  experiencing 
and  consider  its  relationship  to  foregoing  or  following 
phases ;   or  we  may  isolate  some  process-factor  in 


186         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

that  phase  and  consider  its  relationship  to  other 
co-existent  factors  ;  and  so  on.  The  essential  point, 
so  far,  to  bear  in  mind  is  that  the  natural  order  as  a 
whole  is  a  contextual  network  of  interrelated  processes 
and  their  products.  The  natural  history  of  experience 
is  the  story  of  an  arbitrarily  isolated  stream,  and,  for 
scientific  interpretation  it  lies  wholly  within  the  field 
of  intra-mundane  reality.  When  once  we  leave  this 
field  ;  when  once  we  inquire  what  is  the  relationship 
between  organic  or  experiential  processes  and  Life 
as  the  Agency  which  calls  them  into  being  ;  when 
once  we  inquire  what  is  the  relationship  between 
conscious  processes  and  the  Subject  which  guides 
and  directs  them  ;  when  once  we  inquire  what  is  the 
relationship  of  the  natural  order  to  the  Source  of  all 
things  ;  we  are  outside  those  limits  of  scientific 
inquiry  which  I  for  one  accept.  Why  should  we  not 
endeavour  to  interpret  the  natural  history  of  experience 
on  the  basis  of  intra-mundane  relationships,  somehow 
existent,  without  entering  into  such  further  inquiries, 
quite  legitimate  in  their  proper  place,  but  none  the 
less  inquiries  which  lie  beyond  the  confines  of  Science  ? 
We  have  said  that  it  is  in  some  respects  convenient 
to  regard  the  conscious  processes  of  the  organism  as 
a  relational  term ;  they  can  then  be  correlated  with 
the  cortical  or  other  physiological  processes,  and  with 
processes  in  the  environment.  But  in  some  respects 
it  is  often  more  convenient  to  regard  the  stimulating 
process  and  the  responding  process  as  the  terms,  and 
consciousness  as  the  relationship  itself  between  these 
two.  When  a  boy,  riding  his  bicycle,  tends  to  fall 
over  towards  the  left,  he  turns  the  handle-bar  and 
wheel  to  the  left,  and,  without  knowing  anything 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    187 

about  the  mechanical  explanation,  utilizes  the 
principle  of  inertia,  as  we  phrase  it,  to  recover  his 
balance.  His  experience  lives  in  the  relationship 
between  the  stimulating  cue  of  just  a  little  leaning 
over  to  one  side,  and  the  appropriate  behaviour- 
response.  In  solving  a  problem  the  intellectual 
relationship  is  between  the  problem  and  its  solution. 
In  all  temporal  relationships  within  the  conscious 
process  itself  the  relation  is  between  the  antecedent 
and  consequent  phases  within  the  process.  Just  as 
in  the  bodily  life  we  live  along  the  threads  of  organic 
relationships,  so  too  we  live  the  mental  life  along  the 
threads  of  the  conscious  relationships.  From  this 
point  of  view  streams  of  process  pass  through  the 
organism,  and  some  of  these  in  their  passage  are 
experience.  Consciousness  as  a  relational  link  points 
this  way  and  that  way  to  the  processes,  or  phases  of 
the  same  process,  in  which  it  provisionally  terminates  ; 
or  rather  to  processes  or  phases  of  process  through 
which  it  passes  on  to  lose  itself  in  the  vast  whole  of 
the  natural  order. 

Of  course  any  such  view  as  this  involves  the  whole- 
hearted acceptance  of  relationships  as  constitutive 
of  the  natural  order  throughout,  and  not  only  con- 
stitutive categories  of  the  mind  as  knowing  and  thus 
impressing  on  the  mere  matter  of  sensations  {sensa) 
the  form  which  makes  the  world  orderly  for  human 
experience.  The  so-called  a  priori  forms  of  relation- 
ship are,  for  us,  not  only  constitutive  of  experience 
within  the  sphere  of  mind  ;  their  peculiar  primacy  lies 
in  the  fact  that  they  are  common  to  the  process  of 
experiencing  and  to  the  world  as  experienced.  To 
use  the  convenient  phraseology  suggested  by  Professor 


188         INSTINCT  AND  EXrERIENCE 

Alexander,  they  are  common  to  the  context  as  enjoyed 
and  the  context  as  contemplated.  This  enjoyment  of 
context,  this  awareness  of  meaning,  is  through-and- 
through  relational,  just  as  the  world-context  and 
world-meaning  which  we  interpret  is  through-and- 
through  relational.  Indeed  it  may  perhaps  be  said 
without  extravagance,  and  without  much,  if  any, 
disregard  of  the  traditional  use  of  philosophical  terms, 
that  the  basal  a  prioj'i  category  is  meaning. 

For  us  then  all  streams  of  process  and  all  their 
relationships,  general  and  particular,  are  constitutive 
parts  of  the  one  natural  order  wherein  arises  every  bit 
of  new  becoming,  every  phase  of  evolutionary  develop- 
ment  which   is   interpretable   in   terms  of  scientific 
explanation.     But  we  may  in  thought  make  cross- 
sections  through  the  flow  of  events,  and  then  we  find 
relatively  isolated  streams  of  process,  interrelated  no 
doubt   with  other  such  streams,  but  yet  possessing 
some  independence ;  or  we  may  make  longitudinal 
sections,  and  then  we  find  much  less  of  isolation — 
much  more  of  continuity.     It  is  this  last  fact, — a  fact 
which  is  at  the  very  foundation  of  evolutionary  treat- 
ment,— which    leads    M.    Bergson   to    insist   on   the 
importance   of    duration.      In    such    a    longitudinal 
section,  along  the  flow  of  process,  any  stage  or  state 
ideally  cut  out  from  the  pulsing  continuity  of  events, 
is  the  embodiment  of  results  of  selective  synthesis 
all  along  the  line  from  an  indefinitely  remote  past  right 
up  to  the  moment  of  its  existence.     This  is  true  of 
all  process  as  continuous.     But  nowhere  are  we  led 
to  grasp  this  fact  so  clearly  as  in  the  processes  of  life 
and  in  the  processes  of  consciousness  that  are  the 
highest  developments  of  life. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    189 

Now  if  we  consider  one  of  the  higher  animals  at 
any  given  moment  of  its  life-history  we  find  a  double 
set  of  relationships  in  accordance  with  our  conception 
of  the  transverse  and  of  the  longitudinal  sections 
across  or  along  the  streams  of  world-process.  The 
first  comprises  the  immediate  relations  to  the  environ- 
ment, including  what,  from  the  psychological  point 
of  view,  is  the  presentation  of  some  situation.  It  is 
clear  that  what  I  here  speak  of  as  the  transverse 
section  is  that  which  is  primarily  concerned  with  the 
relationships  involved  in  the  perception  of  the 
external  world.  The  second  or  longitudinal  section 
comprises  all  relations  of  antecedence  and  sequence  ; 
comprises  the  hereditary  relationships ;  and  com- 
prises the  phenomena  of  expectation  and  memory  in 
their  reference  to  future  or  past.  The  distinction  it 
must  be  remembered  is  purely  analytic.  In  actual 
life  both  are  combined  in  one  web.  The  analysis 
pretty  nearly  comes  to  this  that,  apart  from  other 
relationships,  the  one  gives  space-relations,^  the 
other  time-relations.  But  we  must  be  careful  to 
avoid  the  error  of  restricting  time  to  the  process  of 


*  Of  course  time-relationships  are  also  involved  when  we  seek  to 
interpret  the  transverse  section.  What  is  present  in  the  ideal  "  now  " 
of  the  moment  of  perception  has  to  be  correlated  with  events  in  the 
perhaps  distant  context  of  the  environment ;  and  these  events  actually 
occurred  within  that  context  before  the  now  of  perception.  If  the  sight 
of  Sirius  is  under  consideration  the  natural  event  of  perceiving  the  star 
has  to  be  correlated  with  the  natural  event  of  the  shining  of  Sirius 
eight  years  ago.  The  hearing  of  distant  thunder  has  to  be  correlated 
with  an  electric  discharge,  say,  ten  seconds  ago,  and  so  on.  Time- 
relationships  of  natural  events  can  never  be  really  eliminated  though 
we  may  disregard  them  in  an  abstract  discussion  of  the  transverse 
section  which  gives  us  the  perception  of  the  external  world. 


190         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

experiencing,  and  restricting  space  to  the  realm  of 
the  experienced. 

Some  years  ago  William  James  propounded  the 
question  : — Does  consciousness  exist  ?  In  reply  he 
denied  the  existence  of  Consciousness  as  an  independ- 
ent Entity,  while  he  fully  recognized  the  existence  of 
conscious  relationships  within  an  empirical  nexus. 
I  should  prefer  to  say  that  from  the  point  of  view  of 
science  we  should  neither  assert  nor  deny  Conscious- 
ness as  a  Source.  We  should  leave  the  question  for 
metaphysics.  But  we  should  assert  that  the  given 
conscious  relationships  (however  given)  are  the  proper 
subject-matter  for  science  which  should  not  go  beyond 
them  to  seek  their  Source.  To  the  questions  :  Does 
Time  exist }  Does  Space  exist  ?  Does  Causality 
exist  ?  Our  answers  would  be  of  like  kind.  Temporal, 
spatial,  causal  relationships  exist  throughout  the 
natural  order,  they  are  common  to  the  processes  of 
which  the  contemplated  world  is  a  visible  changing 
expression,  and  to  our  enjoyment  of  a  privileged 
process  therein  ;  that  is  what  gives  them  their  deep- 
seated  a  priori  character.  They  are  ineradicably 
real  as  constitutive  of  a  relational  context  which  has 
meaning.  But  whether  Time,  for  example,  is  a  Real 
Entity,  the  Source  of  temporal  relationships — that  is 
a  question  which  lies  wholly  outside  our  limited 
universe  of  discourse. 

Let  us  now  pass  on  to  deal  with  the  relationships 
of  the  transverse  section  ^  in  somewhat  greater  detail, 
remembering   that  our  treatment  is  purely  analytic, 

'  How  far  I  am  indebted  in  what  follows  to  M.  Bergson's  doctrine 
of  "pnre  perception,"  I  must  leave  the  reader  to  judge.  Cp,,  "Matter 
and  Memory,"  p,  26  and  passim. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     191 

for  in  actual  experience  the  transverse  and  the 
longitudinal  relationships  are  given  together  in  the 
brief  span  of  consciousness  which  we  enjoy.  And 
let  us,  since  we  are  proceeding  by  the  method  of 
abstraction,  eliminate  representative  factors  and  dis- 
regard affective  tone.  Ideally  in  such  an  instantaneous 
"  now  "  the  organism  is  in  physical  relation  to  all 
that  exists  in  the  transverse  section  of  the  total  flow 
of  process ;  practically  it  is  in  biological  relation  to 
that  part  of  the  world  which  we  call  its  environment ; 
but  psychologically  it  is  only  in  relation  to  that  part 
of  the  environment  which  is  presented  to  sense  at  the 
moment  of  experience.  Hence  an  essential  feature 
of  the  transverse  relationship,  qua  experiential,  is  that 
it  is  a  selective  and  limited  relationship,  the  selection 
and  limitation  being  dependent  on  the  sensory  and 
nervous  constitution  of  the  organism. 

This  selective  and  limited  nature  of  the  relational 
process  of  experience  has  its  analogies  throughout 
the  natural  order.  "  There  is  no  essential  difference," 
says  M.  Bergson,^  "  between  the  process  by  which  the 
acid  picks  out  from  the  salt  its  base,  and  the  act  of  the 
plant  which  invariably  extracts  from  the  most  diverse 
soils  those  elements  which  serve  to  nourish  it.  .  .  . 
In  short,  we  can  follow  from  the  mineral  to  the  plant, 
from  the  plant  to  the  simplest  conscious  beings,  from 
the  animal  to  man,  the  progress  of  the  operation  by 
which  things  seize  from  out  their  surroundings  that 
which  attracts  them." 

In  the  conscious  relationships  of  the  instantaneous 
"  now  "  there  are  thus  specialized  limited  and  selected 
relations  between  the  process  which  has  the  property 

'  "  Matter  and  Memory,"  pp.  207-8. 


192         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

of  experiencing  and  some  parallel  processes  in  the 
environment  as  experienced.  Now  the  data  thus 
afforded  involve  correlation  with  external  events 
through  sensations  of  sight,  hearing,  touch,  and  so 
forth  ;  but  there  are  other  data  which  are  correlated 
with  intra-organic  events — snap-shot  data  due  to 
general  physiological  tone  (coenaesthesis)  to  visceral 
changes  in  progress,  and  to  motor  behaviour 
(kinaesthesis).  These  last,  the  behaviour  data,  are 
of  paramount  importance  and  give  the  business 
context  of  the  data  of  sight,  hearing,  and  the  other 
special  senses,  when  we  restore  to  process  its  natural 
movement  and  change  in  time.  If  then  we  divide 
the  data  of  the  instantaneous  snap-shot  into  those  of 
extra-organic  origin  on  the  one  hand  and  those  of 
intra-organic  origin  on  the  other  hand,  these  two 
sets  of  data  form  a  synthetic  complex  of  the  ex- 
perience^ at  a  given  isolated  instant  correlative  with 
the  process  of  experienc/«^asthen  and  there  enjoyed. 
Of  course  this  is  a  very  abstract  view  of 
experience  limited  to  an  ideally  instantaneous 
snap-shot.  It  is,  however,  scarcely  possible  to  over- 
emphasize the  importance  of  realizing  the  fact  that 
even  in  such  a  snap-shot  view  a  number  of  simul- 
taneous relationships,  with  varying  emphasis,  are 
themselves  related  w'thin  a  complex.  Apart  from 
such  relationing  of  relationships  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  a  basis  for  conscious  experience.  Any 
selected  group  of  data,  such  as  those  afforded  by 
the  sight  of  an  object,  are  only  a  salient  feature  with- 
in a  context,  and  this  context  is  not  only  contemplated 
in  thought,  but  enjoyed  in  the  moment  of  experiencing. 
I  cannot  here  enter  into  the  subtle  question,  important 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     19S 

as  it  is  for  psychology,  whether  relationing  should 
be  regarded  as  an  elementary  mental  process  not 
susceptible  of  further  analysis.  In  any  case  it  is  of 
fundamental  importance.  The  doctrine  of  context 
lies  at  the  very  foundations  both  of  psychological  and 
of  physiological  interpretation. 

But  enough  of  the  instantaneous  snap-shot  dealing 
only  with  the  transverse  section.  In  life  its  process  is 
in  progress.  And  directly  we  introduce  into  our 
analytic  treatment  the  concept  of  progress,  we 
supplement  transverse  relationships  by  longitudinal 
relationships.  We  thus  get  a  continuous  sequence  of 
transverse  sections.  A^id  that  is  what  tue  get  in 
instinctive  experieyice  according  to  my  interpretation. 
What  then  is  the  nature  of  the  longitudinal  relation- 
ships in  their  incipient  genetic  form  within  instinctive 
experience  ?  It  is  that  which  is  expressed  in  the 
doctrine  of  the  acquirement  of  primary  meaning.  If, 
in  any  given  instinctive  sequence  a^  b,  c,  d,  e,f  (each 
letter  representing  a  transverse  section),  we  fix 
our  attention  on  the  phase  d  it  is  partly  conditioned 
by  the  precedent  phase  r,  as  that  is  by  b  and  so  on, 
and  it  partly  conditions  the  sequent  phase  e.  Such 
serial  conditioning  is  dependent  on  primary  reten- 
tion, which  should  be  distinguished  from  memory 
as  retrospection  and  from  pre-perception.  These  are 
later  developments  of  the  longitudinal  relationships. 
In  our  moorhen's  dive  the  experiential  process  at 
any  moment  is  not  only  conditioned  by  the  data 
of  the  transverse  section  ;  it  is  conditioned  also 
by  the  precedent  phases  of  process.  The  process  of 
experiencing,  as  it  flows,  constantly  changes  in  puls- 
ing  continuity.     I    speak    here,   be   it   remembered, 


194         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

of  the  instinctive  experience  as  such,  in  abstraction 
from  any  secondary  meaning  which  may  also  be 
present. 

The  essential  feature  of  this  secondary  meaning 
is  that  some  later  phase  of  an  original  instinctive 
sequence  may  be  partially  re-presented  before  it  is 
again  presented — or  rather  would  have  been  again 
presented  in  the  unmodified  instinctive  sequence. 
The  conditions  of  the  phase  d  are  therefore  different 
from  what  they  were  on  the  first  occasion — different 
by  the  addition  of  factors  of  revival  as  they  may 
be  termed.  And  since  the  whole  sequence,  all  along 
the  line,  is  thus  differently  conditioned,  the  experi- 
ential process — correlated  with  the  organic  processes 
of  behaviour — is  different.  There  is  intelligent 
modification  of  behaviour  since  new  relationships 
have  been  introduced. 

Note  here  the  intimate  relation  betv/een  meaning 
and  context.  Broadly  speaking,  if  we  may  combine 
in  one  synthesis  biological  and  psychological  inter- 
pretation, context  is  meaning.  Assuredly  in  the 
absence  of  context  there  is  no  meaning.  And  it  is 
scarcely  a  straining  of  the  use  of  terms  to  say  that, 
in  the  earlier  and  lower  phases  of  organic  life,  any 
stimulus  has  meaning  within  the  context  of  the 
responses  it  evokes.  The  salient  feature  of  psycho- 
logical meaning  is  that  re-presentative  factors  are 
present  and  are  influential  within  the  context  as  a 
whole.  In  our  higher  mental  life  the  context- 
meaning  has  been  partly  automatized  and  partly 
generalized  into  that  awareness  of  conscious  atti- 
tude which  is  so  difficult  to  describe  and  to  analyse 
— a  conscious   enjoyment   correlated  with   the  total 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     195 

functional    activity    of   a    complex    constellation    of 
cortical  centres. 

Let  us  now  consider  a  little  more  closely  the 
longitudinal  relationships  when  secondary  meaning 
is  being  developed.  They  arise  within  the  brief 
span  of  the  living  or  specious  present.  Beyond 
this  brief  span  they  cannot  immediately  reach. 
Their  forward  direction  within  this  span  gives  the 
peculiar  quality  of  pre-perception  of  what  is  just 
coming ;  and  their  backward  direction  gives  the 
peculiar  quality  of  what  is  just  going,  fading  away 
at  the  rearward  edge  of  the  span.  These  two  arise 
together.  But  pre-perception  has  the  dominant 
utility  in  the  primitive  life  of  experience.  What 
practically  concerns  the  animal  is  what  is  just 
coming,  that  which  at  the  outset  of  development 
is  closely  followed  by  the  experience  of  the  ap- 
propriate behaviour  organically  conditioned,  and 
not  yet  conditioned  by  the  expectant  conscious 
relationship  ;  but  that  which  (when  intelligence 
supervenes),  as  coming,  can  be  met  or  avoided. 
Expectancy  has  a  practical  bearing  different  from 
the  theoretical  bearing  of  retrospective  memory. 

It  is,  I  think,  clear  that  all  direct  and  primary 
experience  of  the  order  of  expectation  and  memory 
must  be  sought  within  the  brief  span  of  process 
wherein  these  longitudinal  relationships  actually 
live.  But  it  is  equally  clear  that  our  memory  and 
anticipation  deal  with  a  past  stretching  back  far 
beyond  the  brief  span  of  direct  and  primary 
experience,  and  with  a  future  foreseen  ahead  of  the 
living  present.  These  deal  with  the  duration  of 
process  as  an  ideal  construction.     Imagination   and 


196         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

conception  have  played  their  part  in  making  a  map 
of  space  and  of  time.  M.  Bergson  is  substantially 
right  in  his  contention  that,  in  ideal  construction, 
we  translate  temporal  sequence  into  spatial  terms. 
Just  as  we  imagine  and  conceive  process-filled 
space — the  natural  order  as  spatial — stretching  far 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  immediate  conscious  rela- 
tionship of  the  transverse  section,  so  do  we  imagine 
and  conceive  process-filled  time — the  natural  order 
as  temporal — stretching  behind  the  present  span 
of  consciousness  as  the  accomplished  past,  and 
projected  forward  (so  far  as  a  basis  of  routine 
permits)  as  the  expected  future ;  and  combining 
these  two  in  one  ideal  construction,  we  are  able  to 
picture  and  think  the  natural  order  as  existent  and 
changing  in  space  and  time.  Any  placing  of  an 
event  at  any  exact  moment  in  the  flow  of  process 
is  a  refere7ice  to  sncli  a  context  of  ideal  cotistrnction. 

If,  then,  we  live  in  the  brief  span  of  process 
which  is  the  conscious  present,  it  is  within  this  living 
present  that  the  process  of  remember/«^  occurs ; 
only  the  remember^^  events  are  referred  to  the 
ideal  construction  of  the  past.  And  they  get  their 
peculiar  quality,  that  which  differentiates  them 
from  the  presentations  of  the  snap-shot  "  now,"  partly 
from  the  fact  that  they  are  thus  revived,  or  relived, 
partly  from  the  sense  of  greater  or  less  familiarity 
they  import  into  the  context,  partly  from  the  fact 
that  they  link  up  with  the  just-nows  of  the  hinder 
margin  of  the  span  of  consciousness — the  past  being 
the  conceptual  prolongation  of  its  rearward  fringe. 
For  M.  Bergson  "  pure  memory  "  ^  is  something 
'  See  "  Matter  and  Memory,"  p.  195,  and  mb  verba  in  index. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    197 

very  different  from  anything  I  have   attempted   to 
interpret   in    the    foregoing    paragraphs.     For    him 
Life  and  Consciousness   have  their  true  home  in  a 
different  plane  (one  is  forced  to  use  spatial  terms  !  ) 
from  that  of  mundane  behaviour.     Where  these  two 
planes  intersect  we  have  his  "  pure  perception,"  since 
here  the  one  order  comes  into  relation  with  the  other- 
But  "  pure  memory  "  dwells  in  the  vital  plane   and 
preserves  an   extra-mundane   existence,    save   in    so 
far  as,  at  the  intersection  of  the  planes,  it  is  presently 
inserted  within  the  intra-mundane  sphere.     It  is  the 
still-existent  duration  of  one's  whole  past,  with  all  its 
dated  events    {Jiozv  dated   is   not   made   clear)  ever 
ready  to  insert  itself  into  present  action.     For   M. 
Bergson  the  past  as  "  pure  memory  "  has  not  ceased 
to  exist,  it  has  only  ceased  to  be  useful.     Its  mere 
utility  for  us  here  on  earth  is  confined  to  the  points 
of  intersection.     The    past   still    exists   in  the  vital 
plane  beyond  the  view  of  present  experience,  just  as 
on  the  other  plane  objects  in  space  exist  beyond  the 
range  of  perception.     If  we  find  this   concept  diffi- 
cult, M.  Bergson  will  tell  us  that  this  is  due  to  our 
inveterate  habit    of  projecting   duration   on   to  the 
plane  of  space,  translating  it  into  a  series  of  quasi- 
spatial  points,  and  fancying  that  we  have  left  these 
points  behind  us  as  we   travel ;  forgetting  that  the 
genuine   Self,   "which  is   indeed   outside   space,"  is 
duration,  since  "  time  is  the  stuff  that  psychical  life 
is  made  of."     Interesting,  nay,  fascinating  in  a  tanta- 
lizing fashion,   as    is   M,  Bergson's    doctrine    of  a 
continuously  abiding    past,    with   wedge-like   inser- 
tions  into  present   mundane   affairs,  it  lies  for  the 
most  part  outside  the  natural  history  of  experience 


198         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

which,    for     us,     deals     only    with    intra-mundane 
process. 

There  is,  however,  a  possible  point  of  contact 
between  M.  Bergson's  conception  of  the  manner  in 
which  Life,  as  memory,  is  influential  on  behaviour, 
and  our  own  widely-divergent  interpretation.  His 
teaching  is  that,  so  long  as  response  follows  directly 
on  stimulus,  there  is  no  opportunity  for  the  guiding 
activity  of  Life  to  be  insinuated  ;  but  that  when 
there  is  some  interval  between  the  one  and  the  other 
— when  alternative  channels  of  nervous  discharge 
are  established — then  Life  can  insert  itself  and  so 
far  render  the  response  an  act  of  free  choice.  Now 
there  is  a  sense  in  which  we  too  can  accept  an 
interval  of  choice  between  stimulus  and  response ; 
there  is  a  sense  in  which  we  can  accept  an  intervening 
influence ;  but  for  us  it  is  not  an  extra-mundane 
Source  of  change  that  intervenes.  For  us  the 
guiding  influence  that  breaks  the  chain  of  that 
automatic  and  sub-cortically  determined  behaviour 
which  I  regard  as  biologically  instinctive,  is  the 
functional  process  of  the  cortex  in  virtue  of  the 
correlated  experiential  relationships. 

We  must  now  revert,  however,  to  that  which  I 
regard  as  the  cardinal  distinction  between  what  I  have 
called,  elliptically,  the  "eds"  and  the  "ing"  of 
experience.  In  this  connexion  we  have  to  be  on  our 
guard  against  the  puzzling  ambiguity  which  results 
from  the  same  word  being  used  in  both  contexts. 
The  word  "sensation"  may  be  used  in  one  passage 
for  what  is  sensed,  in  another  for  the  process  of 
sensing.  So,  too,  perception  may  be  the  perceiv^^  or 
perceiv///^ ;    the   idea   may   be   a   product — what  is 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE     199 

ldea.ed,  as  in  Berkeley's  writings,  or  a  process,  as  in 
much  Berkeleyan  criticism.  The  same  ambiguity 
runs  up  into  regions  of  higher  and  more  complex 
mental  development.  Consider  what  we  mean  when 
we  speak  of  scientific  or  philosophical  thought.  Do 
we  not  sometimes  mean  the  body  of  doctrine  which  is 
the  "  ed  "-product  of  investigation  ;  sometimes  the 
process  by  which  these  results  have  been  reached  } 
The  teaching  of  science  is  both  a  presentation  of  what 
has  been  scienced,  and  a  development  of  sciencing — 
of  scientific  observing  and  thinking.  To  add  to  our 
difficulties  and  our  liability  to  confusion,  we  cannot 
even  speak  of  our  own  process  of  experiencing  save 
as  that  which  is,  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence,  ex- 
perience^, or,  to  use  Professor  Alexander's  useful  term, 
enjoyed.  Endeavouring,  as  best  we  may,  to  avoid 
these  difficulties  and  to  escape  from  this  confusion, 
we  have  to  note  that  both  within  the  context  of  the 
"  eds,"  and  within  that  of  the  "  ing,"  there  are  diffisren- 
tiations,  but  that  whereas  the  differentiations  of  the 
"  eds  " — the  objects  of  perception,  conception,  imagin- 
ation and  so  forth — are  relatively  clear-cut  and 
isolated  for  thought,  the  differentiations  of  the  "ing  " 
retain  much  more  of  their  primitive  continuity,  are 
much  less  sharply  defined,  exhibit  in  far  larger 
measure  what  M.  Bergson  speaks  of  as  interpene- 
tration.  The  several  items  of  the  perceived  and  the 
conceived  have  a  relative  discontinuity  and  mutual 
independence  of  each  other  which  is  in  marked  con- 
trast with  the  relative  unity  and  continuity  of  per- 
ceiving and  conceiving.  Hence  among  the  "  eds  "  wc 
have  what  M,  Bergson  speaks  of  as  "  the  multiplicity 
of  juxtaposition,"  whereas  "just  in  proportion  as  we 


200         INSTINCT   AND    EXPERIENCE 

dig  down  below  the  surface  and  get  to  the  real  self  [as 
experiencing]  do  its  states  of  consciousness  cease  to 
stand  in  juxtaposition  and  begin  to  permeate  and 
melt  into  one  another,  and  each  to  be  tinged  with  the 
colouring  of  all  the  others."  *  I  believe  that  this 
distinction  between  the  "eds"  and  the  "ing"  of 
experience  lies  at  the  root  of  much  of  M.  Bergson's 
philosophy;  though  he  would  not  accept  the  interpre- 
tation I  put  upon  it.  He  speaks  of  two  aspects  of  the 
self.  "  Our  perceptions,  sensations,  emotions  and 
ideas,"  he  says,  ^  "  occur  under  two  aspects  :  the  one 
clear  and  precise  but  impersonal ;  the  other  confused, 
ever-changing  and  inexpressible  because  language 
cannot  get  hold  of  it  without  arresting  its  mobility  or 
fit  it  into  its  commonplace  forms  without  making  it 
into  public  property."  The  former  are  the  "  eds  "  of 
experience  ;  the  latter  is  a  phase  of  the  "ing."  Again 
M.  Bergson  says  ^ :  *'  Sensations  and  tastes  seem  to 
me  objects  as  soon  as  I  isolate  and  name  them,  and  in 
the  human  soul  there  are  only  processes^  The 
essential  feature  of  duration  is,  for  M.  Bergson,  the 
continuous  development  of  experienc/;/^  as  it  grows, 
when  our  ego  lets  itself  live,  when  phases  of  conscious- 
ness melt  into  each  other,  when  every  successive  phase 
affords  an  example  of  creative  evolution.  "  The 
capital  error  of  associationism,"  he  says,  *  "  is  that  it 
substitutes  for  the  continuity  of  becoming,  which  is  the 
living  reality,  a  discontinuous  multiplicity  of  elements, 
inert  and  juxtaposed."      "In  place  of^  an  inner  life 

'  "Time  and  Free  Will,"  pp.  162  and  164. 
^  Ibid,  p.  129.  *  Ibid,  p.  131, 

'  "Matter  and  Memory,"  p.  171. 
*  *'  Time  and  Free  Will,"  p.  237. 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    201 

whose  successive  phases,  each  unique  of  its  kind," 
melt  into  each  other  and  interpenetrate,  "  we  get  a 
self  which  can  be  artificially  re-constructed  and  simple 
psychic  states  which  can  be  added  and  taken  from  one 
another  just  like  the  letters  of  the  alphabet." 

For  M.  Bergson  the  distinction  I  have  drawn 
between  the  "  ing  "  and  the  •'  eds  "  of  experience  is 
that  between  the  snap-shot  data  with  which  we  deal 
intellectually  and  the  intuitive  awareness  of  the  con- 
tinuity of  conscious  life.  For  Professor  Alexander  it 
is  that  between  contemplation  and  enjoyment.  But 
are  we  not,  it  will  be  asked,  here  putting  more  strain 
upon  the  distinction  than  it  will  bear.  For  surely,  it 
will  be  said,  intuition  itself  afibrds  data  which  can  be 
dealt  with  by  the  intellect;  enjoyment  itself  can  be 
contemplated.  May  we  not  make  the  "  ing  "  of  one 
moment  the  "ed"  of  a  subsequent  moment?  May  we 
not,  for  example,  make  the  process  of  thinking  the 
object  of  subsequent  thought }  In  a  sense  no  doubt 
we  can.  But  only  by  translating  it  into  terms 
which  may  be  conceivi?^;  just  as,  according  to  M. 
Bergson,  we  can  only  deal  with  time  intellectually 
when  we  translate  the  continuous  duration  of  pro- 
cess into  a  series  of  spatial  or  quasi-spatial  time- 
points. 

What  I  mean  by  translation  can  perhaps  best  be 
illustrated  in  reference  to  aesthetic  appreciation. 
Although  it  is  no  doubt  impossible  to  have  this  mode 
of  enjoyment  in  the  absence  of  any  contemplation  of 
beautiful  objects  in  nature  or  in  art,  still  at  the 
moment  of  enjoyment  the  emphasis  is  on  appreciating 
rather  than  on  what  is  appreciated.  And  the  question 
is  whether  at  the  moment  or  afterwards  we  can  make 


202  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

the  essential  features  of  this  appreciative  enjoyment 
the  object  of  intellectual  contemplation.  It  is  not 
easy  to  make  one's  meaning  clear.  When  we  are 
reading  with  full  interest  and  attention,  we  are  not 
interested  in  our  interest,  we  are  not  attending  to 
our  attention.  The  "  eds  "  of  interest  and  attention 
are  all  in  the  subject-matter.  Yes  !  But  afterwards, 
in  reflection  and  retrospection,  can  we  not  then  make 
the  process  of  attending  the  object  of  our  subsequent 
attention  .''  Can  we  not  even,  on  re-reading  in  psycho- 
logical mood,  squint  round  at  our  mental  process  to 
see  how  our  enjoyment  is  getting  on  and  what  it  is 
like.  Surely  it  will  be  said  we  can  think  about  our 
appreciative  enjoyment,  can  discourse  on  it,  and  write 
aesthetic  treatises  which  deal  with  it.  But  are  the 
concepts  we  employ  other  than  suggestive,  other  than 
symbolic  of  that  which  can  only  be  reached  through 
direct  awareness  in  enjoyment }  It  may  be  urged 
that  all  concepts,  as  cognita,  are  symbolic  in  universa- 
lized form  of  the  concrete  particulars  which  are 
directly  experienced.  Yes  !  But  here  both  particulars 
and  universals  belong  to  the  realm  of  the  experienc(?^. 
Both  are  what  Dr.  Alexander  terms  non-mental,  in 
the  sense  that  they  are  set  before  the  mind  for  con- 
templation. The  distinguishing  feature  of  appreci- 
ative enjoyment  is  that  it  is  not,  in  this  sense,  before 
the  mind  ;  it  is,  so  to  speak,  at  the  back  of  the  mind. 
It  is  not  what  is  appreciated  ;  it  is  a  qualification  of 
conscious  process  as  appreciating.  Can,  then,  the 
enjoyment  of  architecture,  of  sculpture,  of  painting,  of 
music,  of  literature,  with  their  subtle  values  in,  rather 
than  for,  consciousness,  be  made  the  objects  of  contem- 
plation }    To  this  question,  I  take  it,  Dr.  Alexander's 


NATURAL  HISTORY  AND  EXPERIENCE    203 

reply  *  would  be  that  in  no  way  can  we  make  enjoy- 
ment an  object  of  contemplative  thought.  I  am  not 
prepared  to  go  quite  so  far.  None  the  less  I  feel  that 
in  translating  the  aesthetic  enjoyment  as  such  into 
the  cognitional  terms  in  which  it  must  be  presented 
to  the  intellect,  we  do  in  large  measure  transform  it. 
And  it  is  only  with  this  transformed  material  that 
science  is  able  to  deal. 

'  Cf.,  S.  Alexander  "  Self  as  Subject  and  as  Person,"  "Proc.  Aristo- 
telian See,"  vol.  xi.,  p.  l8  (1911).  Berkeley  recognized  that  the  enjoy- 
ment of  the  "  ing  "  is  different  from  the  contemplation  of  the  "  ed  " 
and  suggested  the  term  notion  for  phases  of  the  "ing"  since  the  term 
ideas,  XXI  his  usage,  was  applicable  only  to  the  "eds"  of  experience. 
Cf.,  "  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,"  §  27,  "  Siris,"  §  308. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT 

WE  tend  to  think,  or,  at  any  rate,  to  express  our 
thought,  in  terms  of  antithetical  contrast. 
A  century  ago  Sydney  Smith  said  * : — **  The  most 
common  notion,  now  prevalent,  with  respect  to 
animals  is,  that  they  are  guided  by  instinct ;  that  the 
discriminating  circumstance  between  the  minds  of 
animals  and  of  men  is,  that  the  former  do  what  they 
do  from  instinct,  the  latter  from  reason."  And  he 
emphasizes  the  contrast  when  he  says  : — "  When  I  call 
that  principle  upon  which  the  bees  or  any  other 
animals  proceed  to  their  labours,  the  principle  of 
instinct,  I  only  mean  that  it  is  not  a  principle  of 
reason.  However  the  knowledge  is  gained,  it  is  not 
gained  as  our  knowledge  is  gained.  It  is  not 
gained  by  experience  or  imitation.  ...  It  cannot  be 
invention,  or  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends ; 
because  as  the  animal  works  before  he  knows  what 
event  is  going  to  happen,  he  cannot  know  what  the 
end  is,  to  which  he  is  accommodating  the  means  : 
and  if  he  be  actuated  by  any  other  than  these,  the 
generation  of  ideas  in  animals  is  .  .  .  very  different 

'  Sydney  Smith,  "  Sketches  of  Moral  Philosophy  "  (Lectures 
delivered  at  the  Royal  Institution  in  the  years  1804,  1805  and  1806), 
p.  240. 

ao4 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      205 

from  the  generation  of  ideas  in  men "  (p  247). 
*'  Ants  and  beavers,"  he  tells  us,  *'  lay  up  magazines. 
Where  do  they  get  their  knowledge  that  it  will  not 
be  so  easy  to  collect  food  in  rainy  weather  as  it  is  in 
the  summer?  Men  and  women  know  these  things, 
because  their  grandpapas  and  grandmammas  have 
told  them  so :  ants,  hatched  from  the  egg  artificially, 
or  birds  hatched  in  this  manner,  have  all  this 
knowledge  by  intuition,  without  the  smallest  com- 
munication with  any  of  their  relations  "  (p.  244). 

We  have  here  the  contrast  between  two  different 
kinds  of  knowledge — two  kinds  which  may  indeed 
coexist  in  the  same  living  creatures  but  which  are 
essentially  antithetical,  or,  at  least,  complementary  in 
their  nature — the  knowledge  that  is  innate  and 
intuitive  and  the  knowledge  that  is  begotten  of 
experience.  And  these  two  different  kinds  of  know- 
ledge are  the  expression  of,  or  are  due  to,  two  diverse 
principles  or  faculties  ;  the  faculty  of  instinct  and  the 
faculty  of  reason. 

In  our  own  day  M.  Bergson,  in  the  philosophical 
doctrine  of  instinct  to  a  consideration  of  which  most 
of  this  chapter  is  devoted,  also  regards  instinct  and 
intelligence  as  opposite  and  complementary  kinds  of 
knowledge.  Although  they  arise  as  differentiations 
of  a  vital  activity  common  to  both,  they  are  diverse 
expressions  of  divergent  processes  of  evolution. 
More  or  less  commingled  in  any  given  organism,  it  is 
the  proportion  that  one  bears  to  the  other  that  differs. 
"  There  is  no  intelligence  in  which  some  traces  of 
instinct  are  not  to  be  discovered,  more  especially  no 
instinct  which  is  not  surrounded  by  a  fringe  of 
intelligence.      It  is  this    fringe  of  intelligence    that 


206         liNSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

has  been  the  cause  of  so  many  misunderstandings. 
From  the  fact  that  instinct  is  more  or  less  intelligent,  it 
has  been  concluded  that  instinct  and  intelligence  are 
things  of  the  same  kind,  and  that  there  is  only  a 
difference  of  complexity  or  perfection  between  them, 
and,  above  all,  that  one  of  the  two  is  expressible  in 
terms  of  the  other.  In  reality  they  accompany  each 
other  only  because  they  are  complementary,  only 
because  they  are  different,  what  is  instinctive  in 
instinct  being  opposite  to  what  is  intelligent  in 
i  ntelligence."  ^  Instinct  and  intelligence  thus  involve 
two  radically  different  kinds  of  knowledge.  But 
"while  both  involve  knowledge,  this  knowledge  is 
rather  acted  and  unconscious  in  the  case  of  instinct, 
thought  and  conscious   in  the   case   of  intelligence" 

(p.  153). 

The  relation  of  instinct   to  consciousness  in   M. 

Bergson's  philosophy  is  a  little  difficult  clearly  to 
grasp.  Here  he  speaks  of  knowledge  as  "«^/^^and 
unconscious "  in  instinct.  But  elsewhere  he  says 
that  consciousness  is  "  the  characteristic  note  of  the 
.  .  .  actually  lived,  in  short  of  the  active  "  ("  Mat.  and 
Mem."  p.  181).  This  indeed  is  a  dominant  note 
in  M.  Bergson's  philosophy.  Our  consciousness — 
the  consciousness  we  enjoy — is  always  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  insinuation  of  spirit  in  the  present 
moment  of  action.  Furthermore  he  tells  us  that 
"  instinct  and  intelligence  stand  out  from  the  same 
background  which  for  want  of  a  better  name,  we 
may  call  consciousness  in  general,  and  which  must  be 
co-extensive  with   universal  life  "  ("  C.   E."  p.  196). 

'  "  Creative  Evolution  "  (translation  of  •'  L'^^volution  Creatrice," 
by  Arthur  Mitchell)  (1911),  P-  I43- 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      207 

Again   and   again    he    seems   to    identify    life    and 
consciousness.     But  on  these  terms,  if  instinctive  be- 
haviour is  essentially  a  vital  act  one  would  suppose 
that  it  is  also  essentially  a  conscious  act.    M.  Bergson, 
however,   draws  a  distinction  between  two  kinds   of 
unconsciousness,    that     in     which    consciousness    is 
absent    {nulle)   and    that   in    which    it    is   nullified 
ianfiulei).     Both   are  equal  to  zero,  but  in  the  one 
case  the  zero  expresses  the  fact  that  there  is  nothing, 
in  the  other  that  we  have   two   equal   quantities  of 
opposite  sign  which  compensate  and  neutralize  each 
other.     The  unconsciousness  of  a  falling  stone  is  of 
the  former  kind  ;  that  of  instinct  (in  extreme  cases) 
is  of  the   latter   kind   (p.  151).     Even  here    I    find 
difficulties  ;    for   even    in   the   fall   of  a   stone  as  a 
physical    process    I    had    gathered     that,     for     M. 
Bergson,    there    is    consciousness    annulled.      "  No 
doubt,"  he  says,  "  the  material  universe  itself  ...  is 
a   kind   of  consciousness,  a  consciousness  in    which 
everything  compensates  and    neutralizes  everything 
else,  a  consciousness  of  which  all  the  potential  parts 
balancing  each  other  by  a  reaction  which  is  always 
equal  to  the  action,  reciprocally  hinder   each   other 
from  standing  out "  ("  Mat.  and  Mem."  p.  313). 

But  we  are  here  concerned  only  with  the  annulling 
of  consciousness  in  instinct.  We  must  contrast  it 
with  intelligence.  In  intelligent  action  there  is  first  a 
representation  of  the  act  to  be  performed,  and  then 
follows  the  performance  of  the  act.  Such  repre- 
sentation is  a  measure  of  our  possible  action  upon 
bodies,  it  is  an  outline  in  matter  of  our  eventual 
action  upon  it.  Now  hesitation  or  choice  is  a  sign 
of  the  inadequacy  of  the  act  at  once  to   fulfil  and 


208         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

thus  to  neutralize  the  representation  ;  and  this  inade- 
quacy of  the  one  to  neutrah'ze  the  other  is  emergent 
consciousness — a  consciousness  "which  may  be  de- 
fined as  an  arithmetical  difference  between  potential 
and  real  activity.  It  measures  the  interval  between 
representation  and  action."  But  if  this  interval  be 
annulled,  if  representation  and  performance  coalesce, 
consciousness  is  neutralized.  "  The  representation 
of  the  act  is  held  in  check  by  the  performance  of 
the  act  itself,  which  resembles  the  idea  so  perfectly, 
and  fits  it  so  exactly,  that  consciousness  is  unable 
to  find  room  between  them.  Representation  is 
stopped  up  by  action."  Consciousness  however  does 
not  even  then  cease  to  exist ;  for  if  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  act  be  arrested  or  thwarted  by  an 
obstacle,  consciousness  may  emerge.  The  interval 
between  representation  and  action  is  reconstituted. 
Hence  in  instinctive  behaviour  "  where  consciousness 
appears,  it  does  not  so  much  light  up  the  instinct 
itself  as  the  thwartings  to  which  instinct  is  subject  ; 
it  is  the  deficit  of  instinct,  the  distance  between 
the  act  and  the   idea,  that  becomes   consciousness" 

(p.  152). 

When  we  remember  that  it  is  only  in  extreme 
cases  that  representation  is  thus  stopped  up  by  action , 
we  may  perhaps  fairly  assume  that  these  extreme 
cases  illustrate  instinctive  behaviour  carried  to  its 
ideal  limits  ;  in  other  words  that  they  are  those  cases 
which,  according  to  my  interpretation,  are  strictly 
speaking  instinctive — those  in  which  pre-perception 
does  not  intervene  between  the  constellation  of  stimuli 
and  the  resulting  response.  On  the  other  hand  in 
those  cases  in  which  some  intelligent  pre-perception, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT     209 

in  my  sense  of  the  word  intelligent,  does  play  a 
part  in  determining  behaviour,  we  have  the  "  deficit 
of  instinct "  which  has  a  conscious  accompaniment. 
I  take  it  that  for  M.  Bergson,  that  which  is  insinuated 
between  stimulation  and  response,  that  which  breaks 
the  coalescent  sequence  of  pure  automatism,  is  "  pure 
memory,"  the  characteristic  of  which  is  to  become 
conscious  in  action.  If  this  be  so,  his  insertion  of 
"  pure  memory "  in  the  guidance  of  behaviour  is 
analogous  to  the  presence  of  factors  of  revival  in  my 
interpretation ;  and  we  both  should  regard  such 
behaviour  as  showing  something  more  or  something 
less  than  instinctive  purity — as  exhibiting  therefore  a 
deficit  of  instinct  as  such. 

In  so  far  as  "  pure  memory  "  is  insinuated  as  choice 
within  the  interstices  of  an  otherwise  automatic  and 
strictly  instinctive  sequence  the  activity  is  really 
vital.  For  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  when  M. 
Bergson  bids  us  identify  life  and  consciousness,  it  is 
life  as  "  free  "  and  "  creative  " — not  merely  mechanized 
and  automatized  routine — to  which  reference  is  made. 
It  is  true  that  automatism  is  the  result  of  life,  but  it 
is  the  result  of  life's  surrender  of  its  essential  activity, 
a  lapse  into  mechanical  routine.  If,  however,  as  mere 
biologists,  we  understand  by  life  the  sum-total  of  the 
physiological  processes  of  which  the  organism  is  the 
privileged  centre,  an  indefinitely  large  proportion  of 
consciousness  is  ''annulled"  and  hence,  for  mere 
business  purposes  of  interpretation,  may  be  safely 
regarded  as  non-existent.  If  so,  the  conception  may 
perhaps  be  brought  into  some  sort  of  relation  with 
the  view  held  by  some  earlier  exponents  of  physio- 
logical psychology,  according  to  which  consciousness 
p 


210  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

is  correlated  with  a  measure  of  obstruction  or  tension 
in  the  cerebral  cortex — with  some  resistance  to  be 
overcome,  of  which  delay  in  response  is  an  indication  ; 
whereas  consciousness  is  absent  when  the  molecular 
disturbances  in  the  cortex,  initiated  by  sensory  stimu- 
lation, are  rapidly  and  smoothly  drafted  off  along 
channels  pre-established  through  heredity  or  through 
constant  habit,  leading  to  automatic  response.  "  In 
the  latter  case,"  said  Romanes,^  "the  routes  of 
nervous  discharge  have  been  well-worn  through 
use ;  in  the  former  case  these  routes  have  to  be 
determined  by  a  complex  play  of  forces  amid  the 
cells  and  fibres  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres.  And 
this  complex  play  of  forces  which  finds  its  physio- 
logical expression  in  a  lengthening  of  the  time  of 
latency,  finds  its  psychological  expression  in  the 
rise  of  consciousness."  I  do  not  wish  to  suggest  that 
M.  Bergson's  conception  of  the  relation  of  conscious- 
ness to  the  phenomena  of  brain-physiology  is  at  all 
like  that  of  Romanes.  Indeed  they  are  poles 
asunder.  But  there  seems  to  be  this  in  common  ; 
that  when  automatism  is  complete,  consciousness  is 
absent ;  or,  as  M.  Bergson  would  say,  is  annulled. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  M.  Bergson  distin- 
guishes and  contrasts  two  orders,  that  of  the  vital  and 
the  willed,  in  opposition  to  that  of  the  inert  and  the 
automatic.  The  brain  in  all  its  parts  belongs  entirely 
to  the  latter  order,  it  is  only  a  cunningly  arranged  set 
of  neurones,  an  elaborate  and  complex  switch-board, 
which  Life  has  made  for  its  use,  which  Life  has  in  large 
measure  allowed  to  descend  to  materialized  auto- 
matism, but  within  which    Life  has   contrived,  with 

'  G.  J,  Romanes,  ''Mental  Evolution  in  Animals"  (1885),  p.  74. 


I 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      211 

some  success  in  the  higher  vertebrates  and  with  much 
greater  success  in  man,  to  leave  room  for  the  insertion 
of  its  free  and  creative  activity.  The  measure  of 
success  in  man  is  such  that  his  brain  has  become  a 
perfect  "  reservoir  of  indeterminism  " — that  is  to  say 
a  system  full  of  opportunities  for  the  insinuation  of 
choice  between  alternatives.  It  is  essential  to  the 
proper  understanding  of  M.  Bergson's  philosophical 
doctrine  that  we  should  remember  that  the  function 
of  the  brain  is  to  provide  a  vast  number  of  alternative 
routes  by  which  afferent  impulses  due  to  stimulation 
may  be  conducted  to  the  effector  organs  which  sub- 
serve behaviour.  It  is  in  itself  wholly  and  solely  a 
mechanism  of  conduction.  It  is  in  no  sense  a  store- 
house of  memories  ;  for  memories  are  preserved  in  the 
realm  of  spirit  which  is  extra-spatial.  From  this 
realm  they  play  down  upon  the  switch-board  of  the 
nervous  system.  In  so  far,  therefore,  as  choice  is 
insinuated  and  an  action  is  free  and  creative,  this  is 
in  no  sense  a  function  of  the  brain ;  its  Source  is  in 
the  unconscious  sphere  of  "pure  memory" — which 
is  the  sphere  of  spirit, — only  at  the  point  of  its 
insertion  into  present  action  does  it  glow  with  the 
light  of  consciousness. 

We  have,  therefore,  two,  if  not  three  kinds  of 
unconsciousness:  (i)  that  of  the  falling  stone;  (2) 
that  of  automatism  (consciousness  annulled)  ;  and  (3) 
that  of  pure  memory  when  it  is  not  being  insinuated 
in  the  present  moment  of  action.  I  separate  (2) 
and  (3)  in  accordance  with  the  statement  in  "  Creative 
Evolution,"  though  it  seems  to  conflict  with  that  of 
"  Matter  and  Memory "  [supra,  p.  207^  A  word  or 
two  must  be  added  with  regard  to  (3).    Pure  memory 


212         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

is  the  continuous   existence  of  mind  or  spirit,  and 
this  is  the  vital  impetus — the  Source  of  all  process. 
As  pure  memory  it  abides  in  the  still  existent  past, 
outside  the  plane  of  space  within  which  the  material 
body  and  brain  are  rendered  perceptible  to  the  senses 
and  the  intellect.     But  this  mind,  this  spirit,  this  pure 
memory,  exists,   not   as  what  we  are  aware  of  as 
consciousness,  but   as   a   mode   of   the  unconscious. 
Unless  I  misunderstand  the  teaching  of  "  Matter  and 
Memory,"  M.  Bergson   is   convinced   that   a  refusal 
to  recognize  the  fact  that  the  greater  part  of  one's 
pure  memory  is  an  unconscious  form  of  real  existence, 
is  tantamount  to  a  refusal  to  recognize  the  existence 
of  Life  and  Spirit  as  Reality — as  active  and  forceful 
duration.     And  that  which,  according  to  M.  Bergson» 
leads  us  to  deny  the  existence  of  unconscious   mind 
is  our  persistent  neglect  of  the  fact  that  the  conscious- 
ness of  which  we  have  intuitive  knowledge,  is  always 
in   alliance  with   some    present    phase    of    practical 
activity.     To   guide  this  activity  is  the   business  of 
consciousness  in  and  for  the  organism  ;  only  at  its 
points  of  insertion   in   our   mundane  life  of  space- 
occupancy,  does  mind  and  memory  glow  with  what, 
for  us,  in  whom  this  insertion  takes  place,  is  conscious 
awareness.     In   a   sense  we  may  say  that  what  we 
feel  as  consciousness  is  the  friction  of  unconscious 
spirit  as  it  traverses  unconscious  brain  matter.     But 
the   Spirit  which  exists  in  time,  which  is  duration, 
and    which    is    only    occasionally    inserted    in    the 
mundane   affairs  of  inert    space,  though  it  is  itself 
unconscious,  and   contains   only  the  potentiality  of 
that  consciousness  which  is  actualized  in  the  present 
moment  of  choice,  is  never  inactive ;  nay,  rather  it  is 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      213 

pure   activity,  the   Source  of  all  change.     It  is  the 
Source  of  instinctive  behaviour. 

Now,  in  instinctive  behaviour,  the  current  of  life 
passes  through  the  organism  ;  and,  as  it  passes,  it 
glows  with  instinctive  knowledge,  though  much  of 
the  consciousness  may  be  annulled  through  the 
stopping  up  of  the  chinks  of  choice.  I  am  not  quite 
clear  as  to  M.  Bergson's  position  with  regard  to  the 
relation  of  pure  memory  to  hereditary  sequence. 
But  I  take  it  that  the  current  of  life  which  streams 
through  any  organism,  let  us  say  a  newly  emergent 
bee  or  a  newly  hatched  chick,  contains  unconsciously, 
in  the  sphere  of  pure  memory,  a  complete  unbroken 
and  continuous  record  of  the  whole  history  of  its 
particular  line  of  racial  descent  to  the  most  remote 
past,  all  of  which  is  for  M.  Bergson  still  existent  in 
the  sphere  of  duration.  But  of  this  immense  fund  of 
pure  memory,  only  that  small  fraction  which  is  iiseful 
to  that  bee  or  chick  in  its  present  activities  has  the 
conscious  instinctive  glow.  Still,  it  is  this  accumu- 
lated knowledge  of  the  past,  just  in  so  far  as  it  is 
inserted  in  present  behaviour,  that  is  the  psychical 
basis  of  instinct  as  a  form,  not  merely  of  mechanized 
automatism,  but  of  life  and  duration  and  knowledge. 
Thus,  I  think,  would  M.  Bergson  explain  the 
hereditary  nature  of  instinctive  behaviour.  Thus 
does  he  elaborate  a  philosophy  of  instinct.  If  we 
divorce  his  theory  of  instinct  from  his  doctrine  of 
pure  memory,  with  its  storage  in  continuous  existence 
of  the  whole  of  past  life-history,  we  must  fail  to 
grasp  its  significance  within  his  system  of  thought. 
The  naturalist  and  the  man  of  science  may  find  in  it 
little  to  their  taste.    But  it  is  not  meant  for  them. 


214  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

They  seek  merely  to  describe  and  state  in  general 
terms  the  correlated  stages  of  an  intra-mundane 
sequence  of  observable  or  inferable  phenomena. 
The  whole  of  this  elaborate  theory  of  pure  memory 
— interesting  as  it  is  as  a  metaphysical  speculation, 
touched  with  poetry — may  be  ignored  by  the 
naturalist.  It  does  not  afford  any  clue  to  scientific 
interpretation. 

Here,  however,  we  seek  to  understand  M.  Bergson, 
and  must  therefore  take  him  on  his  own  terms.  In 
instinct,  a  small  but  very  useful  portion  of  an  in- 
definite fund  of  the  potential  knowledge  of  pure 
memory  is  rendered  actual — ^just  that  which  is  wanted 
for  the  business  purposes  of  life.  But  this  is  true  also 
of  all  life-processes,  "  so  that  we  cannot  say  .  .  . 
where  organization  ends  and  where  instinct  begins." 
"  When  we  see,"  says  M.  Bergson,  "  in  a  living  body 
thousands  of  cells  working  together  for  a  common 
end,  dividing  the  task  between  them,  living  each  for 
itself  at  the  same  time  as  for  others,  preserving  itself, 
feeding  itself,  reproducing  itself,  responding  to  the 
menace  of  danger  by  appropriate  defensive  reactions, 
how  can  we  help  thinking  of  so  many  instincts  ? 
And  yet  they  are  the  natural  functions  of  the  cell, 
the  constitutive  elements  of  its  vitality.  ...  In  both 
cases,  in  the  instinct  of  the  animal  and  in  the  vital 
properties  of  the  cells,  the  same  knowledge  and  the 
same  ignorance  is  shown.  All  goes  on  as  if  the  cell 
knew,  of  the  other  cells,  what  concerns  itself;  as  if 
the  animal  knew,  of  other  animals,  what  it  can  utilize 
— all  else  remains  in  shade"  (pp.  ly^-iyd).  Even  in 
the  automatism  of  the  vital  processes,  such  as  those 
of  nutrition,  or  the  development  of  the  embryo,  pure 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  INSTINCT      215 

memory  embracing  the  whole  history  of  the  past  is 
operative.  Just  that  part  of  the  accumulated  fund 
which  subserves  vital  utility  is  insiniTated.  This 
selective  part  is  knowledge,  all  the  rest  is  an  un- 
utilized balance  of  ignorance.  There  is  choice  just  in 
so  far  as  there  is  this  selective  discernment  of  what  is 
here  and  now  useful.  For  though  the  material 
structures — the  cells,  tissues,  and  organs  that  we  see 
— have  been  materialized  and  mechanized,  process 
and  change  are  the  sole  prerogative  of  life.  It  is  the 
Life  of  the  universe  that  gives  it  movement  and  flow  ; 
otherwise  it  would  be  a  mere  row  of  static  or 
immobile  snap-shots  of  the  inert.  But  in  the  organized 
flow  of  vital  processes,  the  consciousness  is  annulled  ; 
and  in  the  instinct  that  is  reduced  to  the  level  of 
automatic  flow  of  organized  routine  (the  "  extreme 
cases ")  the  knowledge  is  of  the  unconscious  order. 
One  would  like  to  be  told  in  language  altogether  free 
from  ambiguity  what  the  nature  of  this  knowledge 
with  consciousness  annulled  actually  is.  The  concept 
is  difficult  to  grasp.  But  we  may  now  turn  to  other 
aspects  of  M.  Bergson's  treatment  of  instinct.  For  as 
we  follow  his  discussion  in  its  further  implications, 
the  development  of  the  subject  proceeds  as  if  instinct 
were  a  kind  of  knowledge  not  less  radiantly  conscious 
than  intelligence. 

Let  us  accept  this  position  without  seeking  to 
harmonize  the  doctrine  of  the  annulling  of  conscious- 
ness in  extreme,  and  one  would  therefore  have 
thought  typical,  cases  of  instinct,  with  that  of  the 
specific  nature  of  the  instinctive  consciousness  as 
such.  Instinct,  then,  is  a  kind  of  conscious  knowledge 
co-ordinate  with   that  of  intelligence  ;   but  it  is  a 


216         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

radically  different  kind  of  knowledge  (p.   150).     It 
reaches  its  highest  development  in  the   arthropods, 
and  especially  in  the  insects,  as  intelligence  reaches 
its  highest  development  in  the  vertebrates,  especially 
in  man.     "  We  may  surmise,"  says  M.  Bergson,  in  a 
passage  which  I  must  quote  in  full,  "  that  they  began 
by  being  implied   in  each  other,  that   the  original 
psychic  activity  included  both  at  once,  and  that,  if  we 
went  far  enough  back  into  the  past,  we  should  find 
instincts  more  nearly  approaching  intelligence  than 
those  of  our  insects,  intelligence  nearer  to  instinct 
than  that  of  our  vertebrates,  intelligence  and  instinct 
being,  in  this  elementary  condition,  prisoners  of  a 
matter  which  they  are  not  yet  able  to  control.     If 
the  force  immanent  in  life  were  an  unlimited  force,  it 
might  perhaps  have  developed  instinct  and  intelli- 
gence  together,  and   to   any  extent,  in   the  same 
organisms.     But  everything  seems  to  indicate  that 
this  force  is  limited,  and  that  it  soon  exhausts  itself 
in  its  very  manifestation.     It  is  hard  for  it  to  go  far 
in  several  directions  at  once  :  it  must  choose.     Now, 
it  has  the  choice  between  two  modes  of  acting  on  the 
material  world :  it  can  effect  this  action  directly  by 
creating  an  organized  instrument  to  work  with  ;  or 
else  it  can  effect  it  indirectly  through  an  organism 
which,  instead  of  possessing  the  required  instrument 
naturally,  will  itself  construct  it  by  fashioning  in- 
organic  matter.     Hence,   intelligence   and   instinct, 
which  diverge  more  and  more  as  they  develop,  but 
which  never  entirely  separate  from  each  other.     On 
the  one  hand,  the  most  perfect  instinct  of  the  insect 
is  accompanied  by  gleams  of  intelligence,  if  only  in 
the  choice  of  place,  time,  and  materials  of  construction. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      217 

.  .  .  But,  on  the  other  hand,  intelligence  has  even 
more  need  of  instinct  than  instinct  has  of  intelli- 
gence ;  for  the  power  to  give  shape  to  crude  matter 
involves  already  a  superior  degree  of  organization,  a 
degree  to  which  the  animal  could  not  have  risen, 
save  on  the  wings  of  instinct.  So,  while  nature  has 
frankly  evolved  in  the  direction  of  instinct  in  the 
arthropods,  we  observe  in  almost  all  the  vertebrates 
the  striving  after  rather  than  the  expansion  of  intelli- 
gence. It  is  instinct  which  still  forms  the  basis  of 
their  psychical  activity  ;  but  intelligence  is  there,  and 
would  fain  supersede  it.  Intelligence  does  not 
succeed  in  inventing  instruments  ;  but  at  least  it  tries 
to,  by  performing  as  many  variations  as  possible  on 
the  instinct  which  it  would  like  to  dispense  with.  It 
gains  complete  self-possession  only  in  man,  and  this 
triumph  is  attested  by  the  very  insufficiency  of  the 
natural  means  at  man's  disposal  for  defence  against 
his  enemies,  against  cold  and  hunger.  This  in- 
sufficiency, when  we  strive  to  fathom  its  significance, 
acquires  the  value  of  a  prehistoric  document ;  it 
is  the  final  leave-taking  between  intelligence  and 
instinct"  (pp.  149,  150). 

I  have  quoted  this  passage  at  length  because 
it  well  illustrates  M.  Bergson's  picturesque  and 
imaginative  treatment  of  one  phase  of  creative 
evolution.  He  pictures  the  vital  impetus  standing 
at  the  parting  of  the  ways,  and  choosing  instinctive 
development  for  the  arthropods,  intelligent  for  the 
vertebrates  and  man.  Of  course  it  must  be  taken  as 
a  poetic  rendering  of  the  drama  of  life  rather  than 
as  an  attempt  at  scientific  interpretation.  M.  Bergson 
enters  sympathetically  into  the  evolutionary  process  ; 


218  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

he  feels  the  onward  push  of  the  vital  impetus ;  he  is 
borne  now  along  the  stream  of  instinct,  and  now 
down  the  current  of  intelligence  ;  he  seeks  to  know 
them  from  within  as  life  alone  can  be  known.  And 
we  too,  if  we  would,  in  some  degree,  profit  by  his 
insight,  must  enter  sympathetically  into  the  current 
of  his  thought ;  must  endeavour  to  place  ourselves  at 
his  point  of  view  ;  must  try  to  catch  the  breath  of  his 
intuition.  I,  too,  stand  at  the  parting  of  the  ways. 
And  I  choose  that  of  instinctive  sympathy  so  far  as 
in  me  lies. 

I  do  not  propose,  therefore,  to  discuss  from  the 
scientific  point  of  view,  the  biological  aspect  of  the 
doctrine  of  two  divergent  paths,  one  of  which  has  led 
to  the  instincts  of  arthropods  and  the  other  to  the 
intelligence  of  vertebrates.  The  observable  differences 
of  behaviour  in  bees  and  in  birds,  for  example,  are 
correlated  with  differences  of  general  structure 
and  internal  anatomy,  with  differences  of  sensory 
endowment  and  build  of  the  nervous  system,  with 
differences  of  mode  of  development,  with  differences 
of  ancestral  history,  with  differences  of  environment, 
with  different  kinds  of  relationship  to  their  com.panions 
and  to  other  organisms,  and  so  forth.  All  of 
these  would  need  careful  consideration — preliminary 
analysis  and  subsequent  synthesis — if  the  divergence 
of  the  evolutionary  products  at  the  end  of  such 
divergent  routes  were  to  be  interpreted  in  the  spirit 
of  science.  We  should  have  to  estimate  with  care 
the  value  of  the  evidence  for  so  marked  a  con- 
centration of  instinct  in  the  arthropods  as  a  group, 
and  so  marked  a  concentration  of  intelligence 
in     the    vertebrates    as     M.    Bergson    takes   as   a 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT      219 

basis  for  his  position.  Mr.  Wildon  Carr  ^  has 
laid  even  more  stress  on  it,  and  in  a  more  un- 
compromising manner,  than  M.  Bergson  himself. 
Mr,  McDougall  ^  has  criticized  it,  claiming  for  the 
solitary  wasps  "  a  degree  of  intelligence  which  (with 
the  doubtful  exception  of  the  higher  mammals) 
approaches  most  nearly  to  the  human."  These 
questions,  however,  interesting  as  they  undoubtedly 
are,  may  be  left  on  one  side.  It  suffices  for  M. 
Bergson's  doctrine  that  the  instinctive  kind  of  know- 
ledge largely  predominates  in  the  behaviour  of  certain 
organisms,  and  that  the  intelligent  kind  of  knowledge 
largely  predominates  in  the  behaviour  of  certain 
other  organisms  ;  what  is  essential  is  that  the  two 
kinds  of  knowledge,  though  they  may  both  be  present 
in  differing  proportions  are  radically  diverse  in  kind, 
"  what  is  instinctive  in  instinct  being  opposite  to  what 
is  intelligent  in  intelligence." 

Where  shall  we  seek  the  exact  nature  of  this  deep- 
seated  distinction  ?  We  are  here  faced  by  a  difficulty 
which  is  seemingly  at  first  sight  insurmountable. 
For,  owing  to  the  radical  nature  of  the  incompatibility, 
"that  which  is  instinctive  in  instinct  cannot  be 
expressed  in  the  terms  of  intelligence,  nor, 
consequently,  can  it  be  analysed  "  (p,  177).  If,  then, 
we  seek  intelligently  and  intelligibly  to  express  the 
distinction  between  two  modes  of  knowing,  to  the 
nature  of  one  of  which  no  expression  in  terms  of 
intelligence  can  be  given,  we  appear  to  be  seeking 
that  which  the  very  conditions  of  the  quest  preclude 
us  from  finding.     But  life  is  in  the  same  predicament 

'  '•  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  232. 
2  Ibid.  p.  255. 


220  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

as  instinct  ;  for  "  the  intellect  is  characterized  by  an 
inherent  inability  to  comprehend  life"  (p.  174). 
These  are  hard  sayings  ;  and  yet  like  other  hard 
sayings  they  contain  a  central  core  of  truth.  It  is  of 
this  central  core  that  we  are  in  search. 

May  we  say  that  through  instinct  an  organism 
knows  without  having  to  learn,  whereas  the  know- 
ledge of  intelligence  comes  through  a  process  of 
learning  ?  No  !  this  does  not  express  the  fundamental 
difference,  though  it  leads  up  to  the  consideration  of 
a  distinction.  Instinct  does  indeed  know  many 
things  without  having  learned  them  ;  knows,  for 
example,  how  to  use  those  parts  of  the  body  which 
are  its  organized  instruments  (p.  146).  But  M. 
Bergson  tells  us  that  if  we  look  at  intelligence  from 
the  same  point  of  view,  we  find  that  it  also  knows 
certain  things  without  having  learned  them  (p.  155). 
For  him  the  distinction  here  lies  rather  in  the 
difference  in  the  mode  of  knowing  and  in  what  is 
known.  In  both  instinct  and  intelligence  there  is 
innate  knowledge.  But  whatever  in  instinct  and 
intelligence  is  innate  knowledge,  bears  in  the  first 
case  on  things,  and  in  the  second  on  relations.  Here, 
so  far  as  intelligence  is  concerned,  M.  Bergson  reverts 
to  the  constitutive  categories.  In  whatever  way  we 
make  an  analysis  of  thought,  he  says  (p.  156),  we 
always  end  with  one  or  several  general  categories  of 
which  the  mind  possesses  innate  knowledge  since  it 
makes  natural  use  of  them.  Hence,  in  the  language 
of  philosophy,  "  intelligence,  in  so  far  as  it  is  innate, 
is  the  knowledge  of  z,form  ;  instinct  implies  a  know- 
ledge of  a  matter''  (p.  157),^  and  he  claims  that  this 

'  By  "matter"  we  should  not  understand  M.  Bergson  to  mean  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY    OF   INSTINCT     221 

entirely  formal  knowledge  of  intelligence  has  an 
immense  advantage  over  the  material  knowledge  of 
instinct.  A  form,  just  because  it  is  empty,  may  be 
filled  with  any  number  of  things  in  turn  (p,  159).  I 
believe,  however,  that  this  time-honoured  distinction 
between  things  and  their  relations,  between  the 
matter  and  the  form  of  that  which  is  experienced, 
leads  us  away  from  and  not  towards  the  central  core 
of  truth  in  M.  Bergson's  doctrine.  It  is,  indeed,  true 
that  only  intelligence,  and  only  highly  developed 
intelligence,  can  distinguish  analytically  between 
things  and  their  relationships,  between  matter  and 
form.  Relationship  and  form  are  concepts  of 
intellectual  thought.  By  that  thought  they  are 
rendered  explicit.  But  if  "  the  behaviour  of  the  insect 
involves,  or  rather  evolves,  the  idea  of  definite  things 
existing  or  being  produced  in  definite  points  of  space 
and  time,  which  the  insect  knows  without  having 
learned  them"  (p.  154),  surely  the  relationships 
thus  "  involved  or  evolved "  are  there  and  are 
constitutive  of  that  instinctive  knowledge.  The 
distinction  between  instinct  and  intelligence  in  this 
respect  is  therefore  that  for  the  former  the  relation- 
ship and  form  are  implicit,  while  for  the  latter  they 
are  rendered  explicit.  This  may  be  true  enough  ; 
but  I  conceive  that  the  radical  difference  lies  deeper 
than  this. 

How,  then,  does  M.  Bergson  himself  sum  up  the 
net  result  of  his  preliminary  considerations  with  regard 
to  the  radical  distinction  ?    "  The  difference,"  he  says 

material  order,  for  that  is  known  by  intelligence  and  the  intellect. 
Should  we  understand  him  to  mean  the  substance  of  life — the  reality 
of  process?    Cf.  "  as  two  activities,"  infra^  p.  224. 


222         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

(p.  1 59),  "  that  we  shall  now  proceed  to  denote  between 
instinct  and  intelligence  is  what  the  whole  of  this 
analysis  was  meant  to  bring  out.  We  may  formulate 
it  thus : — There  are  things  that  intelligence  alone  is 
able  to  seek,  but  which,  by  itself,  it  will  never  find. 
These  things  instinct  alone  could  find ;  but  it  will 
never  seek  them."  I  can  myself  accept  this  formula 
which  accords  well  with  my  conception  of  instinct. 
For  instinct  never  seeks  though,  within  its  range  of 
behaviour,  it  is  remarkably  successful  in  finding.  It 
is  true  that  we  should  say,  in  the  language  of  popular 
speech,  that  an  animal  instinctively  seeks  its  food, 
seeks  a  mate,  and  so  forth.  But,  in  strictness,  to  seek 
surely  involves  an  anticipation  of  that  which,  through 
seeking,  may  be  found  ;  and  within  the  instinctive 
consciousness  I  can  only  provisionally  admit  the 
presence  of  a  form  of  pre-perception  so  dim  and 
vague  that  such  anticipation  of  what  is  to  be  sought 
and  may  be  found  is,  in  my  interpretation,  practically 
negligible  as  a  guide  to  behaviour.  Instinct,  however, 
does  none  the  less  effectively  provide,  in  a  biological 
fashion,  those  preliminary  findings,  which  afford  the 
opportunities  for  subsequent  revival,  and  which  thus 
render  possible  intelligent  seeking.  The  things  which 
instinct  finds,  though  it  seeks  them  not,  are  those 
things  which  subserve  the  preservation  of  the  in- 
dividual, and,  through  the  individual,  of  the  race  ;  and 
these  things,  when  they  are  subsequently  sought,  are 
sought  just  because  their  like  have  previously  been 
found  through  instinctive  behaviour.  I  do  not  of 
course  claim  that  this  represents  M.  Bergson's  meaning. 
His  distinction,  I  believe,  here,  as  elsewhere,  is  that 
between  the  intuitive  "  knowledge  "  that  life  alon.e  can 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      22S 

give  ;  and  the  system  of  cinematographical  snap-shots 
which  intelligence  takes  of  the  external  world  in  space, 
and  from  which  all  our  intellectual  knowledge  is 
elaborated. 

We  are  getting  nearer  to  the  central  core  of  M. 
Bergson's  doctrine.  For  instinct  is  moulded  on  the 
very  form  of  life ;  and  the  order  of  its  knowledge 
belongs  to  the  order  of  the  vital,  whereas  the  know- 
ledge of  intelligence  and  the  intellect  always  deals 
with  the  materialized,  the  spacialized,  translating 
everything  into  the  order  of  the  inert.  Hence  the 
intellect  is  characterized  by  a  natural  inability  to 
comprehend  life.  It  can  only  deal  with  the  material- 
ized products  of  life.  But  we  normally  think  in  an 
atmosphere  of  intelligence  ;  and  it  is  this  that  prevents 
us  from  grasping  the  inner  meaning  and  essential 
character  either  of  life  or  of  instinct.  Even  M.  Bergson 
himself  has  again  and  again,  to  use  modes  of  expres- 
sion which,  till  one  has  in  some  degree  mastered  his 
whole  thesis,  are  apt  to  lead  to  grave  misunderstanding. 
Let  me  exemplify.  The  solitary  wasp,  Ammophila, 
stings  its  caterpillar  prey  in  the  nerve-centres  along 
the  ventral  line  of  the  body.  Dr.  and  Mrs.  Peckham 
have,  indeed,  shown  that  the  instinctive  accuracy, 
with  resulting  paralysis  and  not  death,  has  been 
exaggerated.  But  this  does  not  much  matter. 
Relying  on  M.  Fabre's  observations,  M.  Bergson 
says  : — "  When  a  paralysing  wasp  stings  its  victim  in 
just  those  parts  where  the  nervous  centres  lie,  so  as 
to  render  it  motionless  without  killing  it,  it  acts  like 
a  learned  entomologist  and  a  skilful  surgeon  rolled 
into  one"  (p.  153).  On  first  reading  this  passage  one 
supposes  that,  though  the  knowledge  is  not  gained  by 


224>         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

the  wasp  as  it  is  gained  by  the  entomologist  and  the 
surgeon,  yet  it  is  like  their  knowledge.  One  is 
perhaps  influenced  by  what  one  has  been  taught  by 
many  writers  on  instinct  with  regard  to  inherited 
experience,  the  implication  being  that  the  experience 
has  been  won  by  the  race,  as  we  gain  experience,  and 
has  been  transmitted  in  perfected  form.  That,  how- 
ever, is  not  M.  Bergson's  view.  The  knowledge  is 
different  in  kind  and  comes  in  a  wholly  different  way. 
Hear  what  M.  Bergson  says,  some  thirty  pages  later 
(p.  183),  "The  whole  difficulty  comes  from  our 
desire  to  express  the  knowledge  of  the  Hymenoptera 
in  terms  of  intelligence.  It  is  this  that  compels  us  to 
compare  the  Ammophila  with  the  entomologist,  who 
knows  the  caterpillar  as  he  knows  everything  else — 
from  the  outside  without  having  on  his  part  a  special 
or  vital  interest.  The  Ammophila,  we  imagine,  must 
learn  one  by  one,  like  the  entomologist,  the  positions 
of  the  nerve-centres  of  the  caterpillar — must  acquire 
at  least  the  practical  knowledge  of  these  positions  by 
trying  the  effects  of  his  sting.  But  there  is  no  need 
for  such  a  view  if  we  suppose  a  sympathy  (in  the 
etymological  sense  of  the  word)  between  the 
Ammophila  and  his  victim,  which  teaches  it  from 
within,  so  to  say,  the  vulnerability  of  the  caterpillar. 
This  feeling  of  vulnerability  might  owe  nothing  to 
outward  perception,  but  result  from  the  mere  presence 
of  the  Ammophila  and  the  caterpillar  considered  no 
longer  as  two  organisms  but  as  two  activities.  It 
would  express,  in  a  concrete  form,  the  relation  of  one 
to  the  other."  Do  we  find  this  suggestion  of  a 
specialized  and  selective  sympathetic  rapport  between 
life  and  life  more  akin  to  poetry  than  to  science  ?    I 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      225 

am  inclined  to  think  that  M.  Bergson  would  agree  ; 
he  would  assuredly  agree  if  we  substitute  philosophy 
for  poetry.  "  Certainly,"  he  says,  "  a  scientific  theory 
cannot  appeal  to  considerations  of  this  kind.  It  must 
not  put  action  before  organization,  sympathy  before 
perception  and  [intellectual]  knowledge.  But  once 
more,  either  philosophy  has  nothing  to  see  here,  or  its 
role  begins  where  that  of  science  ends"  (p.  183), 

The  burden  of  M.  Bergson's  message  is  that  a 
philosophy  of  life  is  not,  and  cannot  be  the  outcome 
of  a  science  which  deals  with  the  organism,  a  science 
built  up  of  concepts  based  on  intellectual  snap-shots 
in  the  world  of  space.  By  the  cinematographical 
method  we  are  bound  to  get  a  mechanical  result ;  and 
that  is  what  the  intellect,  as  such,  always  provides. 
It  is  incapable  (as  defined  by  M.  Bergson)  of  providing 
anything  else.  He  admits,  nay,  contends,  that 
"organization  can  only  be  studied  scientifically  if  the 
organized  body  has  first  been  likened  to  a  machine. 
.  .  .  This  is  the  standpoint  of  science.  Quite  different 
in  our  opinion  is  that  of  philosophy  "  (p.  98). 

We  must  take  M.  Bergson  on  his  own  terms.  In 
his  philosophy  life  is  extra-mundane — the  Source  of 
all  process.  It  is  beyond  the  reach  of  science ;  the 
intellect  can  nowise  grasp  it.  But  by  intuition,  which 
is  instinct  raised  to  its  highest  power,  it  is  aware  of 
itself ;  and  by  sympathy  it  is  directly  aware  of  other 
process,  most  directly  of  other  process  in  living  organ- 
isms. A  difficult  concept  this — if  indeed  that  can  be 
called  a  concept  which  belongs  to  the  antithetical  kind 
of  knowledge  within  which  clean-cut  concepts  have  no 
place.  M.  Bergson  does  his  best  to  help  us  to  live  our- 
selves into  his  mode  of  thinking.  He  therefore  appeals 
Q 


226         INSTLNCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

to  experience  as  expenenc?^^.  "Though  instinct," 
he  says,  "  is  not  within  the  domain  of  intelligence,  it 
is  not  situated  beyond  the  limits  of  mind.  In  the 
phenomena  of  feeling,  in  unreflecting  sympathy  and 
antipathy,  we  experience  in  ourselves — though  under 
a  much  vaguer  form  and  one  too  much  permeated 
with  intelligence, — something  of  what  must  happen  in 
the  consciousness  of  an  insect  acting  by  instinct.  .  .  . 
Intelligence  is,  before  anything  else,  the  faculty  of 
relating  one  point  of  space  with  another,  one  material 
object  to  another ;  it  applies  to  all  things,  but  remains 
outside  them  ;  and  of  a  deep  cause  it  perceives  only 
the  effects  spread  out  side  by  side.  Whatever  be  the 
force  that  is  at  work  in  the  genesis  of  the  nervous 
system  of  the  caterpillar,  to  our  eyes  and  our  intelli- 
gence it  is  only  a  juxtaposition  of  nerves  and  nerve- 
centres.  It  is  true  that  we  thus  get  at  the  whole 
outer  effect  of  it.  The  Ammophila  no  doubt  discerns 
but  a  very  little  of  that  force,  just  what  concerns 
itself;  but  at  kast  it  discerns  it  from  within,  quite 
otherwise  than  by  a  process  of  [intellectual]  knowledge 
— by  an  intuition  {lived  rather  than  represented), 
which  is  probably  like  what  we  call  divining 
sympathy"  (pp.  184-5). 

Here  we  are  at  the  very  heart  of  M.  Bergson's 
doctrine  of  instinct.  "  Instinct  is  sympathy.  If  this 
sympathy  could  extend  its  object  and  also  reflect 
upon  itself,  it  would  give  us  the  key  to  vital  operations 
— ^just  as  intelligence,  developed  and  disciplined, 
guides  us  into  matter.  For — we  cannot  too  often 
repeat  it — intelligence  and  instinct  are  turned  in 
opposite  directions,  the  former  towards  inert  matter, 
the   latter   towards  life.  ...  It  is  towards  the  very 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT     227 

inwardness  of  life  that  intuition  leads  us — by  intuition 
I  mean,"  says  M.  Bergson,  "  instinct  that  has  become 
disinterested,  self-conscious,  capable  of  reflecting  upon 
its  object  and  of  enlarging  it  indefinitely"  (p.  i86). 

I  cannot  follow  up  in  detail  M.  Bergson's  treatment 
of  the  higher  modes  of  intuition.  Something  must, 
however,  be  said  on  the  subject  since  it  throws  further 
light  on  his  doctrine  of  instinct  with  which  we  are 
here  concerned.  Remembering  (i)  that  instinct  is 
moulded  on  life,  (2)  that  life  is  fundamentally  im- 
pulsion, (3)  that  this  impulsion  is  of  the  psychological 
order,  (4)  that  instinct  is  sympathy,  and  (5)  that 
intuition  is  instinct  become  self-conscious,  as  a  form 
of  enjoyment  leading  us  to  the  very  inwardness  of 
life ; — remembering  these  points,  we  find  that  in  the 
operations  of  the  human  mind  the  essential  feature 
of  intuition  is  that  it  is  vital  impulsion,  diverse  from, 
and  yet  always  co-operating  with,  the  intellect.  We 
find  that  pure  intuition,  external  or  internal,  is  that  of 
an  undivided  continuity.^  It  is  intelligence  that 
breaks  up  this  continuity  into  elements  laid  side  by 
side.  It  is  forced  to  do  so  by  the  needs  of  practical 
life  and,  later,  by  the  needs  of  scientific  thought.  But 
"  by  unmaking  that  which  these  needs  have  made,  we 
may  restore  to  intuition  its  original  purity  and  so 
recover  contact  with  the  real."^  As  Mr,  Wildon 
Carr,  interpreting  M.  Bergson,  says  ^ : — "  Beside  the 
intellect  and  implied  in  our  knowledge  of  its  limit- 
ations, is  a  power  of  intuition,  that  is  of  apprehending 
reality  not  limited  by  the  intellectual  categories,  and 

*  "Matter  and  Memory,"  p.  239. 

*  Ibid,  p,  241. 

'  **  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii,,  p,  236. 


228  INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

this  reality  is  the  living  activity  itself  apprehended  as 
a  real  duration."  We  get  at  this  activity  intuitively 
in  the  midst  of  the  process  of  experienci;^^,  and  we 
feel  that  it  lies  behind  the  items  experienc^'^  and 
susceptible  of  intellectual  treatment.  "  Any  one," 
says  M.  Bergson  in  a  passage  which  Mr.  Lindsay 
quotes  ^ : — "  Any  one  who  has  been  engaged  in  literary 
production,  knows  perfectly  well  that  after  long  study 
has  been  given  to  the  subject,  when  all  documents 
have  been  collected  and  all  sketches  made,  one  thing 
more  is  necessary — an  effort,  often  painful,  to  set  one- 
self in  the  heart  of  the  subject  and  get  from  it  an 
impulse  as  profound  as  possible,  when  there  is  nothing 
more  to  be  done  than  to  follow  it.  This  impulse,  once 
received,  sets  the  spirit  on  a  path  where  it  finds  again 
all  the  information  it  had  collected  and  a  thousand 
other  details.  The  impulse  develops  itself,  analyses 
itself  in  expressions,  whose  enumeration  might  be 
infinite  ;  the  further  you  go  on,  the  more  is  revealed  ; 
never  can  you  say  everything  that  is  to  be  said  ;  and 
yet  if  you  turn  back  to  apprehend  the  impulse  that 
is  behind  you,  it  is  hidden  from  you."  Hidden,  that  is, 
I  take  it,  from  the  intellect  which  deals  with  the 
multiplicity  of  things  given  to  experience — the 
experienc^^j — but  revealed  in  the  process  of  ex- 
perienczV/^  of  enjoying — revealed  through  intuition. 
For  intuition  is,  it  seems,  both  the  consciousness  of 
the  vital  impetus  involved  in  the  higher  mental 
activity,  and  the  realization  of  this  impetus  as  the 
source  of  all  invention.  When  once  the  profound 
impetus  has  been  given,  the  application  may  be  left  to 

1  "The  Philosophy  of  Bergson,"  pp.  237-8.       Quoted  from  ''The 
Introduction  to  Melapbysic"  (1903). 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT     229 

the  intellect  working  in  cinematographical  fashion 
with  its  symbols  and  its  concepts.  To  intuition  we 
owe  "  all  that  is  greatest  in  the  exact  sciences  as  well 
as  all  that  deserves  to  live  in  metaphysic."  But  "if 
intuition  originated  the  invention  it  was  the  symbol 
alone  that  made  the  application  possible  "  ;  ^  and  the 
symbol  is  the  tool  that  intelligence  fashions  for  its 
use. 

It  is,  I  conceive,  through  internal  intuition  that  we 
have  our  knowledge  of  experiencing — of  think/;/^ — of 
that  aspect  of  experience  which,  as  I  urged  at  the 
close  of  the  last  chapter,  can  never  become  the  object 
of  intelligent  knowledge — can  never  (save  through 
some  symbolic  expression)  take  its  place  among  the 
"  eds  "  of  experience.  It  is,  I  conceive,  through  the 
external  intuition  which  M.  Bergson  calls  sympathy, 
and  never  by  any  intellectual  process,  save  through 
some  symbolism  verbal  or  other  (the  word  external 
being  itself,  for  M.  Bergson,  an  intellectual  concept 
since  all  intuition  is  interpenetrating) — it  is,  I  say, 
through  sympathy  alone  that  we  can  have  intuitive 
knowledge  of  the  mental  processes  of  our  fellow  men 
or  of  animals.  Such  intuitive  sympathy  is  the  special 
characteristic  of  the  artist ;  it  is  the  parent  of  the 
animism  of  primitive  times  and  primitive  races.  But 
from  what  less  self-conscious  form  are  this  intuition 
and  this  sympathy  evolved  ?  From  the  instinct 
which,  in  far-away  times  past,  was  interpenetrating 
with,  and  scarcely  differentiated  from,  intelligence. 
The  instinctive  knowledge  of  the  animal  is  of  the  same 
order  as   our  own   intuitive   knowledge  but  always 

*  Quoted  from  "  Introduction  to  Metaphysic,"  by  Lindsay,  op.  cit., 
p.  225. 


230         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

in  the  evolutionary  process,  specialized  and  selectively 
concentrated  on  those  objects,  or  rather  those 
processes,  which  are  provocative  of  instinctive 
behaviour.  Such  I  believe  to  be  the  kernel  of  M. 
Bergson's  doctrine  of  instinct. 

It  is  no  doubt  possible,  nay,  probable,  that  I  have 
selectively  absorbed  those  parts  of  his  doctrine  which 
appeal  to  my  own  modes  of  thought.  But  I  elected 
the  stream  of  sympathy  rather  than  that  of  criticism 
and  naturally  emphasize  that  part  of  his  treatment 
with  which  I  can  sympathize.  I  trust,  however,  that  I 
have  not  unintentionally  mis-represented  M.  Bergson's 
central  idea.  It  now  remains  for  me  to  show  how 
far  my  own  interpretation  differs  from  or  accords 
with  that  which  I  find  in  M.  Bergson's  pages. 

In  the  first  place  I  must  set  aside  all  the  pure 
memory  business,  all  reference  to  extra-mundane  life. 
With  these  I  have  no  concern.  Of  course  this  ruling 
out  of  the  character  of  Hamlet  from  M,  Bergson's 
philosophical  drama  leaves  the  play  a  maimed  and 
mutilated  travesty  which  the  author  would  not 
acknowledge  as  representative  of  his  work.  I  seek, 
however,  the  intra-mundane  basis  which  remains  when 
the  extra-mundane  elements  have  been  removed. 
Were  there  no  such  solid  basis  I  feel  convinced  that 
the  fabric  of  the  philosophy  could  not  stand.  Now,  for 
M.  Bergson  the  characteristic  feature  of  instinct  is  that 
it  is  a  form  of  knowledge  which  has  an  inward 
direction,  lifewards — opposite  to  that  of  the  intellect 
which  is  ever  directed  outwards  so  as  to  apprehend 
objects  in  space.  Even  as  sympathy  instinct  is  an 
inner  feeling.  The  Ammophila  is  taught  from  within 
of  the   vulnerability   of    the    caterpillar ;    and    this 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT      231 

instinctive  rapport  "  might  owe  nothing  whatever  to 
outward  perception."    That  seems  to  me  to  be  an 
extravagant  position.      I  question  whether  any  form 
of  sympathy  can  be  said  to  owe  nothing  whatever  to 
outward  perception  :  it  is  only  called  into  being  in 
alliance  with  outward  perception.       In  any  case  as  I 
interpret  instinctive  experience  it  has  both  an  outward 
and  an  inward  direction — an  inner  awareness  as  the 
enjoyment  of  experiencing — an  outward  reference  in 
as  much  as  an  external  situation  is  experienced.       I 
freely  admit  that  at  the  instinctive  stage  of  mental 
development  these  are  but  little  differentiated  ;  indeed 
the  difference  of  reference  can  only  be  apprehended 
through  reflective  thought.     But  M.  Bergson's  instinct 
(inner     direction)     and     his     intelligence     (outward 
direction)  are  given  together.     And  I  should  urge  that 
the  business  direction  of  what  I  should  call  instinctive 
experience  is  towards  the  experienci?<a? — not  towards 
the  experiencz;^^,  though  both  are  given  at  the  same 
time.      The   practical    reference    when    a    chick    is 
pecking  at  small  objects  is  to  the  grains  or  maggots 
not   to  the  enjoyment,  though  that  is  present   and 
essential  to  the  conscious  relationship.     For  me  the 
difference   between   instinctive    experience    and   the 
supervening  phase  of  intelligence  is  that,  in  the  latter, 
pre-perceptions,  due  to  the  revival  of  previous  ex- 
perience, are  present  and  play  their  part  in  determining 
the  behaviour  which  is  thereby  rendered  intelligent. 
But  in  intelligent  experience,  at  this  early  stage  of  its 
genesis,  both  directions,  inner  and  outward,  are  still 
present.      There  is   that  which   is   intelligently  ex- 
perienced and  there  is  an  enjoyment  of  intelligently 
experiencing.      And   this   is   carried   up,   in   further 


232         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

development,  to  the  highest  limits  of  our  intellectual 
life.  There,  too,  we  have  the  intellectually  experienced 
concepts  and  the  like,  and  the  enjoyment  of  intellectual 
experiencing. 

Nothing  can  be  experienced,  by  arthropod  or 
vertebrate,  without  experiencing ;  experiencing  is 
impossible  with  nothing  experienced.  None  the  less, 
if  we  may  trust  our  own  experience  (and  what  else  can 
we  trust?)  there  may  be  a  marked  difference  of 
emphasis.  In  our  intellectual  life  we  may  so  dwell 
on  the  aspect  of  the  known  that  the  process  of  know- 
ing becomes  merely  a  background  accompaniment. 
In  our  emotional  life  the  tide  of  feeling  may  rise  to 
such  a  level  of  intensity  that  our  whole  being 
seems  concentrated  at  the  experiencing  pole.  This 
variation  of  emphasis  is  a  familiar  fact  of  our  daily 
life.  It  may  be  that  in  animal  life — in  that  of  the 
arthropod  for  example — the  emphasis  on  feeling,  on 
enjoyment  pleasurable  or  the  reverse,  predominates. 
Who  can  say  ?  Probably  nowhere,  save  in  human 
thought,  is  the  emphasis  on  the  intellectually  known 
and  knowable,  so  highly  differentiated  until  it 
culminates  in  the  predominantly  intellectualist 
temper  of  the  man  of  science.  And  nowhere,  save 
in  human  thought,  is  experiencing  itself  in  some 
measure  translated  into  terms  of  the  known  and 
knowable,  so  that  we  can  discuss  it  in  conceptual 
language.  Thus  we  reach  the  paradox  that  internal 
intuition  and  the  external  intuition  of  sympathy 
are  dealt  with  in  a  manner  so  splendidly  intellectual 
as  that  which  M.  Bergson  employs  to  win  us  over  to 
the  view  that  they  are  not  susceptible  of  intellectual 
treatment ! 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  INSTINCT     233 

But  it  is  only  by  putting  ourselves  outside  the 
process  of  experiencing  that  we  can  deal  with  it  in 
terms  of  intellectual  knowledge.  We  are  forced  to 
view  it  as  if  from  without  in  order  to  give  it  a  place 
in  our  ideal  construction  of  the  natural  order.  We 
live  in  the  conscious  relationship  and,  as  we  live,  it  is 
only  by  intuition  that  we  are  aware  of  its  enjoyment 
direction.  But  in  interpreting  our  own  experience 
we  stand  outside  it  and  view  it  thus  translated  in 
relative  detachment  from  the  process  of  knowing  it. 
The  correlative  process  is,  however,  never  absent. 
No  percepts  are  possible  without  the  process  of 
perceiving  ;  no  concepts  without  the  process  of 
conceiving  ;  no  synthesis  of  experienced  items  is 
possible  without  the  synthetic  process  of  experiencing. 
In  all  phases  of  mental  life — in  arthropods  or  verte- 
brates,— instinct  and  intelligence  (in  M.  Bergson's 
sense  of  the  words)  intuition  and  intellect,  are 
the  inner  and  outer  directions  of  the  self-same 
experience. 

It  is  part  of  M.  Bergson's  method  to  found  on 
the  results  of  analysis  a  sundering  of  orders  of 
existence.  An  analysis  of  natural  relationships  leads 
us  to  distinguish  the  conscious  and  the  organic  from 
the  mechanical  and  the  physical.  This  is  straight- 
way made  the  basis  of  a  separation  of  two  wholly 
different  orders,  that  of  the  vital  and  that  of  the 
inert.  Again :  some  measure  of  permanence  and 
some  measure  of  change  are  given  together  in 
perceptual  experience  ;  forthwith  the  permanence  is 
bestowed  unreservedly  on  the  order  of  the  inert ; 
the  change  is  restricted  to  the  order  of  the  vital. 
But  all  change  involves  time-relationships  ;  and  so 


234  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

duration  becomes  the  sole  prerogative  of  the  vital 
and  the  conscious,  and  the  material  universe,  as  such, 
is  left  timeless  and  irretrievably  static.  Intuition  and 
intellect  are  blended  in  mental  life  ;  but  the  former 
is  moulded  on  the  vital  order  which  can  be  known 
through  it  alone  ;  the  latter  deals  only  with  static 
snap-shots  and  cannot  comprehend  life  or  process. 
Thus  are  the  results  of  analysis  hypostatized  in 
M.  Bergson's  philosophy. 

Now  I  conceive  that  M.  Bergson  is  right  in 
contending  that  time  and  process,  change  and  motion 
are  pHviarily  given  in  experience  through  intuition 
and  enjoyment.  We  are  thus  aware  of  them  at 
first  hand.  But  is  he  right  in  restricting  time  and 
process  and  movement  to  the  so-called  vital  order 
and  leaving  the  material  universe  timeless,  processless, 
and  immobile  }  I  believe  that  he  is  wholly  wrong. 
Though  we  may  know  them  outside  us  only  in 
second-hand  reflection  ;  there  they  are  to  be  thus 
known.  Let  us  grant  that  abstract  science,  the 
ultimate  triumph  of  intellectual  procedure  according 
to  M.  Bergson,  deals  with  static  snap-shots.  As  we 
shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  mathematicians  treat 
the  mechanics  of  motion  in  terms  of  configurations 
of  particles,  these  particles  occupying  a  series  of 
selected  positions  ;  and  any  such  position  is  a  strictly 
instantaneous  cinematograph  picture  in  thought. 
No  doubt  each  position  is  that  which  is  occupied  in 
a  given  instant  of  time  ;  but  it  is  in  what  M.  Bergson 
would  call  a  spatialized  time — a  position  on  a  time- 
chart  represented  by  a  point  on  a  line  in  space  which 
only  symbolizes  time  for  the  intellect.  It,  too,  is  a 
snap-shot.    There  is  no  flow  in  a  point ;  the  continuous 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  INSTINCT      235 

progress  of  real  duration  is  eliminated.  Well  and 
good.  The  method  is  triumphantly  successful.  But 
when  we  are  thinking  of  the  process  which  is  thus 
dealt  with  in  snap-shots,  we  think  through  the 
positions,  and  the  process  of  thought  restores  the 
real  movement,  the  real  duration,  the  time-flow, 
which  had  been  eliminated  for  the  purposes  of 
rigidly  scientific  treatment.  Yes  !  says  M.  Bergson. 
But  this  movement,  this  duration,  is  wholly  within 
the  order  of  the  vital ;  it  is  movement  and  duration 
of  our  thinking.  And  in  so  far  as  there  is  real 
process  outside  us,  we  come  into  touch  with  it, 
through  sympathetic  intuition,  as  part  of  the  order 
of  the  vital — the  Life-impetus  of  the  universe.  Now 
for  us,  as  for  M.  Bergson  there  is  real  movement  and 
real  duration  in  the  process^  the  products  of  which  are 
experienced.  For  him,  however,  the  reality  is  in  the 
order  of  the  vital  artificially  sundered  from  the  order  of 
the  inert.  For  us  the  reality  is  in  the  constitution  of 
nature,  many  of  the  processes  of  which  are  not  what 
we  should  term  vital.  They  are  inorganic  processes, 
but  none  the  less  exhibiting  real  changes  in  time. 

But  how  do  we  get  at  the  movement  and  the 
duration  of  any  process  which  is  outside  us,  since  the 
only  process  we  can  enjoy  is  that  of  experiencing? 
M.  Bergson  says  that  we  do  so  by  sympathy.  I 
should  adapt  his  thought  to  my  own  interpretation 
as  follows  : — We  are  privileged  centres  of  relationship 
within  a  relational  context.  Of  any  other  centre  of 
relationships,  say  another  man  or  animal,  we  can 
only  realize  the  nature  of  its  process,  by  reading 
ourselves  into  its  very  heart.  The  more  of  the  artist 
there  is  in  us,  the  greater  the  measure  of  our  success. 


236         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

For  in  artistic  appreciation  intuition  and  sympathy 
are  all-important.  We  can  only  realize,  and  that 
imperfectly,  the  instinctive  relationships  of  bird  or 
bee  by  putting  ourselves  in  the  place  of  the  organism 
which  is  behaving  instinctively — by  feeling  its  very 
life.  In  some  such  form  I  can  accept  M.  Bergson's 
teaching — But  how  do  we  come  to  do  it?  Is  it 
through  strictly  intellectual  procedure,  the  drawing 
of  logical  inference  in  explicit  fashion.  M.  Bergson 
says  No.  And  here  again  I  can  in  large  measure 
agree.  Its  roots  surely  lie  deeper  than  that.  It  is 
through  no  such  intellectual  and  logical  procedure 
that  the  cat  in  some  way  and  in  some  degree  comes 
to  realize  the  nature  of  its  kitten, — dimly  and  dumbly 
no  doubt,  but  still  effectively  for  practical  behaviour. 
The  work  of  logic  and  the  intellect,  in  us  as  inter- 
preters, is  concerned  rather  with  the  reasonable 
restriction  of  a  sympathetic  tendency  which  is  far 
more  primitive  than  scientific  inference. 

Does  it  not,  however,  seem  somewhat  strained 
and  extravagant  to  say  that  we  sympathize  with  the 
processes  of  inorganic  nature  ?  Is  not  this  merely  a 
poetical  metaphor .?  Can  we  enter  sympathetically 
into  the  process  of  crystallization }  Can  we 
sympathize  with  the  solar  system  ?  In  a  sense  I 
believe  we  can,  and  must  do  so,  even  to  attain  the 
end  of  scientific  interpretation.  If  we  would  follow 
any  movement  or  process  in  thought  we  must  always 
to  some  extent  identify  ourselves  with  the  process, 
must  live  its  flow,  must  get  in  some  measure 
inside  it,  if  we  are  adequately  to  realize  its  nature. 
"  How  marvellously  you  seem  to  know  exactly  how 
your   motor-car   will    behave   at  any  moment   and 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  INSTINCT     237 

just  what  it  wants,"  said  a  friend  to  a  skilled 
expert.  '*  I  do  it  by  instinct,"  was  the  reply  ;  "  but 
then  you  see  I  am  a  motor-car ! "  Some  such 
reading  of  oneself  into  the  very  heart  of  one's 
object  of  thought  is  the  secret  of  success  in  all 
effective  interpretation  even  of  inorganic  processes. 
You  must  in  some  fashion  feel  the  polarities  of  the 
molecules  in  the  crystal,  feel  the  double  refraction 
of  the  light  that  passes  through  it,  feel  the  electrical 
strains  of  the  ether  you  invent.  It  is  when  a  man 
of  science  knows  the  process  he  seeks  to  elucidate, 
as  it  were  from  within,  that  he  shoots  ahead  of 
his  fellows  who  know  only  its  outer  aspect.  This 
is  part  of  his  intuition ;  his  touch  of  genius.  Is 
this  a  matter  of  the  intellect  as  such  ?  Unquestion- 
ably in  such  cases  it  is,  highly  intellectualized. 
But  it  is  probably  only  the  supreme  development 
of  a  process  which  permeates  the  whole  of  experience, 
of  that  which  some  psychologists  term  the  empathic 
tendency  ;  a  tendency  to  be  in  some  measure  the 
object  of  close  attention  ;  a  tendency  for  the 
enjoyment  of  experiencing  to  diffuse  itself  over,  or 
to  insinuate  itself  into,  that  which  is  experienced  in 
the  focus  of  perception  ;  a  tendency  which,  as  I 
said  above,  is  at  the  root  of  the  animism  of  primitive 
races.  One  is  forced  to  put  the  matter  rather  vaguely 
and  picturesquely.  As  M.  Bergson  would  say,  it  is 
not  readily  snap-shotted  by  the  intellect.  But  if  we 
ourselves  endeavour  to  sympathize  with  his  thought, 
such  considerations  seem  to  justify  his  view  that 
intuition,  sympathy,  and  instinct,  in  his  sense  of  the 
term,  point  inwards  to  the  reality  of  process,  rather 
than  outwards  to  its  materialized  products. 


238         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

As  a  rider  to  our  discussion  of  M.  Bergson's 
doctrine  of  instinct  and  intuition  we  may  devote  a 
brief  space  to  Dr.  C.  S.  Myers'  suggestive  thesis 
to  which  allusion  was  made  in  an  earlier  chapter. 
According  to  M.  Bergson,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
province  of  instinct  and  intuition  is  to  apprehend 
the  inner  nature  of  process,  of  life  and  consciousness, 
while  the  province  of  intelligence  and  the  intellect 
is  to  know  the  external  order  of  the  inert.  "  If 
the  consciousness  that  slumbers  in  instinct  should 
awake,"  he  tells  us  ;  "  if  we  could  ask  and  it  could 
reply,  it  would  give  up  to  us  the  most  intimate 
secrets  of  life."  According  to  M.  Bergson  instinct 
and  intuition  are  moulded  on  life  and  feel  its  inner 
pulses  ;  but  intelligence  and  the  intellect  are 
moulded  on  the  mechanical  and  the  inert,  and 
mechanize  all  that  they  touch.  Dr.  Myers  on  the 
other  hand  inverts  this  relationship  to  the  inner 
life  and  to  objective  interpretation.  "  According  to 
my  view,  and  to  my  use  of  the  words,"  he  says,^ 
"  instinct  regarded  from  within  becomes  intelligence  ; 
intelligence  regarded  from  without  becomes  instinct" 
And  he  correlates  instinct  with  a  mechanistic 
interpretation  ;  intelligence  with  a  finalistic  inter- 
pretation. According  to  him  instinct  and  intelligence 
are  different  aspects,  outer  and  inner,  of  one  and  the 
same  mental  process.  "We  ought,"  he  says  (pp. 
267-8),  "to  speak,  not  of  instinct  and  intelligence, 
but  of  instinct-intelligence  treating  the  two  as  one 
indivisible  mental  function.  .  .  .  Regarded  from  the 
objective  standpoint  instinct-intelligence  appears  as 
instinct ;   regarded  from  the  subjective  standpoint  it 

1  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol  iii,,  p.  218. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INSTINCT      239 

appears  as  intelligence."  Here  we  have  a  use  of 
the  term  instinct  which  is  very  different  from, 
almost  diametrically  opposite  to,  that  which  M. 
Bergson  has  striven  to  render  current.  We  must 
remember,  however,  that  as  things  now  are,  no 
two  writers  use  the  term  in  quite  the  same  sense ! 

From  some  passages  it  seems  as  if  the  antithesis 
which  Dr.  Myers  seeks  to  emphasize  is  that  between 
the  physiological  and  the  mental.  For  he  says  (p. 
270) : — "  Throughout  the  psychical  world  there  is 
but  one  physiological  mechanism ;  there  is  but  one 
psychological  function — instinct-intelligence."  Here 
instinct  appears  to  be  correlated  with  physiological 
mechanism ;  and  intelligence  with  psychological 
function.  I  am  doubtful,  however,  whether  I  have 
quite  grasped  Dr.  Myers'  full  meaning ;  for  he 
speaks  (p.  269)  of  instincts  as  "endowed  with  per- 
ceptual and  conative  dispositions."  But  if  instinct 
is  the  physiological  aspect  of  the  two-faced  unity, 
the  propriety  of  applying  the  terms  perceptual  and 
conative  to  this  aspect  is  questionable — so  question- 
able that  I  fear  that  I  may  not  be  giving  a  correct 
summary  of  Dr.  Myers'  thesis. 

In  any  case,  if  I  understand  him  aright,  the 
highest  development  of  human  intelligence  is  but 
one  aspect  of  that  which  has  a  strictly  correlative 
instinctive  aspect.  And  this  is  brought  into  relation 
with  a  philosophical  doctrine  of  the  relation  of 
mechanism  to  finalism.  Dr.  Myers  advocates  the 
thorough-going  acceptance  of  a  mechanical  aspect 
of  all  that,  in  its  psychological  aspect,  he  regards 
as  finalistic.  "  Some  superhuman  being,"  he  says 
(p.  207),  "  would  as  surely  find  our  human  intelligence 


240  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

determined  by  mechanism  as  we  commonly  believe 
the  mental  activity  of  animals  to  be  determined 
by  instinct."  We  must  not,  however,  infer  that  Dr. 
Myers  would  regard  such  mechanism  as  other  than 
the  phenomenal  appearance  of  the  underlying 
purpose  of  which  it  is  the  expression.  His 
philosophy  is  essentially  finalistic  ;  "  for  ends  exist 
not  only  in  life  but  throughout  the  universe " 
(p.  217),  The  mechanism  of  instinct  is  only  an 
aspect  of  that  fundamental  finalism  which  is 
characteristic  of  intelligence. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

FINALISM    AND    MECHANISM:    BODY   AND 
MIND 

AT  the  close  of  the  last  chapter  we  saw  that  Dr. 
Myers  regards  the  antithesis  between  instinct 
and  intelligence  as  an  example  of  the  wider  antithesis 
between  mechanism  and  finalism.  "  So  far  as  instinc- 
tive behaviour,"  he  says,  "  can  be  regarded  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  individual  experience  of  the 
organism,  it  appears,  however  imperfectly,  as  intelli- 
gent,— characterized  by  finalism.  So  far  as  intelligent 
behaviour  can  be  regarded  from  the  standpoint  of 
observing  the  conduct  of  other  organisms,  it  appears, 
however  imperfectly,  as  instinctive — characterized  by 
mechanism."  Thus  for  him  intelligence  and  instinct, 
finalism  and  mechanism,  are  equally  true  and  valid 
interpretations  of  the  same  problem  regarded  from 
different  standpoints.  And  the  broader  antithesis 
is  all-embracing  in  its  range ;  "  for  end  exists  not 
only  in  Life  but  throughout  the  Universe,  if  only 
we  view  the  Universe  as  a  huge  organism  "^  (p.  217). 
The  last  sentence  suggests  the  doctrine  of  panpsychism 
— to  be  briefly  considered  in  the  sequel.  Our  present 
concern  is  with  finalism  and  mechanism.  We  will 
deal  with  finalism  first. 

*   *'  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol.  iii,,  p.  209, 
R  241 


242         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

What  from  the  empirical  point  of  view  does 
finalism  mean  ?  It  means,  I  suppose,  that  in  some 
cases  we  can  with  advantage  interpret  a  process  as 
proceeding  to  or  towards  an  end  which  we  can  foresee. 
In  what  cases  ?  In  those  in  which  we  have  become 
acquainted  with  natural  routine.  Apart  from  routine 
we  have  'no  data  on  which  to  base  any  anticipation 
of  end.  Now  there  is  plenty  of  routine  in  the  inorganic 
world  which  we  might  interpret  in  this  way.  But  as 
a  matter  of  fact  we  seldom  do  so.  Nor  do  we  use  the 
word  purposive  in  such  connexions.  We  do  not 
speak  of  earth-sculpture  as  the  end  of  denudation  ; 
nor  do  we  speak  of  the  process  of  denudation  as 
purposive.  When  we  have  occasion  to  look  ahead 
we  are  content  to  predict  future  stages  of  routine, 
without  introducing  the  finalistic  concept  of  end  or 
purpose. 

We  will  pass  at  once,  then,  to  the  sphere  of 
organic  life.  Here  we  do  commonly  employ  finalistic 
terms.  We  say  that  flight  is  the  end  for  which 
wings  are  developed  ;  the  secretion  of  bile,  one  of 
the  ends  which  the  liver  subserves.  The  whole  con- 
ception of  adaptation  in  biology,  with  its  undertone 
of  utility,  is  a  conception  implying  an  end  to  be 
attained.  I  have  myself  again  and  again  spoken  of 
instinctive  behaviour  as  purposive  and  laid  stress  on 
its  survival  value — that  is  its  value  to  the  end  of 
escaping  elimination. 

Now  it  may  be  urged  that,  from  the  strictly 
scientific  point  of  view,  all  these  modes  of  expression 
are  unsatisfactory  and  misleading  if  they  imply  that 
in  any  single  case  the  present  is  conditioned  by  the 
future   or  the   earlier   stage  by  the  later.     For  the 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM         243 

future  is  not  yet  in  being,  and  the  later  stage  is 
non-existent  till  it  is  actually  reached.  Adaptive 
behaviour,  it  will  be  said,  is  in  all  cases  to  be 
explained  as  a  heritage  of  the  past ;  the  well-adapted 
parents  have  survived  and  have  transmitted  to  their 
offspring  the  so-called  potentiality  of  like  adaptation. 
This  potentiality  is  just  the  present  structure  and 
constitution  of  the  organism.  All  this  is  true  enough 
and  sufficiently  obvious  to  all  those  who  have  devoted 
any  thought  to  the  subject.  And  yet  there  is  surely 
something  about  the  peculiar  nature  of  biological 
phenomena  which  justifies  the  conception  of  end  or 
purpose — a  conception  which  is  current  among 
biologists  of  all  schools.  What  is  that  something  ? 
Clearly  the  correlated  routine  which  we  sum  up  under 
the  term  heredity. 

Now  we  must  distinguish  between  the  end  fore- 
seen, however  dimly,  by  a  conscious  organism,  and 
the  end  foreseen  by  the  biologist  who  studies  the 
organism.  The  former  is  a  pre-perceptive  or  anticipa- 
tory conscious  relationship  developed  in  the  intelligent 
organism  ;  the  latter  is  an  anticipation  in  the  mind 
of  the  observer  who  interprets.  The  former  may, 
perhaps,  not  unreasonably  for  our  present  purpose, 
be  excluded  in  the  case  of  plants.  Reading  our 
anticipation  into  that  which  we  interpret  we  say, 
that  the  acorn  contains  the  potentiality  of  the  oak- 
tree  ;  that  its  end  is  to  become  an  oak  ;  or  perhaps, 
more  generally,  that  it  is  part  of  the  purpose  of  nature 
that  seeds  should  develop  into  plants,  shrubs,  or  trees. 
And  we  foresee  that  any  given  seed  will  grow  into  the 
likeness  of  its  parents — a  likeness  which  is  substan- 
tially perfect,   if  for  the  present  we  disregard   all 


244         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

variations  and  mutations.  How  have  we  come  to 
know  this  ?  In  brief  by  the  study  of  life-history  in 
a  series  of  affih'ated  individuals  ?;/,  n^  o,  and/.  Such 
study  reveals  routine.  We  find  that,  in  them,  the 
tune  of  development  is  played  again  and  again 
da  capo.  And  having  learnt  the  tune  in  m,  n,  o, 
and  p,  we  foresee  the  sequence  of  the  organic  melody 
and  harmony  in  q  as  soon  as  a  few  chords  have  been 
played.  Then  we  can  say  that  the  opening  bars  are 
significant  of  the  whole  piece — may  even  say  that 
the  simple  organic  ditty  of  nmcor  or  the  complex 
symphony  of  qiiercns  is  the  end  for  which  the  opening 
bars  of  development  exist.  But  we  can  only  do  so 
in  so  far  as  history  repeats  itself;  and  history  only 
repeats  itself  so  far  as  the  constitution  of  q,  and  the 
conditions  at  any  given  stage  of  its  development, 
resemble  the  constitution  of  p  and  o  and  the  condi- 
tions at  like  stages  of  their  development.  Any 
"prospective  value,"  apart  from  constitution  and 
conditions  actually  present,  is  entirely  in  the  mind 
of  the  interpreter. 

But  here  the  teleological  vitalists  will  demur. 
If  Dr.  Driesch  be  their  spokesman  he  will  urge 
that  we  are  wholly  ignoring  the  really  important 
question  : — Why  the  sequence  in  any  given  case  is 
what,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  observe  it  to  be :  we  are 
ignoring  his  reply  to  this  question,  namely,  that 
entelechy  is  the  ground  and  Source  of  development  and 
organization.  With  entelechy  as  Source  I  have  here 
no  concern  ;  we  do  not  seek  the  why  of  any  natural 
process  in  this  sense.  And  to  entelechy  as  ground 
I  raise  no  serious  objection.  It  is  just  the  inherited 
constitution  under  another  name.     If  it  be  found 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM         245 

convenient  to  name  the  ground  of  organization  in 
yeast  or  amoeba,  in  alga  or  mollusk,  in  oak-tree  or 
man,  its  entelechy,  I  do  not  see  what  reasonable 
objection  can  be  taken ;  so  long  as  scientific  interpre- 
tation is  furthered,  and  so  long  as  it  avowedly  labels 
the  specific  characteristic  of  processes  which  are  just 
part  of  the  natural  order  ;  so  long,  in  short,  as  it  is 
not  hypostatized  as  a  controlling  entity. 

A  little  way  back  we  disregarded  the  occurrence 
of  variations  or  mutations.  Now,  granted  that  both 
modes  of  organic  change  obtain  ;  granted  that  biolo- 
gists will  some  day  be  able  to  elucidate  more  clearly 
the  conditions  of  their  natural  origin  ;  granted  that 
mutations  occur  beyond  the  field  of  hybridization  ; 
granted  that  in  some  more  or  less  modified  form  the 
Mendelian  laws  may  be  fully  established  ;  nay,  more, 
granted  that  it  may  hereafter  be  proved  that,  quite 
apart  from  natural  selection,  in  which  the  environment 
is  so  potent  a  factor,  organic  evolution  occurs  along 
lines  determined  by  the  intrinsic  constitution  of  the 
evolving  organisms.  Let  all  this  be  granted  in  a 
spirit  of  generous  concession.  We  are  indeed 
granting  more  than,  in  my  opinion,  is  at  present 
proven  ;  still  I  see  no  reason  why  all  this  should  not 
be  conceded  for  the  sake  of  argument.  For  the  sake 
of  what  argument  ?  The  argument  for  finalism.  And 
what  does  this  argument  come  to  ?  This  : — that 
in  organic  nature  up  to  date  we  find  definite  tendencies 
in  apparently  determinate  directions ;  and  that  we 
may,  in  some  cases,  foretell  from  the  trend  of  the 
evolutionary  curve  up  to  date,  its  probable  course  in 
the  future.  But  the  natural  order  is  throughout 
replete  with  determinate  tendencies  of  such  a  character 


246         INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

that  we  can  with  some  confidence  predict  what  will 
occur  if  things  go  on  in  the  time  to  come  as  they 
have  gone  on  in  the  time  that  is  past,  wherein  our 
observations  have  been  carried  out.  Such  finalism, 
then,  is  really  nothing  other  than  our  old  friend 
scientific  prediction  under  another  name. 

But  what  if  the  variations  or  mutations  are 
genuinely  new  departures — are  creative,  as  M. 
Bergson  would  say  ?  What  if  they  are  unforeseeable 
and  unpredictable  because  they  are  off  the  line  of 
previous  routine  ?  I  have  already  urged  that  this 
would  not  be  a  matter  for  surprise,  since  nature  is 
replete  with  events  which  could  not  be  predicted 
because  the  routine  of  their  occurrence  had  not  yet 
been  presented  for  observation — the  appropriate 
conditions  had  not  yet  occurred.  But  surely  such 
unpredictable  new  departures  cannot  for  one 
moment  be  regarded  as  affording  any  evidence  for 
finalism,  at  our  present  stage  of  its  consideration, 
since  their  essential  characteristic  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  end  cannot  be  foreseen.  For  empirical  treat- 
ment finalistic  interpretation  is  based  on  routine  : 
non-routine  events  wholly  escape  the  meshes  of  .its 
net. 

So  far  we  have  considered  a  finalistic  interpreta- 
tion of  processes  in  which  we  have  assumed  the 
conscious  relationship  to  be  absent.  We  have  con- 
sidered purposive  processes — that  is,  processes  which 
we  interpret  as  proceeding  to  an  end  which  ive 
can  foresee.  Only  where  an  intelligent  being  is 
guided  in  virtue  of  the  presence  of  conscious  relation- 
ships towards  an  end  which  he  can  dimly  or  clearly 
foresee  do  we  have  finalistic   behaviour  or  conduct 


FINALISM   AND   MECHANISM  247 

and  not  merely  a  finalistic  interpretation — purpose- 
ful behaviour,  and  not  merely  behaviour  which  we 
may  regard  as  purposive  like  many  of  the  tropisms 
in  plants  and  lowly  animals. 

Now  there  can  surely  be  no  doubt  that  in  human 
life,  where  elementary  meaning  for  practical  behaviour 
has  risen  to  significance  for  conceptual  thought  and 
conduct,  wherein  interest  is  far-reaching  and  conative 
process  has  become  fully  volitional,  wherein  the  out- 
look towards  the  possible  or  probable  future  has 
become  open-eyed  and  rational ; — there  can  surely 
be  no  doubt  that  here  purpose  and  end  are  concepts 
essential  for  adequate  interpretation  of  the  facts. 
Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt  that  what  we  may  fairly 
speak  of  as  the  same  end  may  be  reached  by  different 
means.  This  is  a  salient  feature  of  the  higher 
mental  life.  It  is  not  distinctive  of  the  higher  mental 
life,  nor  of  intelligent  process.  It  is  seen  in  in- 
stinctive behaviour,  and  is  abundantly  illustrated  in 
biology  where  somewhat  similar  structural  features — 
such  as  those  of  the  eye  in  vertebrates  and  in  some 
moUusks — have  been  reached  by  different  evolu- 
tionary routes,  and  where  the  regeneration  of  lost 
parts  takes  place  in  diverse  manners  and  even  in 
some  cases,  it  seems,  from  tissues  of  different  em- 
bryonic origin.  I  do  not  even  say  that  this  apparent 
identity  of  effect  reached  through  a  series  of 
different  conditions  is  restricted  to  the  mental  and  the 
organic  spheres.  Even  in  the  inorganic  realm, 
though  we  may  assert  with  some  confidence  that  the 
same  assemblage  of  conditions  will  always,  in  a 
system  similarly  constituted,  be  the  antecedent  of  the 
same  effect,  we  cannot  convert  this  proposition,  and 


MS         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

say  that  an  apparently  identical  effect  is  always  the 
consequence  of  the  same  assemblage  of  conditions. 
Still  in  the  inorganic  world  we  can  work  back  from 
effect  to  correlated  conditions  with  much  greater 
security  than  we  can  in  the  realm  of  the  living,  where 
such  a  method  of  procedure  is  proverbially  insecure. 
Nor  is  this  surprising  when  one  remembers  how  com- 
plexity and  unity  are  combined  in  the  organism  as 
they  are  combined  nowhere  else  in  nature  ;  and  when 
one  remembers  that  stability  in  constitution  amid 
varying  conditions  has,  perhaps  more  than  anything 
else,  the  hall-mark  of  survival  value  ;  is,  perhaps  more 
than  anything  else,  what  we  should  expect  to  find 
under  vigorous  natural  selection.  Nowhere  is  com- 
plexity in  unity  carried  to  higher  level  than  in  man  ; 
nowhere  is  constitutional  stability  (which  we  com- 
monly speak  of  as  the  triumph  of  character  over 
circumstances)  more  pronounced  ;  nowhere  does  the 
end  more  markedly  dominate  the  means.  In  any 
case  it  is  a  sufficiently  familiar  fact  that  what  we 
roughly  call  the  same  end  may  be  attained  by  very 
different  means. 

But  when  we  say  that  in  human  life  the  present 
is  big  with  the  future,  which  it  will  beget,  that  the 
child  has  the  potentialities  which  will  be  realized  in 
later  years,  that  the  end  in  view  precedes  and 
dominates  the  devising  of  means  to  its  attainment,  do 
we  mean,  can  we  seriously  mean,  that  the  present  is 
determined  by  the  future  ?  The  future  is  not  yet  in 
being.  How  can  that  which  is  non-existent  deter- 
mine conduct,  or  thought,  or  anything  else  ?  It  is  an 
inversion  of  the  natural  order  of  sequence  to  speak, 
in  any  natural  sense,  of  the  future  as  a  condition  of 


FINALISM   AND  MECHANISM  249 

present  process.  The  true  statement  of  the  matter  is 
surely  this : — That  among  the  conditions,  then  and 
there  actually  present,  are  certain  anticipations  of,  or 
desires  for,  a  further  development  more  or  less  clearly 
foreseen  as  possibilities  in  the  future ;  and  that  just 
in  so  far  as  these  are  present  may  we  speak  of  a 
purpose  and  end  and  so-called  final  cause.  Some 
form  of  at  least  pre-perception,  if  not  of  definite 
anticipation,  is  essential.  If  this  and  nothing  more 
than  this  be  finalism,  then  are  we  all  finalists  in  our 
interpretation  of  human  life.  And  there  is  nothing 
to  differentiate  the  natural  course  of  process  in  this 
case  from  that  in  any  other  case,  save  only  the 
presence  among  the  existent  relationships  of  the 
psychological  factors  which  we  name  prospective 
significance  and  interest.  These,  of  course,  do 
differentiate ;  and  that  in  a  most  important  manner, 
which  must  nowise  be  ignored,  but  which  must  just 
be  accepted  where  pre-perceptive  relationships  have 
been  established  and  highly  developed.  And  such 
conscious  relationships  count,  really  count,  every 
whit  as  much  as  any  other  natural  relationships. 
They  are  not  merely  epiphenomenal  phosphorescence  ; 
they  are  real  conditions  of  the  course  of  process,  both 
mental  and  bodily. 

Now,  wherever  we  have  evidence  of  conscious 
relationships  with  prospective  reference  functioning 
in  this  way,  we  have  a  genuinely  teleological  factor. 
It  is  just  because  I  am  not  satisfied  that  there  is 
evidence  of  such  conscious  relationships  in  the  life  of 
plants,  in  the  development  of  the  embryo,  in  the 
reflex  actions  of  the  spinal  animal,  and  in  instinctive 
behaviour  from  the  biological  standpoint,  that,  as  at 


250  INSTINCT   AND   EXPERIENCE 

present  advised,  I  cannot  accept  a  finalistic  interpre- 
tation of  such  processes.  But  others,  as  we  shall 
presently  have  occasion  to  show,  accept  it,  and  base 
their  whole  interpretation  of  organic  process  upon  it. 

And  what  about  universal  finalism  ?  This  implies 
not  only  a  conscious  relationship,  but  one  of  un- 
limited range,  and  one  that  embraces  the  whole  not 
yet  of  the  future.  Am  I  putting  the  matter  fairly  in 
stating  it  thus?  If  with  Dr.  Myers  we  view  the 
universe  as  a  huge  organism  which  embraces  the 
whole  duration  of  the  natural  order  from  start  to 
finish  within  a  single  and  immediate  span  of 
consciousness,  then  a  fore-knowledge  of  end  would 
qualify  the  whole  of  consciousness  and  be  a  condition 
of  natural  process.  Would  this  satisfy  the  universal 
finalist?  I  think  not.  Does  not  such  finalism 
generally,  if  not  always,  involve  the  concept  of 
Source  ?  Will  not  the  finalist  say  that  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  universe  is  not  only  aware  of  the  end  as  a 
condition  of  the  direction  taken  by  process,  but  is 
also,  and  essentially,  the  Agency  through  which  the 
whole  natural  order  is  made  to  achieve  that  end  .-'  If 
this  be  so,  then,  in  so  far  as  universal  finalism 
involves  the  concept  of  Source  or  Agency  it  is  out- 
side the  sphere  of  our  considerations  here.  We  could 
here  only  accept  universal  teleology  as  an  expression 
of  universal  intelligibility. 

Antithetical  to  finalistic  interpretation  is  mech- 
anistic interpretation.  I  feel  sure  that  finalists 
will  regard  much  that  I  have  written  in  preceding 
paragraphs  as  a  vain  and  futile  attempt  to  interpret 
the  evidence  for  finalism  in  terms  of  mere  mechanism. 
The  term  mechanism,  and  the  adjectives  mechanistic 


FINALISM   AND   MECHANISM  251 

and  mechanical  are,  however,  somewhat  ambiguous. 
"  Mechanics,"  said  Kirchoff,  "  is  the  science  of  motion. 
We  define  as  its  object  the  complete  description  in 
the  simplest  possible  manner  of  such  motions  as 
occur  in  nature."  We  may  here,  I  take  it,  regard  the 
laws  of  equilibrium  as  special  cases  which  can  be 
brought  under  the  laws  of  motion.  Now  motion  is 
a  concept  reached  by  the  scientific  analysis  and  re- 
synthesis  of  certain  changes  in  the  routine  of  the 
phenomenal  world  which  are  presented  to  observa- 
tion. It  is  essential  to  remember  that  mechanics,  as 
a  science  of  motion,  is  a  product  of  ideal  construction  ; 
it  furnishes  a  very  much  simplified  conceptual  map 
or  model  which  enables  us  to  interpret  observable 
phenomena.  And  as  the  motion  itself  is  purely 
conceptual,  so,  too,  for  mechanics,  is  that  which 
moves ;  whether  it  be  an  indefinitely  complex  object, 
such  as  a  planet,  or  a  molecule,  or  an  atom,  or  an 
electron,  or  a  point.  These  are  statistical  units 
employed  as  occasion  arises,  and  as  may  be 
convenient  in  relation  to  the  problem  in  hand ;  and 
they  are  employed  within  the  conceptual  scheme  of 
the  thought-model.  Within  this  scheme,  the  ideal 
motions  of  these  purely  ideal  products  of  scientific 
thought  (particles,  let  us  call  them)  are  dealt  with  in 
terms  of  velocity,  and  of  acceleration  as  a  measure  of 
change  in  velocity.  And  the  acceleration-measure 
may  be  applied  either  (i)  to  the  quickening  or  slow- 
ing off  of  velocity  in  the  same  direction,  or  (2)  to  the 
changes  of  that  direction.  The  velocity  of  a  particle 
ideally  isolated  at  any  given  moment  is  the  net  result 
of  the  whole  of  its  mechanical  history.  If,  however, 
the  particle  be  not  isolated,  but  is  one  among  a 


252         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

number  of  others  which  are  related  within  a  con- 
figuration, then,  for  mechanics,  its  acceleration  is 
strictly  correlated  with,  or  is  a  function  of,  its  relation 
to  all  the  other  particles  in  the  configuration  in 
accordance  with  the  constitution  of  that  configuration. 
We  need  not  trouble  about  any  mathematical  diffi- 
culties in  calculating  the  acceleration  values. 
Theoretically,  if  we  know  the  existing  positions  and 
the  velocities  of  all  the  particles  within  a  configura- 
tion as  a  mechanical  system  in  any  two  moments, 
and  if  we  know  the  laws  of  the  type  of  configuration, 
that  is,  its  constitution,  then  we  can  predict  their 
velocities  and  positions  in  any  succeeding  moment. 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  statement  includes  all 
changes  of  direction  as  well  as  changes  of  speed. 
The  assertion  is  often  made  that  changes  of  direction 
may  occur  independently  of  mechanical  relationships. 
This,  however,  is  never  the  case  within  the  con- 
figuration as  an  ideal  construction  of  the  science  of 
mechanics. 

Such  an  interpretation  as  I  have  briefly  sketched 
above  is  given  by  Professor  Karl  Pearson  in  the  new 
edition  of  his  "Grammar  of  Science"  (191 1).  It  is, 
however,  urged  by  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell  and  other 
mathematicians  "  that,  ultimately,  the  whole  history 
of  a  system  of  material  particles  is  describable  in 
terms  of  their  masses  and  spatial  relations  "...  and 
"  that  in  order  to  predict  the  future  or  reconstruct  the 
past  of  any  material  system,  all  we  need  to  know  is 
the  geometrical  configuration  of  its  particles  in  any 
two  moments  of  time."  ^     If  this  position  is  accepted, 

'  T.  Percy  Nunn,  "Animism  and  the  Doctrine  of  Energy,"  "Pro- 
ceedings Aristotelian  Society,"  191 1-1912.  Cp.  his  "  Aims  of  Scientific 


FINALISM   AND  MECHANISM         253 

"it  is  no  longer  possible  to  think  of  a  particle  as 
possessing  a  velocity  or  an  acceleration."  For  any 
geometrical  position  within  a  mechanical  context  is 
purely  static.  The  matter  may  be  put  in  this  way. 
If  in  a  mechanical  system  we  take  an  instantaneous 
flash-photograph  or  snap-shot,  A,  of  the  configuration 
at  a  given  moment,  and  a  second  snap-shot,  B,  at  a 
subsequent  moment,  then  we  can  predict  the  exact 
configuration  which  will  be  given  in  snap-shot  C  at 
a  later  moment,  if  the  constitution  of  the  system 
remains  unchanged.  Each  flash-photograph  just 
gives  the  momentary  positions  of  the  particles,  and 
their  positions  only.  But  that  is  all  that  we  need  for 
mathematical  treatment.  If  it  be  asked  what 
becomes  of  the  motion  on  this  view,  the  reply,  I 
conceive,  is  that  there  may  be  movements  in  the 
changing  world  which  is  to  be  interpreted,  and  there 
may  be  movement  of  thought  in  the  mind  of  the 
interpreter,  as  he  thinks,  through  A  and  B  to  C,  but 
within  the  ideal  construction,  as  such,  we  deal  only 
with  the  snap-shotted  positions. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said : — If  mechanics  deals 
with  ideal  constructions,  surely  its  thought-model,  and 
its  snap-shots,  are  merely  products  of  the  scientific 
imagination.  Are  you  not  by  this  method  just 
putting  into  your  ideal  construction  at  the  start,  all 
that  you  get  out  of  it  at  the  finish  ?  If  the  premises 
be  granted,  no  doubt  the  conclusions  necessarily 
follow.    But  we  want  to  know  the  laws  of  nature,  not 

Method"  (1907),  §  45,  p.  103.  I  have  received,  and  wish  to  acknow- 
ledge, much  help  from  Dr.  Nunn  in  correspondence  as  well  as  through 
his  writings.  Mr.  B.  Russell's  "Principles  of  Mathematics "  should 
be  consulted,  especially  i.,  chap.  liv. 


254.         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

only  the  laws  of  your  ideal  constructions.  Quite  so  I 
And  therefore  the  test  of  the  validity  of  an  ideal 
construction  is  whether  it  can  be  applied  in  such  a  way 
as  to  enable  us  to  interpret  observable  phenomena. 
Now  observable  phenomena  have  a  way  of  being  so 
terribly  complex  that  in  thousands  of  cases  we  do 
not  know  whether  the  necessary  conclusions  within  a 
mechanical  scheme,  as  such,  are  applicable  to  the 
observable  routine  of  phenomena.  We  often  know 
little  or  nothing  about  the  particles  or  their  positions. 
We  cannot  get  any  mechanical  snap-shots.  Take  a 
particular  case  which  bears  upon  our  special  inquiry. 
Whether  an  ideal  construction  of  the  strictly 
mechanical  order  is  applicable  within  that  exceed- 
ingly complex  natural  configuration  of  particles  (if 
such  it  be)  which  we  call  the  cortex  of  the  human 
brain,  we  simply  don't  know.  I  conceive  that,  as 
things  now  are,  anything  like  positive  assertion  or 
anything  like  positive  denial  is  sheer  unscientific 
dogmatism.  Some  day  we  may  know :  to-day  we 
do  not  know.  That  is  surely  the  true  position  of 
matters.     Ought  we  not  to  leave  it  at  that } 

Reverting  now  to  our  ideal  construction,  let  us 
call  the  interpretation  of  a  system  in  which  such 
a  snap-shot  determination  as  was  described  above 
is  practicable,  an  A  B  C  interpretation.  Such  an 
interpretation  gives  the  ABC  law  in  terms  of 
mechanical  relationships.  There  may  be  all  sorts  of 
other  relationships  very  interesting  and  important 
in  their  proper  context.  But  the  mechanical 
relationships  are  all  that  mechanics  wants  and  all 
that  mechanics  is  concerned  with.  If  the  constitution 
of  the  system  changes  and  with  it  the  mechanical 


FINALISM  AND   MECHANISM         255 

relationships,  we  shall  have  to  determine  the  law  of 
the  change,  let  us  say  in  term  of  a  j3  y.  We  shall 
then  have  to  combine  an  ABC  determination 
with  an  a  /3  7  determination. 

We  may  next  ask  whether  an  A  B  C  interpreta- 
tion, that  is  one  in  strictly  mechanical  terms  of  mass- 
particles  and  positions,  is  applicable  in  the  case  of 
some  of  the  complex  phenomena  with  which 
chemistry  deals.  I  take  it  that,  in  any  comprehensive 
sense,  it  is  not  yet  generally  applicable.  What,  then, 
is  the  scientific  attitude  ?  To  assert  roundly  that  it 
is  and  must  be  applicable,  though  we  do  not  yet 
know  how  to  apply  it  ?  Or  to  deny  that  it  can  be 
applicable  because  on  other  grounds  we  think  it 
ought  not  to  be  applicable  ?  Or  to  say  that  we 
do  not  know  ?  I  have  no  hesitation  in  advocat- 
ing an  honest  confession  of  ignorance.  And  if 
this  should  be  our  attitude  with  regard  to  many 
chemical  phenomena,  still  more  should  it  be  our 
attitude  in  presence  of  complex  physiological 
changes. 

So  far  I  have  tried  to  keep  strictly  to  the  ABC 
question  which  I  conceive  to  be  the  question  for  the 
science  of  mechanics  as  such.  May  I  now  be  allowed 
to  apply  the  term  mechanistic  to  a  system  interpret- 
able  in  terms  of  the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  ? 
Of  course  this  is  putting  a  number  of  varied  phenomena 
in  one  general  group  ;  but  we  must  do  this  to  avoid 
detailed  discussion  here  out  of  place.  Let  us  grant 
that  we  have  passed  to  a  region  of  scientific  inquiry 
where  the  strict  ABC  of  mechanics,  in  terms  of 
mass-particles  and  positions,  cannot,  as  yet  at  any 
rate,  be  applied.     In  what  way  shall  we  express  the 


^56         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

method  of  procedure  ?  We  find  routine.  How  shall 
we  deal  with  it  ?  Shall  we  say  that  for  any  scientific 
determination  we  require  a  treatment  in  terms  of 
D  E  F  analogous  to  (but  only  analogous  to,  not 
identical  with)  the  strictly  mechanical  treatment? 
Here  D  E  F  stand  for  three  static  stages  snap- 
shotted in  the  changing  routine  of,  let  us  say,  a 
chemical  reaction.  If  stage  D  and  stage  E  are 
known,  then  stage  F  can  be  predicted  and  the  law  of 
the  constitution  of  the  system  for  the  purpose  in  hand 
may  so  far  be  ascertained.  No  doubt  matters  are 
often  very  much  more  complicated  than  this.  The 
to  and  fro  changes  are  very  intricate.  The  poise  of 
the  system  alters  from  moment  to  moment.  But  we 
want  to  get  at  certain  basal  principles  of  interpretation. 
I  seek  to  indicate  by  the  formula  D  E  F  that  the 
determination  is  in  terms  of  sequent  stages  of  chemical 
or  physical  routine. 

Now  pass  to  the  field  of  physiology  and  organic 
routine.  I  take  it  that  the  term  mechanistic  (but 
sometimes  mechanical!)  is  commonly  applied  to  the 
hypothesis  that  the  organic  changes  are  interpretable 
without  remainder  in  terms  of  D  E  F.  They  may 
have  other  relationships  very  interesting  to  the 
physiologist,  but  from  the  mechanistic  standpoint 
these  are  merely  epiphenomenal.  Many  biologists 
and  physiologists,  however,  cannot  regard  this 
hypothesis  as  tenable.  Let  us  grant  that  they  are 
right  in  claiming  that  certain  physiological  changes 
cannot  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  D  E  F  alone  ;  and 
let  us  apply  the  formula  G  H  I  to  the  law  of  the 
remainder — the  strictly  organic  and  physiological  as 
such.     Then  we  have  the  opportunity  of  correlating 


FINALISM  AND   MECHANISM         257 

G  H  I  changes  with  D  E  F  changes  without  identify- 
ing the  one  with  the  other. 

As  an  example  of  what  I  mean  by  interpretation 
in  terms  of  G  H  I,  we  may  take  the  case  of 
Tubularia  as  formulated  by  Dr.  Driesch.  If  the  head 
of  this  hydroid  polyp  be  excised,  a  new  head  is 
restored  by  the  combined  work  of  many  parts  of  the 
stem.  Furthermore  "  if  you  cut  out  of  a  Tubularia 
stem  pieces  which  are  less  than  ten  millimetres  in 
length,  you  will  find  the  absolute  size  of  the  head 
restored  to  be  in  close  relation  to  the  length  of  the 
stem  piece"  (i.  127).  Here  is  a  prediction  which  is 
fulfilled ;  for  we  may  trust  Dr.  Driesch  implicitly  in 
his  facts.  How  then  is  this  explained  by  him  } 
He  tells  us  that  what  we  can  thus  predict — the 
"prospective  value"  as  he  terms  it  (p. v.) — is  a 
function  of  the  size  of  the  piece  of  stem  (s),  the 
direction  of  the  cut  (1)  and  the  constitution  of 
the  Tubularia — its  entelechy  (E),  And  he  gives  the 
equation  p. v.  (X)  =  /  (s,  1,  E).  So  that  given — 
what  must  always  be  given  in  any  interpretable 
routine — the  constitution  of  the  system,  and  the 
conditions  of  the  case,  the  changes  which  occur  can 
be  foretold,  so  long  as  the  constitution  E  remains 
constant.  One  does  not  need,  however,  to  seek 
abnormal  cases  to  exemplify  the  method  of  treat- 
ment. Given  the  constitution  of  that  complex 
organic  system  which  we  call  a  hen's  egg,  and  given 
the  conditions  under  which  the  process  of  develop- 
ment as  embryogenic  routine  runs  its  course ;  then 
we  can  apply  our  G  H  I  principle  and  predict  the 
state  of  matters  say  at  the  96th  hour.  All  this  I 
conceive  is  fully  in  accordance  with  the  recognized 
s 


258         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

methods  of  scientific  procedure.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  whether  a  physico-chemical  interpretation  of 
certain  organic  changes  in  terms  of  D  E  F  can  be 
correlated  with  (not  necessarily  identified  with)  a 
further  interpretation  of  remainder  phenomena  in 
terms  of  G  H  I. 

We  come  now  to  psychological  interpretation — to 
avoid  ambiguity  let  us  say  an  associationist  interpreta- 
tion of  the  synthetic  juxtaposition  and  compounding 
of  the  "  eds "  of  experience  including  thought. 
Epiphenomenalists  claim  that  psycho-physiological 
processes,  or  rather  their  "ed  "-products,  are  interpret- 
able  in  terms  of  G  H  I  without  remainder.  They 
say  that  although  an  intelligent  relationship  to  a 
pre-perceived  end  may  seem  to  determine  the  direction 
of  behaviour,  yet,  none  the  less,  this  does  not  really 
count ;  if  we  knew  enough  about  physiology  that 
alone  would  suffice  ;  just  as  if  we  knew  enough  about 
physico-chemical  mechanism  that  would  suffice  for 
organic  interpretation  ;  and  if  we  knew  enough  about 
mechanics  that  in  turn  would  suffice  for  the  complete 
understanding  of  every  material  change  in  the 
universe.  All  this,  however,  is  somewhat  speculative  ; 
it  does  not  appear  to  be  at  present  within  the  sphere 
of  the  practical  politics  of  contemporary  science.  Let 
us  grant  then  that  psychological  products,  and 
intelligent  behaviour  in  relation  to  them,  cannot  be 
interpreted  in  terms  of  organic  G  H  I  without 
remainder.  Let  us  call  the  law  of  the  remainder 
X  Y  Z.  This  means  that,  in  any  routine  of  psycho- 
logical products,  if  the  constitution  of  the  mental 
system  be  known,  stages  X  and  Y  and  Z  are  sequent 
stages  ;  and   that   if  you   know  X  and   Y  you  can 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM         259 

foretell  Z  on  the  basis  of  routine.  In  the  absence 
of  routine,  of  course  no  scientific  predictions  are 
possible  in  any  field  of  inquiry.  Here  X  Y  Z  are 
not  identified  with  G  H I  in  the  sense  that  the 
psychological  is  merely  a  phosphorescent  accompani- 
ment of  brain-process.  They  can  only  be  identified, 
within  an  ideal  construction,  in  the  sense  that  the  same 
process  may  have  (5^/// physiological  rt:«^  psychological 
relationships,  just  as  an  organic  process  may  have 
both  physico-chemical  and  physiological  relationships. 
The  business  of  science  is  to  correlate  these  several 
relationships.  Both  parallelists  and  inter-actionists 
claim  that  there  is  a  complete  or  partial  correlation 
between  what  I  have  called  the  G  H I  and  the 
X  Y  Z.  But  the  inter-actionists  call  in  a  psychic 
entity  which,  according  to  M.  Bergson,  dwells  in  time 
but  not  in  space ;  so  that,  for  them,  the  correlation 
is  only  at  the  locus  of  inter-action  ;  for  M.  Bergson  it 
is  along  the  line  of  the  knife-edge  where  pure  memory 
gets  its  wedge-like  insertions  into  the  spatial  world  of 
the  inert.  But  I  shall  have  somewhat  more  to  say  on 
this  subject  a  few  pages  later. 

Now  in  accordance  with  the  foregoing  analysis  we 
have : — 

1.  Mechanical  interpretation  in  terms  of  A  B  C. 

2.  Mechanistic      „        „        „        „         D  E  F. 

3.  Organic  „        „        „        „         G  H  I. 

4.  Psychological   „        „        „        „        XYZ. 

It  may  be  that  the  chemical  and  physical 
phenomena  dealt  with  in  terms  of  D  E  F  will  here- 
after be  resolved  into  complex  configurations  of  mass- 
particles  analytically  interpretable  in  terms  of  A  B  C  ; 
and   it  may  be  that  the  organic   phenomena  dealt 


260         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

with  in  terms  of  G  H  I  will  hereafter  be  shown  to 
be  complex  D  E  F  business.  But  we  seem  very  far 
off  at  present  from  any  such  resolution  of  the  presented 
phenomena.  Let  us,  therefore,  assume  for  the  sake  of 
argument,  that  both  the  D  E  F  phenomena  and  the 
G  H  I  phenomena  are  sui  generis.  Then  I  submit 
that  the  scientific  course  is  just  to  accept  the  fact  in 
each  case  and  to  seek  to  correlate  phenomena  which 
will  not  submit  to  identification.  And  my  further 
contention  is  that  if  we  attempt  to  explain  the  facts 
by  saying  that  we  must  call  in  a  D  E  F  entity 
(Energy)  as  the  Source  of  the  D  E  F  phenomena, 
and  must  call  in  a  G  H  I  Entity  (Life  or  Entelechy) 
as  the  Source  of  the  G  H  I  phenomena ;  then,  for 
good  or  ill,  we  leave  the  plane  of  scientific  interpreta- 
tion. And  I  should  urge  that  if  we  do  call  in 
Entelechy  in  this  sense  as  the  Source  of  vital 
phenomena,  then  we  ought,  on  precisely  analogous 
grounds,  to  call  in  a  crystalline  entity  (perhaps  as  a 
mode  of  Energy)  as  the  Source  of  the  phenomena  of 
crystallization. 

Apart,  however,  from  this  point  I  seek  through 
the  above  table  to  avoid  an  ambiguity  in  the  use  of 
terms  which  I  find  somewhat  troublesome.  The  term 
mechanistic  (and  not  infrequently  the  term  mechanical) 
is  sometimes  applied  no  further  down  the  above  table 
than  2  ;  but  they  are  sometimes  applied  to  3  and  4 
also.  Thus  Mr.  McDougall  says,  in  a  passage  already 
quoted,  that  instinctive  action  is  "incapable  of  being 
described  in  purely  mechanical  terms."  And,  as  we 
have  seen.  Dr.  Myers  says : — "  So  far  as  intelligent 
behaviour  can  be  regarded  from  the  standpoint  of 
observing  the  conduct  of  other  organisms,  it  appears, 


FINALISM   AND   MECHANISM  261 

however,  imperfectly  as  instinctive — characterized 
by  mechanism."  Since  such  phrases  are  in  current 
use,  it  is  incumbent  on  a  writer  who  attempts  to  deal 
with  instinct  and  experience  to  make  his  own  position 
clear.  This  I  have  endeavoured  to  do  at  the  risk  of 
seeming  unduly  crabbed  and  technical. 

It  may,  however,  be  said  that  these  phrases,  in 
such  contexts,  are  not  meant  to  be  taken  in  the 
narrower  sense  to  which  I  have  attempted  to  restrict 
them.  In  what  sense,  then,  are  they  to  be  accepted  ?  ^ 
What  does  a  mechanistic  interpretation,  from  this 
broader  philosophical  standpoint  imply  ?  Does  it 
not  imply  the  universal,  and  perhaps  eventually  the 
quantitative  correlation  of  all  the  happenings  within 
the  natural  order,  as  such,  without  going  beyond  one 
natural  order  within  which  such  correlations  afford 
the  data  for  an  ideal  "  unity  of  concatenation  "  ?  Now 
whether  such  universal  correlation  obtains  throughout 
the  universe  of  things  and  thoughts,  we  do  not  yet 
know.  There  may  be  some  loose-jointed  indeter- 
minism,  just  a  very  little  of  which  William  James 
demanded.  We  are  still  only  beginners  and  novices 
in  the  interpretation  of  nature.  We  know  just  a 
little  about  correlation.  Bit  by  bit  we  are  extending 
this  knowledge.  But  considering  the  bewildering 
variety  and  multiplicity  of  the  events  in  the  midst  of 
which  we  live,  bold  indeed  is  he  who  ventures  to 
affirm  that  universal  correlation  is  more  than  an  ideal 
construction  the  validity  of  which  has  still  to  be  tried 

^  For  M.  Bergson  and  his  interpreters  everything  which  can  be  ex* 
plained  in  intellectual  terms  is  mechanical  or  mechanistic.  All  that  is 
not  Life  (apprehended  through  intuition  and  sympathy)  belongs  to  the 
mechanical  order  of  the  inert. 


INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

and  tested.  After  all,  the  world  may  be  in  some 
measure  chaotic.  The  cosmos  may  be  evolving,  not 
only  from  an  earlier  and  towards  a  later  cosmic  phase, 
but  out  of  partial  chaos.     Who  can  say  ? 

We  pass  then  to  some  further  consideration  of 
universal  correlation,  the  meaning  of  this  phrase 
being,  I  trust,  sufficiently  clear.  Can  we  accept  it  as 
an  ideal  construction  which  may  some  day  be 
applicable  to  the  world  of  events  we  strive  to 
interpret  ?  There  is  (need  I  again  add  the  qualifying 
words,  within  the  self-imposed  limits  of  our  dis- 
course ?) — There  is  one  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  its 
acceptance.  And  that  is  the  acceptance  as  part  and 
parcel  of  it — the  full  free  and  unhesitating  acceptance, 
— of  conscious  relationships  as  belonging  to  the 
natural  order,  to  be  correlated  with  other  relationships, 
and  really  counting  in  any  situation  within  which 
they  are  developed.  To  say  that  the  motions  of  my 
fingers  as  I  write  are  the  same  that  they  would  be  if 
the  conscious  relationship  were  entirely  absent,  is 
little  short  of  absurd.  To  urge  that  behaviour  in  any 
intelligent  situation  is  just  what  it  would  be  if 
intelligence  were  non-existent, seems  to  me  a  deliberate 
ignoring  of  what  for  any  reasonable  interpretation  are 
the  facts  of  the  case.  I  have  little  remaining  space 
at  my  command.  I  can  spare  none  of  it  to  discuss 
the  epiphenomenal  doctrine.  The  argument,  I  take 
it,  runs  thus : — Intelligence  is  correlated  with  cortical 
functioning  ;  but  if  the  cortical  functioning  took  place 
without  the  correlated  intelligence,  the  behaviour 
would  remain  the  same.  (Here  comes  in  unconscious 
cerebration  and  the  like.)  But  have  we  any  evidence 
that   the   very   same   cortical    functioning    which   is 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM  263 

developed  when  intelligence  is  present,  ever  does 
occur  in  exactly  the  same  way  in  the  absence  of  such 
correlated  intelligence  ?  May  we  rub  off  the  slate  an 
observed  or  inferred  correlation  and  unblushingly  say 
that  it  doesn't  really  count?  I  must  apologize,  how- 
ever, to  my  epiphenomenal  friends  and  to  the  shade 
of  my  master  Huxley,  for  this  cavalier  dismissal  of 
their  views,  and  again  plead  in  excuse  the  exigencies 
of  space. 

We  thus  clear  the  ground  and  reach  a  plain  issue  ; 
either  the  conscious  relationships  are  developed 
within  one  natural  order  and  are  co-ordinate  with 
other  relationships  ;  or  there  are  two  independent 
orders  which  inter-act ;  that  of  matter,  of  which  the 
body  is  part ;  and  that  of  life,  of  which  mind  is  an 
attribute. 

It  is  sometimes  asserted  that  inter-action  of  mind 
on  body  and  body  on  mind  is  inconceivable.  But, 
regarding  the  matter  from  the  point  of  view  of 
inferred  correlation  of  bodily  and  mental  processes, 
this  argument  pressed  home  results  in  universal 
inconceivability,  and  a  complete  paralysis  of  inter- 
pretation, if  we  are  to  be  precluded  from  dealing 
with  connexions  unless  we  can  explain  the  "why" 
of  them.  Science  just  accepts  correlations  as  facts. 
We  may,  indeed,  go  somewhat  beyond  Hume's  view 
that,  in  the  world  around  us,  this  and  that  are  merely 
"  conjoined,"  being  "connected"  only  in  our  experience 
through  custom.  We  may  firmly  believe  that  they 
are  really  connected  in  nature  since  nature  is  a 
correlated  context  of  which  our  conscious  relation- 
ships are  part.  But  ivhy  within  the  correlated  context 
of  the  constitution  of  nature,  this  should  be  connected 


264         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

with  that,  science  cannot  say.  We  must  just  accept 
the  facts  as  they  are  given.  Why  there  should  be 
mutual  attraction  between  the  earth  and  the  moon, 
we  do  not  know.  And  accredited  manipulators  of 
that  triumph  of  ideal  construction,  the  ether,  assure 
us  that  it  will  not  help  us  over  our  difficulty.^  Why 
the  motion  of  one  billiard  ball  should  be  com- 
municated to  another  by  impact — this,  it  is  said, 
passes  the  wit  of  man  to  tell.  Why  anything  should 
be  correlated  with  anything  else,  in  this  sense  of  the 
word  why,  we  do  not  know ;  experience  merely 
acquaints  us  with  the  facts  of  observation  ;  our 
scientific  explanations  only  serve  to  correlate  the  less 
familiar  with  the  more  familiar  types  of  correlation. 
All  correlation  is  (if  you  will)  a  mystery  ;  granted 
two  orders  of  being,  there  is  no  more  mystery  in  the 
kind  of  correlation  suggested  by  inter-actionists  than 
in  any  other  observed  or  inferred  correlation.  And 
if,  on  the  one-order-of-nature  hypothesis,  conscious 
relationships  are  as  a  matter  of  fact  found  to  obtain 
— Well,  there  they  are,  as  modes  of  natural  process 
to  be  correlated  with  other  modes. 

Now  Mr.  McDougall  arguing  in  favour  of  inter- 
action rightly  urges  ^  that  it  should  not  be  rejected 
on  the  score  of  its  being  more  inconceivable  than 
other  modes  of  correlation.  But  when  he  is  criticiz- 
ing the  assumed  correlation  of  conscious-processes 
with  cortical  brain-processes  he  speaks  with  a 
different  voice.  "To  assume,"  he  says,  "that  of  all 
physical  processes  just  certain  brain-processes  are 
accompanied  by  conscious  concomitants,  would  leave 

'  Cf.  Karl  Pearson,  "  The  Grammar  of  Science,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  301-2, 
2   "  Body  and  Mind  "  (19U),  pp.  207-8. 


FINALISM   AND   MECHANISM  265 

the  relation  too  obviously  mysterious ;  the  coming 
into  being  of  the  sensation,  at  the  moment  of  the 
occurrence  of  a  brain-process  of  a  certain  quality 
would  be  too  decidedly  miraculous  "  (p.  152).  Why 
it  should  be  more  mysterious  and  miraculous  than  the 
correlation  of  certain  events  in  an  independent  soul 
order  with  certain  material  processes  of  a  second 
order  I  am  unable  to  see.  Mr.  McDougall  holds  ^ 
"  that  the  instincts  are  differentiations  of  the  will  to 
live  ...  by  means  of  which  it  pushes  on  along 
diverging  paths,  creating  by  their  agency  the  various 
great  families  of  the  animal  kingdom  ;  each  animated 
by  the  great  instincts  common  to  all,  the  tendencies 
to  seek  food  and  to  reproduce  its  kind  ;  each  animated 
also  by  special  instincts  characteristic  of  the  group ; 
each  instinct  creating  for  its  own  service  the  bodily 
organs  and  the  nervous  structures  best  suited  to  serve 
as  the  instruments  by  which  it  may  secure  the  satis- 
faction of  its  conative  impulse."  I  confess  that  this 
interpretation  of  instinct  seems  to  me  to  involve 
quite  as  much  of  mystery  and  miracle,  as  the 
assumption  that  a  natural  correlation  obtains 
between  cortical  functioning  and  conscious  process. 
But  might  we  not  wisely  drop — both  one  side  and 
the  other — all  reference  to  mystery  and  miracle  ? 

Opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  inter-action — the  inter- 
action, be  it  noted,  of  two  orders  of  being, — is,  in 
current  controversy,  that  of  psycho-physiological 
parallelism.  Now  the  very  term  parallelism  seems 
at  the  outset  to  imply  two  orders  of  process  which 
run  side  by  side  and  cannot  intersect.  And  even 
the     term    concomitance,    as    commonly    accepted, 

'  "  British  Journal  of  Psychology,"  vol,  iii.,  p,  258, 


^66         INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

carries  a  like  implication.  What,  then,  is  the  thesis 
that  the  upholders  of  this  doctrine  are  concerned 
to  maintain  ?  We  may  summarize  it  briefly  thus  :  that 
every  psychical  process  has  a  parallel  physiological 
process  ;  that  for  every  differentiation  of  the  former 
there  is  a  parallel  differentiation  of  the  latter  ;  and, 
as  a  corollary,  that  when  any  two  physiological 
processes  are  precisely  alike  in  every  respect,  and 
in  all  their  relationships,  then,  if  the  one  has  a  given 
psychological  concomitant,  that  of  the  other  is 
identical.  Obviously  this  is  an  ideal  construction 
which  far  outruns  what  can  be  established  on 
empirical  data ;  hence  many  psychologists  regard 
it  as  a  working  hypothesis.  And  if  this  means  that 
they  abandon  the  concept  of  parallelism  and  accept 
only  the  concept  of  correlation,  for  what  it  is  worth 
and  as  far  as  it  goes,  that  is  clearly  a  step  in  the 
right  direction. 

If  this  is  spoken  of  as  an  appeal  to  physiology 
to  the  end  of  furthering  an  explanation  of  the  facts 
of  psychology,  let  us  make  the  appeal  with  our  eyes 
fully  open.  What  do  we  hope  to  get  from  the 
appeal }  An  explanation  of  the  conscious  relation- 
ship between  i/iis  and  ^/lai  ?  Well  and  good.  But 
what  do  we  mean  by  an  explanation }  Do  we 
expect  to  gain  from  physiology  any  further  informa- 
tion as  to  the  nature  of  the  conscious  relationship 
as  such  f  If  so,  our  expectation  is  futile.  Let  us  not 
delude  ourselves  with  vain  hopes,  or,  if  it  be  preferred, 
worry  over  idle  fears.  The  conscious  relationship 
within  a  synthetic  process  comes  into  being  under 
certain  conditions.  That  is  just  a  fact  to  be  accepted. 
Physiology  will  neither  make  it  or  mar  it.     All  we 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM         267 

can  do  is  to  correlate  this  fact  with  other  facts. 
That  is  where  physiology  comes  in.  It  furnishes  a 
body  of  other  facts  to  be  correlated  with  these 
psychological  facts.  Why  they  should  be  correlated 
in  the  context  of  nature  we  do  not  know.  All  that 
we  can  confidently  affirm  is  that  some  correlations 
between  psychological  and  physiological  happenings 
seem  as  well  established  as  any  other  correlations  in 
the  realm  of  nature.  For  the  experiential  relation- 
ship is,  for  us,  just  a  natural  event  which  we  come 
to  know  just  as  we  come  to  know  other  natural 
events.  We  eschew  all  the  metaphysics  of  episte- 
mology.  But  if  some  mental  states  have  cortical 
correlates,  may  not  all }  We  ask  this  as  a  question 
to  be  answered  bit  by  bit  through  inquiry.  We  do 
not  make  any  positive  assertion.  At  most  we  may 
accept  a  provisionally  affirmative  reply,  as  part  of  a 
policy  which  spurs  us  on  to  further  investigation. 
Even  if,  however,  we  grant  that  only  in  some  cases 
is  there  a  correlation  between  the  mental  and  the 
psychological  ;  is  it  not  in  accordance  with  scientific 
method  to  pass  on,  with  some  measure  of  con- 
fidence, to  the  conclusion  that,  where  such  correla- 
tion does  obtain,  the  same  physiological  happenings 
in  the  cortex,  will  always  be  correlated  with  the 
same  states  of  consciousness  and  not  with  other 
states  ? 

It  is  just  here,  however,  that  difference  of  opinion 
and  divergence  of  interpretation  come  in.  There  is 
an  alternative  view.  And,  since  I  am  desirous  that 
it  should  not  suffer  from  inadequate  presentation, 
I  will  quote  from  an  able  paper  written  by  a 
distinguished    exponent    of    the    philosophy   of   M. 


268         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

Bergson.     "  I    suppose,"    says    Mr.    Wildon    Carr,* 
"  every  one  agrees  that  as  a  fact  every  psychological 
state   implies   a   physiological   state.  .  .  .  But   is   it 
equally   agreed    that    to    the    same    cerebral    state 
there    corresponds    the    same    psychical    state,    and 
conversely  that  to  an  identical  psychical  state  there 
corresponds  an  identical  cerebral    state  >     May    not 
different,  even  totally  different,  psychical  states  be 
accompanied     by     the    same    nervous    conditions  ? 
There  are  some  cases  in  which  it  seems  to  me,"  says 
Mr.    Carr,    "almost   impossible   to  believe  that  it  is 
not  so.  .  .  .  It  is  not  necessarily,  nor  even  probably 
true  that   the   same    cerebral   state    determines   the 
same  psychical  state,  for  there  might  correspond  to 
the    same    cerebral     state     several    very    different 
psychical    states.  .  .  .    Our    body    is    the     material 
instrument  of    the    mind.  .  .  .  Why  then  does  this 
mind    seem    to   spring   into    being   just    where   our 
afferent  nerves  end  and  our   efferent   nerves    begin, 
that  is  to  say,  in  the  brain  ?     Because  it  is  just  there 
that  the  intellect  becomes  serviceable,  just  there  that 
it  enables  the  living  creature  to  control  and  direct 
its    activity,   just    there   that  the    free   choice   with 
which  it  endows  it  becomes  realizable.    There  is  no 
parallelism,  nor  causality,  there  is  solidarity.      The 
body  serves  the  mind  and  the  mind  directs  the  body. 
They  are   inseparable,    to   quote    an  illustration    of 
Bergson's,   as    the    knife     is    inseparable    from    its 
edge.     The  brain  is  the  sharp  edge  by  which   con- 
sciousness penetrates  the  compact  tissue  of  events, 
but  it  is    no    more   co-extensive  with  consciousness 

'  "  Proc.  Aristotelian  Soc."  N.S.  vul.  xi.  (1910-1911),  pp.  134, 
•35.  143- 


FINALISM   AND    MECHANISM  269 

than  the  edge  is  co-extensive  with  the  knife." 
Thus  Mr.  Carr.  One  must  remember  here  that  the 
knife  belongs  to  a  different  order  of  being  from  the 
events  into  which  its  edge  is  inserted. 

I  said  above  that  parallelism  implies  two  orders  of 
being.  Here  is  what  Mr.  Carr  says  in  the  connexion  : 
— *'  Parallelism,"  he  writes,  "  is  an  attempt  to  express 
a  relation  between  two  things  that  belong  to  different 
orders,  to  different  kinds  of  reality.  The  problem  of 
parallelism  comes  to  us  from  the  two  substances  of 
Descartes,  the  two  attributes  of  Spinoza.  It  comes 
to  us  permeated  with  the  idealist-realist  controversy 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  It  is  on  this  dualism 
that  the  hypothesis  of  parallelism  rests.  I  do  not 
mean,"  he  adds,  "that  parallelism  may  not  find  its 
solution  in  some  form  of  monism  ;  what  I  do  mean 
is  that  it  is  based  on  a  view  of  phenomena  which 
divides  them  into  two  entirely  separated  orders  of 
reality,  or  planes  of  reality,  or  meanings  of  reality, 
or  kinds  of  reality — qualities  and  percepts,  things 
and  thoughts.  Parallelism  is  not  merely  based  on 
that  view,  it  is  essentially  that  view ;  it  does  not 
explain  dualism,  but  is  the  expression  of  it " 
(pp.  139,  140). 

Now  it  has  been  my  aim  to  contribute  in  some 
slight  measure  to  the  translation  of  the  old 
philosophical  antithesis  of  two  orders  of  being,  into 
other  terms  involving  other  concepts.  Starting  with 
naive  perceptual  experience,  instead  of  positing  the 
world  on  the  one  hand  and  mind  on  the  other  hand 
as  independent  terms  within  different  orders  of 
process,  I  accept  the  given  experiential  relationship 
as  one  among  many  relationships  within  one  order 


270         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

of  being  to  be  interpreted  in  just  the  same  scientific 
way ;  and  the  old  antithesis  takes  for  me  the  form 
of  that  between  experiencing  and  the  experienced. 
But  at  the  lowest  level  at  which  we  can  begin  to 
interpret,  as  best  we  may,  the  experiential  relation- 
ship, it  is  already  extraordinarily  complex.  Just  think 
of  the  chain  of  correlations  involved  in  seeing  an 
"  object."  And  think  of  the  differentiations  involved 
when  instead  of  seeing  the  object  we  subsequently 
have  an  anticipatory  image  of  it !  It  is  difficult 
enough  to  conceive,  even  in  schematic  form,  how 
all  this  comes  about — that  is  to  say  to  trace  step 
by  step  all  the  complex  correlations.  But  this 
difficulty  is  not  in  the  smallest  degree  lessened 
when  we  assume  that  much  of  it  takes  place  in  a 
different  order  of  being.  The  correlations  have  to 
be  traced  there  just  as  much  as  here.  All  we  can 
do  in  either  case  is  just  to  accept  process  as  given 
and  endeavour  to  show  how  the  stages  are  related. 
And  here  comes  the  stress  on  process.  Whatever 
else  it  may  be,  experiencing  is  a  process.  However 
else  we  may  interpret  it,  the  successive  phases  of 
process  are  correlated.  On  any  hypothesis,  there 
is  also  a  correlation  between  this  process  and  other 
processes — whether  this  process  belongs  to  the  mind 
order  and  the  other  processes  to  the  world  order, 
or  all  are  given  within  one  natural  order.  Now  on 
the  two-order  hypothesis  psychical  process  in  the 
mental  sphere  inter-acts  with  physiological  process 
in  the  brain.  On  the  one-order  hypothesis  there  are 
not  really  two  processes,  but  one  process,  a  psycho- 
physiological process ;  a  process,  with  what  M. 
Bergson  would  term  the  unity  of  interpenetration ; 


FINALISM    AND  MECHANISM         271 

a  process  of  which  the  physiologists  may  study  the 
correlations  within  the  organism,  and  of  which  the 
psychologists  may  study  such  correlations  as  are 
involved  in  M.  Bergson's  doctrine  of  pure  perception. 
Physiological  Z;-^^?/^^^  and  a  physiological  con-figura- 
tion or  constellation  are  different  from  mental  pro- 
ducts and  a  psychological  disposition.  But  though 
the  products  are  diverse  there  is  but  one  emerging 
life-process,  unitary  and  indivisible  so  long  as  the 
organism  functions  as  a  whole.  The  life-process, 
however,  is  an  extraordinarily  complex  one,  and 
the  belief  in  its  unitary  character  does  not  preclude 
the  belief  in  interrelations  between  different  phases 
within  the  whole.  Indeed  many  of  the  arguments 
in  favour  of  inter-action  between  two  orders,  the 
mental  and  the  physiological,  are,  in  my  opinion, 
merely  translations  into  the  language  of  animism, 
of  the  unquestionable  inter-action  between  cortical 
and  sub-cortical  functioning  within  the  organic 
process.  In  a  sense  too  much  stress  may  perhaps 
be  laid  on  the  unitary  process  of  living,  that  is,  if 
it  be  regarded  as  the  unity  of  a  blank  sheet  of 
paper.  But  if  it  be  regarded  as  the  unity  of  a 
whole  with  correlated  parts — the  whole  dominating 
the  parts  and  the  parts  contributing  to  the  whole ; 
if  it  is  the  kind  of  unity  of  which  human  design  is 
a  highly  developed  example,  then  the  stress  seems  to 
be  amply  justified. 

In  the  emphasis  on  process,  and  especially  in 
the  emphasis  on  process  as  one  and  indivisible,  no 
matter  how  much  distinguishable  differentiation  may 
obtain,  we  come  to  some  extent  into  line  with  Mr. 
Carr   who,    interpreting    M.    Bergson,     says    in    a 


272         INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

passage  quoted  above : — "  There  is  no  parallelism, 
nor  causality,  there  is  solidarity."  But  for  him 
the  solidarity  is  at  the  plane  of  intersection  of  two 
different  orders  of  being.  It  is  solidarity  along  the 
line  of  the  knife-edge. 

On  what  kind  of  evidence,  then,  is  the  existence 
of  an  independent  mind-order  accepted  ?  It  is 
confidently  claimed  that  there  are  certain  modes  of 
mental  process  which  cannot  possibly  be  correlated 
with  cortical  process.  Hence  they  must  run  their 
course  in  the  mind  independently  of  bodily 
happenings.  Dr.  Driesch  takes  the  case  of  a  man 
who  notices  that  a  lamp  recently  bought  begins  to 
smoke.  He  examines  the  mechanism,  decides  that 
this  or  that  must  be  done  to  stop  the  nuisance, 
and  stops  it.  The  brain  is  affected  in  correlation 
with  certain  presented  stimuli ;  the  brain  is  also 
instrumental  in  initiating  the  appropriate  movements 
of  thumb  and  finger.  But  the  middle  portion  of 
the  series  has  "  nothing  to  do  with  the  brain  what- 
ever ...  it  is  not  of  a  cerebral  character  at  all, 
though  at  both  ends  it  is  in  connexion  with  cere- 
bral phenomena."  The  intervening  mental  events 
form  an  "  intra-psychical  series."  This  is 
the  business,  not  of  the  brain  but  of  the  psychoid 
which  uses  the  brain.  The  psychoid  here  invoked 
is  entelechy  raised  to  a  higher  power.  It  is  the 
essential  agent  concerned  in  action  ;  and  action  is 
that  which  is  determined  by  past  experience.  It  is 
that  which  has  a  historical  basis. 

But  what  is  the  evidence  for  an  intra-psychical 
series,  independent  of  any  physiological  series  ? 
For  this  we  may  profitably  turn  to  Mr.  McDougall's 


FINALISM   AND  MECHANISM         273 

recent  book  on  "  Body  and  Mind  " — a  work  of  great 
ability  in  which  are  skilfully  marshalled  the  argu- 
ments for  a  doctrine  of  animism.  It  is  not  easy  to 
grasp  firmly  the  key  to  the  whole  position  set  forth 
in  a  portly  volume — I  believe,  however,  that  this  key 
bears  the  label  "  Meaning."  ^ 

We  see  an  object  from  a  dozen  points  of  view, 
and  yet  we  call  it  the  same  object.  What,  then,  is 
the  same  ?  Not  the  presentations,  for  they  may  be 
all  different,  but  the  meaning.  And  the  appropriate 
response  is  determined  not  by  this  or  that  constel- 
lation of  stimuli,  but  by  the  meaning  they  suggest  to 
the  mind.  The  same  idea  may  be  expressed  in 
English,  French  or  German.  The  assemblage  of 
physical  marks  on  paper,  the  images  on  the  retina, 
the  physiological  impulses  coursing  along  the  optic 
nerve,  the  exact  changes  in  the  occipital  lobe  of  the 
brain  are  different ;  but  the  meaning  for  the  mind  is 
the  same.  We  may  see  a  sentence  printed,  or  we 
may  hear  that  sentence  spoken.  In  the  one  case 
the  visual  centre  in  the  occipital  lobe  is  thrown  into 
physiological  activity  ;  in  the  other  case  the  auditory 
centre  in  the  temporal  lobe.  It  matters  not.  The 
meaning  for  the  mind  is  the  same.  A  telegram  from 
a  friend  is  received,  bearing  the  words  : — "  Your  son  is 
dead."  How  different  the  effect  from  that  produced 
by  the  words  : — "  Our  son  is  dead  "  !  And  yet  how 
slight  the  difference  in  visual  stimulation  !  How 
minute  the  difference  of  cortical  change  !    The  pro- 

'  I  should  myself  prefer  to  reserve  the  word  meaning  for  secondary 
meaning  in  the  perceptual  sphere,  and  to  apply  the  word  significance 
to  meaning  which  has  conceptual  relationships.      But  to  do  this  here 
would  only  confuse  the  issue. 
T 


274         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

found  difference  lies  in  the  meaning  conveyed  to  the 
mind,  not  in  the  merely  cerebral  states.  Of  course 
the  cerebral  states  give  the  cue  to  the  meaning  ;  but  it 
is  the  meaning  itself — meaning  for  the  mind — which 
counts.  Or,  translating  this  into  psychological  terms, 
as  Mr.  McDougall  puts  it,  "  the  sensory  content, 
whether  vivid  and  rich  in  detail,  or  dim  and  scanty, 
is  but  a  subordinate  part,  a  mere  cue  to  the 
meaning  "  (p.  304). 

But  the  essential  point  for  Mr.  McDougall  is  that 
"  there  exists  no  unitary  neural  process  correlated 
with  meaning ;  that  in  fact  meaning  has  no  imme- 
diate neural  correlate  which  can  be  regarded  as  its 
immediate  cause,  or  its  phenomenon,  or  of  which 
it  can  be  regarded  as  the  psychical  aspect "  (p.  305). 
So,  too,  with  conation.  "  The  conditions  of  conation," 
he  says,  *'  are  psychical,  and  in  many  cases  these 
psychical  conditions  are  such  as  have  no  immediate 
correlates  among  the  brain  processes "  (p.  328). 
Mr.  McDougall  appears  to  be  convinced  that  those 
who  provisionally  accept  a  correlation  between  mind- 
process  and  brain-process,  are  logically  committed  to 
an  atomistic  psychology — to  the  doctrine  that 
consciousness  is  compounded  of  elements  (p.  281), 
and  that  these  elements  are  ultimately  sensations 
{sensa).  Admitting  that  correlated  with  these  sensa- 
tions as  such,  there  are  cortical  events,  he  claims  that 
these  are  severally  separate  and  distinct,  and  can 
only  be  united  in  experience  by  the  relating  activity 
of  the  soul.  After  discussing  "  the  psycho-physics 
of  meaning,"  he  says  : — "  We  have  seen  that  even  the 
sensory  content  of  the  consciousness  of  an  object 
has  for  its  physical  correlate  a  number  of  discrete 


FINALISM  Ax\D   MECHANISM         275 

processes  in  the  brain,  which  in  no  sense  constitute  a 
unitary  whole.  How  much  less,  then,  are  we  justified 
in  assuming  that  the  unitary  psychic  whole  of 
sensory-context-plus-meaning  has  any  physical  corre- 
late in  the  brain"  (p.  311).  In  fine,  "the  brain- 
processes  could  produce  no  sensations  except  by 
acting  upon  a  soul,  and  their  effects  are  combined  in 
one  consciousness  only  in  virtue  of  their  acting  upon 
one  soul  "  (p.  299).  Thus  Mr.  McDougall  is  confident 
that  the  unity  of  consciousness  remains  absolutely 
unintelligible  unless  we  postulate  "  some  ground 
other  than  the  bodily  organization  "  (p.  366).  Such 
is  the  animistic  thesis. 

Now  Mr.  McDougall  distinguishes  again  and 
again  between  what  I  have  spoken  of  as  the  "eds" 
and  the  "  ing "  of  experience,  though  not  in  these 
terms.  He  speaks,  for  example,  of  "  those  who  think 
of  all  consciousness  and  all  psychical  process,  as 
consisting  in  what  we  call  the  sensory  content  of 
consciousness  ;  for  the  sensory  content  does  seem  like 
a  patchwork."  Here  we  have  the  juxtaposed  and 
compounded  "  eds  "  of  experience — those  "  eds  " 
which  Dr.  Alexander  regards  as  non-mental.  "  But," 
Mr.  McDougall  continues,  "  the  sensory  content  and 
the  sensations  and  images  that  compose  it  are 
abstractions  only,  achieved  by  fixing  our  attention 
on  one  aspect  of  mental  process.  Sensations  are 
merely  incidents  in  the  process  of  cognition,  and  no 
amount  of  compounding  of  sensations  will  result 
in  an  act  of  cognition,  a  knowing  of  an  object" 
(p.  170).  Here  we  have  the  "ing"  of  experi- 
ence. Since,  however,  the  "  eds "  or  sensory  con- 
tent   have    neural    correlates,    and   since    they    are 


276         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

abstractions  reached  by  neglecting  the  correlative 
"  ing  ",  one  may  surely  urge  that  this  correlative  "  ing  " 
is  also  in  like  manner  an  abstraction  reached  by 
neglecting  the  correlative  "  eds."  But  it  is  this 
abstraction  that  Mr.  McDougall  hypostatizes  as  the 
psychic  entity.  Furthermore,  since  mental  process  is 
essentially  a  relating  of  the  "  eds  "  which  have  brain- 
correlates,  on  what  valid  grounds  can  Mr.  McDougall 
deny  that  physiological  process  is  essentially  a 
relating  of  the  brain-correlates?  As  I  conceive 
physiological  process,  this  is  just  its  essential  feature. 
It  is  the  process  through  which  organization  is 
reached.  And  why  should  not  the  same  process 
which  relates  and  organizes  the  conscious  experience, 
relate  and  organize  also,  within  one  order,  the  function- 
ing of  the  cortex } 

It  will  perhaps  be  said  that  I  am  ignoring  the 
whole  of  the  argument  from  meaning.  My  attitude 
is  rather  that  of  one  who  accepts  all  the  facts  and  rejects 
the  conclusion.  The  facts  are  familiar  to  psychologists. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  number  of  different 
but  allied  presentations  may  be  psychologically 
connected  with  what  we  may  term  a  common 
meaning-path.  Any  one  of  these  may  then  be  a 
condition  of  the  flow  of  process  along  that  path — 
any  one  of  the  different  presentations  of  what  we  call 
the  same  object  for  example ;  or  the  spoken  word 
and  the  written  word.  But  any  two  presentations 
may  also  be  differentiated  in  connexion  with  different 
common  paths — the  words  oitr  and  yojir  for  instance. 
Furthermore  the  one  presentation,  say  our,  may 
become  allied  with  one  complex  set  of  meaning- 
paths,  the  other  presentation,  say  yotir^  with  a  quite 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM  277 

different  set.  And  so  forth.  It  is  all  terribly 
complex.  But  the  psychological  complexity  remains 
precisely  the  same  for  empirical  treatment  (and 
Mr.  McDougall  claims  that  his  doctrine  of  animism 
is  based  entirely  on  empirical  considerations,)  whether 
there  are  neural  correlates  or  not.  We  have  not  to 
deal  with  an  argument  from  complexity.  Mr. 
McDougall  does  not  say  that  all  this  is  too  complex 
to  have  physiological  correlates.  He  asserts  that 
the  nature  of  meaning  is  such  that  it  cannot  have  a 
physiological  correlate. 

This  simplifies  the  issue.  What  is  the  essential 
characteristic  of  meaning  which  is  adduced  in 
justification  of  this  assertion  ? 

Now  the  word  meaning,  like  so  many  other 
psychological  terms,  is  used  in  both  those  contexts 
to  which  I  have  so  often  drawn  attention — that  of  the 
"eds,"  and  that  of  the  "ing,"  of  experience.  Mean- 
ing may  be  something  meant,  or  it  may  be — well 
just  meanzw^.  When  we  say  that  a  nauseous 
caterpillar  has  acquired  meaning  for  a  bird  that  has 
seized  its  like,  the  meaning  is  what  will  be  pre- 
perceiv^^:/.  In  this  sense  of  the  word  all  meaning 
within  a  scheme  of  knowledge  is  something  known — 
something  meant.  It  is  that  which  is  in  some  way 
related  within  the  scheme.  Mr.  McDougall  does  not 
use  the  word  in  this  sense.  He  definitely  excludes  this 
reference  in  a  footnote  (p.  304),  and  tells  us  that  he  uses 
the  word  "  to  denote  the  consciousness  of  meaning, 
or  the  meaning  part  of  the  consciousness  of  an  idea." 
Unless  I  wholly  misunderstand  him  this  is  surely 
meaning  as  a  distinguishing  feature  of  mentaA  process, 
as  such ;  it  is  meaning  as  relating  one  related  item 


278  INSTINCT   AND   EXrERIENCE 

with  another.  It  is  the  meaning  that  has  reference 
not  to  the  related  terms,  but  to  the  relating  process, 
as  that  which  renders  any  relationship  possible.  But 
for  Mr.  McDougall  the  relating  activity  is  the 
prerogative  of  the  psychic  entity — a  prerogative  all 
its  own.  Just  as  no  juxtaposition  of  associated 
items  presented  to  sense  could  possibly  constitute 
experience,  were  there  no  psychical  activity  which, 
as  SLSsoclsitiug,  unites  them  in  one  synthesis  ;  so  no 
collocation  of  words  on  a  printed  page  could  be  other 
than  presented  blotches  of  printer's  ink  unless  the 
relating  activity  of  the  psychic  entity  gave  them 
meaning. 

But,  stripped  of  what  some  of  us  regard  as  the 
non-scientific  concept  of  the  psychic  entity,  what  does 
this  come  to  }  It  reduces  to  this : — In  the  absence  of 
synthetizing  process  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as 
a  synthetic  product.  To  this  we  can  all,  I  suppose, 
subscribe.  But  why  do  some  of  us  exclude  the 
psychic  entity  from  any  place  in  what  we  regard  as 
scientific  interpretation  ?  Because  it  seems  to  us  to 
be  a  concept  having  reference  to  the  Source  of  the 
observed  synthesis.  Because  it  is  put  forward  as  the 
Agency  whose  business  is  that  of  relating.  We 
again  re-echo  the  words  of  Henry  Sidgwick  : — "  Why  " 
—/or  scientific  interpretation — "  Why  do  the  relations 
want  a  Source  ?  Why  cannot  they  get  on  without 
one?  "  It  is  just  because  Mr.  McDougall,  as  I  think, 
comprises  in  one  synthesis  a  doctrine  of  process  and  a 
doctrine  of  its  Source,  whereas  I  regard  all  reference 
to  Source  as  outside  the  pale  of  scientific  inquiry,  that 
our  conclusions  are  bound  to  be  widely  divergent. 

If,  then,  meaning,  in  my  interpretation,  is  just 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM  279 

part  of  process  itself,  why  does  it  so  persistently 
elude  our  most  patient  search  for  it  among  the 
juxtaposed  or  compounded  products  of  mental 
process  ?  Because  we  seek  it  where  it  can  never  be 
found.  Because  we  look  for  it  among  the  "  eds  "  of 
experience.  Because,  as  relating  and  cognizing,  it 
can  never  at  the  same  time  assume  the  guise  of  the 
related  and  cognized.  As  M.  Bergson  would  say,  it 
wholly  eludes  the  photographic  camera  of  the 
intellectualist.  Only  through  intuition  are  we 
directly  aware  of  the  flow  of  process  and  of  the  inner 
nature  of  experiencing.  That  is  why  conation  can 
never  be  objectified  or  "  ed "  ified.  It  is  felt  as 
mental  tendency  with  directed  meaning.  Its  end,  as 
the  object  of  desire  which  is  meant,  may  be  clearly 
and  sharply  conceived  ;  but  as  it  streams  onward 
towards  that  end  it  is  just  mental  living — it  is 
process  glowing  with  brilliant  awareness  and  enjoy- 
ment. Life  eludes  intellectual  thought,  save  in 
symbolic  concepts,  as  it  eludes  the  scalpel  of 
the  anatomist  and  all  physiological  analysis.  Mean- 
ing and  conation  are  moulded  on  the  very  form 
of  life  ;  on  life  in  its  highest  development.  But  why 
should  we  deny  that  the  process  which  is  life  has 
physiological  relationships  as  well  as  psychological 
relationships  all  along  the  line  ?  After  all,  that  great 
body  of  unitary  physiological  process  which  is  the 
functional  correlate  of  the  structural  complexity  of 
the  cortex,  with  its  millions  of  neurones,  must  have 
some  significance  within  the  ideal  construction  of  the 
biologist.  What  precludes  us  from  regarding  its 
imperial  business  as  that  of  relating  the  contributory 
sub-processes  within  its  provincial  centres  ? 


^80         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

The  printed  letters  on  this  page  give  rise  to 
discrete  and  separate  stimulations  of  the  retinal 
cones.  The  impulses  are  carried  inwards  by  discrete 
and  separate  neuronic  fibres.  Somewhere  in  the  brain, 
eventually,  let  us  say,  in  the  occipital  lobe  of  the 
cortex,  there  occurs  the  process  of  relating  these 
several  items  hitherto  only  partially  related  in  lower 
centres.  Is  this  relating  in  no  sense  a  physiological 
process  ?  And  where  does  this  physiological  process 
cease  ?  Suppose  that  instead  of  the  discrete  and  sepa- 
rate retinal  stimulations  affecting  the  visual  centre  of 
the  occipital  lobe,  there  are  allied  visual  and  auditory 
stimulations  affecting  the  relatively  distant  centres  in 
the  occipital  and  temporal  lobes.  Seeing  the 
multiplicity  of  neuronic  connexions  throughout  the 
cortex,  why  should  we  be  told  with  so  much 
confidence  that  physiological  processes  in  the  brain 
cannot  possibly  be  the  ground  of  the  relating  of 
these  sub-processes  within  its  empire  ?  May  not  the 
relating  activity,  so  called,  be  just  as  reasonably 
assigned  to  the  physiological  process  in  the  cortex 
and  the  organism  as  a  whole  as  to  the  correlated 
psychological  process,  hypostatized  as  a  psychic 
entity  ?  Is  not  a  denial  of  brain-process  as  relating 
and  integrating,  just  because  we  cannot  at  present 
tell  in  detail  just  how  sub-process  here  is  correlated 
with  sub-process  there,  tantamount  to  a  denial  that 
any  physiological  interpretation  of  physiological  facts 
can  be  given  ?  Of  course  this  may  be  so.  But  why 
found  so  much  upon  our  present  physiological 
ignorance?  Why  not  give  physiology  just  a  little 
longer  to  try  its  prentice  hand  at  interpretation  ? 

It  seems  to  me  that  even  now,  though  we  may 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM         281 

still  be  ignorant  of  many  details,  the  evidence  for 
physiological  solidarity  is  not  inconsiderable.  At  the 
one  end  of  the  scale  of  animal  life,  as  Mr.  McDougall 
himself  indicates  (p.  259),  the  admirable  work  of  Dr. 
Jennings  on  the  infusoria  leads  us  to  infer  that  the 
response  of  the  organism  to  local  stimulation  is  a 
"  total  reaction."  And  at  the  other  end  of  the  scale  I 
venture  to  submit  that  the  physiological  inference 
from  Mr.  McDougall's  own  striking  research  on  vision 
and  retinal  rivalry  is  that  the  cortex  responds  by  total 
reaction. 

If  a  spot  of  white  light  be  viewed  by  an  observer 
having  a  red  glass  before  his  left  eye  and  a  blue  glass 
before  his  right  eye  the  spot  may  appear  to  be  purple. 
But  it  may  at  one  moment  appear  to  be  red  and  at 
another  moment  appear  to  be  blue.  Either  colour 
may  pre-dominate  or  prevail  according  to  the  attentive 
reinforcement  or  inhibition  of  the  process  related  to 
the  stimulation  in  the  one  retina  or  the  other.  So, 
too,  the  microscopist  learns  to  use  his  two  eyes 
separately  :  and  can  at  will  see  either  the  object  in 
the  microscope  field  or  the  drawing  on  which  his  other 
eye  is  focussed.  "  It  is  difficult,"  says  Mr.  McDougall, 
"to  reconcile  the  alternation  of  the  two  colours  in 
consciousness  with  the  view  that  the  excitations  of  the 
two  optic  nerves  become  physically  compounded  in 
visual  centres  of  the  cerebrum  ;  and  it  is  still  more 
difficult  to  reconcile  with  this  view  the  possibility  of 
reinforcing,  by  voluntary  effort,  either  process  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other"  (p.  290).  For  Mr.  McDougall 
voluntary  attention  is  an  activity  of  the  psychic 
entity  ;  inhibition  a  secondary  effect  thereof.  For  us 
such    attention    is    the    psychological    correlate    of 


282         INSTINCT  AND   EXrERlENCE 

selective  processes  within  the  cortex.  Both  attention 
and  inhibition  imply  physiological  relationships  within 
the  context  of  the  nervous  system.  But  this  is  by 
the  way.  Our  present  concern  is  with  "  physical 
compounding  "  in  a  "  common  centre." 

When  we  look  at  any  illuminated  surface  with 
both  eyes,  it  appears  no  brighter  than  when  it  is  seen 
with  one  eye  only.  This  fact  again,  according  to  Mr. 
McDougall,  is  incompatible  with  the  common  view 
that  the  optic  nerves  transmit  their  excitations  to  be 
summed  in  a  common  centre.  Other  such  facts  based 
on  his  own  very  careful  observations  are  adduced  by 
Mr.  McDougall  in  support  of  his  conclusion  that  "  the 
fusion  of  simultaneous  sensory  stimuli  to  a  unitary 
resultant  is  not  a  physiological  or  physical  fusion  or 
composition,  but  a  purely  psychical  fusion  ...  for  it 
is  clear  that  these  psychical  fusions  of  effects  of 
sensory  stimuli  obey,  or  take  place  according  to, 
purely  psychical  laws  that  have  no  physical  counter- 
parts .  .  .  the  fusion  is  a  psychical  process  to  which 
no  physical  process  runs  parallel "  (p.  293). 

Now  we  are  here  invited  to  make  election  between 
two  alternatives ;  either  (i)  purely  physical  com- 
pounding in  terms  of  resultants  in  some  hypothetical 
nerve-centre  ;  or  (2)  purely  psychical  integration  in 
terms  of  a  soul-entity  whose  integrating  power  is 
taken  for  granted  to  account  for  the  facts.  I  am  not 
prepared  to  accept  the  limitations  of  election  laid 
down.  I  am  not  prepared  to  agree  that  if  a  process 
is  not  interpretable  in  terms  of  so-called  mechanical 
summation,  then  we  must  interpret  it  in  terms  of  a 
psychic  entity.  I  have  already  made  confession  of  my 
faith  that  if  by  vitalism  is  meant  no  more  than  that 


FINALISM  AND  MECHANISM         283 

there  are,  in  physiological  phenomena,  organic 
relationships  and  modes  of  synthesis  which  differ 
from  those  in  a  physico-chemical  system,  as  such, 
then  I  am  a  vitalist.  But  I  may  be  a  vitalist  in 
this  sense,  without  subscribing  to  the  doctrine  of 
animism. 

Let  us,  however,  scan  a  little  more  narrowly 
inorganic  analogies,  freely  admitting  that  they  are 
not  very  close.  In  the  solar  system  regarded  as  a 
gravitative  field,  there  are  reciprocal  relationships 
which  are  the  ground  of  observed  attractions.  Where 
is  the  specific  centre  in  which  this  ground  has  its  seat } 
Is  it  in  the  sun  ?  Then  what  about  perturbations  "i 
Does  it  not  pervade  the  whole  system  ?  Have  we  not 
to  take  into  consideration  the  total  configuration  ? 
Or  take  physical  phenomena  which  suggest  closer, 
but  still  distant,  analogies.  Two  coils  in  which 
electrical  processes  occur,  reciprocally  influence  each 
other.  Is  it  necessary  that  there  should  be  a  third 
instrumental  centre  in  which  the  reciprocal  influence 
shall  be  collected  and  compounded  ?  Does  not  the 
total  field  of  reciprocal  influence  suffice  ? 

These  are  admittedly  distant  analogies ;  perhaps 
it  will  be  said  that  they  are  far-fetched.  I  submit, 
however,  that  they  suggest  that  we  should  not  seek  in 
the  physiology  of  the  nervous  system  for  an  indepen- 
dent centre  of  summation,  but  should  lay  stress  upon 
total  reaction — should  emphasize  the  whole  field  of 
reciprocal  influence  within  the  entire  cerebral  context. 

Am  I  false  to  the  scientific  flag,  if  I  urge  that  we 
are  still  novices  in  the  interpretation  of  the  integrative 
processes  within  the  cortex,  and  if  I  claim  that  we 
ought    not    to    found    too    much    on    our    present 


284  INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 

ignorance  ?  No  doubt  the  exact  nature  of  the  rein- 
forcing and  inhibiting  influence  of  one  cortical  sub- 
process  on  another  or  others  requires  further  elucida- 
tion. Still  some  of  the  facts  of  inhibition  of  a  purely 
physiological  type,  say  in  the  spinal  cord,  are  now 
familiar.  A  sample  of  them  has  been  given  in  our 
third  chapter.  Now  seeing  that  it  is  the  normal 
business  of  the  two  eyes  to  function  as  one  binocular 
organ,  may  not  the  physiological  process  of  one 
retina  be  brought  into  physiological  relation  with  that 
of  the  other  retina,  each  normally  inhibiting  the 
redundant  part  of  the  other,  so  as  to  preclude  the 
visual  confusion  which  must  arise  if  there  were 
variable  summation  of  brightness  in  the  course  of 
their  joint  action  ?  Much  more  investigation  is 
needed.  I  am  well  aware  that  this  is  of  the  nature  of 
a  surmise.  But  can  it  be  asserted  that  such 
reciprocal  inhibition  is  physiologically  impossible,  or 
even  that  it  is  wholly  unsupported  by  physiological 
analogies  ?  It  seems  to  me  that  this  is  the  kind  of 
thing  that  goes  on  throughout  the  whole  business  of 
the  integrative  action  of  the  nervous  system.  And  if 
some  such  reciprocal  inhibition  of  cortical  sub- 
processes  due  to  the  stimulation  of  the  two  retinas 
has  been  established  through  natural  selection,  I  see 
no  reason  why  emphatic  blue  in  the  one,  supported 
by  psycho-physiological  meaning,  should  not  partially 
or  wholly  inhibit  the  sub-processes  normally  due  to 
the  stimulation  of  the  other  retina.  The  whole 
matter  is  difficult  to  interpret.  The  question  is 
whether  any  physiological  interpretation,  correlated 
with  the  psychological  interpretation,  on  some  such 
lines  as  these  or  better  physiological  lines  is  a  sheer 


FINALISM   AND  MECHANISM         285 

impossibility.  For  that  is  Mr.  McDougall's  contention. 
It  is  just  because  the  cortex  is  one  system  with  a 
unitary  integrative  process  that  the  principle  of  total 
reaction  seems  to  me  to  be  of  the  highest  physiological 
importance.  The  ground  of  physiological  integration 
correlative  with  that  of  psychological  integration 
is  to  be  sought,  I  conceive,  not  in  some  hypothetical 
summation  centre,  but  in  cortical  process  as  a  whole. 
In  no  cortical  centre  does  physiological  change  occur 
without  in  some  measure  affecting  the  total  con- 
stellation of  cerebral  changes  which  in  their  entirety 
constitute  cortical  process.  Until  such  a  unitary 
interpretation  is  shown  to  be  physiologically  unsound 
in  principle,  I  submit  that  it  should  be  given  further 
trial  before  we  have  recourse  to  a  psychical  entity 
independent  of  physiological  correlates. 

But  the  trouble  is  that  if  one  brings  forward 
biological  and  physiological  evidence  of  such  total 
reaction ;  if  one  adduces  instances  of  sub-cortical 
inhibition  ;  if  one  urges  in  opposition  to  extreme 
vitalistic  or  animistic  interpretation  that  embryological 
development  proceeds  towards  an  end  which  we  can 
foresee ;  if  one  lays  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  same 
organic  end  is  often  reached  by  diverse  means;  if  one 
turns  for  illustration  to  biological  evolution  ;  one  is 
met  by  the  assertion  (and  I  regard  it  as  nothing  more 
than  a  bare  assertion)  that  all  this  is  evidence  of  the 
activity  of  a  teleological  psychic  entity.  One  is  told 
that  "  all  the  wonderful  stability  and  complexity 
combined  with  gradual  change  throughout  the  ages 
...  is  in  reality  an  attribute  of  an  enduring  psychic 
existence  of  which  the  lives  of  individual  organisms 
are   but   successive   manifestations"   (p.    377).     The 


286  INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 

same  assemblage  of  facts  which  I  regard  as  evidence 
of  the  instrinsic  nature  of  the  organism  as  a  differen- 
tiated part  of  one  natural  order,  is  adduced  by  Mr. 
McDougall  as  evidence  of  the  extrinsic  inter-action  of 
an  animistic  principle  nowise  "  mechanistic "  but 
essentially  finalistic.  So  there  the  matter  must  rest. 
One  can  only  say  :   Utrtim  horiim  mavis  accipe. 

We  have  come  back  into  touch  with  the  problems 
of  mechanism  and  finalism  ;    for  the  activity  of  the 
psychic   entity   is   essentially  teleological.     In  three 
chapters    of   his   work   Mr.    McDougall    urges    the 
inadequacy   of  mechanism    for  the  interpretation  of 
biological  phenomena — in  my  judgment  with  complete 
success,  since  the  term  mechanism  is  restricted  with- 
in the  limits  of  physico-chemical  processes.     If  the 
concept  of  mechanism  be  thus  defined,  then  I  can 
fully  agree  with  Mr.  McDougall  and  other  vitalists 
that  unquestionably  a  mechanistic  interpretation  of 
organic  phenomena  is  inadequate.     But  it  seems  to 
me  that  there  is  a  great  leap  from  this  sound  basis 
to  the   conception  of  the   soul  as   an   independent 
psychical   entity   controlling    phenomena — unless   it 
be  the  leap  from  the  natural  ground  of  phenomena 
to   their  Source.     In   that  case  the  whole  problem 
has  to  be  discussed  on  a  different  platform.     Here  I 
endeavour  to  keep  on   what  I   conceive   to   be  the 
plane  of  scientific  interpretation.     And  just  as  I  hold 
that  the  scientific  explanation  of  organic  phenomena 
in  terms   of  physics   and   chemistry,   and    in    these 
terms  only,  is  wholly  inadequate ;  so  do  I  regard  the 
explanation  of  these  phenomena  in  terms  of  finalism 
as  wholly  speculative — especially  as  Mr.  McDougall 
himself  says  that  "  we  have  to  confess  that  we  cannot 


FINALISM   AND   MECHANISM  287 

form  any  conception  of  the  way  in  which  this 
teleological  guidance  of  morphogenesis  is  affected  " 
(p.  244)  ;  and  Dr.  Driesch  tells  us  that  "  we  are  by  no 
means  able  to  understand  "  it  "  even  in  the  slightest 
degree"  (op.  cit.,  ii.  p.  143).  If  we  could  only 
consent  to  restrict  the  term  finalism  to  the  interpreta- 
tion of  psychological  phenomena  in  which  there  is 
inferential  evidence  that  some  pre-perception  of  end 
is  present,  then  for  scientific  interpretation  the 
question  would  be  : — What  is  the  nature  and  value  of 
such  evidence  in  the  case  of  morphogenesis  ?  Here, 
of  course,  there  is  plenty  of  room  for  difference  of 
opinion.  But  the  issue  would  be  clear  and  nowise 
ambiguous.  As  things  are  at  present,  an  alternative 
seems  to  be  presented  in  this  form  :  there  must  be 
either  mechanism  or  finalism  ;  in  organic  phenomena 
physical  and  chemical  mechanism  is  insufficient  for 
interpretation  ;  therefore  these  phenomena  must  be 
finalistic.  But  may  there  not  be  a  great  array  of 
natural  phenomena  which  are  neither  mechanistic,  in 
the  physico-chemical  sense,  nor  finalistic  in  the  sense 
of  involving  conscious  pre-perception  ? 

That,  however,  does  not  satisfy  Mr.  McDougall. 
He  extends  downward  the  teleological  conception 
and  teaches  that  "  not  only  conscious  thinking,  but 
also  morphogenesis,  heredity  and  evolution  are 
psycho-physical  processes.  All  alike  are  conditioned 
and  governed  by  psychical  dispositions  that  have 
been  built  up  in  the  experience  of  the  race  "  (p.  379). 
Here  the  conscious  relationship  (however  we  interpret 
it)  ,is  co-extensive  with  life.  As  we  have  already 
seen,  M.  Bergson,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Professor 
Titchener,  on  the  other  hand,  have  given  expression 


288         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

to  similar  opinions,  Paulsen  and  his  school  go 
further.  In  their  doctrine,  all  modes  of  natural 
process  involve  relationships  which,  if  not  conscious, 
are  at  any  rate  of  the  conscious  order.  If  this  be  so, 
"  then  we  may  assume  that  just  as  a  system  of 
impulses  with  corresponding  feelings  runs  parallel 
with  the  vital  processes  in  animal  bodies,  a  similar 
but  less  highly  developed  inner  life  corresponds  to 
plant  life  ;  and  furthermore  that  something  akin  to 
this  appears  in  the  spontaneous  movement  of  inorganic 
bodies,  in  chemical  and  crystalline  processes,  in 
processes  of  attraction  and  repulsion."  ^ 

One  may  here  ask  whether  the  suggested 
consciousness — or,  at  any  rate,  that  which  is  of  the 
conscious  order — comprises  anything  analogous  to 
pre-perception.  I  urged  at  the  beginning  of  the 
fourth  chapter,  that  the  scientific  evidence  for 
consciousness  is  closely  connected  with  the  evidence 
for  pre-perception,  and  that,  where  we  may  reasonably 
infer  the  guidance  of  behaviour  by  pre-perception, 
we  may  fairly  assume  conscious  perception  as  its 
natural  precursor.  What  evidence  is  there  of  pre- 
perception  in  chemical  and  crystalline  processes,  in 
processes  of  attraction  and  repulsion  ?  It  may  be 
said  that  inorganic  processes  lead  up  to  ends  which 
we  can  in  some  measure  foresee,  and  that  the  Source 
of  these  processes  must  therefore  have  some 
teleological  pre-perception  of  the  end  to  which 
nature  is  passing  on  in  the  course  of  evolution.  That, 
however,  I  submit,  is  not  the  scientific  question. 
The  scientific  question  is  whether  in,  let  us  say,  the 

'  Paulsen,  "Introduction  to  Philosophy,"  English  translation  by 
Frank  Thilly  (1907),  p.  120. 


FINALISM   AND   MECHANISM         289 

crystalline  process  itself,  there  is  a  pre-perception  of 
what  is  just  coming  based  on  Isome  prior  perception 
of  what  on  a  previous  occasion  has  come.  I  do  not 
think  that  we  have  any  such  evidence  as  science 
must  demand,  that  this  is  the  case.  But  this  is  by 
the  way.     Let  us  follow  the  course  of  the  argument. 

Paulsen  leads  up  to  his  panpsychic  doctrine 
through  psychological  considerations.  I  may  perhaps 
be  allowed  to  bring  the  question  into  line  with  my 
own  method  of  treatment  and  to  put  the  matter 
briefly  thus : — If  experience  be  a  process,  wherein  lies 
the  essential  feature  of  the  process  ?  In  experiencing, 
or  in  the  experienced  ?  In  a  sense  we  may  reply :  In 
both,  since  all  that  is  experienced  involves  the  correla- 
tive actual  or  possible  experiencing.  Now,  psychol- 
ogists tend  to  become  members  of  one  or  other  of  two 
great  schools.  The  adherents  of  the  one  school 
emphasize  the  "  eds  "  of  experience  and  are  associa- 
tionists  and  intellectualists  ;  those  of  the  other  school 
emphasize  the  "  ing  "  of  experience  and  are,  as  the 
phrase  goes,  voluntaristic.  They  lay  stress  on  im- 
pulse, and  will,  and  conative  tendency ;  they  lay 
stress  on  the  consciousness  of  process  in  progress. 
And  this  experiencing  is,  and  is  felt  as,  a  unitary 
process  in  contradistinction  to  the  manifold  of  "  eds," 
relatively  discrete,  juxtaposed,  or  compounded.  I 
hold  that  the  voluntaristic  school  emphasize  a  fact  of 
the  utmost  importance — the  fact  that  we  intuitively 
enjoy  experiencing  as  such ;  that  we  are  directly 
aware  of  the  process  and  flow  of  the  mental  life. 
Paulsen  was  a  voluntarist.  And  he  made  this  the 
basis  of  his  panpsychism.  He  urges  that  those  who 
lay  stress  only  on  what  is  presented,  or  conceived  or 
u 


290         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

otherwise  knowledged  (if  I  may  be  allowed  the  word) 
*'  will  always  find  it  impossible  to  conceive  plants  as 
psychical  beings,  or  to  consider  the  movements 
of  inorganic  beings  to  be  the  signs  of  psychical 
processes."  What  does  this  imply  ?  It  implies  that 
all  "  processing  "  is  of  the  same  order,  and  always  and 
everywhere  of  the  conscious  order — whether  it  be 
gravitating,  or  crystallizing,  or  organizing,  or  ex- 
periencing as  we  human  folk  experience.  It  involves 
the  assumption  that  the  constitutive  ground  of  the 
natural  order  is  throughout  of  such  a  character  as  to 
involve  conscious,  or  quasi-conscious  relationships. 

Well,  it  may  be  so !  Who  can  tell  ?  Most  of  us 
have  been  tempted  to  indulge  in  such  speculations.^ 
But  if  we  come  to  regard  such  a  doctrine  as  somewhat 
too  speculative  within  the  bounds  of  a  philosophy 
founded  on  science ;  if  we  cannot  fully  subscribe  to 
panpsychism  ;  if  we  feel  that  it  is  safer  at  present  to 
assume  that  only  some  natural  processes  involve  such 
conscious  relationships  as  those  of  which  we  are  our- 
selves aware  ;  nay,  more,  if  we  go  further  and  regard, 
provisionally,  profiting  by  experience  as  the  best 
criterion  we  have  of  consciousness  as  an  effective 
relationship,  and  believe  that,  in  the  higher  vertebrates, 
this  is  correlated  with  physiological  relationships  in 
the  cortex  of  the  brain  ;  may  we  not  incorporate  at 
any  rate  this  result  of  such  considerations  as  Paulsen 
voiced  : — that  just  as  experiencing  is  a  unitary 
process,  so  is  living  a  wider  unitary  process,  and  so 
too  is  the  whole  of  nature  a  yet  more  basal  unitary 
process  ?  If  we  speak  of  the  conscious  relationship 
as  a  property  of  certain  organisms  under  certain 
»  Cf.,  my  "  Animal  Life  and  Intelligence  "  (1890),  p.  467. 


FINALISM  AND   MECHANISM         291 

conditions,  we  must  always  remember  that  it  is  a 
consciousness  not  only  of  the  related,  but  also  of  the 
process  of  relating.  And  if,  as  I  have  urged,  instinctive 
experience  implies  the  existence  of  a  synthetic  group 
of  experienced  items ;  it  involves  also  the  correla- 
tive synthetic  process  of  experiencing ;  if  it  involves 
a  primary  form  of  conscious  relationship  to  a  given 
situation  as  experienced,  it  involves  also  a  primary 
intuition  (in  M.  Bergson's  sense  of  the  word)  of  the 
process  of  relating ;  and  if  in  my  interpretation  it  is 
based  on  organic  foundations,  those  foundations  are 
grounded  in  the  constitution  of  the  organism  as  a 
visible  expression  of  that  unitary  process  which  we 
name  living,  as  living  itself  is  only  a  differentiation  of 
that  vast  unitary  process  of  which  the  contemplated 
order  of  nature  is  the  product. 

Further  than  this  in  a  book  the  aim  of  which, 
however  inadequately  attained,  is  to  deal  with 
scientific  problems  in  a  scientific  spirit,  I  am  not 
prepared  to  go.  Of  the  Source  of  phenomena  it  is 
not  my  province  to  treat.  Science  deals  with  process 
and  its  products  as  somehow  existent.  I  have, 
throughout  spoken  of  existent  process  as  the  ground 
of  observed  and  observable  phenomena.  But  of  only 
one  form  or  mode  of  process  have  we  any  direct 
conscious  awareness — the  process  which  we  enjoy  as 
we  live.  What,  then,  is  the  Source  of  process  ?  That 
is  a  question  for  metaphysics,  not  for  science.  Can 
we  identify  ground  and  Source  ?  Can  we  say  that, 
in  the  enjoyment  of  process  which  is  our  conscious 
life,  we  are  in  merging  unity  with  the  Source  of  the 
universe?  This  metaphysical  route  leads  up  to  the 
doctrine  of  immanence.    Or  shall  we  say  that  process 


292         INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 

as  given,  implies  a  Source  as  Giver  ?  This  route 
leads  up  to  the  doctrine  of  transcendence.  But 
once  more  I  urge  that  the  man  of  science  should 
leave  these  questions  to  be  discussed  by  meta- 
physicians. Once  more  I  urge  that  the  more 
clearly  we  distinguish  the  scientific  problems  from 
the  metaphysical  problems  the  better  it  will  be 
both  for  science  and  for  metaphysics. 


INDEX 


A  priori  character,  common  to 
experiencing  and  the  experi- 
enced, 190 

Admiration,  a  binary  emotional 
compound,  124 

Esthetic  appreciation,  a  form  of 
enjoyment,  201 

Alexander,  Dr.  S.,  his  use  of  the 
word  enjoyment,  123,  188  ;  and 
contemplation,  134,  188,  201  ; 
his  contention  that  all  sensa  and 
cognita  are  non-mental,  135 

Allied  reflexes,  68 

Alternating  reflexes,  68 

Ammophila,  instincts  of,  con- 
sidered, 223,  226,  230 

"Animal  Behaviour,"  references 

to,  S.  23,  33 
Animism,   Mr.    W.   McDougall's 

advocacy  of,  III,  275 ff. 
Annulling    of   consciousness,   M. 

Bergson's  doctrine  of,  207 
Antagonistic  reflexes,  68 
Arthropods,  instinctive  knowledge 

characteristic  of,  216 
Associating  process  and  associated 

products,  52 

Bergson,  M.  Henri 
on  swimming  and  walking,  17 

the  unitary  nature  of  experi- 
encing, 52 

the  intellectual  instincts,  98 

interpenetration  as  con- 
trasted with  juxtaposition, 
124,  199 

order  of  inert  and  order  of 
vital,  159,  182,  210,  233 


Bergson,  M.  Henri 
on  the  new  and  unique  in  ex- 
perience, 172 
organic  routine  as  due  to  the 

Agency  of  Life,  172 
spontaneity  of  Life,  176 
science  and  metaphysics,  178 
his  criticism  of  Darwin,  179 
insistence  on  importance  of 

process  and  change,  180 
argument  that  all  process  is 
vital,  181 
on  selective  processes,  191 
his  doctrine  of  pure  memory, 
196,  209,  212 
pure  perception  referred  to, 
197 
on  the  insertion  of  Life,  198 
objects     and    processes     of 

experience,  200 
the  capital  error  of  associa- 
tionism,  200 
his  doctrine  of  instinct,  205  ff. 
on  consciousness  as  annulled, 
207 
the  brain  as  a  switchboard, 

210 
the  brain  as  a   reservoir  of 

indeterminism,  211 
kinds     of    unconsciousness, 

211 
Life  and  Spirit  as  Reality, 
212 
his  position  with  regard  to  the 
relation  of  pure  memory 
to  heredity,  213 
on  relation  of  organization  to 
instinct,  214 


293 


294 


INSTINCT   AND  EXPERIENCE 


Bergson,  M,  Henri 

on  the  choice  presented  to  Life, 
216 
the  divergence  in  arthropods 

and  vertebrates,  216 
the  inherent  inability  of  the 
intellect    to    comprehend 
life,  220 
some    distinctions    between 
instinct  and    intelligence, 
220 
the  relation  of   seeking    to 

finding,  222 
the  instinct   of  ammophila, 

223,  226,  230 
science  and  philosophy,  225 
instinct  as  sympathy,  226 
intuition,  227 
the  kernel   of  his    doctrine  of 

instinct,  230 
his  hypostatization  of  results  of 
analysis,  234 
view  of  the  relation  of  the 
intellect     to     mechanical 
interpretation,  261 
Berkeley,  Bishop,  his  use  of  word 

"  notion,"  203  {footnote) 
Bradley,  Mr.  F.  H.,  on  sentient 

experience,  126 
Brain  as  switchboard,  M.  Berg- 
son's  doctrine  of,  210 

Calkins,  Miss  M.  W.,  on  idealist 
position,  128 

Cat,  decerebrate,  77 

Carr,  Mr.  Wildon,  referred  to, 
219;  on  intuition,  227;  on 
psycho-physiological  parallel- 
ism, 268, 272 

Cause,  use  of  term  avoided  as  far 
as  possible,  140 

Chemistry  and  mechanics,  255 

Cinematographical  snap-shots, 
129,  181,  225,  229,  234 

Clifford,  W.  K.,  on  organism  as 
historic  being,  160 

Common  path,  physiological 
principle  of,  64 

Common  meaning  path,  276 

Conation,  equivalent  to  mental 
process,  136 


Conative  aspect  of  instinct,  41, 43, 

S3 
Concatenation,  unity  of,  145,  261 
Conceptual    maps    or     thought- 
models,  146 
Conditions  of   world   process  as 

a     whole :     there     are    none, 

141 
Conditioning    and    conditioned, 

same  process  as,  according  to 

point  of  view,  141 
Congenital    dispositions    of    the 

cortex,  104 
Conscious  relationship,  a  link  in 

a  correlated  chain,  92 
Conscious    relationships    of    the 

natural     order    really     count, 

262 
Consciousness,   criterion  of,   90 ; 

as  annulled,  207 
Constellation  of  reflexes,  69,  73  ; 

of  cerebral  changes,  285 
Constitution  and  disposition,  1 17 
Contemplation    and    enjoyment, 

188,  201 
Context  and  meaning,  194 
Correlation,    use   of   term,    140  ; 

universal,  261 
Cortex  and  consciousness,  93 
Creative  departure  from  routine, 

171,  176,  246 
Crystal,  formation  of;  conditions 

and  ground,  143  ;  prediction  of 

nature  of  before  first  formed, 

149 

Darwin,   Charles,  criticised  by 

M.  Bergson,  179 
Decerebrate  animal,  74 

frog,  74 

pigeon,  75 

dog,  76 

cat,  77 

Descartes,  his  use  of  the  word 

eminenter,  138 
Disposition  and  constitution,  117 
Divergent  paths  to  insects  and  to 

man,  M.  Bergson's  doctrine  of, 

218 
Diving  and  swimming,  6 
Dog,  scratching  reflex  of,  60 


INDEX 


295 


Dog,  extensor  thrust  of,  64 

,  decerebrate,  76 

,  Dr.  Pagano's,  experiments 

on,  78 
•,  Dr.  Pawlow's  observations 

on  association  in,  84 
Driesch,  Dr.  Hans 

brief  definition  of  instinct,  22 

doctrine  of  entelechy,   154  ff., 
244 ;  as  applied  to  Tubularia, 

257 

on  intra-psychical  series,  272 
on  our  conception  of  teleological 
guidance,  287 


Emotional  aspect  of  instinct,  13, 
112 

Empathic  tendency,  237 

End,  same,  reached  by  different 
means,  247 

Enjoyment  as  equivalent  to  ex- 
periencing, 123,  134,  199;  con- 
trasted with  contemplation,  188, 
201 

Entelechy,  doctrine  of,  154;  as 
ground,  156,  244 ;  as  Source, 
157,  244,  in  Tubularia,  257 

Epiphenomenal  doctrine,  262 

Epistemology,  part  of  the  meta- 
physics of  Source,  165 

Evolution  contains  non-routine 
factors,  167 

Existence  of  world  for  experience 
postulated,  127 

Expectation  and  memory,  195 

Experiencing  and  the  experienced, 
51  ;  in  the  discussion  of 
emotion,  123 ;  as  a  double 
reference,  126,  132 ;  polarized 
in  privileged  centres,  134,  192  ; 
ambiguity  to  be  avoided,  198  ; 
distinction  as  drawn  by  M, 
Bergson,  200 ;  can  we  contem- 
plate experiencing  ?  201  ;  in- 
stinctive experience  involves 
both,  231  ;  with  differing  em- 
phasis, 232  J  in  relation  to 
meaning,  279 ;  in  relation  to 
panpsychism,  289 

Eye  of  vertebrate  and  pecten,  179 


Faculty    interpretation    of    in- 
stinct, danger  of  falling  into,  1 18 
Fatigue,  physiological,  70 
Finalism,  discussion  of,  242 
Finding  and  seeking  in  M.  Berg- 
son's  doctrine  of  instinct  and 
intelligence,  222 
Flight  of  swallow,  54 
Foster,  Sir  Michael 
on  decerebrate  frog,  74 
decerebrate  pigeon,  75 
difference  between  automatic 
and  voluntary  act,  83 
Frog,  decerebrate,  74 

GOLTZ,  Dr.  F. 

on  decerebrate  dog,  76 
Green,  T.  H. 
on  Source  of  phenomena,  137 
impossibility    of  a    natural 
history  of  self-conscious- 
ness, 164 
Groos,  Dr.  Karl 
on  the  value  of  play,  25 

the  genesis  of  the  instinctive 
play  response,  87 
Ground,  use  of  term,  142 

"  Habit  and  Instinct,"  references 

to,  4,  23,  55 
Hamilton,  Sir  Wm. 

on  instinctive  belief,  judgment, 
and  cognition,  97 
Hereditary  dispositions  of  cortex, 

87 
Hereditary  transmission,  174 
History,  and  science,  165  ;  does  it 

repeat  itself?  166,  244 
Hume,  David,  modified  quotation 

from,   138 ;   on  custom  as   the 

ground  of  routine,  166 
Huxley,  T,  H.,  on  human  instincts 

in  the  intellectual  sphere,  102 

Ideal  construction  of  mechanics, 

253 
Idealist  and  realist,  127 
Impetus  of  Life,  177 
Impulse,  nature  of,  1 18 
Impulsive,  force  of  instinct,  n6, 

120 


296 


INSTINCT  AND  EXPERIENCE 


Individual  and  individuality,  172 

Innate  mental  tendencies,  87 ; 
distinguished  from  instincts, 
103  ;  their  range  in  animal 
life,  121 

Innate  capacity  and  instinct,  96, 
103 

Instinct  and  instinctive,  defini- 
tions, 5  ;  Dr.  Driesch's,  22  ; 
Dr.  Myers',  22,  28,  238;  Dr. 
Stout's,  25  ;  Mr.  McDougall's, 
24,  30;  Dr.  Wundt's,  31; 
Father  Wasmann's  3 1  ;  Sydney 
Smith's,  204 ;  M.  Bergson's, 
205  ft. 

Integration  in  nervous  system,  83, 
284 

Intelligence,  involved  in  first  per- 
formance of  instinctive  act,  34  ; 
definition  of,  50 ;  as  process 
and  product,  51  ;  as  distin- 
guished from  instinct  by  M. 
Bergson,  220;  and  by  Dr. 
Myers,  238 

Interaction  of  mind  and  body, 
263 

Internuncial  path,  65 

Intuition,  as  described  by  M. 
Bergson,  182,  227 

James,  Wm.,  on  nemo  dat  quod 
non  Aabet,  138;  on  problem  of 
the  one  and  the  many,  144  ;  on 
the  discontinuity  theory,  144 ; 
does  consciousness  exist  ?  190 

James-Lange,  theory  of  emotion 
alluded  to,  113 

Jennings,  Dr.,  observations  on 
infusoria,  91  ;  on  total  reaction, 
281 

KiRCHOFF,  his  definition  of  me- 
chanics, 251 

Knowledge,  instinct  as  a  kind  of, 
204,  215 

Lankester,  Sir  Ray,  on  instinct 

and  educability,  94 
Life  cannot  be  comprehended  by 

the  intellect  according   to  M. 

Bergson,  220 


Life  history  and  routine,  169,  244 
Living  matter,  origin  of,  160 
Lindsay,  Mr.   A.  D.,  quotations 
from  his  work  on  "  The  Philo- 
sophy of  Bergson,"  228,  229. 
Longitudinal    section    in  experi- 
ence,  189,  193  ;   relationships, 
195 


McDoUGALL,  Mr.  W. 
criticises,  Dr.  Driesch's  defini- 
tion of  instinct,  24 
on  the  use  of  the  term  instinct, 
30.47 
instincts       as       perceptual 

systems,  38 
definition  of  infelligence,  50 
innately  organized    instinc- 
tive inlets,  85 
innate    re-presentation,    e.g. 
in  nest-building,  106 
his    doctrine    of   instinct    and 
emotion  considered,  108  ff, 
on  intelligence  of  solitary  wasps, 

219 
his  use  of  term  mechanical,  261 
on  the  interaction  of  mind  and 
body,  264 
the  doctrine  of  concomitance, 
264,  265 
his  discussion  of  meaning,  273  fif. 
no    neural    process    correlated 
with  meaning,  274 ;  or  with 
conation,  274 
his  animistic  interpretation,  275 
on  retinal  rivalry,  281 

physical  compounding  in  a 

common  centre,  282 
our  conception  of  teleological 
guidance,  287 
Man,  principal  instincts  of,  in  Mr. 

McDougall's  treatment,  1 1 1 
Meaning,  primary  and  secondary, 
8,  9  ;  primary,  193  j  secondary, 
194 ;  and  context,  194  j  Mr. 
McDougall's  discussion  of, 
273  ff. 
Mechanical    ideal     construction, 

251  fif. 
Mechanism  and  physiology,  256 


INDEX 


297 


Mechanistic  interpretation,  250 ; 
place   of  in   scientific  scheme, 

259 

Memory,  195  ;  pure,  M.  Bergson's 

doctrine  of,  196,  209,  212  ;  not 

a  function  of  the  brain,  211 

Modifications  and  variations,  175 

Monistic  unity  of  concatenation, 

14s 

Moorhen,  diving,  4,  193  ;  swim- 
ming, 1$  ;  primary  experience 
of,  19 
Myers,  Dr.  C.  S, 
on  the  beginning  of  experience, 

16,  18,  130 
criticises,    Dr.   Driesch's    brief 

definition  of  instinct,  22 
on  relation  of  instinct  to  intelli- 
gence, 28,  238  ff. 
instinct  and  reflex  action,  56 
finalism  and  mechanism,  240, 
241,  260 

Natural  history  of  experience, 
impossible  according  to  T.  H, 
Green,  163 

Natural  order  as  contextual  net- 
work of  interrelated  processes, 
186 

Noci-ceptive  nerves  and  nocuous 
stimuli,  72 

Non-mental,  use  of  term  by  Dr. 
Alexander,  135,  139 

Notion,  Bishop  Berkeley's  use  of 
term,  203  {footnote) 

Nunn,  Dr.  T.  Percy,  on  the  tend- 
ency to  hypostatize  energy,  183 
{^footnote) ;  on  mechanical  inter- 
pretation, 252  ;  help  received 
from  acknowledged,  253 

Object  as  meaningful,  proleptic 
use  of  the  word  in  speaking  of 
instinct,  42 

Order  of  nature  as  one,  133,  188, 
263,  269,  291 

Orders  of  inert  and  vital  wholly 
separate  for  M.  Bergson,  159, 
182,  210,  233 

Organization,  relation  of,  to  in- 
stinct, 214 


Pagano,  Dr.,  experiments  on 
newly-born  puppies,  78,  109 

Panpsychism,  doctrine  of,  288  ff. 

Pallial  eye  of  pecten,  179 

Parallelism,  psycho-physiological, 
265 

Paths,  private,  internuncial  and 
common,  65 

Paulsen,  doctrine  of  panpsychism, 
288  ff. 

Pawlow,  Dr.,  experiments  on 
association  in  dog,  84 

Pearson,  Professor  Karl,  on 
routine  as  grounded  in  percep- 
tive faculty,  166  ;  interpretation 
of  mechanics,  252 

Peckham,  Dr.  and  Mrs.,  defini- 
tion of  instinct,  88 

Perceptual  country  and  concep- 
tual maps,  146 

Philosophy,  relation  of,  to  science 
according  to  M.  Bergson,  225 

Physiological  interpretation  of  re- 
flex action  and  behaviour,  57 

Physiology  and  mechanism,  256 

Physiology  and  psychology,  266 

Pigeon,  decerebrate,  75 

Postures,  reflex,  71 

Prediction,  limits  of,  149 

Pre-perception,  37,  55  ;  Mr. 
McDougall's  interpretation  of, 
38 ;  Dr.  Stout's  treatment  of, 
39 ;  in  daily  life,  44 ;  and 
cortical  spread,  48  ;  has  domi- 
nant utility  in  early  stages  of 
experience,  195  ;  some  form  of 
necessary  for  finalistic  con- 
duct, 249;  and  panpsychism, 
288 

Prepotency  of  noxious  stimuli,  67, 
72 

Present,  specious,  195 

Primary  instincts  of  man,  1 1 1 

Private  path,  65 

Process  and  product,  relations  of, 

143 

Process,  as  synthetic,  129;  the 
nature  of  psycho-physiological, 
270,  276 

Products  as  frozen  bits  of  world- 
process,  143 


298 


INSTINCT  AND   EXPERIENCE 


Prospective  reference,  psychology 

of,  43 
Prospective  value,  257 
Protoplasm,   could  properties  of, 

have  been  predicted  prior  to  its 

evolution?  151 
Psychic  entity,  278,  280,  281,  285 
Pugnacity,  118 
Pure    perception,    M.    Bergson's 

doctrine  of,   referred    to,    190, 

197 

Realist  and  idealist,  127 

Reality  as  Source,  183 

Reflex  action  and  instinct,  54,  74 

Reflex  arc,  57 

Refractory  state  of  diminished 
excitability,  68 

Reid,  Dr.  Archdall,  on  the  volun- 
tary nature  of  instinct,  47  ;  on 
acquired  characters,  94,  96 

Reid,  Thomas,  on  instinctive  be- 
lief, 97 

Relationship,  conscious,  nature  of, 
184  ;  terms  of,  185 

Remembering  and  the  remem- 
bered, 196 

Repetitive  routine,  criterion  of, 
169 

Reverence,  different  ways  of  treat- 
ing such  an  emotion,  122,  124 

Revival,  factors  of,  194 

Romanes,  G.  J.,  on  lapse  of  con- 
sciousness in  automatism,  210 

Routine  as  basis  of  science,  1 56  ; 
as  basis  of  finalism  in  interpre- 
tation of  the  organic,  243 

Russell,  Mr.  Bertrand,  on  mathe- 
matical treatment  of  mechanics, 
252 

Scale  of  potency  in  reflexes,  72 
Schrader,  Dr.  Max 

on  decerebrate  frog,  75 
decerebrate  pigeon,  75 
Self-assertion  and  subjection,  115 
Serviceable  aspect   of  instinctive 

behaviour,  22 
Sherrington,   Dr.   C.  S.,  on   the 

integrative  action  of  the  nervous 

system,  57  ff. 


Sidgwick,  Henry,  criticises 
Green's  doctrine  of  Source,  137, 
278 

Smith,  Adam,  on  instinctive 
belief,  97 

Smith,  Sydney,  on  instinct  as  a 
kind  of  knowledge,  204 

Seeking  and  finding  in  M.  Berg- 
son's doctrine  of  intelligence 
and  instinct,  222 

Source,  metaphysics  of,  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  science,  3,  136,  138, 
140,  157.  178,  180,  183,  186, 
278,  291 

Specious  present,  1 95 

Spinal  animal.  Dr.  C.  S.  Sher- 
rington's researches  on,  61  fF. 

Spinal  irradiation  and  induction, 
69 

Spontaneous  reflex,  70 

Spontaneity  of  Life,  176 

Stout,  Dr.  G.  F. 
on     primary     and     secondary 
meaning,  8,  9 
definition  of  instinct,  25 
criticises    the    author's    views, 

34-53 
on  the  anticipation  involved  in 
instinct,  39,  106 
the    conative    aspect  of    in- 
stinct, 41 
his  term  quasi-conative,  105 
Subject,  the  word  used  in  logical 

sense,  131 
Swimming  and  diving,  6 
Sympathy,   M.  Bergson's   use  of 

the  term,  224  ff. 
Synthetic  process  as  only  regroup- 
ing, 168 

Teleological  factor,  1 11,  249 
Terms  of  conscious  relationship, 

18s 
Thomson,  Professor  J.  Arthur,  is 

there  one  science  of  nature?  158; 

on  organisms  as  historic  beings, 

160 
Thomson,  Sir  J.  J.,  on  scientific 

policies  and  creeds,  136 
Thorndike,  Dr.,  on  definition  of 

instinct,  99 


INDEX 


299 


Time-relationships,  189  {footnote) 
Titchener,   Dr.    E.    B.,   on    first 
movements  of  first  organisms  as 
conscious,  89;  on  definition  of 
instinct,  100 
Total  reaction,  281,  283,  285 
Transmission,  hereditary,  177 
Transverse  section  of  experience, 

18S 
Transverse  relationships,  190 
,    sequence  of,   as   in- 
stinctive experience,  193 
Tyndall,  John,    Belfast  address, 
151 

Unconsciousness,  kinds  of,  in 
M.  Bergson's  doctrine,  211 

Unforeseeable  variations,  attitude 
towards,  176 

Unity  of  experiencing,  124 

Universal  finalism,  250 

Universals,  problem  of,  146 


Variations,  prediction  of,  175, 

245 

,  unforeseeable,  176,  246 

Vertebrate  intelligence  contrasted 

with  arthropod  instinct,  2x6 
Vital  chemistry,  153 
Vital  force,  152 
Vitalism,  152,  244,  283 
Vitalistic  tendency  in  thought,  3 
Voluntaristic  school  of  psychology, 

289 


Ward,  Dr.  James 
on    experience    as    owned    by 
some  one,  126 
Wasmann,  Father 
on  the  definition  of  instinctive 
behaviour,  31 
Wundt,  Dr.  Wilhelm 
on  the  definition  of  instinctive 
behaviour,  31 


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